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iABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance prompted by the Ghanaian Code introduced in 2003. Using a
sample of the Ghanaian listed firms from 2000-2009 and the directors of these
same firms, the thesis attempts to achieve four specific objectives. The first
objective is to measure the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code
provisions from the Ghanaian listed firms’ annual reports during the whole, pre
2003 and post 2003 introduction of the code. The second objective is to
empirically investigate the relationship between the degree of compliance with
the Ghanaian Code and firm performance. The third objective is to empirically
evaluate the perceptions of the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms on the
adoption of the Ghanaian Code and its benefit to their firm’s performance. The
final objective is to critically examine whether the use of multiple governance
data has the potential to affect the research on governance-performance
relationship findings. Given the multiple governance data from the Ghanaian
listed firms’ annual reports and the directors’ responses, the results based on the
degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code suggest a statistically significant
improvement from pre 2003 period to post 2003 period. This evidence is
supported by the directors’ responses who noted that the standard of corporate
governance has improved in their firms after the introduction of the Ghanaian
Code. Also, the regression results based on the annual report data suggest that
there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the Ghanaian
corporate governance index (GCGI) and profitability across Ghanaian listed
firms, evidence supported by the directors’ responses who noted that the full
adoption of the Ghanaian Code is beneficial to their firm’s performance. By
contrast, the regression results based on the CEO duality, board size, proportion
of non-executive directors, audit and remuneration committees suggest either
statistically significant or no relationship between each of the five mechanisms
and firm performance. These results are not supported in most cases by the
directors’ responses where they showed support for the adoption of these
mechanisms except board size as beneficial to their firm’s performance. Overall,
the empirical analysis suggests a consensus between the regression results and
the directors’ opinions on the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code rather than the
selective adoption of its specific provisions where there is disagreement. These
results raise questions about the effectiveness of the selective adoption of a
particular code provision to improve firm performance.
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE THESIS
The Security and Exchange Commission Ghana (SECG) introduced corporate
governance guidelines on best practices (hereafter the Ghanaian Code) in
2003 with which all Ghanaian listed firms were encouraged to comply. This
was consistent with the implementation of codes in many countries around
the world, for example, the Cadbury Committee (1992) to the Combined
Code (1998) in the UK, King Report I (1994) and II (2002) in South Africa,
Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002 (hereafter SOX) in the US, amongst others. It is
also reflected in the importance attached to corporate governance by the
international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic
Corporation and Development (OECD) and the Commonwealth Association
for Corporate Governance (CACG). These codes underpinned by the agency
theory were to address the misalignment of shareholder and manager
interests resulting from the separation of ownership and control (Berle and
Means, 1932). Given the objective of these codes of aligning shareholder and
manager interests, listed firms were encouraged to comply with these codes
because better-governed firms are expected to perform better than their
poorly-governed counterparts.
But, does the adoption of corporate governance provisions from these codes
really matter to firm performance? Weir and Laing (2000) pre 1992 and post
1992 regression results suggest that the adoption of the Cadbury Code
recommendations has no impact on firm performance in the UK, the findings
supported by CBI/Touch Ross (1995) directors’ opinions study which
suggests that Cadbury recommendations have had no positive impact on
their firm’s performance. By contrast, Ntim (2009) regression results suggest
2that the adoption of the South African Code provisions (King Report II) has
positive and statistically significant impact on firm performance, evidence
supported by Jenkins-Ferrett (2001) where the directors of South African
listed firms rated the adoption of corporate governance as utmost important
to important in contributing to their firm’s performance.
After the passage of SOX Act in 2002, Reed et al (2006) in their directors’
opinions study asked financial executives of privately-held firms to identify
other benefits that could be derived from the voluntary implementation of
the Act. They reported that private-held firms get better financing options,
better credit opportunities and the opportunities to take the firm public
following the implementation of some of the provisions of the Act, suggesting
that the cost of financing their firms operations is expected to be lower.
Recently, Bhagat and Bolton (2009) separated their sample listed firms into
pre 2002 and post 2002 SOX Act to investigate how governance-performance
relationships might have been impacted by the Act. Their regression results
suggest a negative and significant relationship between board independence
and operating performance during the pre 2002 period, but a positive and
significant relationship during the post 2002 period. However, their corporate
governance indices introduced by Gompers et al (2003) and Bebchuk et al
(2009) failed to provide consistent results during the sub-periods.
Given the diversity of findings, and as in Metrick and Ishii (2002) and Klapper
and Love (2004) that firm-level corporate governance quality matter more in
countries with weak legal systems, more research is needed to further
understanding the adoption of corporate governance provisions and its
impact on firm performance. In this respect, and given the widespread
introduction of codes of corporate governance, this thesis will investigate the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Ghana
from 2000 to 2009. As will be discussed in chapter four, there is substantial
evidence to suggest that the relationship between the specific governance
mechanisms and firm performance studies have taken place in Ghana (e.g.
3Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 2006a; 2006b; Abor and Biekpe, 2007;
Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu, 2008; Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei, 2008;
Isshaq et al, 2009; Aboagye and Otieku, 2010). However, no single study to
date has considered the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code
specific governance provisions introduced in 2003 and its impact on firm
performance. Beside, only transparency and disclosure scores have been
developed for Ghanaian listed firms (Tsamenyi et al, 2007; Bokpin and
Isshaq, 2009) but the authors failed to link the scores to firm performance.
Furthermore, the directors’ opinions on the current state of corporate
governance in Ghana (Ocran, 2001) failed to ask directors views on whether
the adoption of corporate governance is beneficial to their firm’s
performance.
In this respect, the study investigating the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code and its impact on firm performance provides good foundation
to incorporate the development of a Ghanaian Corporate Governance Index
(GCGI) as the main explanatory variable and the specific governance
mechanisms1 as additional explanatory variables. In addition, the directors’
opinions on corporate governance and firm performance may help to validate
and complement the findings of the GCGI and the specific governance
mechanisms for the first time in the same study and context. This is because
it is the board responsibility to implement good corporate governance2 in
their various firms and therefore incorporating their views regarding the
formal adoption of the Ghanaian Code reflect the importance attached to its
implementation, which may or may not support the findings from the
governance-performance relationships from the regression results of the
GCGI and the specific governance mechanisms.
1 These include the CEO duality, board size, proportion of non-executive directors, audit committee and a
remuneration committee
2 This is especially important in countries where the adoption of corporate governance is based on
principles with the philosophy of comply or explain basis which is not backed by the force of law as in the
case of Ghana.
41.2 MOTIVATION AND THE NEED FOR THE THESIS
This thesis is motivated by the following four reasons. First, it is almost a
decade since the Ghanaian Code was introduced in Ghana. However, no
research to date has investigated the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions and its impact on firm performance. Prior to its
introduction, and as will be discussed in chapter three, there were some
inconsistencies and weaknesses in the regulation of firms in Ghana (Adda
and Consulting, 2006). In this respect, it has provided a consistent approach
to which the Ghanaian firms are governed and therefore provides the
opportunity to investigate the relationship between the degree of compliance
with the Ghanaian Code provisions and firm performance. Second, and as will
be discussed in chapter four, the type of governance data used in each
governance-performance relationship study may affect the research findings.
In particular, most prior studies on governance–performance relationship
have used either the specific governance mechanisms or a corporate
governance index or the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and
firm performance which may significantly affect the research findings.
Exceptions to this are Ntim (2009) and Bhagat and Bolton (2009) who
integrated the specific governance mechanisms and corporate governance
index in their governance-performance relationship studies. To date,
research on this topic in Ghana has mostly used the specific governance
mechanisms which are then regressed on firm performance (e.g. Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe 2006a; 2006b; Abor and Biekpe, 2007; Kyereboah-
Coleman and Amidu, 2008; Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei, 2008; Isshaq et
al, 2009; Aboagye and Otieku, 2010). These specific governance
mechanisms in isolation may not be sufficient to discover the relationship
with firm performance because some governance mechanisms are more
effective than others in promoting profitability (Diacon and O’sullivan, 1995).
Beside, and as will be discussed in chapter four, these specific governance
mechanisms are mostly collected from the Ghanaian listed firms through
5questionnaire administration and interviews (e.g. Kyereboah-Coleman and
Biekpe 2006a; 2006b) which might not reflect the actual governance
practices against the firm performance measures used for these studies.
Given the above reasons, one can argue that, the governance data in this
thesis, for the first time, will be based on the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions directly collected from the listed firms’ annual
reports to represent the specific governance mechanisms and the
development of the GCGI, as well as questionnaire responses from the
directors of these listed firms. This will be an extension to previous studies
by Ntim (2009) and Bhagat and Bolton (2009) which will provide a platform
for a comparison between the regression results based on the annual report
data and the questionnaire responses from directors to determine whether
the adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions is beneficial to firm
performance in Ghana. Third, all prior governance-performance relationship
studies in Ghana (e.g. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 2006a; 2006b; Abor
and Biekpe, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu, 2008; Kyereboah-
Coleman and Osei, 2008; Isshaq et al, 2009) have failed to address the
potential problems of endogeneity which is always an issue in governance-
performance relationship studies (Black, 2001). Hence, the regression
analysis of prior Ghanaian studies may suffer from the potential problems of
endogeneity. As will be discussed in chapters five and nine, this thesis for the
first time specifically addresses the potential problems of endogeneity of the
governance-performance relationship investigation in Ghana.
Finally, only few previous governance-performance relationship studies in the
developed countries have considered pre and post adoption of their
respective country’s code to determine the governance-performance
relationship impact during the sub-periods. For example, and as will be
discussed in chapter four, Weir and Laing (2000) studied pre 1992 and post
1992 Cadbury recommendations on the specific governance mechanisms-
performance relationship in the UK, while Cui et al (2008) focuses on the
development of a corporate governance index based on the pre 2003 and the
6post 2003 Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) recommendations on good
corporate governance. In the US, Bhagat and Bolton (2009) studied the pre
2002 period and the post 2002 period of the SOX Act by integrating the
specific governance mechanisms and the corporate governance indices
introduced by Gompers et al (2003) and Bebchuk et al (2009) to determine
the governance-performance relationship impact as a result of the Act. In
this respect, there is no available pre and post governance-performance
relationship study in developing countries and in particular Africa where this
thesis is based. Given the lack of evidence, this thesis in Ghana will separate
the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions into the pre
2003 (2000-2002) and the post 2003 (2004-2009) periods to investigate
how the governance-performance relationship is impacted by the formal
adoption of the Ghanaian Code. As in Cui et al (2008) and Bhagat and Bolton
(2009), and given the introduction of the Ghanaian Code, 2003 is used as a
seminal year and will be excluded from the analysis during the pre 2003 and
the post 2003 periods.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
The principal objective of this thesis is to carry out an empirical investigation
of the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in
Ghana prompted by the Ghanaian Code introduced in 2003. An investigation
of the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions and the
directors’ opinions on the adoption of the same code will help to improve our
understanding of the applicability of corporate governance mechanisms
replicated from the worldwide corporate governance reforms. In order to
achieve the principal objective of this thesis, four specific objectives will have
to be achieved. First, the thesis measures the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions from the Ghanaian listed firms’ annual reports and
the subsequent development of the GCGI and its sub-indices. An important
focus of this aspect of the thesis is to assess the extent to which the degree
7of compliance is in line with the recommendations of the Ghanaian Code
during the whole, pre 2003 and the post 2003 periods of its introduction.
The second specific objective of the thesis is to empirically investigate the
relationship between the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code
provisions and firm performance during the whole, pre 2003 and the post
2003 periods. This will be achieved in two ways. First, the specific
governance mechanisms-performance relationship will be investigated to
understand whether each governance mechanism on its own can have
positive impact on firm performance. Second, the GCGI-performance
relationship will also be examined to determine whether the development of
the GCGI which covers several Ghanaian Code provisions is more important
to firm performance than its specific governance provisions. Consequently,
and after systematically addressing the potential problems of endogeneity, it
might be expected that the development of the GCGI will have a more
positive and statistically significant impact on firm performance than each
specific governance mechanism.
The third specific objective of the thesis is to empirically evaluate the
perceptions of the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms on the adoption of
the Ghanaian Code provisions and its benefit to their firm’s performance. In
this respect, the achievement of this objective will help to validate and
complement the regression results of the specific governance mechanisms
and the GCGI impact on firm performance. On the other hand, it will help to
identify additional issues that may not be addressed by the regression results
from the annual report data. The final specific objective of the thesis is to
critically examine whether the use of multiple governance data3 has the
potential to affect the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance. In this respect, the thesis will compare the regression results of
3 As will be discussed in chapter five, the multiple governance data include the specific governance
mechanisms, the GCGI and the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm performance to
investigate the governance-performance relationship in the same study and context.
8the specific governance mechanisms and the GCGI with the directors’
opinions on corporate governance and firm performance.
The opportunity to achieve these objectives will be provided by the Ghanaian
listed firms where data on the specific governance mechanisms and the
development of the GCGI will be based on their annual reports data from
2000 to 2009. Similarly, the questionnaire data will be collected from the
executive and non-executive directors of the same listed firms. In this
respect, the method of analysis will be based on multiple regression models
for the annual report data and a simple statistical analysis for the
questionnaire data.
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS
There are six main contributions of the thesis to the existing corporate
governance research. First, the Ghanaian Code on corporate governance
suggests that the practices embodied in it are not backed by the force of law
but no study to date has investigated the degree of compliance among
Ghanaian listed firms since its introduction. As will be explained in chapter
six, this thesis seeks to fill this gap in the extant literature by providing for
the first time the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions
across Ghanaian listed firms. In particular, the sample is grouped into pre
2003 and post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code to determine whether
compliance with corporate governance provisions is better than when the
code was not in place. Although, considerable variability is expected in
corporate governance standards among Ghanaian listed firms, the results
indicate significant improvement from pre 2003 to post 2003 in the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions.
Second, the thesis provides the first direct evidence of the relationship
between the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions and
9firm performance in Ghana. Unlike prior governance-performance
relationship studies in Ghana, the sample will be divided into sub-periods to
show how the governance-performance relationships have been impacted by
the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. In addition, the developed GCGI
incorporates several specific governance provisions that are recommended by
the Ghanaian Code and expected to have a more positive and significant
impact on firm performance than the selective adoption of its specific
governance provisions. In line with prior studies, and after systematically
addressing the potential problems of endogeneity for the first time in Ghana,
the regression results based on the GCGI show a positive and statistically
significant impact on firm performance. However, the regression results
based on the specific governance mechanisms suggest either statistically
weak or no association between each of the five specific governance
mechanisms and firm performance.
Third, the thesis attempts to offer the first direct evidence of the directors’
opinions on the adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions and its benefit to
their firm’s performance. In line with the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code, the directors’ responses indicate that the standard of
corporate governance in their firms has improved after the introduction of
the Ghanaian Code. Contrary to the regression results of the specific
governance mechanisms-performance relationship, the directors’ responses
offer strong support to a majority of selective adoption of the specific
governance mechanisms as beneficial to their firm’s performance. Consistent
with the regression results of the GCGI-performance relationship, the
directors’ responses indicate strong support for the full adoption of the
Ghanaian Code provisions as beneficial to their firm’s performance instead of
the selective adoption of its specific governance provisions. Furthermore, the
directors’ responses suggest their preparedness to comply with further
corporate governance provisions such as the establishment of a nomination
committee, as well as their strong support for an independent committee to
review the Ghanaian Code.
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Fourth, the thesis seeks to offer methodological extensions to previous
corporate governance research because it integrates not only the extensively
used specific governance mechanisms to the study of governance-
performance relationship, but also other approaches, including the
governance index-performance relationship and the directors opinions on
corporate governance and firm performance in the same study and context.
The integration of the multiple governance data in this thesis helps evaluate
the consistency or otherwise of the governance-performance relationship
testing. In particular, the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and
firm performance support the interpretation and understanding of the
findings from the GCGI and the specific governance mechanisms impact on
firm performance. Furthermore, it has helped to establish the directors’
preparedness to comply with further corporate governance provisions not
imposed by the Ghanaian Code and therefore not captured in the analysis of
the GCGI and the specific governance mechanisms impact on firm
performance findings.
Fifth, this thesis provides for the first time a comparison of the regression
results and questionnaire responses among Ghanaian listed firms in the same
study and context, which helps to build up an understanding of the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance from
different standpoint. Comparing the findings across different research results
helps to establish whether the specific governance mechanisms on their own
or a set of such mechanisms is beneficial to firm performance with the
responses from directors validating and complementing the regression
results based on the annual report data.
Finally, investigating the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code and
its impact on firm performance in Ghana has important policy implications.
The investigation of corporate governance practices from the Ghanaian listed
firms’ annual reports and the responses from directors regarding the
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adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions helps offer suggestions to
corporate governance regulators in relation to the likely success and the
outstanding challenges of the implementation of corporate governance in
Ghana. Also, the findings based on the governance-performance relationship
which show that better governed firms perform better than poorly governed
firms may encourage the Ghanaian firms to adopt the Code provisions in
anticipation of improving their firm’s performance.
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The thesis is structured as follows. As a foundation to the development of
corporate governance in Ghana, chapter two will provide an historical
account of the worldwide corporate governance reforms underpinned by the
agency theory and its effect on corporate governance practices across firms.
Included in this chapter are discussions of the agency theory as an
underlying theory for the development of corporate governance around the
world, corporate governance reforms in the UK, US and South Africa,
transnational institutional corporate governance reforms, and the evaluation
of these reforms on worldwide firms’ corporate governance practices.
Chapter three contains the full account and where possible, a review of the
Ghanaian corporate governance framework and how it fits into the worldwide
corporate governance landscape. Areas that will be reviewed include; a
comprehensive description of the Ghanaian legal and regulatory environment
and the challenges facing the regulatory system; a detail discussion of the
Ghanaian Code provisions; a critique of the Ghanaian Code against some of
the world codes; and a discussion of potential improvement of the standard
of corporate governance practices in Ghana.
Chapter four contains a review of prior theoretical and empirical evidence on
governance-performance relationship and the directors’ opinions on
corporate governance and firm performance. Issues that will be reviewed
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include; a discussion on the five specific governance mechanisms and the
governance index impact on firm performance; a discussion of the directors’
opinions on corporate governance and firm performance; hypotheses
development on the basis of the review to empirically test the thesis’
objectives; and a discussion of literature gaps and the potential thesis
contribution. Chapter five presents data considerations and analysis
procedures for the empirical analysis of the thesis. The chapter begins by
discussing data, sample and the development of the GCGI. Included in this
section of the chapter are discussions on the development of the GCGI based
on the annual report data as the main explanatory variable, the
measurement of the five specific governance mechanisms as additional
explanatory variables, the measurement of the dependent variables and the
control variables. The second issue of discussion concerns the description of
a panel data analytical framework and how to address the potential problems
of endogeneity in the thesis. Finally, the chapter discusses the questionnaire
development and the analysis and reporting procedures in relation to the
directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm performance.
In chapters six, seven, eight, nine and ten, the thesis presents the empirical
analysis of the issues discussed in chapter five. In chapter six, the thesis
focuses on the analysis of the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code
provisions across the sample from 2000 to 2009. Four aspects of the degree
of compliance with the GCGI developed from 36 specific governance
provisions based on the Ghanaian Code recommendations will be analysed in
this chapter. First, it discovers the degree of compliance with the GCGI for
the full sample over the ten year period under investigation. This allows the
thesis to investigate the progressive improvement of the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions. Second, the thesis examines
the degree of compliance with the sub-indices of the GCGI to determine each
sub-index contribution to the overall GCGI. Third, it assesses the degree of
compliance with the GCGI that existed prior to the introduction of the
Ghanaian Code and after its introduction. Of particular concern in this respect
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is whether the degree of compliance with corporate governance has
improved following the introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003. Finally,
the thesis tests for the statistically significant differences in compliance with
the GCGI before and after the adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions. In
this respect, the sample firms are grouped into pre 2003 and post 2003 sub-
periods given that the Ghanaian Code was introduced in 2003. Of interest is
whether the regulators’ effort, and the eventual introduction of the Ghanaian
Code, has provided significant improvement of the degree of compliance with
the GCGI during pre 2003 and post 2003 periods.
Chapter seven contains descriptive statistics, as well as a test of panel
regression assumptions. The first section of the chapter examines the
summary descriptive statistics of the dependent and control variables, as well
as correlation analysis for all the variables used in this thesis. Given that
panel regression technique is used to test all hypotheses that will be
discussed in chapter four, the second section of the chapter tests the panel
regression assumptions to help determine the appropriateness of the
empirical model specification. Of particular interest is whether pooled
ordinary least square (OLS) or the alternative random and fixed effects is
appropriate. In this respect, Breusch and Pagan (1980) Langrange Multiple
test will be conducted to choose between pooled OLS and the alternative
random or fixed effects. Following that, the Hausman specification test will
help to differentiate between random and fixed effects regression models.
Chapter seven will conclude that fixed effect regression is appropriate for the
accounting-based firm performance (i.e. ROA and ROE), while the random
effect will be considered appropriate for the market-based firm performance
measure (Q-ratio).
In chapter eight, the thesis presents the empirical evidence of the
relationship between corporate governance based on the annual report data
and firm performance. In this regard, two aspects of the governance-
performance relationship are analysed. First, the thesis explores the
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relationship between each of the five specific governance mechanisms, as
well as the GCGI and firm performance during the whole period under
investigation. Of particular interest in this respect is whether each of the five
specific governance mechanisms can have an impact on firm performance or
a set of these mechanisms developed into the GCGI is more important to
firm performance. Second, the thesis compares pre 2003 and post 2003
governance-performance relationship based on the five specific governance
mechanisms and the GCGI from the annual report data. Of interest in this
respect is whether the Ghanaian listed firms perform better within the
governance environment that existed prior to the introduction of the
Ghanaian Code or after the implementation of the Ghanaian Code.
In chapter nine, the thesis conducts endogeneity tests and a series of
robustness checks of the results discussed in chapter eight. Given that the
GCGI is the main explanatory variable, the chapter tests for the presence of
endogeneity where the GCGI is endogenously related to the accounting-
based firm performance measures of ROA and ROE. It then addresses the
problems of endogeneity based on two main strategies. First, a lagged
governance-performance relationship is estimated for the five specific
governance mechanisms and the GCGI during the whole, pre 2003 and post
2003 periods. Of particular interest of this estimation is to address the
problems of endogeneity that is caused by a time-lag. Second, it estimates
panel instrumental variable regressions to address the problems of
endogeneity. Of particular interest in this respect is to use the appropriate
instrument (s) to represent the GCGI. In this respect, instruments such as
board size, director holdings and the Ghanaian Code Change are used in two-
stage instrumental variable fixed effect regressions to estimate the
relationship between the instrumented GCGI and the accounting-based firm
performance measures of ROA and ROE.
In chapter ten, the thesis presents the empirical evidence on the directors’
opinions on corporate governance and firm performance. The main objective
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of this section of the thesis is to compare the perceptions of the directors of
the Ghanaian listed firms regarding the adoption of the Ghanaian Code and
its benefit to firm performance with the regression results based on the
annual report data discussed in chapters eight and nine. First, the
questionnaire responses help to provide an in-depth insight into corporate
governance implementation issues to include whether; the Ghanaian Code is
a benchmark for good corporate governance in Ghana, the standard of
corporate governance has improved after the introduction of the Ghanaian
Code, the directors are prepared to comply with further corporate
governance provisions, they received support from regulators in the
implementation of corporate governance, and a need to review the Ghanaian
Code. Second, the questionnaire responses also allow an in-depth study into
the benefit of; separating the roles of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and
the Chairman, a board size of between eight and sixteen, a balance of
executive and non-executive directors, presence of audit and remuneration
committees, and the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions. The
questionnaire responses provide a platform for the thesis to validate the
regression results based on the annual report data. Chapter eleven concludes
the thesis with particular focus on the summary of the key results,
contributions of the thesis, limitations of the thesis and suggestions for future
research.
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CHAPTER TWO
AGENCY THEORY AND THE WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE
REFORMS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the agency theory and the worldwide corporate
governance reforms as a foundation to the development of corporate
governance in Ghana that will be discussed in chapter three. Although, the
agency theory as an underlying theory for the development of corporate
governance will be discussed, the main objective of this chapter is to provide
historical account and where possible, a review of corporate governance
reforms worldwide and its effect on firms’ corporate governance practices. In
particular, the chapter focuses on the UK, US, South Africa and transnational
institutional reforms (OECD and Commonwealth Association for Corporate
Governance) and their effects on the worldwide firms’ governance practices.
The underlying principle is to get better understanding of international
corporate governance practices within which the Ghanaian corporate
governance framework that will be discussed in chapter three can be better
understood. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2
discusses the agency theory and corporate governance development. Section
2.3 examines the corporate governance reforms in the UK, US and South
Africa. Section 2.4 reviews transnational institutional corporate governance
reforms. Section 2.5 evaluates the effects of the various reforms on the
global firms’ governance practices, while section 2.6 provides summary to
the chapter.
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2.2 AGENCY THEORY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT
The agency theory has been a fundamental part of corporate governance
discussions. In this respect, the underlying assumption of the theory is that
of the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932), where
the shareholders mandate the managers to manage their business on their
behalf. However, and given the likelihood that managers instead of
shareholders may control firms, a number of managerial theories of the firm
during the 1960s have attempted to model managerial actions free from the
control of shareholders. In particular, researchers such as Williamson (1964),
Marris (1964), Monsen and Downes (1965) have argued that in a business
operational environment whereby public firms are perceived to be under the
control of managers, their objectives are expected to favour the managerial
interests rather than the shareholder interests. Arguably, the separation of
ownership and control might lead to a conflict of interest on the part of the
managers which could subsequently link to the notorious agency problem.
Recognising the seriousness of the agency problem is very important to the
shareholders, but in the absence of appropriate governance mechanisms, the
shareholders may be unable to exercise control over the managers
contracted to look after their interests in the management of a firm. In this
respect, agency theorists during the 1970s and 80s argued that a number of
governance mechanisms exist that may limit managers from focusing on
their own interests rather than the shareholders’ interests. For example, Ross
(1973) was the first to investigate the agency problem, with a detailed
theoretical explanation of the agency theory being presented by Jensen and
Meckling (1976). The authors described the managers of the company as the
agents, and the shareholders as the principals. They noted that in the case of
agency relationship, and provided that both the managers and shareholders
are utility maximizers, the managers will not always make decisions in the
best interest of the shareholders; therefore the resulting conflict of interest
might lead to the agency problem.
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Thus, one way of monitoring the managers’ actions is to make sure that they
are not acting based on a self interest motive but for the benefit of the
shareholders. This might be achieved by way of implementing good corporate
governance practices which allows non-market control mechanisms to be put
in place in order to safeguard the shareholders’ interests. For example, the
appointment of non-executive directors, separating the role of the CEO from
the chairman, establishment of board committees, demanding access to
information and allowing shareholders to participate in the running of the
firm are all control mechanisms put in place to protect the shareholders’
interests. These mechanisms have been the focus of the agency theory to
safeguard the shareholders’ interests from expropriation by the managers.
Similarly, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983a; 1983b) are of the view
that managerial competition in the labour markets and the presence of non-
executive directors may also constrain managers in pursuing their own
personal interests.
Given the agency theory proposition that boards dominated by executive
directors (insiders) are not accountable to shareholders (Fama, 1980;
Sonnenfeld; 2002), the presence of non-executive directors (outsiders) on
the board is suggested to be an effective internal governance mechanism
used to partially reduce the agency problems in modern firms (Fama, 1980;
Lipton and Lorch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). In particular, Fama (1980) and Fama
and Jensen (1983a) are of the view that board of directors with significant
proportion of non-executive directors can limit the use of executive
discretion. For example, and given the outside directors concern to maintain
their reputation in the external labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983a), the
presence of non-executive directors on the board can limit the executive
discretion by exploiting their monitoring ability and defending their
reputations as effective independent decision makers.
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The agency theory also suggests that the impetus of the inherent conflict of
interests in the shareholders-managers relationship leads to the agency
costs. The agency costs arise where there is a separation of ownership and
control of a firm and the resulting costs incurred by the shareholders in an
attempt to monitor the managers’ activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). In
this respect, the agency costs might result from the shareholders’ effort to
monitor the behaviour of the managers, as the latter have the power to use
some strategic information to their own advantage. The fundamental
question is therefore, how can the shareholders exercise control over the
managers? Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Benston (1985) have argued
that shareholders’ and managers’ interests may be aligned through
managerial ownership. Researchers such as Schleifer and Vishny (1986) have
also argued that the managerial interests may be minimised by the
predominance of larger blockholders who have the resources and ability to
monitor the managers’ action. However, Eisenhardt (1989) argued that it is
expensive and very difficult for the shareholders to verify what the managers
are doing.
That notwithstanding, other incentive schemes and contracts may also be
used as monitoring techniques to align the shareholders’ and managers’
interests. For example, executive compensation packages and linking
remuneration to performance are suggested to minimise the agency costs
resulted from the separation of ownership and control (Coughlan and
Schmidt, 1985; Murphy, 1985). Arguably, managers are likely to pursue their
own interests in order to gain higher bonuses if remuneration is linked to
performance, which effectively may lead to the tendency to focus on project
and firm investments in the short-term rather than the long-term
shareholder wealth maximisation (Boatright, 1999). However, Short et al
(1998) argued that the tendency of short-termism4 is characterised in
countries (e.g. UK) with outsider-dominated shareholders where the business
4 Short-termism is defined as a tendency to foreshorten the time period applied to investment decisions, or
use the discount rate higher than the firm’s opportunity cost of capital (Demirag and Tylecote, 1992).
20
operational environment is not dominated by firms directly controlled by their
managers but through the actions of outsiders such as institutional investors
who have not necessarily focused on long-term performance of the firms.
Beyond the internal governance mechanisms, another way in which the
agency costs may be minimised between shareholders and managers is
through external factors. For example, in a regulatory environment whereby
financial disclosures are mandatory, the statutory audits which provide
independent confirmation of financial performance measures by external
auditors can be the basis to assess the efficient contract between the
shareholders and the managers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Wallace,
1987). Similarly, Jensen and Ruback (1983) considered the important role
play by the stock market as a means of disciplining firm managers through
the takeover mechanism. In this respect, if shareholders are not happy with
a firm’s managers they can vote in favour of a takeover. Given the threat of
takeover as a means of disciplining managers, it discourages them from
pursuing their own interests at the expense of shareholders because they do
not want to lose their jobs. This is particularly important because according
to Rappaport (1990), the takeover market ‘represents the most effective
check on management autonomy ever devised’ (p.100).
The labour market discipline can also be an important external governance
mechanism to help reduce the agency costs. For example, Fama and Jensen
(1983a) are of the view that the labour market discipline can motivate
managers to act in the best interest of shareholders if it provides future
opportunities that managers are interested. In this respect, if the available
opportunities are responsive to ‘on-the-job’ performance, then the
managerial objectives will be aligned with the shareholders’ interests. Also,
and given the importance of the market for directors, the discipline provided
by the threat of job dismissal in firms with poor performance acts to align the
objectives of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Cosh
and Hughes, 1997b; Conyon and Nicolitsas, 1998). In particular, and given
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‘on-the-job’ poor performance, the value on the director labour market will
fall following dismissal and therefore the threat of job dismissal will align
managerial objectives with that of the shareholders’ interests.
Since the 1990s several reforms in respect of codes development and policy
documents have taken place globally in an attempt to help firms improve
their corporate governance standards to safeguard the shareholders’
interests. In particular, most of the worldwide corporate governance reforms
have focused on agency theory in the development of code of best practices
on corporate governance. In the UK, for example, the major corporate
governance reports such as the Cadbury Committee (1992), the Greenbury
Committee (1995), the Combined Code (2008, 2006, 2003, 1998), the Smith
Committee (2003), the Higgs Committee (2003) and the UK Corporate
Governance Code (2010) have all focused on the agency theory paradigm by
protecting and enhancing wealth maximization of shareholders. Similarly, the
2002 SOX in the US placed much emphasis on the protection and
shareholder value maximization. In the developing countries and in particular
Africa where the country (Ghana) of study is based, South Africa was the first
to develop a corporate governance code of best practice based on the 1994
publication of King I Report (Demirag et al, 2000; Mallin, 2004) followed by
King II and III in 2002 and 2009 respectively. As a result, the transnational
institutions (OECD-1999 & 2004 and Commonwealth Association of Corporate
Governance-1999) also focused on the fundamental principles of corporate
governance as minimum standards for member countries to develop their
own code of best practice suitable for each individual country’s legal, cultural
and regulatory requirement. Notably, these principles were replicated from
the earlier corporate governance reforms mostly experienced in the UK, US
and South Africa.
Fundamentally, the key issue addressed by the progressive corporate
governance reforms worldwide is the agency problem. To achieve this, the
recommendations made by these codes cut across similar non-market
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mechanisms in relation to board composition; board committees; shareholder
rights; financial affairs and auditing; and disclosure practices in order to
safeguard the interest of shareholders. For example, and to minimize the
agency problem, the progressive corporate governance reforms underpinned
by the agency theory since the Cadbury Report (1992) to date have all
recommended the adoption of these mechanisms which are not backed by
law in the case of the UK and South Africa. However, this is not the case in
the US where the adoption of these specific governance mechanisms is
backed by law.
Given that the main purpose of the worldwide corporate governance reforms
is to protect the shareholders’ interests, this thesis is grounded on the
agency theory paradigm which posits that the adoption of good corporate
governance by a firm reduces its agency costs resulting from the separation
of ownership and control, in other words, it helps to improve firm
performance by realigning the shareholders’ and managers’ interest. Thus,
how companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992) in order to
minimize the agency problem form the basis of corporate governance
provisions adopted by firms worldwide. Within this framework, the worldwide
corporate governance reforms are discussed in the following sections, and
where possible provides its effect on firms’ corporate governance practices.
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN THE UK, US AND
SOUTH AFRICA
This section examines the corporate governance reforms in the UK, US and
South Africa with particular focus on the key recommendations made by the
various codes in these countries to address the agency problems. Arguably,
corporate governance failures and the various company scandals globally
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triggered the need for corporate governance reforms5 where specific
governance mechanisms were introduced to safeguard the interest of
shareholders. In the recent past, the global recession in 2008-2009 has also
raised questions on the effectiveness of the existing corporate governance
provisions adopted by firms globally. Whereas the UK and South Africa
governance reforms are characterised with the principles-based approach to
corporate governance and the philosophy of comply or explain6, the
formulation, implementation and enforcement of corporate governance in the
US are based on rules. Of particular interest to this thesis is the purpose of
the various reports/rules in addressing the agency problems and how they
try to achieve their purpose.
2.3.1 UK corporate governance reforms
As indicated in section 2.2, the major corporate governance reports in the UK
since the Cadbury Report (1992) to the 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code
have all focused on addressing the agency problem in order to maximise
shareholder wealth. In this regard, board structure mechanisms, board
committees, accounting and auditing, shareholder rights, internal controls
and disclosure practices have been the focus of numerous reports. Out of
these came the UK Corporate governance Code which identifies key
provisions in the area of leadership, effectiveness, accountability,
remuneration and relations with shareholders. In particular, and as
recommended by the code, the board are mandated to take the strategic
5 Iskander and Chamlou (2000) reported the first well-documented failure of governance as the South Sea
Bubble in the 1700s in the UK followed by the stock market crash of 1929 in the US which revolutionlised
business law in England and the Securities law in the US. In addition, the secondary banking crisis of the
1970s in the UK, the US savings and loans debacle of 1980 and the Asia financial crisis generated much
debate about the systematic failures in the corporate world. Further, company scandals such as the Maxwell
affair, BCCI, issues of excessive remuneration at the British Gas, the collapse of Baring bank, the Enron
affair, Parlamat and WorldCom have all interrupted the history of corporate governance. These, amongst
other things, prompted many initiatives of corporate governance reforms globally.
6 The philosophy of comply or explain means that firms should be encouraged to comply with the code in
spirit rather than the letter and where necessary provide explanation (explain) why they have not followed
the code’s provisions.
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leadership of a firm with the post of the CEO and the Chairman separated. As
part of their function, the percentage of the non-executive directors (NEDs)
included in the board should play both monitoring and advisory roles in the
process of evaluating management performance. The board committees
recommended by the code include nomination, audit and remuneration.
These committees are to support the functions of the board in the areas such
as risk management and internal control, appointment of directors, audit and
the designing of a remuneration policy. Additionally, the code has
recommended that there should be a dialogue with shareholders based on
the mutual understanding of objectives. Interestingly, the percentage of the
NEDs who are supposed to monitor and advise the board could be
professionals who are executive directors of other firms. In this respect,
firms may have executive directors who sit on other boards as NEDs and
therefore their independence in mind and appearance may be questioned.
The implication here is that these executive directors may not necessarily
play the monitoring and advisory role of non-executive directors as a result
of the executive directorship that they hold in other firms.
In the UK, the formulation, implementation and enforcement of the specific
governance mechanisms to minimise the agency problem have been
successfully achieved through a series of committees’ reports7. This is very
important because different committees address different mechanisms which
allowed these committees to focus on specific areas of concern. For example,
the Cadbury Report (1992) recommended a minimum number (three) of
non-executive directors on the board. However, the Higgs Report (2003)
reinforced this provision after the Enron debacle in the US and recommended
that at least half of the board should comprise non-executive directors
because of its importance. This approach in the UK has set a precedent
through which other codes are influenced globally.
7 For example, Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel Report (1995), Turnbull Report
(1999), Higgs Report (2003) and Smith Report (2003) provided good foundation which was later adopted
by the Combined Codes (2008; 2006; 2003; 1998) and the subsequent publication of the UK Corporate
Governance Code in 2010.
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2.3.2 Corporate governance reforms in the US
In the US, the Wall Street Stock Market crash in 1929 uncovered some
market manipulation, insider dealing among company directors, general
mismanagement and the violation of shareholder rights. This prompted the
US Congress to enact the Securities Act 1933 and the Securities and
Exchange Act 1934 in response to the abuses. These Acts were enacted to
improve transparency in relation to corporate financial disclosure. Unlike the
UK principles-based approach to corporate governance, the US corporate
governance system is more of rules. The rules-based approach of corporate
governance has been the nature of reforms in the US. Over the years, there
had been a number8 of state and federal developments including takeovers
and constituency statutes under state laws.
In 2001, the US further experienced corporate crises resulting from the
financial scandals of WorldCom, Tyco International, Adeplhia Communication,
Global Crossing, Quest Communications, Computer Associates, and Arthur
Andersen. However, the collapse of Enron, the largest bankruptcy in the US
history, in particular was the focus for attention. It was apparent that an
evidence of accounting fraud, regulatory failures, and executive excess as
well as close relationship with the company’s external auditors led to the
corporate governance reforms by the US Congress. The reforms were
incorporated in the Accounting Industry Reform Act 2002, generally known
as the SOX. Similar to the UK reforms, the purpose of the SOX was to
address the agency problems by placing much emphasis on the protection of
shareholders value maximisation.
The SOX focused on a broad-based reform of listed firm’s accounting
oversight with an initial requirement for the CEO and chief financial officer
(CFO) to certify that quarterly and annual reports filed on the Security and
8 For example, the Delaware corporation law which has been suggested to be company friendly (Mallin,
2007); and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 which focused on private pension funds.
26
Exchange Commission (SEC) are in full compliance with applicable Securities
laws and present a fair picture of the financial position of the firm. Failure to
comply leads to severe penalties up to a fine of $1 million or ten years
imprisonment when aware that the information disclosed does not comply
with the applicable securities laws requirement. Following that, the Act
addressed the strengthening of external auditor independence and the
establishment of an audit committee. It stated that all listed firms on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) must have in place an audit committee
with independent members, and at least one member should be a financial
expert. Disclosure requirement of the name of the financial expert and
whether the person is independent from management must be stated in the
annual report. More importantly, the SOX establishes the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a new regulatory body for external
auditors, charged with the responsibility of registering all external auditors
for listed firms on the NYSE. This applies to both US and non-US audit firms.
Although the NYSE has mandated listed firms to have majority independent
non-executive directors on the board and the establishment of a nomination,
compensation and audit committees, the SOX mainly focused on audit by
supporting the establishment of audit committee instead of the broader view
of governance reforms as in the case of the UK. For example, neither NYSE
nor SOX addressed the problem of duality as experienced in the UK which
suggests that US regulators encourage firms to combine the two roles. Unlike
the UK which used a series of committees to address the governance failures,
the progressive corporate governance reforms in the US are mainly based on
enactment of laws by law makers to safeguard the interest of shareholders.
2.3.3 The South African corporate governance reforms
The progressive corporate governance reforms in South Africa are similar to
the UK where committee reports are used as the basis to address the agency
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problem. However, the specific governance provisions go beyond what is
experienced in the UK and the US. For example, the King I Report (1994)
focused on an integrated approach to corporate governance which went
beyond the financial and regulatory aspects of corporate governance by
incorporating stakeholder theory9. This inclusive approach of corporate
governance was based on the consensus of the South African business
community. Although the Report addressed the traditional areas of corporate
governance such as the role and function of the board and internal audit, it
significantly considered the integrated sustainability reporting including
stakeholder relations, ethical practices and social and transformation issues.
However, the King I Report (1994) failed to specify any number for
independent non-executive directors on the board as well as the
establishment of a formal nomination committee as experienced in the UK
and US. As an improvement as well as reinforcing King I, the King II Report
(2002) recommended the majority of the board to be independent non-
executive directors, discouraged duality, provided for risk management and
internal control, disclosure practices including sustainability reporting,
establishment of board committees (nomination, audit and remuneration)
and encouraged meaningful dialogue with shareholders.
Out of the King I and II Reports came the King III Report (2009). However,
as a result of the enactment of the South African Companies Act no. 71 of
2008, and the changes in the international governance trends, the King III
Report was published in 2009 to incorporate the changes. The new issues
included in the report for the first time ranges from information technology
governance, business rescue, fundamental and affected transactions to
language, gender and terminology. Basically, these changes were made
9 The underlying assumption of the stakeholder theory is that firms are expected to maximise the welfare of
multiple stakeholders who are directly or indirectly affected by their operations but not only the
shareholders as in the case of the agency theory paradigm (Blair, 1995). However, Sternberg (1997)
rejected the application of the stakeholder theory in the context of business and corporate governance by
suggesting that the stakeholder theory distracts business from achieving its objective of maximizing long-
term shareholders value, denying accountability to shareholders and also undermines the shareholders from
the right of their private property.
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based on what has been addressed in the South African Companies Act no.71
2008. But the uniqueness of the King III Report and unlike the King I and II
Reports is that the application of the code should be by all entities regardless
of the way and form of incorporation or establishment. This means that the
code applies to all sectors including public, private and not-for-profit sectors.
It is worth noting that the principles contained in King III Report have some
similarities with the UK Corporate Governance Code. However, and unlike the
UK where the Code is applicable to only listed firms on a ‘comply or explain’
basis, the South African Code applies to all entities ranging from companies
listed on Johannesburg Stock Exchange to not-for-profit organisations. It is
expected that the directors should make clear in the company’s annual report
regarding proof compliance with the code or provide reasons for non-
compliance. This will enable the stakeholders to challenge the directors on
the quality of its governance (King III Report, 2009).
Although, the specific governance provisions experienced in South Africa to
minimise the agency problem is evidenced in the various reports, it has
however gone beyond what is experienced in the UK and US. This is very
important because firms may have some difficulties in complying with all the
provisions and the objective of maximising shareholder value as proposed by
the agency theory might not be supported. In this case, compliance with
certain provisions replicated from the South African Companies Act no. 71
2008 might not be value relevant as all firms will any way comply with such
provisions because they are backed by the Companies Act.
2.4 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS
This section reviews the transnational institutional corporate governance
reforms. Following the need for international regulation as a result of
globalisation of business activities among corporations, this has generated
some global agreement on constructive principles of good corporate
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governance developed by transnational institutions to apply across countries
with different political, legal and economic backgrounds. Of particular interest
to this thesis are the OECD principles of corporate governance and the
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) which is
examined in turn.
2.4.1 The OECD corporate governance reforms
With the endorsement of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the OECD publication of the
principles of corporate governance was the first international corporate
governance standards to be adopted by member countries. The business
sector advisory group was formed in 1996 and a task force to refine a set of
core principles of good corporate governance. As in the case of other
governance reforms, this came as a result of corporate scandals and failures
around the world and in particular the Asia financial crisis which was an
indication of systematic failure in the corporate world. In 1999 the OECD
published its first principles of corporate governance which centred on
fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility (OECD, 1999). The
body through its task force of the Business Sector Advisory Group identified a
framework of five basic principles of corporate governance including
protection of shareholder rights, equitable treatment of shareholders,
protection of stakeholder rights, timely and accurate disclosure and
transparency and diligent exercise of the board of directors’ responsibilities.
The framework was meant to be adopted by both OECD member countries
and non-member countries. However, the degree of application was basically
similar to the UK/US corporate governance practices. The principles support
the increased disclosure and transparency practices to which the UK and the
US firms are required to adhere by their regulators.
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Following the 1999 principles, the OECD in May 2004 released a revised
version of the principles of corporate governance. The idea was to step up to
improve the corporate governance practices by representation on the work of
regional corporate governance round-tables for non-OECD countries. The six
key practices relevant across an array of jurisdictions for effective
implementation covered the following: ensuring the basis for an effective
corporate governance framework, rights of shareholders, equitable treatment
of shareholders, role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and
transparency and the responsibility of the board (OECD, 2004).
First, the principles state that the basis for corporate governance framework
should be consistent with the rule of law, promote transparent and efficient
market and make sure that responsibilities of different supervisory,
regulatory and enforcement agencies is segregated. Second, the protection
and exercise of shareholder rights should be embodied in the corporate
governance framework. Third, the governance framework should ensure that
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders, are treated
equally and also put measures in place to safeguard shareholders whose
rights have been violated. Fourth, the corporate governance framework
should acknowledge the rights of stakeholders as detailed by law and any
other agreements to allow for co-operation for the creation of jobs, wealth
and sound enterprises. Fifth, the corporate governance framework should
ensure that disclosure is made in areas of the financial position,
performance, ownership and governance practices of the company in a timely
manner for relevant stakeholders. And lastly, the corporate governance
framework should ensure the existence of strategic guidance, mechanisms in
place for effective monitoring by the board and to make clear the board
accountability to shareholders in particular and to the company. As much as
the OECD revised version aimed to strengthen the effective application of
corporate governance with the introduction of the need for effective
corporate governance framework, the other five principles were replicated
from the 1999 OECD principles.
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Arguably, the principles described above appear to be of a general nature
rather than addressing the specific issues affecting the agency problem. For
example, the specific provisions regarding the establishment of board
committees as experienced in the UK, US and South Africa as well as duality
and the percentage of non-executive directors on the board were not
addressed. Notwithstanding the lack of specifics, the purpose of the reform
appears to provide a fundamental framework for member and non-member
countries to develop their own code. It can also be said that the OECD
principles came out of what is experienced in the UK, US and South Africa.
2.4.2 The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance
The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG-1999)
principles of guidelines placed much emphasis on developing African
economies in relation to corporate governance practices. The guidelines
covered fifteen principles within which the role and responsibilities of the
directors were dominant. These include the following: leadership, board
appointments, strategy and values, company performance, compliance,
communication, accountability to shareholders, relationships with
stakeholders, balance of power, internal procedures, board performance
evaluation, management appointments and development, technology, risk
management and annual review of future solvency. Fundamentally, and
similar to the OECD principles described earlier, the CACG (1999) has also
provided a basic framework for the development of corporate governance in
the African developing countries. Although, the guidelines appear not to
directly address the agency problem, it has influenced most of the developing
African countries in their effort of improving corporate governance practices
of which Ghana is no exception.
32
2.5 EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS SINCE 1992
ON FIRMS GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
This section evaluates the progressive corporate governance reforms
worldwide since 1992 and their effects on firms’ governance practices. The
corporate governance practices experienced by firms may best be seen as
inter-related from one reform to another. For the purposes of clarity in this
section, however, the main effects on board composition; board committees;
shareholder rights; financial affairs and auditing; and disclosure practices will
each be evaluated in turn. The effects of the reforms will be evaluated in
detail for two reasons. Firstly, they contain the relevant corporate
governance provisions covered by the UK, US, South Africa and the
transnational institutions to which the Ghanaian corporate governance
framework will be better understood in chapter three. Secondly, and as has
been noted earlier, the various principles and rules represent the main
mechanisms to help partly reduce the agency costs.
2.5.1 Board composition effects experienced worldwide
In relation to the board composition, there were some differences regarding
board composition in corporate governance regulatory environment between
the UK, US, South Africa and transnational institutional reforms. For
example, there was no requirement to separate the role of the CEO and the
Chairman of the board prior to 1992 in the UK, US and South Africa.
However, the Cadbury Report in 1992 recommended the separation of the
two roles which was supported by the subsequent governance reports in the
UK and South Africa. In this respect, Conyon (1994) documented that 77%
of UK firms separated the role of the CEO and the Chairman immediately
after the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992. Rayton and Cheng
(2004) also recorded an improvement in the separation of the role in 2002.
They noted that 88% of the listed firms in the UK separated the roles of the
CEO and the chairman in 2002 compared with 80% in 1998, the evidence
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supported by McKnight and Weir (2009). These figures show that listed firms
in the UK progressively complied with this provision. Consistent with the UK
provision, the King Reports recommended the role of CEO and the chairman
to be separated of which compliance levels has improved from 61% in 2002
to 86% at the end of 2006 (Ntim, 2009). In the US however, the securities
laws did not directly address the board composition until the enactment of
SOX. In this case, the separation of the role of the CEO and the Chairman
was not mandated and therefore encouraged the leadership duality.
Notwithstanding the fact that the SOX has no provision regarding leadership
duality, Linck et al (2009) noted that more firms separated the post of CEO
and the chairman post-SOX. In particular, the small firms showed the
steepest decrease from 54.8% in 2001 to 45.5% in 2005.
Further, Short and Keasey (1999) indicated that there is a major difference
on the operations of the board in the UK and the US. Whereas the board of
the UK firms are dominated by executive directors, the US firms are mainly
dominated by outside directors (Short and Keasey 1999; Dahya and
McConnell 2009). This view is not consistent with Rayton and Cheng (2004)
who documented that, on average, the main boards in the UK have contained
an in-built majority of non-executive directors. Recently, Cosh et al (2008)
noted that the proportion of non-executive directors on the board in the UK
rose from an average of about one-third in 1980/81 to one-half in 1995/96.
This further increased in 2006 where the non-executive directors of the top
100 listed companies’ board on average accounted for 60% of the total
board. The reform has also affected the board size. Cosh et al (2008)
reported that the UK board size has declined since 1980s and is more directly
related with the debate regarding the appropriate composition of the board
prompted by the progressive corporate governance reports. Cosh and
Hughes (1997a) documented that the board size and composition for all
directors in the UK declined from 14 in 1980/81 to 13 in 1995/96. This figure
further reduced to 11 in 2005/06 (Cosh et al, 2008). Similarly, the board size
of the US decreased by 5.6% from 1989 to 2001 but the average size of the
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board increased by 8.4% from 2001 to 2005 after the publication of the SOX.
This is a reverse of the entire reduction in board size over the previous
twelve years (Linck et al, 2009). Effectively, the US board size increased
after the reform whereas the UK board size continues to decrease. It is
important to note here that the progressive corporate governance reforms
have impacted on the composition of the board in the UK, US and other parts
of the world.
2.5.2 Board committees effects experienced worldwide
The main committees experienced by listed firms globally include audit,
remuneration/compensation and nomination/corporate governance.
Nonetheless, the focus for attention has been the audit committee due to the
Enron debacle. The evidence in the UK principles-based approach to
corporate governance suggests that almost all quoted companies operated a
remuneration committee and an audit committee in 2002 (Rayton and
Cheng, 2004), the findings supported by Weir and Laing (2000) who found
that 95% of the UK listed firms had a remuneration committee in 1995 and
Weir et al (2002) who reported that 96% of the UK listed firms operated an
audit committee in 1996. In contrast, Carcello et al (2002) documented that
only 85% of their sample of 150 proxy statements filed in spring 2001 have a
completely independent audit committee in the US. This means that the
rules-based approach to corporate governance does not guarantee full
compliance. In South Africa, Ntim (2009) reported that the compliance
levels for remuneration (audit) committees improved from 85 % (87%) in
2002 to 95% (95%) at the end of 2006.
With regard to a nomination committee, Rayton and Cheng (2004) reported
that the proportion of the UK companies using a nomination committee
doubled in 1993 from 39% (reported by Conyon, 1994) to approximately
84% in 2002, the findings supported by McKnight and Weir (2009) who
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found 85% large UK listed firms in 2000 to have a formal nomination
committee in place. In contrast, only 26% of South African firms had a
nomination committee in 2002 but doubled in 2006 to 60% (Ntim, 2009). It
is however important to note that compliance with a formal nomination
committee has been slow post 1992 compared with other board committees
discussed earlier in all jurisdictions.
2.5.3 Shareholder rights effects experienced worldwide
The progressive corporate governance reforms globally were partly meant to
restore public confidence which was challenged by the corporate governance
failures around the world. In particular, the shareholder rights effects
experienced may be well understood by looking into the governance reforms
in the UK, US, South Africa and transnational institutions. The reforms seem
to have empowered shareholders in the decision making process of a
particular firm. This includes the voting rights of the shareholders during the
AGM to enable them to re-elect directors and the approval of their
remuneration packages. In this respect, the surveys conducted by several
institutional investor bodies in the UK have indicated that there has been
some increase in voting levels by institutional investors in recent years. For
example, The National Association of Pension Fund (NAPF) in 1989 reported
that 20% of the UK pension funds showed their intention to vote. This figure
increased to 30% three years later with 26% of those surveyed intending to
vote on a regular basis. Another survey carried out by Institutional
Shareholders Committee (ISC) in 1990 suggests that an average of 20% of
shares were voted in the companies they surveyed. This figure also increased
to 34% in 1993 but they however noted that most insurance companies were
found to be more active than pension funds in this regard.
Nonetheless, Dedman (2002) reported that although institutional investors
are using their votes more, the Cadbury Report and the ISC have a long way
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to go before their wishes are fully met regarding voting levels. This means
that the shareholder rights have not been exercised effectively by those
institutions that hold majority of shares (62% in 1993 according to Cosh et
al, 2008) among the UK firms. However, Choi et al (2008) reported that the
SOX in the US have had a significant effect on firms with weak shareholder
rights than those with strong shareholder rights. They argue that the market
anticipated benefits to shareholders from the improved accounting and
governance reforms imposed by the SOX, suggesting that the reaction was
positive and significant. They however were of the view that strong
shareholder rights firms decreased shareholder protection after the passage
of SOX. This means that SOX provisions in relation to shareholder rights
were under regulated compared with what the strong shareholder rights
firms anticipated. Despite gaining recognition and several endorsements from
policy makers globally, there is little evidence to suggest that the South
African King Reports and the transnational institutional reforms have had any
significant impact on shareholder rights. This is not however, to state that
the recommendations made by these reforms in relation to shareholder
rights have not been effective. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests
that (Armstrong et al 2006; Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Mallin, 2007) the
King Report is considered as one of the examples of good corporate
governance models around the world. These might have gone a long way to
influence the formulation, implementation and enforcement of corporate
governance practices in the developing countries.
2.5.4 Financial affairs and auditing impacts experienced globally
The progressive corporate governance reform is suggested to have had an
impact on the way companies deal with their financial affairs and auditing
around the world. The Cadbury Report placed much emphasis on the financial
aspects of corporate governance (Dahya et al, 2002). Understandably, one of
the principal areas dealt with by the Report was the use of creative
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accounting practices being used to conceal the calculation of shareholder
wealth, which later attracted much attention from the accounting profession
in the UK to drive the harmonisation of accounting standards (Whittington,
1993). Evidence also suggests that the Turnbull Report in relation to internal
control systems had contributed to the improvement of UK listed firms
internal control (Financial Reporting Council, 2005).
In the US however, the aftermath of the Enron debacle prompted the law
makers to strengthen the way public firms’ financial affairs and auditing
should be managed. The SOX establishes PCAOB to regulate accounting
professionals who audit financial statements of public firms. The PCAOB was
made responsible to oversee and investigate audits and auditors of public
firms. The audit functions objectivity and effectiveness have improved
subsequent to the Act in the following ways: prohibiting the registered
accounting firms from providing a number of non-audit services to the client
that they audit; rotating the lead auditor of the registered accounting firms
every 5 years; reporting to the audit committee all critical accounting policies
and practices used by the client; attesting to and reporting on the
assessment made by management of the effectiveness of internal control as
part of the audit of financial statements; and auditors are made to keep audit
working papers and evidence for not less than 5 years subsequent to the
audit of financial statements. Following that, section 302 of the SOX
mandated CEOs and CFOs that, each issuer shall prepare a statement to
accompany the audit report to certify the appropriateness of the financial
statements and disclosures contained in the periodic report, and that those
financial statements and disclosures fairly present, in all material respect, the
operations and financial condition of the issuer. These measures have helped
to improve the financial affairs and auditing of public firms.
Generally, the progressive corporate governance reforms worldwide have had
some impact on the firms’ governance practices. This is in relation to
increased management accountability for financial reporting which has
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helped to reduce accounting irregularities and or aggressive financial
reporting in recent years. The recommendations made regarding audit
committees and their relationship with external auditors, rigorous financial
reporting and auditing process might have influenced public firms’ financial
affairs and auditing globally.
2.5.5 Impacts of governance reforms on disclosure globally
As a result of the progressive corporate governance reforms, public firms are
required to provide a minimum amount of information for interested parties.
Notably, the requirement is on comply or explain basis in the UK and South
Africa, while this is mandatory in the US. In this case, public firms are able
to disclose accounting information, board remuneration, the activities of
board committees and the internal control effectiveness, which enhances
transparency and also partially reduces the agency problem. In this respect,
and right from the Cadbury Committee Report, King Report, and OECD to the
SOX, disclosure practices on relevant accounting information, board
remuneration, board committees’ activities and internal control effectiveness
were all recommended. This shows the importance attached to disclosure
practices which have gone a long way to impact on the information provided
by public firms. Focusing on disclosure of share options in the UK, Forker
(1992) noted that the CEO dominance has a negative impact on disclosure
practices. This means that not much information will be provided if the
combined roles of CEO and the chairman are in the hands of one person.
Hence, the separation of the two roles was much emphasised by the
corporate governance reforms in the UK and later adopted by subsequent
reforms.
Furthermore, SOX overwhelmingly endorsed disclosure practices in the US.
For example, section 401, 402 and 403 requires all registrant to provide
explanation for their off-balance sheet events, prohibits companies from
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making loans to insiders which necessitate electronic filing of disclosures of
insider transactions in company stock. Following that, section 404 requires
CEO and CFO certifications of disclosure controls to be made in a timely
manner together with information and risk relevant to the entity’s business.
Empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of the SOX in the US is
found to have had a significant effect on public firms governance practices
(Linck, et al, 2009). Disclosure effectiveness underpins transparency which is
good for any capital market; hence, it is one of the objectives and the key
principles of corporate governance reforms globally.
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has focused on the agency theory and the worldwide corporate
governance reforms. The main objective has been to give an historical
account of the progressive corporate governance reforms and its effect on
the world corporate governance landscape. Following the extant literature, it
concentrated on corporate governance reforms in selected countries and
transnational institutions. The selected countries corporate governance
reforms is made up of the UK, US and South Africa which are generally
considered as pace setters in both developed and developing countries. The
formulation, implementation and enforcement of corporate governance
practices in these countries were based on comply or explain philosophy (UK
and South Africa) and the application of rules in the US. However, all these
reforms focused on addressing the notorious agency problem in order to
safeguard the interest of shareholders.
The transnational institutional corporate governance reforms considered in
this chapter include the OECD and the CACG. The recommendations made by
these reforms focused on fundamental principles of corporate governance as
minimum standards for member countries to develop their own code of best
practice suitable for individual country’s legal, cultural and regulatory
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requirement. Evidence in the governance reforms literature suggests that all
the institutions adopted the principles-based approach practised in the UK
and South Africa and considered the principles to be a replication of the
earlier corporate governance reforms. As a result, the overall effect of the
progressive corporate governance reforms experienced since 1992 is quite
significant in both the national and international contexts. In this respect, the
reforms have impacted on the board composition, board committees,
shareholder rights, financial affairs and auditing, and disclosure practices of
public firms. More importantly, the reforms have helped in promoting good
corporate governance practices, which takes into account the interest of
shareholders, with the necessary mechanisms to help partially reduce the
agency problem. This is the basis on which other countries have developed
their own code of best practices on corporate governance for
implementation.
Fundamentally, the chapter identified two major corporate governance
reforms within the international context: the principles-based and the rules-
based approaches. It is suggested in the existing literature that the
principles-based approach refers to the reforms pioneered in the UK, and
later adopted by South Africa and the transnational institutions, in which case
the comply or explain philosophy is dominant and is usually not backed by
the force of law. In contrast, the rules-based approach refers to the
regulatory reforms in the US, where the SOX is paramount and does not
allow for any flexibility for non-compliance. Nonetheless, and due to the
increased globalisation and the integration of the world stock market resulted
from cross-listing, corporate governance practices worldwide are
progressively converging across different countries.
Overall, one clear achievement of the worldwide governance reforms
underpinned by the agency theory is the consensus by the codes with specific
governance mechanisms in addressing the agency problem. For example, a
majority of the codes considered CEO duality as harmful and recommended
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the separation of the two posts. The codes also have considered the
important advisory and monitoring roles played by the non-executive
directors on the board with particular focus on independent non-executive
directors in addressing the agency problem. Given the benefit of board
committees in addressing the agency problem, a majority of the codes have
recommended the establishment of audit, remuneration and nomination
committees to perform their special functions to support the board. In
respect of the shareholder rights, a majority of the codes have encouraged
shareholders/institutional shareholders to participate in the decision making
of their firms during the AGM through voting. Notably, a majority of the
codes have also placed much emphasis on the financial affairs and auditing
and disclosure practices of which strong recommendations have been
provided by the various codes for firms to provide a statement of compliance
with corporate governance among others. Given the worldwide governance
reforms with the various codes recommendations in addressing the agency
problems, the next chapter introduces the development of corporate
governance in Ghana where this thesis is based.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
GHANA
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the development of corporate governance in Ghana.
Its main objective is to provide a full account and where possible, a review of
the Ghanaian corporate governance framework and how it fits into the
worldwide corporate governance landscape. In particular, it examines the
legal and regulatory environment as well as the Ghanaian Code provisions
experienced in Ghana. However, and unlike the UK and the South Africa
where the formation of independent committees are dominant for the
provision of the code of best practices on corporate governance, the
Ghanaian Code was for the first time introduced in 2003 by the Security and
Exchange Commission Ghana (SECG). Whereas the UK and the South African
codes have been subjected to a series of revisions to date, the Ghanaian
Code has not been reviewed. The remainder of the chapter is structured as
follows. Section 3.2 presents a comprehensive description of the Ghanaian
legal and regulatory environment. Section 3.3 examines the Ghanaian Code
on corporate governance. Section 3.4 critiques the Ghanaian corporate
governance environment, while section 3.5 provides a summary to the
chapter.
3.2 THE GHANAIAN LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
This section presents a comprehensive description of the Ghanaian legal and
regulatory environment within which companies operate. Specifically,
subsection 3.2.1 will look into the Companies Code 1963 (Act 179,
henceforth the Companies Code); subsection 3.2.2 will discuss the role of
43
SECG, while subsection 3.2.3 examines the role of the Ghana Stock
Exchange (GSE) in relation to the development of corporate governance in
Ghana.
3.2.1 The Ghanaian Companies Code and corporate governance
Recognition of the existence of corporate governance in Ghana dates back to
July 1963, when the Companies Code was enacted to govern the formation
and operation of Ghanaian companies. Its provisions are largely based on the
English Common Law, and notably, similar to the UK Companies Act 1948
(Adda and Consulting, 2006). It is directed and administered by the Attorney
General’s office and Ministry of Justice through the Registrar General’s
Department. Focussing on its contribution to the development of corporate
governance in Ghana, it has mandated companies to apply the following key
mechanisms. First, the Companies Code focuses on the board composition
requirements with particular emphasis on the membership of the board. It
specifically called for all public companies to have a minimum number of
three directors (section 300a) to manage the affairs of a company to the
benefit of its shareholders.
The Companies Code also mandated boards in section 190 to appoint a
company secretary who may be a body corporate. As will be discussed in
section 3.3, the Ghanaian Code also makes provision for the appointment of
a company secretary to advise and guide the chairman in undertaking his
responsibilities. With regard to CEO duality, section 193 mandates the board
from time to time to appoint a Managing Director (MD) to direct and
administer the business of a company. However, there is no provision made
by the Companies Code regarding the chairmanship of the board which
suggests that it does not prohibit the MD to occupy the two positions.
Further, the Companies Code placed much emphasis on the appointment of
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executive directors (section 192) but failed to make provision for the
appointment of non-executive directors to the board.
Second, even though the Companies Code does not mandate Ghanaian
companies to establish board committees, it does ask the board to exercise
their powers through committees as they think fit (section 138a). It is
unclear as to which committee the board should delegate its power to act on
their behalf and whether the committees’ composition includes board
members or not. It also suggested that the determination of the directors’
remuneration from time to time should be agreed through an ordinary
resolution of the company (see section 194) which implies that there is no
specific committee charged with the responsibilities to handle board
remuneration. However, section 128 stipulates that a note to the accounts
regarding particulars of directors’ emoluments and pensions for both existing
and past directors is required. To make things clearer and as will be
described in section 3.3, the Ghanaian Code makes provision for the
establishment of two main committees namely, an audit committee and a
remuneration committee who have the delegated authority from the board to
perform their assigned functions.
Third, the Companies Code grants shareholders a number of rights and
powers to exercise over the companies that they have invested in. For
example, sections 149 to 178 mandate companies to hold an annual general
meeting (AGM) where the shareholders participate in the decision making
process. It noted that such an AGM should take place not earlier than twenty
one days following the receipt of the company’s audited financial statements,
directors’ report and auditors report by its members which will subsequently
be laid before the AGM for consideration. In this case, the AGM on an annual
basis should not be held more than fifteen months between the date of one
AGM and the next. This is where the shareholders exercise their right to
attend, speak and vote at the AGM (see section 31). Also, section 185
empowers shareholders to remove directors’ from office and through
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cumulative voting, re-elect the longest serving board members who retire by
rotation during the AGM (see sections 298 and 300). And, as will be
discussed in section 3.3, the Ghanaian Code also empowers shareholders to
exercise their rights during the AGM as noted above.
Finally, the Companies Code in relation to financial affairs and auditing
requires that, every company must keep proper books of accounts with
subsequent circulation to its members the profit and loss account, balance
sheet and reports once at least every calendar year (sections 123 and 124).
In this regard, section 131 stipulates that every company’s board must give
approval to the accounts prior to their publication where a signature of two
members on behalf of the board is required before such publication. In
addition, the board is required to provide a report of the state of affairs of
the company including whether there have been any changes regarding the
nature of business of the company or associated companies during the
financial year (see section 132). In this respect, all public companies are
required to prepare and file to the Registrar General’s office an annual return
which should include a certified copy of profit and loss, balance sheet, group
accounts, directors’ report and auditors report sent to the members (sections
122 and 295). Further, section 296 requires public companies to appoint an
auditor who is a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants-Ghana
(ICAG). As will be explained in chapter five, each company’s annual report
will be used as the basis on which corporate governance practices will be
benchmarked for this thesis.
3.2.2 The SECG and corporate governance development
Evidence suggests that the Companies Code makes room for additional
regulation of companies subject to special regulation (Adda and Consulting,
2006). In this case, the Securities Industry Law 1993 (PNDCL 333) created
SECG to supervise the operation of stock exchanges and companies. In May
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2000, the SECG was admitted as a full member of the International
Organisation of Securities Commission. The SECG primary objective spans
from the protection of investors to the maintenance of integrity of the
securities market in Ghana. It has an Administrative Hearings Committee
established by an amendment to the Securities Industry (Amendment) Act
2000 (Act 590), charged with the responsibilities of law enforcement in
relation to securities and the Companies Code. Focusing on the contribution
to the development of corporate governance in Ghana, the Securities and
Exchange Regulations 2003, LI 1728 have provided a series of corporate
governance mechanisms that govern companies in the area of board
composition, board committees, financial affairs and auditing and disclosure
practices.
Regarding board composition, section 3 of the regulations has indicated
qualifications and disqualifications of directors and executive officers that
should serve in the office of a particular company. Specifically and similar to
the Companies Code provisions discussed earlier, section 3 (1) mandates
listed companies to have not less than three directors as its board members.
In this respect, a majority of the board members must have recognised
academic or professional qualifications or experience in banking,
accountancy, economics, business administration, dealing in securities or any
other relevant qualifications (SECG Regulations, 2003, section 3 [2]).
Consequently, section 4 of the regulations placed much emphasis on the CEO
of such companies that, no licence shall be given if the CEO does not qualify
up to the requirement outlined in section 3(2) above. Further, section 3 (3a-
3e) disqualifies a person to become a director or executive officers if such
person has the following: convicted; adjudged bankrupt; misconduct himself
in the public office; any breach of law or regulation; and if the person is
prohibited to hold such position.
However, section 3 of the regulations fails to provide the maximum number
that should constitute the board membership. This failure is a replication of
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the weaknesses of the Companies Code governance framework discussed in
subsection 3.2.1 and the GSE Listing Rules that will be examined in
subsection 3.2.3. Although the GSE Listing Rules maintained that 50% of the
board should be non-executive directors, it does not prescribe the minimum
and a maximum number that should constitute the board. As will be
described in section 3.3, the Ghanaian Code recognises the minimum number
of eight and a maximum number of sixteen to constitute the board.
With respect to the formation of the board committees, section 61 of the
regulations mandates all public companies to make available to the
Commission with written evidence on the operation and effectiveness of the
audit committee. This section of the regulation is important because it is one
of the board committees that have oversight responsibilities of listed
companies financial affairs and auditing. Arguably, and as explained in
chapter two, the worldwide corporate governance development has also
considered the establishment of an audit committee as an important
governance mechanism. In this case, any person in Ghana who contravenes
section 61 of the regulations shall be liable to a fine of 2 million old Ghana
cedis for each day that the default subsists (SECG Regulations, 2003, section
62). Although the Companies Code does not recommend this provision, as
will be discussed in subsection 3.2.3 and section 3.3, the GSE and the
Ghanaian Code also requires audit committees to be established by listed
firms.
With regards to financial affairs and auditing, section 54 of the regulations
stipulates that every public company must prepare and circulate to the
Commission, the GSE, its shareholders and bondholders and the stock
exchange on which it is listed prior to the expiration of three months from
the close of its financial year, an annual report with the audited financial
statements prepared in accordance with the Ghana National Accounting
Standards issued by the ICAG. Similarly, and as will be explained in section
3.3, the Ghanaian Code also considers the financial affairs and auditing as
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best practices in the development of corporate governance in Ghana. Finally,
section 60 of the regulations mandates listed companies to comply with the
disclosure requirements of the stock exchange in which they are listed. In
this respect, the GSE Listing Rules 42 (2d) and 54 which will be discussed in
subsection 3.2.3 is supported by SECG Regulations. As will be discussed in
section 3.3, the disclosure provisions in the Ghanaian Code are not consistent
with the Companies Code, GSE and SECG requirements. In particular, it
requires a statement in the company’s annual report to the extent of its
compliance with the law and corporate governance practices.
3.2.3 The GSE and corporate governance development
Apart from the Companies Code and the SECG Regulations, the revised GSE’s
2006 Listing Rules has played a very substantial role in the regulation of
companies and the development of corporate governance in Ghana. Adda
and Consulting (2006) noted that the weaknesses of the governance
framework of the Companies Code are somewhat dealt with by the GSE
Listing Rules. In this regard, the GSE Listing Rules have reinforced, if not all,
some of the corporate governance provisions found in the Companies Code
and the SECG Regulations. The main aim of the GSE is to provide a fair,
orderly and efficient market for trading of securities issued (GSE Listing
Rules, 2006, intro. Para). In particular, the rules for a potential listing and
existing listed companies are detailed in Part I to Part X with the various
sections dealing with a range of issues regarding the sponsorship for listing
new applicants and the authority of the GSE in relation to ownership
structure. The focus for attention in this subsection is the contribution that is
being made by GSE in the development of corporate governance in Ghana. In
this regard, the Listing Rules placed much emphasis on the following
corporate governance mechanisms: board composition; board committees;
shareholder rights; and disclosure practices among potential listing and
existing listed firms.
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In relation to the board composition, the GSE Listing Rules have a
requirement for a company seeking admission to the official list as follows. It
is expected that the character and integrity of the directors’ and
management of a new applicant is considered to be of high standard. More
importantly, the board should be composed of at least 50% non-executive
directors to which 2 or 25% of the total board shall be independent (Revised
GSE Listing Rules, 2006, rule 11, 1-3). This listing requirement meets
international best practice in relation to the inclusion of non-executive
directors on the board. However, it did not state the minimum and a
maximum number that shall constitute a particular company’s board
membership as in the case of the UK and South African codes. Beside, the
requirement of the 50% non-executive directors is not consistent with the
provisions made by the Companies Code and the SECG Regulation, where
only the minimum number of three is provided to constitute the board. As
will be described in section 3.3 and consistent with what is experienced in the
UK and South Africa, the Ghanaian Code only called for the majority of the
board to be non-executive directors without stating the exact proportion that
should constitute non-executive directors. In this respect, failure to comply
with rule 11 regarding the quality of management as indicated above can
lead to the suspension of listing and compulsory de-listing. This confirms the
assertion that listing on the GSE further increases the chances of a company
strengthening its corporate governance practices (Adda and Consulting,
2006).
With regard to the establishment and function of board committees, the GSE
Listing Rules do not make mention of such committees but the Guidelines
and steps for listing on the GSE states that a written evidence of the
existence, operation and effectiveness of audit committee of a particular
company must be submitted as one of the listing requirements (GSE Listing
Regulation 1990, LI 1509). It is therefore expected that companies seeking a
listing on the GSE must prove the establishment, operation and effectiveness
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of an audit committee of which the membership should be comprised of non-
executive directors. Although the number of the membership is not stated in
the guidelines, its function should include the oversight for the appointment
and remuneration of statutory auditors; review and evaluation of internal
control system; review of audited accounts; review of internal audit
procedures and effectiveness; and the appraisal of the general conduct of the
business of the company. It is important to state here that the requirement
of the establishment of an audit committee is similar to what is experienced
globally. It is also worth noting that the GSE guidelines regarding the
establishment of an audit committee is consistent with the provisions in
SECG Regulations discussed in subsection 3.2.2 and the Ghanaian Code that
will be discussed in section 3.3.
However, there are some inconsistencies regarding the membership of the
audit committee. While the GSE guidelines called for the membership to be
solely non-executive directors, the SECG Regulations failed to make provision
for the membership requirement. In the same vein, the Ghanaian Code (see
section 3.3) only recommended that a majority of the audit committee
members be non-executive directors. Also, the GSE Listing Rules in line with
the Companies Code and SECG Regulations failed to mandate companies for
the establishment of a remuneration committee and a nomination committee
as practised globally (e.g. UK, US and South Africa). Nonetheless, evidence
suggests that the GSE upholds good corporate governance when it protested
against the violation of the Companies Code regarding the action taken by
the then Ghana government, a controlling shareholder, to replace the MD
and the General Manager of a listed company known as the Produce Buying
Company without acting through the appropriate governing board (Business
and Financial Times, Jan 21-27 2002, cited in Prempeh, 2002). The action
taken by the GSE adds to the debate of the importance of the establishment
of a nomination committee to oversee the selection and the appointment
process to replace a member of the board.
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The GSE Listing Rules placed much emphasis on the shareholder rights as
enshrined in the Companies Code. In this respect, rule 36a mandates
shareholders to re-elect any director due for re-election following an AGM of
the company. The GSE also encourages immediate announcement of any
meeting at least twenty one days before such meeting is held or such shorter
notice period permitted by the company’s regulations specifying the place,
date and hour of the meeting (GSE Listing Rules, 2006, rule 40c). According
to the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), a
corporate governance country assessment completed in May 2005 by the
World Bank, the shareholder rights in Ghana related to AGM was 75% largely
observed compared with ROSC average of 64% (World Bank, 2005). The
report also suggested that the basic shareholder rights are well-observed in
Ghana. In relation to directors share ownership and related party
transactions, rule 42 (2a, 2b) requires that listed companies are to provide
information in its annual report at the end of each financial year on the
holding of each director share ownership and the particulars of material
transactions involving each director and the company.
Disclosure requirements in Ghana are high on the agenda of the GSE Listing
Rules. For example, rule 42 (2d) encourages disclosure in the company’s
annual report the name of the directors, company secretary, solicitors,
external auditors and share registrars, the address and telephone number of
the company’s registered office and the registrar’s address. Further, rule 54
requires immediate disclosure of material information in relation to the affairs
or events of the company, which may be considered relevant for decision
making by investors. However, the disclosure standards in Ghana are
considered partially-observed at 50% compared to the ROSC average of 74%
(World Bank, 2005). Recently, Tsamenyi et al (2007) investigated disclosure
practices and concluded that disclosure levels in Ghana are generally low.
The authors found that the average of 52% disclosure and transparency
score is below the suggested 60%. This evidence is consistent with the World
Bank Country Assessment Report discussed earlier.
52
3.3 THE GHANAIAN CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Given the inconsistencies and weaknesses found in the rules and regulations
of the Companies Code, SECG regulations and the GSE Listing Rules
regarding corporate governance practices in Ghana, the Ghanaian Code was
the first attempt to make official corporate governance guidelines on best
practices not backed by the force of law. The Ghanaian companies were
encouraged to comply with the Ghanaian Code introduced in 2003. As noted
earlier, most of the corporate governance provisions were already being
carried out in Ghana based on the existing legal and regulatory framework.
However, Adda and Consulting (2006) reported that the legal framework for
registration of companies in Ghana has not kept up with the international
best practices. They noted that the Companies Code has seen no major
changes since its introduction. Also, and contrary to the worldwide corporate
governance reforms, it does not provide for the appointment of non-
executive directors, CEO duality is not prohibited and there is no requirement
for the establishment of board committees. Again, and apart from the 50%
on non-executive directors’ inclusion of the board mandated by the GSE
Listing Rules and the establishment of audit committee proposed by both
SECG and GSE, the prohibition of the CEO duality and the establishment of a
remuneration committee and a nomination committee were not
recommended by both regulators. In this respect, Ghana was lagging behind
the worldwide corporate governance reforms discussed in chapter two, and in
particular the reforms in the UK and South Africa which might have prompted
the introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003.
Unlike the UK, South Africa and the Transnational Institutions who relied on
the formation of committees to promote the highest standard of corporate
governance in their various jurisdictions, the Ghanaian Code was introduced
by SECG in 2003, with the principles applying to all corporate bodies
approved or licensed as stock exchanges, dealers and investment advisers.
In particular, the Code charged companies to adapt to their specific
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circumstances provided the spirit of the principles underlying the practices is
maintained. This is similar to what the Cadbury Report and King Report first
recommended in the UK and South Africa. Consistent with the UK and the
South African approach to corporate governance associated with comply or
explain philosophy, the Ghanaian Code also mandated companies to provide
an explanation if any of the principles were not followed. In this respect,
shareholders may have the opportunity to either accept or reject the
explanation given for not complying with some of the Ghanaian Code
provisions. This means that board may be held accountable for ineffective
application of the principles enshrined in the Ghanaian Code.
3.3.1 The Ghanaian Code provisions imposed on companies
In order to ensure board accountability and reporting, the Ghanaian Code
called for effective management of companies regarding shareholder
protection and value maximization, the view supported by the agency theory.
Consequently, it recommended that the primary responsibility of the board of
a particular company is the prevalence of good corporate governance. This
subsection examines corporate governance provisions imposed on companies
by the Ghanaian code. Specifically, the previsions are divided into five main
parts, especially those related to the board composition, board committees,
shareholder rights, financial affairs and auditing and disclosure practices, as
these are the focus of this thesis.
3.3.1.1 Board composition
Consistent with the worldwide corporate governance reforms and in
particular what is experienced in the UK and South Africa, the Ghanaian Code
recognised the crucial role that the company chairman plays in securing good
corporate governance. As such, and to avoid power concentration, it is
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suggested that the positions of the CEO and chairman of the Ghanaian
companies must be separated, with particular emphasis on listed companies
unless there is a specific reason not to do so. In this regard, there should be
an explanation to shareholders with the reason why the two positions are
held by one person. However, the Ghanaian Code recommended only for the
role to be separated but not expressly requiring the chairman to be a non-
executive director as practised in the UK and South Africa. Also, and as will
be discussed in chapter five, the developed GCGI determines whether the
CEO and the chairman role is separated or not. In addition to the separation
of the roles of the CEO and the chairman, the Ghanaian Code also
recommended for the size of the board to be representational in order to
promote effective and responsible management. It argued that the
membership of the board should be between a minimum of eight and a
maximum of sixteen members and maintained that the procedures for
appointment to the board should be formal and transparent. However, the
minimum of eight and the maximum of sixteen board membership proposed
are all even numbers which could create potential voting problems at the
board meetings if the board membership is not based on odd numbers. Also,
and as will be explained in chapter five, the developed GCGI determines
whether the board size requirement is met or not.
Consistent with the corporate governance provisions experienced around the
world, the Ghanaian Code called for a balance of executive and non-
executive directors on the board, with particular emphasis on independent
non-executive directors to represent at least one third of the total
membership of the board and at any event not less than two. In this case,
and similar to the UK and South African codes, the Ghanaian Code definition
of independent non-executive director is if the person: is not a substantial
shareholder of the company; has not been previously employed by the
company in an executive position for the previous three years; is not a
professional adviser or consultant to the company; and has no business link
or any other relationship with the company. Focusing on the selection and
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appointment of the non-executive directors, it recommended that the
appointment should ordinarily be a matter of the board as a whole. In this
regard, the Ghanaian Code did not recommend the establishment of a
nomination committee. This is not consistent with the corporate governance
provisions practised worldwide. Also, and as will be described in chapter five,
the developed GCGI determines whether the independent non-executive
directors requirement is met or not.
With regards to the significant role played by the finance director, company
secretary and the regular board meetings held in the case of listed
companies, the Ghanaian Code called for a specific director on the board to
be made responsible for the finance function of the company. It also
recommended that a qualified company secretary should be appointed as
required under the Company Code, charged with the responsibilities as an
adviser and guide to the chairman of the board. As such, the board should
meet regularly and in the case of listed companies, the meeting should take
place at least six times a year. Also, and as will be examined in chapter five,
the developed GCGI determines whether these requirements are met or not.
3.3.1.2 Board committees
Similar to the worldwide corporate governance development, the Ghanaian
Code recommended for the establishment of two separate committees in
order to improve the functioning and responsibilities of the board as follows:
the audit committee and a remuneration committee. Of these, the audit
committee is required to be constituted by at least three directors to whom
the majority should be non-executive directors. Specifically, it suggested that
the membership of the audit committee should include directors with
adequate financial knowledge and the chairman of the committee should be a
non-executive director. The Ghanaian Code also requested the provision of
information on the activities of the audit committee in the company’s annual
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report. With regards to the remuneration committee, although the Ghanaian
Code required the membership to be composed of a majority of non-
executive directors, no guidance is given regarding the chairmanship and the
minimum number of directors that should constitute the remuneration
committee. Like the audit committee, information on its membership and the
aggregate amount of compensation paid to the directors must be provided in
the company’s annual report. This should include whether directors receive
part of their remuneration in stock or stock options. Nonetheless, the board
committees differ from the worldwide corporate governance reforms in the
following areas: there is no requirement for the chairman of the
remuneration committee to be an independent non-executive director as in
the case of the UK and South Africa; and the Ghanaian Code also failed to
recommend for the establishment of a nomination committee which has been
considered as best practice in the UK and South Africa. For the purposes of
this thesis, and as will be described in chapter five, the developed GCGI
determines whether audit and remuneration committees requirements are
met or not.
3.3.1.3 Shareholder rights
The Ghanaian Code recommended a number of provisions in order to
improve the relationship between shareholders and managers. Consistent
with the agency theory being the theoretical framework for the worldwide
corporate governance reforms, the Ghanaian Code called on the board to try
and focus on the shareholder value maximization. In order to give
shareholders the greater influence in the affairs of a particular company, the
Ghanaian Code requested a company to: provide adequate notice to
shareholders prior to its AGM; allow shareholders to approve its board
members re-election at the AGM; facilitate voting by proxy as well as the
opportunity for shareholders to vote by mail; provide information in its
annual report on a related party transaction; and to provide information on
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the directors share ownership in its annual report. Where appropriate, and as
will be explained in chapter five, the developed GCGI determines whether
these requirements are met or not.
3.3.1.4 Financial affairs and auditing
The Ghanaian Code called for several recommendations regarding financial
affairs and auditing for companies to practise. In particular, it suggested that
the Ghanaian companies should prepare their financial statements in
accordance with the Ghana National Accounting Standards and other
Accounting Standards issued by the ICAG. In this regard, it mandated
directors to produce the company’s yearly financial statements at the legally
required date and audited in accordance with the Generally Accepted
Standards of Auditing required by ICAG. The external auditor should belong
to one of the auditing firms recognised by ICAG, and in this case, the auditor
is required to specify in his report if the financial statements audited have
been prepared in line with the Ghana National Accounting Standards.
Moreover, the board should provide information in the company’s annual
report the existence of appropriate systems to monitor risk and to safeguard
the company’s assets by maintaining adequate records. As such, the
Ghanaian Code has made clear for the board to provide a balanced and
understandable assessment of the company’s financial and operating results
in its annual report. It also called for information on the fees paid to the
external auditors for audit and non-audit related work to be provided in the
company’s annual report. For the purposes of analysis, and as will be
described in chapter five, the developed GCGI determines whether these
requirements are met or not.
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3.3.1.5 Disclosure practices
The Ghanaian Code has made it clear that the disclosure requirements
expected from companies are supplementary to those mandated by law or
regulation or under any other sections discussed in subsection 3.3.1. With
reference to the disclosures, the Ghanaian Code suggested that companies
should disclose in their annual reports the following six main statements of
compliance. First, it mandated boards to include the company’s current and
foreseeable material risk in its annual report. Second, the board must
disclose in the company’s annual report a statement of accepting
responsibility of the preparation of its financial statements. Third, the board
must disclose in the company’s annual report the adequacy of its internal
control measures. Fourth, the board must disclose in the company’s annual
report a statement indicating the degree of compliance with the law. Fifth,
and similar to what is practised in the UK and South Africa, the board must
disclose in the company’s annual report a statement on the extent of
compliance with corporate governance practices. And finally, the board must
disclose in the company’s annual report a statement of being a going concern
for each financial year. Also, and as will be examined in chapter five, the
developed GCGI determines whether companies are compliant to these
disclosure requirements or not.
3.4 CRITIQUE OF THE GHANAIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK
A useful critique of the Ghanaian Code provisions is a comparison with the
code of best practices on corporate governance that were in place before the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code. In this case, the 1998 Combined Code on
corporate governance applicable to the UK listed firms and the South Africa
1994 King I Report are used for the evaluation. It is however important to
note that the UK and South Africa corporate governance reforms have taken
approximately 20 years to establish the code of best practices compared to
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the Ghanaian counterpart which is almost half way (approximately 10 years)
since the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. However, the status quo of
compliance or regulation is either voluntary or self-regulatory in all the
jurisdictions. In relation to board composition, both the Combined Code and
the King I are practised under unitary board structure as in the case of the
Ghanaian Code. But, whereas the UK Combined Code recommended at least
three non-executive directors, the South African King I recommended at
least two non-executive directors compared with the Ghanaian Code that
called for a balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board
and not a specific number. Arguably, major differences are that the Ghanaian
Code requires one third of the board to be independent non-executive
directors and at any event not less than two compared with the UK combined
Code advocating at least two independent non-executive directors. In this
case, the South African King I Report did not specify any number for
independent non-executive directors who should be members of the board.
However, the revised King II and III Reports addressed this problem and
noted that majority of non-executive directors should be independent.
Interestingly, and because of its importance, all the three codes agreed on
the split of chairman and CEO posts but the Ghanaian Code did not expressly
require the chairman to be a non-executive director as in the case of the UK
and South Africa. With regard to board meetings, the UK Combined Code
asks for frequent meetings to be held, while the South African King I
provides for at least once every quarter compared to at least six times a year
for the Ghanaian listed firms. It is important to emphasise that the provision
of a fixed number of meetings may be unrealistic for firms to adopt. This is
because the frequency of meetings to be held in each financial year should
be determined by a particular firm’s strategic direction and its operational
environment. Arguably, the UK Combined Code provision regarding the board
to have frequent meetings should be supported rather than having a fixed
number of meetings provided by the South African King Report I and the
Ghanaian Code.
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Notably, the UK Combined Code has provided for three committees: audit,
remuneration and a nomination committee compared to the South African
King I and the Ghanaian Code with only audit and remuneration committees.
That notwithstanding, and as noted earlier, the King II and III in the later
revisions provided for a nomination committee for South African listed firms.
In essence, the Ghanaian Code has not been reviewed to reflect the
establishment of a nomination committee and is considered in this thesis as
one of the weaknesses of the Ghanaian Code. This is because the
appointment of new members to serve on the board should be considered as
very important and the existence of a nomination committee could help to
recruit directors with relevant skills and knowledge but not through
established relationships with other directors or major shareholders. This
may help Ghanaian firms to have more independent non-executive directors
on the board to provide their effective advisory role.
With regard to compliance and enforcement, both the UK Combined Code
and the South African King I Report make use of the board, institutional
shareholders/shareholders rights and auditors to that effect. In Ghana, there
is no emphasis on the institutional shareholders and auditors other than the
provisions on the board and the shareholder rights. This does not allow the
institutional shareholders to play a major role in terms of corporate
governance development. As a result, if the institutional shareholders are not
involved in the broader corporate governance process through
communication, voting and the evaluation of compliance of the Ghanaian
Code provisions, then the objective of the effective corporate governance
adoption might not be achieved. Arguably, all the three codes of best
practices agreed on the provisions regarding financial affairs and auditing. In
this respect, the audit committee takes the oversight responsibilities on
financial affairs and auditing in all the jurisdictions including the appointment
of external auditors.
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However, major differences are that the preparation of financial statements
is guided by the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the case
of the UK Combined Code and South African King I Report compared with the
Ghanaian Code focus on the Ghana Accounting Standards and other
standards. With the emergence of the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS), the subsequent reports in the UK and South Africa to date
have recommended the adoption of IFRS. To date, this has not been
recommended by the Ghanaian Code even though the ICAG in 2007 asked
Ghanaian firms to adopt the IFRS for the preparation of their financial
statements. This also suggests that the revision of the Ghanaian Code is
imminent and must be considered by the regulatory authorities in Ghana.
Fundamentally, the evidence from the provisions made by the Ghanaian
Code appears to suggest that there has been a major contribution to the
development of good corporate governance in Ghana. Specifically, listed
companies on the GSE are to comply with the Ghanaian Code provisions in
respect of board composition; board committees; shareholder rights;
financial affairs and auditing; and disclosure practices. As indicated earlier,
the Ghanaian Code, however, failed to recommend for the establishment of a
nomination committee. As such, this thesis extends the analysis on this issue
in chapter five, where the questionnaire survey includes a question regarding
the company directors preparedness to comply with further corporate
governance practices and in particular a nomination committee. It will also
help ascertain and understand from the directors whether there is the need
to review the Ghanaian Code by an independent committee as practised in
the UK and South Africa. Nevertheless, the history and scope of corporate
governance practices in Ghana between pre 2003 and post 2003 would have
provided flexible choices regarding Ghanaian listed firms’ corporate
governance practices. Arguably, prior research (see section 2.5 of chapter
two) have found some impact of corporate governance reforms worldwide on
listed firms’ governance practices (Conyon, 1994; Dahya et al, 2002; Rayton
and Cheng, 2004; Cosh et al, 2008; Choi et al, 2008; Linck et al, 2009;
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Ntim, 2009). However, the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code
provisions imposed on listed firms has not been studied to date, and
therefore the first relevant hypothesis in this thesis is operationalised in the
following form:
Ho1: There is significant improvement in the degree of compliance with
corporate governance practices by listed firms during pre 2003 and
post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code.
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to focus on the development of corporate
governance in Ghana. Its main objective has been to provide a full account of
the Ghanaian corporate governance framework. It examined the legal and
regulatory environment within which the Ghanaian companies operate. This
is made up of the Companies Code, SECG Regulations and the GSE Listing
Rules. The formulation, implementation and enforcement of the Ghanaian
Code on corporate governance rest on the SECG. However, and until the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code, there were some inconsistencies and
weaknesses in the regulation of companies in Ghana regarding corporate
governance practices. It became known from the review that the corporate
governance development has been hampered by the weaknesses of the
Companies Code governance framework which is fundamental to corporate
governance practices in Ghana.
Further, the corporate governance requirements enshrined in the Companies
Code, SECG Regulation and the GSE Listing Rules were suggested to fall
short with what is experienced globally. By contrast, the publication of the
Ghanaian Code provided a consistent approach by which companies are
governed. Although its application is not backed by the force of law,
companies listed on the GSE are to comply or provide explanation for non-
compliance. The review provided, where applicable, the provisions imposed
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on companies and assessed whether it is consistent with what is experienced
worldwide. It was revealed that, the Ghanaian Code, similar to the
Companies Code, SECG Regulations and the GSE Listing Rules failed to make
provision for the establishment of a nomination committee. This particular
shortfall is experienced in the UK and South Africa and should have been
provided for in the corporate governance development in Ghana in order to
help appoint qualified board members who are not politically chosen for
effective decision making.
The next chapter reviews prior empirical studies on the relationship between
corporate governance and firm performance. Specifically, the studies on the
specific governance mechanisms and the governance index impact on firm
performance, followed by the directors’ opinions on corporate governance
and firm performance will be reviewed in both developed and developing
countries in order to help develop additional hypotheses in this thesis for
testing.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PRIOR STUDIES ON GOVERNANCE-PERFORMANCE
RELATIONSHIP
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the governance-performance relationship that has
attracted empirical attention following the progressive worldwide corporate
governance reforms. In this respect, an important empirical question is
whether the adoption of the specific governance mechanisms or a set of
these mechanisms developed into a governance index is beneficial to firm
performance. Similarly, do the directors who are responsible for the adoption
of good corporate governance in their firms value these provisions as
beneficial to their firm performance? In this review, the thesis focuses on
three aspects of governance10 implications on firm performance and will be
mainly limited to studies undertaken since the 1990s. This is in line with the
period to which the worldwide corporate governance reforms started and
therefore its impact on firm performance needs to be evaluated from the
existing literature. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents
studies on the relationship between the specific governance mechanisms and
firm performance. Section 4.3 reviews studies on the relationship between
governance index and firm performance. Section 4.4 discusses studies on the
directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm performance. Section
4.5 provides critical observation of the governance-performance literature
and potential contributions, while section 4.6 summarises the chapter.
10 These include the adoption of the specific governance mechanisms, a set of governance mechanisms
developed into governance index and the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance.
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4.2 THE SPECIFIC GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS-PERFORMANCE
RELATIONSHIP STUDIES
This section presents studies on the relationship between the specific
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Of particular interest to this
thesis is the CEO duality, board size, proportion of non-executive directors
and board committees as these mechanisms among other provisions are
recommended by the Ghanaian Code discussed in section 3.3 of chapter
three. In particular, most prior studies examined the relationship between
these mechanisms and firm performances have used performance measures
such as accounting-based measures (ROA, ROE and ROI), market-based
measures (Tobin’s Q, Market Returns, and Share Returns) or both. Arguably,
there is a considerable specific governance mechanisms-performance
relationship research mainly undertaken by researchers since the worldwide
corporate governance reforms with particular focus on non-African countries
but relatively few studies in Africa. Tables 4-1 to 4-4 summarises studies on
the specific governance-performance relationship separated into CEO duality,
board size, proportion of non-executive directors and board committees with
the key studies in Ghana presented in subsections 4.2.1; 4.2.2; 4.2.3; and
4.2.4 respectively. These specific governance mechanisms-performance
relationship studies are reviewed in order to develop hypotheses two to five.
4.2.1 Empirical studies on CEO duality-performance relationship
The post of the CEO is quite critical for the survival of any company as well
as the chairman of the board. But whether to allow the CEO to combine the
role of the chairman or not is a question for debate among researchers,
regulators and law makers globally. In particular, the US governance reforms
encourage CEO duality, whereas in the UK, South Africa and Ghana where
this thesis is based, the CEO post is advocated by the code of best practices
to be separated from that of the chairman of the board. In this respect, does
the separation work better than the combined roles in relation to benefiting
66
firm performance? The agency theory position is that CEO duality is bad
because having the CEO as the Chairman of the board to evaluate his/her
own work defeats the objective of having the board. This is because the CEO
may use his/her power as a board Chairman to select directors who are not
expected to challenge his/her actions (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). In this
respect, the board will be incapable to effectively monitor and evaluate the
CEO’s actions because the CEO duality ‘signals the absence of separation of
decision management and decision control’ (Fama and Jensen, 1983a,
p.314). This suggests that a board controlled by the CEO is expected to lack
independence which may lead to more agency problems, and eventually,
poor firm performance (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Pi and Timme, 1993).
As can be seen from Tables 4-1a-c, the evidence of whether CEO duality is
better than separating the two roles in enhancing firm performance is mixed.
First, and as in line with the agency theory, many prior studies have found a
negative impact from CEO duality on firm performance (Rechner and Dalton,
1991; Pi and Timme, 1993; Dahya et al, 1996; Worrell et al, 1997; Faccio
and Lasfer, 1999; Kiel and Nicolson, 2003; Bozec, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib,
2006; Ujunwa; 2012). Using different firm performance measures, such as
ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, the results of these studies indicated a negative
association between the CEO duality and firm performance. Those
researchers argued that a combined leadership structure may lead to the
implementation of the decisions that favours the CEO’s personal objectives at
the expense of shareholders and therefore poor performance.
In contrast, other studies have found a positive association between CEO
duality and firm performance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Brickley et al,
1997; Boyd et al, 1997; O’Sullivan and Wong, 1999; Coles et al, 2001;
Buckland, 2001; Peng et al, 2007; Dey et al, 2011; Guillet et al, 2012).
Using various firm performance measures such as ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q,
these studies reported a positive impact from CEO duality on firm
performance. In particular, Dey et al (2011) document that firms that split
the CEO and Chairman roles due to investor pressure have significantly lower
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announcement returns and subsequent performance, and lower contributions
of investments to shareholder wealth. In this respect, the restrictive
assumptions of the agency theory of the CEOs being inherently opportunistic
(Boyd, 1995) have been questioned by Donaldson and Davis (1991) who
suggested an alternative model that defines CEOs as individuals who are not
opportunistic shirkers but mainly driven by intrinsic motivation for
achievement. This is particularly important because the evidence of CEO
duality having a positive impact on firm performance reported by these
researchers need to be interpreted with care as they did not control for
agency control mechanisms. For example, Brickley et al (1997) failed to
control for firm characteristics that generate conflict of interest between
shareholders and managers.
A third group of studies have found no significant association between CEO
duality and firm performance (Daily and Dalton, 1993; Baliga et al, 1996;
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Dalton et al, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Weir
et al, 2002; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Elsayed, 2007; Chen et al, 2008;
Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2008). In particular, Chen et al (2008) recently re-
examined the association between the CEO duality and firm performance by
controlling for firm characteristics such as ownership structure, CEO
compensation and agency costs. Although they reported an increased
number of firms changing from dual to non-dual, their findings do not show a
significant association between CEO duality and firm performance nor
improvement in firm performance after change in leadership structure. They
argued that the insignificance association between CEO duality and firm
performance is due to the possibility that CEO duality is endogenously and
optimally determined given the firm characteristics and ownership structure.
Focusing on Ghana where this thesis is based, prior studies examining the
impact of CEO duality on firm performance have also found mixed results
between the two. For example, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) are
the first researchers who reported a negative association between duality
and firm performance among Ghanaian listed firms. But, using listed and
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non-listed Banks, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006b) inconclusively
reported a negative association between duality and firm performance for the
overall sample but found a positive association between the two for listed
banks. The latter evidence is consistent with the work of Abor and Biekpe
(2007) who also reported a positive association between duality and firm
performance among Ghanaian Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs). However,
and consistent with the agency theory, the Ghanaian Code does recommend
the separation of the roles as best practice. This may be seen to be more
effective in terms of enhancing firm performance and also to limit the power
of the CEO of monitoring the monitors. Arguably, prior CEO duality-
performance relationship evidence among listed firms in Ghana is limited
compared to the general literature. Given that no research to date has
examined the impact of the Ghanaian Code recommendation of roles
separation on firm performance, the second relevant hypothesis is
operationalised in the following form:
Ho2: The separation of the roles of CEO and the chairman should lead to
higher firm performance.
Although four studies reviewed in the US found CEO duality to significantly
have a positive impact on firm performance, the majority of the studies in
the UK and other countries supported the agency theory with evidence of a
negative or no relationship between the two as shown in Table 4-1a-c. This
may illustrate why duality is encouraged in the US compared with regulators
in the UK and other countries who discourage duality. Given that firms
consider the costs and benefits of different leadership structure because of
their specific characteristics (Faleye, 2007), the observed sample of firms
that have chosen one type of leadership structure over the other are not
random, and therefore the OLS estimates become inconsistent and biased
(Chen et al, 2008). In this thesis, a distinction will be made between pooled
OLS and the alternative random-effects and fixed-effects models to control
for unobservable factors, which may affect CEO duality-performance
relationship.
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Table 4-1a: Empirical research on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in the US
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance
variable
Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
Donaldson &
Davis (1991)
1985-1987 321 firms in 1988
Business
Week’s
ROE CEO Duality is significant and positively associated with
firm performance. i.e. Firms with the CEO post
combined with the chairman outperform firms
with the two post separated
Brickley et al
(1997)
1984-1991 661 Forbes CEO
surveyed firms
Industry-adjusted
return on capital
Stock Returns
Found significant positive relationship between CEO
duality and corporate performance. i.e. the cost of
separation is higher than the benefits for most large
firms.
Coles et al
(2001)
1984-1988 144 large firms Economic Value-
added, Market Value-
added
CEO duality is significant positive associated with firm
performance
Dey et al
(2011)
2001-2009 760 listed firms Abnormal market
return
Split between the two post have significant lower
announcement returns & subsequent performance, and
low contributions to investments to shareholder wealth
Guillet et al
(2012)
1992-2008 351 restaurant firms Q-ratio
ROA
The results show a positive effect of CEO duality on
firm performance
Empirical research showing negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
Rechner &
Dalton (1991)
1978-1983 141 firms in Fortune
500
ROE, ROI, Profit
Margin
CEO duality is negatively associated with firm
performance. i.e. Independent CEO firms consistently
outperform those with CEO duality
Pi and & Timme
(1993)
1987-1990 112 listed banks ROA, Cost Efficiency
(EFF)
CEO Duality has negative interaction with firm
performance.
Worrell et al
(1997)
1972-1990 438 firms in 1990
Business week
Cumulative abnormal
returns
CEO duality is significant and negatively associated
with firm performance
Empirical research showing no relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
Daily & Dalton
(1993)
Not given in
the study
186 small listed
corporations
ROA CEO duality has no impact on firm performance
Baliga et al
(1996)
1980-1991 375 Fortunes 500
companies
Market Value Added
(MVA), ROA, ROE
CEO Duality has insignificant effect on firm
performance. i.e. No evidence to suggest that duality
affects firm performance
Chen et al
(2008)
1999-2003 5154 firm year
observation
Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE The results do not show any significant relation
between CEO duality and firm performance nor
improvement in firm performance after a change in
leadership structure
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Table 4-1b: Empirical research on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in the UK
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
O’Sullivan &
Wong (1999)
1989-1993 116 firms Market-to-book ratio,
abnormal returns, ROCE
Separating the roles of the CEO and the Chairman is more
common in the underperforming UK firms which become hostile
targets than those with duality status
Buckland
(2001)
1990-1994 378 1990s IPOs Average annual actual
returns, average annual
abnormal returns,
average annual growth
rate
More strongly, the findings suggest that those entrants with CEO
duality perform significantly better, on average, than those with
the recommended role separation.
Empirical research showing negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
Dahya et al
(1996)
1989-1992 76 listed firms Average abnormal stock
& market returns
The market responds favourably to the split of the two roles and
unfavourably when one person occupies the two roles.
Faccio & Lasfer
(1999)
1996-1997 1650 Listed
Companies
Q ratio, ROE, ROA, P/E CEO Duality has negative effect on firm performance.
Empirical research showing no relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
Vafeas &
Theodorou
(1998)
1994 250 Public traded
firms
Market-to-book ratio,
operating performance
Found insignificant relationship between CEO duality/leadership
structure and firm performance
Weir and Laing
(2000)
1992 & 1995
Pre & Post
200 listed
companies for each
year
ROA, RAW Separating the role has no impact for both Pre & Post Cadbury
recommendations on ROA. This means that those companies
that separated the role do not outperform those with the
combined post
Weir et al
(2002)
1994-1996 311 listed
companies
Q Ratio The absence of duality has no significant impact on firm
performance
Dulewicz &
Herbert (2004)
1997-2000 75-80 listed firms CFROTA, Sales turnover Separating or not separating the post has no impact on firm
performance
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Table 4-1c: Empirical research on CEO duality-performance relationship in other countries
Author (Year) Country of
study
Study
period
Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
Boyd et al
(1997)
Belgium,
France, Italy,
Spain, SWISS
& UK
1991 2097 firms ROI CEO duality is significant and positively associated
with firm performance
Peng et al
(2007)
China 1992-1996 403 public listed
firms
ROA, Sales CEO duality is positively related with firm
performance
Empirical research showing negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
Kiel & Nicholson
(2003)
Australia 1996 348 listed
companies
Tobin’s Q, ROA CEO duality is significant and negatively associated
with Tobin’s Q. But has no relationship with ROA
Bozec (2005) Canada 1976-2000 25 SOE ROS, ROA, Sales
Efficiency, NIE, Asset
Turnover
A negative relation is found between CEO duality and
ROA. However, it has no impact on ROS, sales
efficiency, NIE and asset turnover.
Haniffa &
Hudaib (2006)
Malaysia 1996-2000 347 listed
companies
Tobin’s Q
ROA
CEO duality is significant and negatively associated
with ROA but statistically insignificant relationship
between CEO duality and Tobin’s Q.
Kajola (2008) Nigeria 2000-2006 140 firm year
observation
ROE, Profit margin CEO status (separated) has positive and significant
effect on firm performance. In other words, CEO
duality has negative effect on firm performance
Jackling & Johl
(2009)
India 2006 180 listed
companies
Tobin’s Q, ROA CEO duality is negatively correlated with firm
performance
Sanda et al
(2010)
Nigeria 1996-1999 93 listed firms P/E Ratio, ROA, ROE,
Tobin’s Q
Firms with CEO post separated perform better than
firms with CEO duality.
Ujunwa (2012) Nigeria 1991-2008 122 quoted firms ROAE CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance
Empirical research showing no relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
Dalton et al
(1998)
Various
Countries
1978-1996 69 prior research accounting & market-
based measures
Found insignificant relationship between CEO
duality/leadership structure and firm performance
Elsayed (2007) Egypt 2000-2004 92 public limited
firms
Tobin’s Q, ROA CEO duality has no impact on corporate performance.
However, there is a relationship (positive or
negative) when the sample is categorised into
industries and high & low performance firms.
Mashayekhi &
Bazaz (2008)
Iran 2005-2006 240 firm year
observation
EPS, ROA, ROE The results show no relationship between CEO duality
and firm performance
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4.2.2 Empirical Studies on board size-performance relationship
Empirical evidence suggests that board size does matter to firm performance
but the agency theory proposes that smaller board size is more effective than
larger board size (Lipton and Lorch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) in monitoring,
controlling as well as quick decision making by directors of a particular firm.
In particular, Lipton and Lorch (1992) are of the view that the board size
between eight and nine directors is considered appropriate because
additional cost associated with slow decision-making is higher than the
marginal benefits if the number of directors exceeds ten. However, and as
can be seen from Tables 4-2a-c, prior studies have found some mixed results
on the relationship between board size and firm performance (Yermack,
1996; Faccio and Lasfer, 1999; Kiel and Nicolson, 2003; Guest, 2009; Adams
and Mehran, 2012; Wintoki et al, 2012). In this respect, Yermack (1996) was
one of the first researchers to investigate board size-performance
relationship. Using a sample of 452 large US firms between 1984 and 1991,
he found an inverse relationship between board size and firm performance.
The author showed that his evidence is robust to firm characteristics such as
size, growth potential, outside directors, director ownership and industry.
Consistent with prior theoretical suggestions that board side between eight
and nine is more effective (Lipton and Lorch, 1992, Jensen, 1993), Yermack’s
evidence indicated that investors valuation of firms’ declines steadily over a
range of board sizes between four and ten. Beyond ten, he found no
relationship between board size and firm performance.
Recent US studies (Vefeas, 1999a; Cheng, 2008; Cheng et al, 2008) and
non-US studies (Eisenberg et al, 1998; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Dahya et al,
2002; Lasfer, 2004; Bozec, 2005; Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Bennedsen et al,
2008; Guest, 2009; O’Connell and Cramer, 2010; Guo and Kga, 2012;
Ujunwa, 2012) have mostly found consistent results with those of Yermack
(1996) that board size is negatively related to firm performance. In
particular, Eisenberg et al (1998) criticised Yermack (1996) for mainly
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focusing on large firms, and for that matter his findings cannot be extended
to smaller firms, as well as those firms operating in different legal and
cultural environments. In this respect, Eisenberg et al (1998) investigated
the relationship between board size and firm performance across 879 small
and medium size firms in Finland from 1992 to 1994. In line with Yermack
(1996), they reported a statistically significant and negative relationship
between board size and firm’s profitability measured by ROA.
Also, Conyon and Peck (1998a) found a negative relationship between board
size and firm performance across a number of European countries (i.e. UK,
France, Netherlands, Denmark and Italy) listed firms (701) from 1992 to
1995. Similarly, and using a larger sample size of 2,746 UK listed firms from
1981 to 2002, Guest (2009) found board size to have a strong negative
impact on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and share returns.
Furthermore, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) examined the relationship between
board size and firm performance in Singapore and Malaysia from 1999 to
2000. Using 230 listed firms in each country, they reported an inverse
relationship between board size and firm value in both countries. These
findings provide empirical support to the conclusions of Yermack (1996) and
Eisenberg et al (1998) that larger boards are not only seen by investors as
ineffective than smaller boards in monitoring managers, but also consume
more managerial perquisites than the smaller boards.
In contrast, other US studies (Coles et al, 2008; Adams and Mehran, 2012)
and non-US studies (Faccio and Lasfer, 1999; Kiel and Nicolson, 2003; El
Mehdi, 2007; Kajola, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Sanda et al, 2010) have
found a positive relationship between board size and firm performance. Using
35 US listed banking firms from 1986 to 1999, Adams and Mehran (2012)
observed statistically significant and positive relationship between board size
and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. In particular, the positive
relationship remains unchanged after controlling for potential problems of
endogeneity between board size and firm performance. This provides
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empirical support to the conclusions of previous studies in the UK and
Australia respectively, where Faccio and Lasfer (1999) and Kiel and Nicolson
(2003) reported board size to have a positive impact on firm performance.
Also, Kajola (2008) found a positive and statistically significant relationship
between board size and firm performance measured by ROE, in a sample of
20 Nigerian listed firms from 2000 to 2006. Using a larger sample size of 93
Nigerian listed firms, Sanda et al (2010) reported a statistically significant
and positive relationship between board size and firm performance measured
by Tobin’s Q. They argued that the optimal number of ten board size is
appropriate for the Nigerian context; evidence not consistent with the agency
theory proposition that smaller board size is more effective than larger board
size (Lipton and Lorch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Similarly, Jackling and Johl
(2009) found that larger board size has a positive impact on firm
performance measure by Tobin’s Q, in a sample of 180 Indian listed firms
during 2006. These findings support the view that larger boards offer greater
exposure to the external environment than smaller boards which improve
access to various resources and therefore positively impacts on performance
(Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al, 2006).
A third group of studies have found no significant relationship between board
size and firm performance (Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Bennett and
Robson, 2004; Wintoki et al, 2012). In particular, Wintoki et al (2012) re-
examined the relationship between board size and firm performance across
6,000 US listed firms from 1991 to 2003 after criticising prior studies for not
controlling for the potential problems of endogeneity. They addressed the
endogeneity problems by using the dynamic GMM and found no causal
relationship between board size and firm performance measured by ROA.
However, their evidence is not consistent with Conyon and Peck (1998a) and
Guest (2009) who followed the same approach to address the problems of
endogeneity but reported a negative relationship between board size and
firm performance.
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In Ghana, the empirical evidence is also mixed. For example, Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe (2006a, 2006b) found a positive association between
board size and firm performance among Ghanaian listed firms, evidence
supported by Abor and Biekpe (2007) and Isshaq et al (2009). In contrast,
Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu (2008) examined corporate governance
practices of SMEs in Ghana and whether there is a linkage between these
governance practices and firm performance. Their evidence on the board
size-performance relationship suggests a negative association between the
two. Of particular interest to this thesis is Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe
(2006b) recommendation of the optimal board size of 10 for the Ghanaian
banks, a recommendation supported by Sanda et al (2010) but in
disagreement with Lipton and Lorch (1992). Arguably, Coles et al (2008) in
their study grouped 8165 firm year observation from 1992 to 2001 into
complex and simple firms in the US and reported that larger board size is
positively associated with complex firms but this is opposite in simple firms
where smaller board size is positively associated with firm performance. Their
evidence suggests that very small or very large board size is optimal given
the nature of a particular firm. Consistent with Lipton and Lorch (1992), the
Ghanaian Code regards board size as an effective specific governance
mechanism and recommends the board size of listed firms to be between a
minimum of eight and a maximum of sixteen members in order to promote
effective and responsible management of a particular firm. Given the
Ghanaian Code provision and the recommendation by Kyereboah-Coleman
and Biekpe (2006a) for firms to maintain smaller boards, the third relevant
hypothesis is operationalised in the following form:
Ho3: The smaller the board size should lead to higher firm performance.
Overall, the board size-performance relationship evidence from both US and
non-US studies have provided mixed results with three directional
relationships of positive, negative and no relationship between the two.
However, a majority of the studies have provided theoretical support for the
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agency theory proposition that smaller boards are more effective than larger
boards in affecting firm performance. In particular, and as indicated earlier, it
may be very difficult for larger boards to arrange meetings, reach consensus
and react quickly in decision making because of communication and
coordination costs. Also, the ability and motivations of the board to monitor
management may decrease with larger boards. Given the smaller boards
observed across Ghanaian firms (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a;
2006b) and the subsequent recommendations of the Ghanaian Code, it is
therefore expected in this thesis for the board size to have a positive impact
on firm performance
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Table 4-2a: Empirical research on the relationship between board size and firm performance in the US
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between size of the board and firm performance
Coles et al
(2008)
1992-2001 8165 firm year
observation from
IRRC
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Larger board size is positively associated with firm performance
(Q) in complex firms. This is opposite in simple firms where
smaller board size is positively related with firm performance (Q).
The result suggests that either very small or very large boards
are optimal. i.e. Tobin’s Q increases (decreases) in board size for
complex (simple) firms, and the relationship is driven by the
presence of NED.
Adams &
Mehran (2012)
1986-1999 35 listed banks Tobin’s Q
ROA
Board size has a positive and statistically significant correlation
with Tobin’s Q but has no impact on ROA
Empirical research showing negative relationship between size of the board and firm performance
Yermack (1996) 1984-1991 452 large industrial
corporations
Tobin’s Q There is inverse association between board size and firm
performance. The results show that investors’ valuation of firm
decreases steadily over a range of board sizes between 4 and 10.
Beyond 10, there is no impact on firm performance. Effectively,
larger board size has negative relationship with firm performance.
Vefeas (1999a) 1990-1994 307 listed firms Tobin’s Q Find significant negative relation between board size & firm value
Cheng (2008) 1996-2004 1252 S&P firms
from IRRC
Tobin’s Q
ROA, Monthly share
returns
Larger board size is significant negatively associated with
variability of firm performance. Overall, the study consistently
shows that board size adversely affects the variability of firm
performance and value.
Cheng et al
(2008)
1984-1991 350 listed firms Tobin’s Q Board size has significant impact on firm performance
Empirical research showing no relationship between size of the board and firm performance
Wintoki et al
(2012)
1991-2003 6000 listed firms ROA After re-examined the relationship between board structure and
firm performance, they find no causal relation between the two
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Table 4-2b: Empirical research on the relationship between board size and firm performance in the UK
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between board size and firm performance
Faccio and
Lasfer (1999)
1996-1997 1650 listed
companies
Q Ratio
ROE, ROA, P/E ratio
Larger board size companies over perform companies with
smaller board size.
Empirical research showing negative relationship between board size and firm performance
Conyon & Peck
(1998)
1992-1995 481 listed firms ROE, Tobin’s Q The results show board size to have a significant negative effect
on firm performance
Dahya et al
(2002)
1988-1996 460 listed firms Performance-related
top- management
turnover
Negative relationship between performance-related top-
management turnover and board size.
Lasfer (2004) 1990-1991
/1996-1997
1424 Tobin’s Q Board size has significant negative impact on firm performance
Guest (2009) 1981-2002 2746 larger sample
size
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Share returns
Board size has strong negative impact on Tobin’s Q, profitability
and share returns.
Empirical research showing no relationship between board size and firm performance
Bennet &
Robson (2004)
1994-1997 1445 SMEs Change in profitability
per employee
There is little evidence of strong association between board size
and firm performance
Dulewicz &
Herbert (2004)
1997-2000 75-80 listed firms CFROTA, Sales turnover No significant correlation between whether larger or smaller
board size and firm performance
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Table 4-2c: Empirical research on the board size-performance relationship in other countries
Author (Year) Country of
study
Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between board size and firm performance
Kiel & Nicolson
(2003)
Australia 1996 348 listed
companies
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Board size is positively correlated with firm
performance
El Mehdi (2007) Tunisia
North Africa
2000-2005 24 listed
companies
Marginal Q Board size is statistically significant and positively
related with firm performance.
Kajola (2008) Nigeria 2000-2006 20 listed
companies
ROE
Profit margin (PM)
There is a positive and significant relationship
between board size and firm performance (ROE) but
no significant relationship between board size and PM
Jackling & Johl
(2009)
India 2006 180 listed
companies
Tobin’s Q
ROA
There is a significant and positive relationship
between larger board size and firm performance.
Sanda et al
(2010)
Nigeria 1996-1999 93 listed firms Tobin’s Q
P/E Ration, ROA, ROE
Board size is significant and positively associated
with firm performance (Tobin’s Q) but has no impact
on ROA. They recommended optimal number of 10
for Nigerian companies.
Empirical research showing negative relationship between board size and firm performance
Eisenberg et al
(1998)
Finland 1992-1994 879 small
firms
ROA Statistically significant and negative correlation
between board size and firm performance.
Bozec (2005) Canada 1976-2000 25 SOE ROS, ROA, Sales
Efficiency, NIE, Asset
Turnover
A negative relation is found between board size and
firm performance (ROS, sales efficiency & assets
turnover) but no impact on ROA,& NIE
Mak & Kusnadi
(2005)
Singapore &
Malaysia
1999-2000 230 firms for
each country
Tobin’s Q The results show a negative relationship between
board size and firm performance
Bennedsen et al
(2008)
Denmark 1999 6850 firms ROA Board size has significant and negative impact on
firm performance
O’connell &
Cramer (2010)
Republic of
Ireland
2001 44 listed firms RET, Financial Q, ROA Board size exhibits a significant negative association
with firm performance. The relationship is
significantly less negative in smaller firms
Guo & Kga
(2012)
Sri Lanka 2010 174 listed
firms
ROA, Tobin’s Q Board size shows a marginal negative relationship
with firm performance
Ujunwa (2012) Nigeria 1991-2008 122 quoted
firms
ROAE Board size is negatively related with firm
performance
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4.2.3 Empirical studies on the proportion of NEDs-performance
relationship
The appointment of non-executive directors to sit on the board is suggested
to be an effective governance mechanism used to partially reduce the agency
problems in modern firms (Fama, 1980; Lipton and Lorch, 1992; Jensen,
1993). Given the agency theory proposition that boards dominated by
executive directors (insiders) are not accountable to shareholders (Fama,
1980; Sonnenfeld; 2002), the presence of non-executive directors on the
board with their different expertise enhances board decision making process
through their independent mind and judgement (Cadbury, 1992). In this
respect, the non-executive directors are appointed to monitor and advise the
executive directors on behalf of the shareholders of a particular firm. This is
the basis on which most of the codes of best practices developed around the
world to date have recommended the inclusion of non-executive directors on
the board. The key studies with a range of evidence regarding the
relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board
and firm performance are shown in Tables 4-3a-c.
Notwithstanding the important role that the presence of non-executive
directors plays in reducing the notorious agency problems, evidence on the
relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board
and firm performance is mixed (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Daily and Dalton,
1993; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Klein, 1998; Vafeas and Theodorou,
1998; Weir et al, 2002; Bozec, 2005; El Mehdi, 2007; Coles et al, 2008;
Kajola, 2008; Guest, 2009; Sanda et al, 2010, Adams and Mehran, 2012;
Wintoki et al, 2012). Using a sample of 119 US Fortune 500 industrial firms
from 1983 to 1989, Pearce and Zahra (1992) found the proportion of outside
directors to have statistically significant and positive impact on firm
performance measured by ROA, ROE and EPS. Similarly, Daily and Dalton
(1993) reported a statistically significant and positive relationship between
the proportion of outside directors on the board and firm performance in a
sample of 186 US smaller listed firms.
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Also, prior US studies (Coles et al, 2008; Gupta and Fields, 2009) and non-
US studies (Faccio and Lasfer, 1999; Weir et al, 2002; El Mehdi, 2007; Cho
and Kim, 2007, Jackling and Johl, 2009) have reported a positive relationship
between the proportion of non-executive directors and firm performance. In
particular, Weir et al (2002) reported a positive relationship between the
proportion of non-executive directors and firm performance measured by
Tobin’s Q in a sample of 311 UK listed firms from 1994 to 1996. In a sample
of 347 Korean listed firms during 1999, Cho and Kim (2007) found that the
rate of outside directors’ participation is significant and positively related with
firm performance measured by ROA. These findings suggest that boards
dominated by outside directors offer higher performance.
In contrast, Other US studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996)
and non-US studies (Kiel and Nicolson, 2003; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004;
Bozec, 2005 Guest, 2009, Mangena et al, 2012) have reported that the
proportion of non-executive directors representation on the board is
negatively related to firm performance. Using a sample of 25 Canadian firms
from 1976 to 2000, Bozec (2005) found that the relationship between the
proportion of non-executive directors and firm performance is negative.
Similarly, Mangena et al (2012) reported a statistically significant and
negative relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and
firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q, in a sample of 157 Zimbabwean
listed firms from 2000 to 2005. This indicates that the benefit of board
independence, objectivity and experience expected from the representation
of outside directors to influence board decisions appears to hold back
managerial initiative through too much monitoring.
A third group of US studies (Daily and Dalton, 1992; Klein, 1998; Adams and
Mehran; 2012; Wintoki et al, 2012) and non-US studies (Vafeas and
Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and Laing; 2000; Haniffa and
Hudaib, 2006; Ghosh, 2006; Kajola, 2008; Sanda et al, 2010) suggest that
the presence of outside directors on the board has no effect on firm
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performance. For example, Daily and Dalton (1992) observed no relationship
between the proportion of non-executive directors and firm performance
measured by ROA for a sample of 100 US listed firms during 1989. Using a
larger sample of 6000 US firms from 1991 to 2003, Wintoki et al (2012) also
reported no causal relation between board independence and firm
performance measured by ROA. Similarly, the UK studies by Vafeas and
Thoedorou (1998), Laing and Weir (1999) and Weir and Laing (2000) have
found statistically insignificant relationship between the representation of
outside directors on the board and firm performance. In addition, Haniffa and
Hudaib (2006) observed statistically insignificant between the proportion of
outside directors and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA, in a
sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms from 1996 to 2000. Their evidence is
supported by the recent studies by Ghosh (2006), Kajola (2008) and Sanda
et al (2010) who also found no relationship between the presence of outside
directors on the board and firm performance in India and Nigeria
respectively.
In Ghana, the evidence is not different from the general literature. For
example, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a, 2006b) found a negative
association between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board
and Ghanaian listed firms’ performance. By contrast, Abor and Biekpe (2007)
reported a significant positive relationship between the two among SMEs in
Ghana. However, the Ghanaian Code recommends a balance of executive
and non-executive directors on the board to monitor the activities of
management. This means that the inclusion of non-executive directors on the
board should therefore ensure effective monitoring of the executive directors
whose interests are not aligned with shareholders value maximisation. In this
respect, and given the Ghanaian Code provision of firms having a balance of
executive and non-executive directors, the fourth relevant hypothesis is
operationalised in the following form:
Ho4: The higher the proportion of non-executive directors, the lower the
firm performance.
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Even though the representation of non-executive directors on the board is
expected to have a positive impact on firm performance, the evidence from
the literature appears to be highly mixed within and between studies. This is
not surprising because Conyon and Peck (1998a) argued that if outside
directors either hold no shares or hold an insignificant number of shares,
their motivation to monitor the executive directors, and therefore defend the
shareholder interests may be immaterial. This is particular important because
the existence of the board as the most effective internal control mechanism
for monitoring the executive directors’ behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983a)
may not be achieved, and therefore could ultimately lead to poor
performance. Given that a high proportion of non-executive directors with
little or no shareholdings suggest weak monitoring, it is expected in this
thesis to lead to poor firm performance.
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Table 4-3a: Empirical research on the proportion of NEDs-performance relationship in the US
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between the proportion of NEDs and firm performance
Pearce & Zahra
(1992)
1983-1989 450 Fortune 500
firms
ROA, ROE, EPS
Net profit margin (NPM)
Proportion of outside directors is significant and positively
associated with firm performance (ROA, ROE & EPS) but has no
impact on NPM
Daily & Dalton
(1993)
Not given in the
study
186 small listed
firms
ROA, ROE, PER Proportion of outside directors is significant and positively
associated with firm performance
Coles et al
(2008)
1992-2001 8165 firm year
observation from
IRRC
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Larger proportion of NEDs on the board is positively (negatively)
associated with firm performance (Q) in complex (simple) firms.
Gupta & Fields
(2009)
1990-2003 744 listed firms Market Value
Market Value to Equity
ROA, ROE
The announcement of independent NEDs resignation results in
1.22% loss in a firm’s market value. This means that investors’
value board independence as the presence of independent boards
is positively associated with greater monitoring of managerial
behaviour.
Empirical research showing negative relationship between the proportion of NEDs and firm performance
Agrawal &
Knoeber (1996)
1987 400 listed firms Tobin’s Q Greater outside representation of the board lead to poorer firm
performance.
Yermack (1996) 1984-1991 452 large industrial
corporations
Tobin’s Q The proportion of outside directors is statistically significant and
positively related to firm performance
Empirical research showing no relationship between the proportion of NEDs and firm performance
Daily & Dalton
(1992)
1989 100 listed firms ROA Proportion of outside directors has no impact on firm
performance
Klein (1998) 1991-1993 486 firms listed on
S&P 500
ROA,
Market Returns (MR),
Productivity
There is no significant relationship between proportion of NED
and firm performance (ROA & MR) but NED is significant and
negatively associated with firm performance (Productivity)
Adams &
Mehran (2012)
1986-1999 35 listed banks Tobin’s Q
ROA
Proportion of NEDs on the board has no impact on firm
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. But it has a significant and
negative relationship with ROA
Wintoki et al
(2012)
1991-2003 6000 listed firms ROA Find no causal relation between board independence and firm
performance
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Table 4-3b: Empirical research on the proportion of NEDs-performance relationship in the UK
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between NEDs and firm performance
Faccio &Lasfer
(1999)
1996-1997 1650 listed
companies
Q-ratio
ROE, ROA
P/E ratio
Companies with proportion of outside directors on the board
perform better than other companies who do not have
independent board.
Weir et al
(2002)
1994-1996 311 listed
companies
Q-ratio Representation of independent NEDs on the board has significant
and positive relationship with firm performance. This is however
not the case if NEDs are not independent.
Empirical research showing negative relationship between the proportion of NEDs and firm performance
Dulewicz
&Herbert
(2004)
1997-2000 300 questions
were answered by
board chairman
CFROTA
Sales Turnover
The larger the proportion of NEDs the lower was the subsequent
growth of sales. However, there is no significant correlation
between proportion of NEDs and firm performance (CFROTA).
Again, no performance differences were found on either the
Combined Code (1/3) or the Smith (50%).
Guest (2009) 1981-2002 2746 larger sample
size
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Share returns
Proportion of outside directors has significant negative impact on
firm performance variables.
Empirical research showing no relationship between the proportion of NEDs and firm performance
Vafeas &
Theodorou
(1998)
1994 250 Public traded
firms
Market-to-book ratio,
Operating performance/
Total Assets
The findings are that there is insignificant relationship between
the proportion of NEDs and firm performance
Laing & Weir
(1999)
1992 & 1995 115 listed
companies
ROA Statistically insignificant relationship between NEDs
representation and firm performance.
Weir & Laing
(2000)
1992 & 1995 200 listed
companies
ROA
RAW
There is statistically insignificant relationship between proportion
of outside directors on the board and firm performance (ROA)
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Table 4-3c: Empirical research on the proportion of NEDs-performance relationship in other countries
Author (Year) Country
of study
Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between the proportion of NEDs and firm performance
El Mehdi (2007) Tunisia 2000-2005 24 listed
companies
Economic performance
(Marginal Q)
Proportion of outside directors is positively
associated with firm performance
Cho & Kim
(2007)
Korea 1999 347 listed firms ROA The rate of outside directors participation is
significant and positively associated with firm
performance (ROA)
Jacking & Johl
(2009)
India 2006 180 listed firms Tobin’s Q
ROA
Proportion of outside directors has positive and
significant impact on firm performance
Empirical research showing negative relationship between the proportion of NEDs and firm performance
Kiel & Nicolson
(2003)
Australia 1996 348 listed
companies
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Proportion of outside directors is significant and
negatively associated with firm performance (Tobin’s
Q) but has no relationship with ROA
Bozec (2005) Canada 1976-2000 25 SOE ROS, ROA, NIE
Sales Efficiency
Asset turnover
The higher the proportion of outside directors, the
lower the firm performance as measured by ROS,
ROA & NIE
Mangena et al
(2012)
Zimbabwe 2000-2005 Total 157 listed
firms
Tobin’s Q Proportion of outside directors is statistically
significant and negative relationship with firm
performance.
Empirical research showing no relationship between the proportion of NEDs and firm performance
Haniffa &
Hudaib (2006)
Malaysia 1996-2000 347 listed
companies
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Proportion of outside directors has no impact on firm
performance (Tobin’s Q & ROA)
Ghosh (2006) India 2003 127 listed
manufacturing
firms
ROA
Adjusted Tobin’s Q
Proportion of outside directors has no significant
impact on firm performance measured by ROA &
Adjusted Tobin’s Q
Kajola (2008) Nigeria 2000-2006 20 listed
companies
ROE
Profit margin (PM)
Proportion of outside directors has no significant
impact on firm performance
Sanda et al
(2010)
Nigeria 1996-1999 93 listed firms Tobin’s Q
ROA, ROE
P/E Ratio
Larger proportion of outside directors has no impact
on firm performance. This is however not the case for
firms with smaller size of NEDs as they perform
better than those with larger NEDs.
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4.2.4 Empirical board committees-performance relationship studies
Previous literature suggests that the establishment of board committees in a
particular firm is an effort to help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
the board in discharging their duties (Jiraporn et al, 2009). Of particular
interest to this thesis are the audit, remuneration and nomination
committees whose functions are well considered as important by the
worldwide corporate governance reforms. Notwithstanding its usefulness,
corporate governance theorists view board committees from a different
perspective. One notable argument is that the creation of board committees
can affect firm performance positively (Wild, 1994; Sun and Cahan, 2009).
This view is supported by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) who also argued
that these committees have the time to meet frequently due to the small size
and are able to make decisions quicker than the main board for
implementation. By contrast, Vefeas (1999b) is of the view that the creation
of board committees add extra costs resulted from management time, travel
expenses and additional fees paid to the members of the committees. He
concluded that these board committees can have negative effect on firm
performance, a finding supported by McKnight and Weir (2009) who reported
that the adoption of a formal nomination committee increases agency cost.
Arguably, the existence of board committees may improve corporate
accountability, legitimacy and credibility by performing specific functions
(Weir et al, 2002). In this respect, and given the focus of this thesis on audit,
remuneration and nomination committees, the functions of these board
committees in an attempt to minimise the agency problems with the ultimate
improvement in firm performance are very important. For example, the main
function of the audit committee is to have frequent meetings with the firm’s
internal and external auditors to review its financial statements, audit
process and internal accounting control systems. This is particularly
important because it helps to minimise the agency costs by facilitating timely
release of unbiased accounting information by managers to shareholders
(Klein, 1998). Furthermore, the effective monitoring by the audit committee
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may also help to reduce financial fraud which may ultimately improve firm
performance.
On the other hand, the principal function of the remuneration committee is to
determine and re-evaluate the nature and amount of compensation paid to
the directors and senior officers. By creating and implementing compensation
schemes and incentives in an attempt to better align the interests of
managers and shareholders may help in reducing the agency problems
(Klein, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000). This is particularly important because
including, for example, share options and bonuses in the managers’
compensation packages may re-align their interests with the shareholders. It
is therefore argued in this thesis that the managerial ownership and payment
of bonuses as part of managers’ remuneration may help to improve firm
performance. The nomination committee key function is to nominate
candidates for the possible appointment to the board. This is also particularly
important because it helps to reduce the agency problems by enhancing
board independence and the quality of appointed directors.
Fundamentally, significant work exists on the impact of board committees in
the context of their primary role. For example, extensive research has been
undertaken in the context of audit committees characteristics and the quality
of financial reporting (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Beasley
et al, 2000; Klein, 2002; Abbort et al, 2004) as well as the remuneration
committees and pay-performance relationship (e.g. Main and Johnston,
1993; Conyon and Peck, 1998b; Ezzamel and Watson, 2002; Johnston,
2005). However, and as can be seen from Tables 4-4a-c, the empirical
literature concerning the relationship between the establishment of board
committees and firm performance is limited (Laing and Weir, 1999).
Consistent with the theoretical literature, the empirical evidence on board
committees-performance relationship is mixed (Wild, 1994; Klein, 1998;
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999; Bozec, 2005; Black and
Kim, 2012). Using a sample of 260 US listed firms from 1966 to 1980, Wild
(1994) investigated the market reaction before and after the establishment
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of audit committees. He reported a statistically significant improvement in
share returns following the establishment of audit committees, indicating that
the presence of audit committees can improve managerial accountability to
shareholders. Using a sample of 115 UK listed firms during 1992 and 1995,
Laing and Weir (1999) observed that the presence of audit and remuneration
committees do positively affect firm performance measured by ROA.
In contrast, and unlike Laing and Weir (1999), prior studies have failed to
find consistent evidence between board committees and firm performance
(Bozec, 2005; Black and Kim, 2012; Lam and Lee, 2012). Using a sample of
25 Canadian firms from 1976 to 2000, Bozec (2005) found the presence of
audit committees to have a negative impact on firm performance. However,
he found the presence of nomination committees to have a positive impact
on firm performance. Recent evidence by Black and Kim (2012) in Korean
658 large public firms and 611 smaller firms found nomination and audit
committees to have a statistically significant and positive impact on large
public firms’ performance but not smaller firms. They however observed that
remuneration committees have no impact on both large and smaller firms’
performance. Consistent with Black and Kim (2012), Lam and Lee (2012)
examined the relationship between board committees and firm performance
in a sample of 346 Hong Kong public listed firms from 2001 to 2003 and
found a statistically significant and positive relationship between the
presence of nomination committees and firm performance. At the same time
however they found a statistically significant and negative relationship
between the presence of compensation committees and firm performance.
A third group of US studies (Klein, 1998) and non-US studies (Vafeas and
Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al, 2002; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Kajola,
2008) have indicated no empirical relationship between board committees
and firm performance. Klein (1998) investigated the relationship between the
presence of audit, compensation and nomination committees and firm
performance but reported no statistically significant relationship in a sample
of 486 US firms from 1991 to 1993. Similarly, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998)
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examined the effect of audit; remuneration and nomination committees on
the performance of 250 UK listed firms during 1994 but observed no
evidence to support the proposition that the presence of these three board
committees significantly enhanced firm performance. Recent evidence by
Weir et al (2002) and Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) in the UK have also found
no significant impact of board committees on firm performance. Also, Kajola
(2008) reported no significant relationship between the presence of audit
committees and performance in a sample of 20 Nigerian listed firms from
2000 to 2006.
In Ghana, Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu (2008) reported that the presence
of audit committees is beneficial to the performance of SMEs. However, there
is no available evidence regarding the impact of the establishment of board
committees on Ghanaian listed firms’ performance. Given that the Ghanaian
Code recommends the establishment of an audit committee and a
remuneration committee in order to improve the effectiveness of the
Ghanaian listed firms’ board operations, the fifth relevant hypothesis is
operationalised in the following form:
Ho5: The presence of an audit committee and a remuneration committee
should lead to better firm performance.
Arguably, the impact of the presence of board committees on firm
performance is still not clear as the research in this area is at its emergent
stage (Dalton et al, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999). However, and given the
important functions of the board committees in an attempt to help reduce
the agency problems, provide an interesting area for further research. This is
particularly important in developing country context as it may help to provide
further insights on the board committees-performance relationship. It is
therefore argued in this thesis that the presence of audit and remuneration
committees in the Ghanaian listed firms could help to reduce the agency
costs and expected to have a positive impact on firm performance.
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Table 4-4a: Empirical research on board committees-performance relationship in the US
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between board committees and firm performance
Wild (1994) 1966-1980 260 listed
companies
Share returns There is a statistically improvement following the establishment
of an audit committee. Overall, the audit committee enhances
both managerial accountability to shareholders as well as an
effective corporate governance mechanism
Vafeas (1999b) 1994 606 listed
companies
Board quality There is a positive association between nomination committee
and board of directors’ quality. This means that directors’ quality
impacts decision making process which will have a positive effect
on firm performance.
Empirical research showing no relationship between board committees and firm performance
Klein (1998) 1991-1993 485 (1992) S&P
firms & 486 (1993)
S&P 500 firms
ROA
Productivity
Market returns
Audit committee is not statistically significant associated with firm
performance. Remuneration committee on the other hand is
significant and positively associated with firm performance
(Productivity & Market returns) but not statistically strong.
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Table 4.4b: Empirical research on board committees-performance relationship in the UK
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between board committees and firm performance
Laing & Weir
(1999)
1992 & 1995 115 listed
companies
ROA Audit and remuneration committees do positively affect firm
performance
Weir &Laing
(2000)
1992 & 1995 200 listed
companies for each
year
ROA
RAW (market-based
measures)
The presence of remuneration committee is significant and
positively associated with firm performance (RAW)
Empirical research showing negative relationship between board committees and firm performance
Main &
Johnston
(1993)
1990 220 large public
held British
companies
Executive pay The presence of a remuneration committee is associated with
higher levels of the executive pay which effectively reduces
profitability.
Empirical research showing no relationship between board committees and firm performance
Vafeas &
Theodorou
(1998)
1994 250 Public traded
firms
Market-to-book ratio
Operating
performance/total
assets
The presence of board committees has no impact on firm
performance.
Weir et al
(2002)
1994-1996 311 listed firms Q Ratio The presence of audit committee has no impact on firm
performance.
Dulewicz &
Herbert (2004)
1997 300 question
answered by board
chairman
CFROTA
Sales turnover
No statistically differences in firm performance (CFROTA or Sales
turnover) between boards with audit and remuneration
committees and those that did not have one.
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Table 4-4c: Empirical research on board committees-performance relationship in other countries
Author (Year) Country
of study
Study period Sample size Performance variable Summary results
Empirical research showing positive relationship between board committees and firm performance
Black & Kim
(2012)
Korea 1998-2004 658 public listed
firms & 611
smaller firms
Tobin’s Q Nomination and audit committees are found to have
significant positive impact on large public firms’
performance but not smaller firms. However,
compensation committee has no impact on both
large public firms and smaller firms
Lam & Lee
(2012
Hong
Kong
2001-2003 346 public listed
firms
ROA, ROE, ROCE, MTBV Nomination committee is found to have significant
positive impact on firm performance. However, a
remuneration committee has a significant negative
impact on firm performance
Empirical research showing negative relationship between board committees and firm performance
Bozec (2005) Canada 1976-2000 25 SOE ROS, ROA, NIE
Sales efficiency
Assets Turnover
The presence of audit committee has a negative
relationship with firm performance. However,
nomination committee has a positive impact on sales
efficiency, NIE & assets turnover.
Empirical research showing no relationship between board committees and firm performance
Kajola ( 2008) Nigeria 2000-2006 20 listed
companies
ROE
Profit Margin (PM)
The presence of audit committee has no significant
impact on firm performance measured by ROE & PM
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The objective of this first section of the chapter was to provide a review of
the theoretical and empirical literature on the specific governance
mechanisms-performance relationship as the foundation. This approach is
fundamental and in particular, prior researchers have extensively undertaken
research by using these mechanisms with highly mixed results. In this
respect, a major criticism of the specific governance mechanisms is that its
purpose of reducing the agency problem might not be achieved if corporate
governance provisions are adopted selectively. Indeed, Diacon and O’Sullivan
(1995) reported that some governance mechanisms are more effective than
others in promoting profitability, suggesting that not all the specific
governance mechanisms recommended by the progressive worldwide
corporate governance reforms on their own may be beneficial to firm
performance. Instead, the adoption of a set of governance mechanisms may
be more effective in reducing the agency problem than the selective adoption
of these mechanisms because they may be interrelated in order for it to be
more effective and useful for the purpose of reducing the agency problems.
In particular, and as will be explained in chapter five, a set of the specific
governance mechanisms developed into governance index covers several
mechanism (Brown and Caylor, 2006) which may have the advantage of
more explanatory power in explaining firm performance than each of the
specific governance mechanisms (Core, 2001). In the next section, prior
studies based on a set of governance mechanisms developed into a single
index are reviewed in order to ascertain whether it provides more consistent
evidence in enhancing firm performance or not.
4.3 GOVERNANCE INDEX-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP STUDIES
The previous section has shown highly mixed results in respect of the specific
governance mechanisms-performance relationship, suggesting that not all
the specific governance mechanisms in isolation are effective in reducing the
notorious agency problems. However, the seminal work of Black (2001) on
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governance index-performance relationship in Russia and that of Gompers et
al (2003) in the US are a case example where they all reported a statistically
significant and positive relationship between their governance index and firm
performance. Recently, Padgett and Shabbir (2008) argued that firm
performance is affected holistically by a set of specific governance
mechanisms but not on an individual basis. This emerging approach focuses
on and reinforces the development of a corporate governance index (CGI) by
integrating the available corporate governance provisions into compliance or
non-compliance indices to investigate governance-performance relationship.
In this respect, is there any evidence by this emerging approach to suggest a
consistent positive and statistically significant association between CGI and
firm performance or not? This section reviews governance index-performance
relationship studies. The review has been structured under three main
themes based on the World Bank (2009) classification of developed and
developing countries. First, governance index-performance studies in the
developed countries have been covered in subsection 4.3.1. Second,
subsection 4.3.2 focuses on studies in the developing countries governance
index-performance relationship studies. The third strand of governance
index-performance relationship in subsection 4.3.3 presents comparative
studies on a mixture of developed and developing countries as well as those
in the developed countries.
4.3.1 Governance index-performance studies in developed countries
A majority of prior studies on governance index-performance relationship are
mainly carried out in the developed countries with the US topping the list of
studies with more than any other country worldwide. This may be particularly
due to the availability of governance data through commercial rating
agencies in the country. This subsection has separated the governance
index-performance relationship into North America, European and other
developed countries studies as follows.
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North America studies
Labelle (2002) is among the first researchers to examine corporate
governance disclosure quality-performance relationship using a sample size
of 162 and 132 listed firms in Canada for the 1996 and 1997 study period.
The author used the ratings on a statement of corporate governance
practices (SCGP) published by the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants (CICA) to benchmark the disclosure quality of corporate
governance. Using logistic regression as a method of estimation, the findings
suggest no consistent and significant relationship between disclosure quality
of corporate governance and firm performance measured by ROE. By
contrast, Klein et al (2005) find that effective compensation, disclosure and
shareholder rights sub-indices have a positive impact on firm performance
measured by Tobin’s Q using a larger sample size of 263 listed firms. They
however found no evidence that a total governance index affects firm
performance. This is mainly because of the board independence sub-index
failure to have any positive impact as the most heavily-weighted sub-index
and they noted that not all measured governance is important as the effects
do differ by ownership category.
Consistently, some recent studies in Canada have also failed to find any
relationship between governance index and firm performance (Gupta et al,
2009; Bozec et al, 2010). Specifically, Gupta et al (2009) examined the
association between governance index or sub-indices and firm performance
using data for the 2002 through to 2005 study period. The authors used the
Globe and Mail’s Report on Business corporate governance index of 158
common listed firms of four year time series data with board competency,
board and CEO compensation, shareholder rights and disclosure as its
dimensions for the study. As noted earlier, their study does not find any
association between the governance index or sub-indices and firm
performance measured by Tobin’s Q, MTBV, ROA and stock returns. Bozec et
al (2010) also re-examined the governance index-performance relationship
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using technical efficiency measures over a five year period from 2001 to
2005 inclusive. Similar to the work of Gupta et al (2009), the authors used
the same governance index or sub-indices from the Global and Mail Report
on Business published each year with firm performance measured by using
data envelopment analysis (DEA) for technical efficiency and Tobin’s Q. The
findings indicate that variation in firm level corporate governance
mechanisms is significant in variation of firm technical efficiency. Further, a
panel data analysis also shows a positive impact of board composition, board
and CEO compensation and disclosure sub-indices on firm technical
efficiency. But consistent with the above Canadian studies, the evidence
suggests no association between the total governance index and firm
performance measured by Tobin’s Q.
In the US and contrary to the Canadian studies, Gompers et al (2003)
henceforth GIM in their study find a strong relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q, NPM, ROE and
sales growth. The authors created a governance index (G-Index) with 24
governance rules to proxy for shareholder rights based on corporate
governance provisions of 1500 large listed firms published by Investor
Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) from 1990 to 1998. Their evidence
suggests that firms with higher shareholder rights are associated with higher
market valuation, and have higher profits, higher sales growth and lower
capital expenditure. They noted that those democratic firms outperformed
their dictatorship counterparts by a statistically significant of 8.5% per year
and further concluded that poor governance causes agency costs. In
strengthening the evidence of GIM, Cremers and Nair (2005) investigated
how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder
activism (internal governance) interact to influence firm performance
measured by abnormal returns, ROE, ROA and NPM using 1500 listed firms
from 1990 to 2001. Their findings suggest that internal and external
governance mechanisms are complementary in being associated with firm
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performance and that firms with better corporate governance provide
superior share returns and are valued higher by the US stock market.
Following that, Bebchuk et al (2009) hereafter BCF examined what matters in
corporate governance by also using corporate governance provisions
published by IRRC in their study. The authors constructed an entrenchment
index (E-Index) with six provisions11 from the 24 provisions used by GIM but
extended the study period from 1990 to 2003 with a sample size ranging
from 1400 to 1800. Using fixed effects as a method of estimation, they
reported that increases in the E-Index during the sample period are
associated with decreases in firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. As
indicated earlier, they extended their study by exploring the extent to which
the six provisions in the E-Index are responsible for the negative association
between the IRRC provisions and stock returns in the 1990s. In this respect,
the evidence suggests that the E-Index is negatively correlated to abnormal
returns both during the 1990 to 1999 in line with the study of GIM and
during the longer period from 1990 to 2003. However, the remaining
eighteen IRRC provisions not in the E-Index were found to be uncorrelated
with either reduced firm valuation or negative abnormal returns.
By contrast, other studies in the US have struggled to find consistent
evidence by using the G-Index and the E-Index constructed by GIM and BCF.
This has cast serious doubt on the validity of their evidence regarding the
positive relationship between corporate governance and firm performance
(Core et al, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 2009; Fodor and Diavatopoulos,
2010). For example, Core et al (2006) investigated whether weak
governance cause weak stock returns using the G-Index but with an
extended study period from 1990 to 2003. Using 9,917 firm-year observation
and a time series regression analysis, the authors find that the G-Index has a
significant negative relationship with future firm performance measured by
11 These provisions include staggered board, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden
parachutes, and super majority requirements for mergers and charter amendments.
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ROA. In this respect, their evidence confirms the finding of GIM that higher
G-Index has greater agency costs. They also investigated the GIM finding
that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant stock market
underperformance. But contrary to the GIM finding, analysts forecast and
earning announcement returns show no evidence that this announcement
surprises the market. They further noted that abnormal stock returns for
firms with weak shareholder rights are somewhat greater than returns for
strong governance firms. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) also focused on the GIM
(G-Index) and BCF (E-Index) but added board index, ownership index and
CEO duality index to shed light on the relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q and stock
returns. They reported that better governance as measured by GIM and BCF
indices, stock ownership, board matters and CEO-Chair separation are
significantly and positively related to operating performance. They however
noted that none of the governance measures is associated with future stock
returns. This evidence is contrary to the claims in the work of GIM and BCF
but confirms the finding of Core et al (2006) discussed earlier.
Of particular importance to this thesis, and given the passage of SOX during
2002, Bhagat and Bolton (2009) examined the relationship between
corporate governance and firm performance for the period 1998 to 2007. The
authors separated the sample into pre 2002 and post 2002 periods to study
how governance index-performance relationships might have been affected
by the passage of SOX. Using the G-Index of GIM and E-Index of BCF as the
most popular indices for their pre 2002 and post 2002 study, the authors
found a negative association between these indices and firm performance
during 1998 to 2001, the results found to be consistent with the earlier
studies by GIM and BCF. However, this is not the case during post 2002,
where the G-Index suggests a positive and significant association with firm
performance during 2003 to 2007. The E-Index also on the other hand
suggests an inconsistent association with firm performance during 2003 to
2007. These findings indicate that the time period of a particular study may
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have an impact on its outcome. This is because the GIM and BCF indices
used may not reflect the actual governance practices given the passage of
SOX and therefore the inconsistent results.
Unlike Bhagat and Bolton (2009) whose study period spanned from 1998 to
2007, Fodor and Diavatopoulos (2010) also re-examined the findings of GIM
and BCF for the study period 1990 to 2007 with the G-Index and E-Index
also used as the corporate governance variables. Their evidence suggests
that the association between the indices (G-Index and E-Index) and firm
performance measured by stock returns is weaker than previously suggested
over the 1990 to 1999 by GIM and BCF. In extending the sample period, they
reported a reversal (negative) association between the indices and firm
performance during 2000 to 2007. Again, sorting firms into portfolios by G-
Index (E-Index) score with monthly returns over the period 2000 to 2007
provides no evidence for superior performance of firms with low G-Index (E-
Index) scores as documented by GIM (BCF). Consistent with the work of
Bhagat and Bolton (2009), the results indicate that the relationships may be
specific to time periods of the studies. As explained earlier, the GIM and BFC
indices may not be a representative of governance practices during 2000 to
2007 and therefore were not able to explain firm performance.
In a significant departure from IRRC corporate governance data as an input
for the development of the G-Index and E-Index for US studies, Brown and
Caylor (2006) created GOV-Scores based on the data of the largest corporate
governance data provider to institutional investors, institutional shareholder
services (ISS) with 51 firm-specific provisions representing both internal and
external governance. Using the sample size of 1868 listed firms from 2002 to
2003, the GOV-Score is found to be significant and positively related to firm
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Also, they suggested that the GOV-7
fully drives the relation between the GOV-Scores and firm performance, the
results which is consistent with BCF E-Index that a small subset of factors
fully drives the association between IRRC corporate governance data and
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firm performance. Similarly, and consistent with Cremers and Nair (2005),
they showed that internal and external governance matter in influencing firm
performance in the US. More importantly, the study used different database
and time periods than previous studies but they confirm past evidence that
the absence of staggered board and poison pills are statistically significant
and positively associated with firm performance.
In contrasting the findings of the governance index-performance
relationships studies mainly based on ISS corporate governance database,
Epps and Cereola (2008) queried whether ISS corporate governance ratings
reflect on firm’s performance for 2002 to 2004 study period in the US. Using
the actual corporate governance ratings received by a firm and accounting-
based performance measured by ROA and ROE, the authors reported that
there is no predicted effect of corporate governance ratings on firm
performance. They cautioned investors to remember that a good governance
rating does not guarantee better firm performance. In another development,
Bauer et al (2010) investigated whether corporate governance matters to the
US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) performance by using ISS corporate
governance database. In this respect, they find a statistically significant and
positive association between CGI and firm performance for over 5000 firms
during 2003 to 2005. The authors however could not find any relationship
between the 220 REITs firms drawn from the original sample and firm
performance. Further, the control sample of REIT selected from the G-Index
sample failed to show any association with firm performance. But, they
contend that the partial lack of association between corporate governance
and performance in the real estate sector might be due to the REIT effect.
Another group of studies in the US have used a mixture or different rating
agencies to test the governance index-firm performance relationship but with
mixed results (Larcker et al, 2007; Erthugul and Hedge, 2009; Spellman and
Watson, 2009; Daines et al, 2010). For example, Larcker et al (2007)
attempted to provide an explanatory inquiry into the dimensions of corporate
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governance and its effect on firm performance. The authors used governance
data from Equilar, Spectrum data files, Compustat and TrueCourse with ROA,
NPM and sales growth as performance measures. Using a larger sample size
of 2,106 listed firms from 2002 to 2003 study period, they reported a
positive association between the governance index and firm performance. By
contrast, Erthugul and Hedge (2009) examined the corporate governance
ratings provided by the premier US agencies and their effect on firm
performance. The rating agencies used include The Corporate Library (TCL),
ISS, Governance Metrics International (GMI) and S&P with stock returns as
the performance measure from 2003 to 2005. Their study focused on
whether rating a firm’s corporate governance practices predicts its future
performance but concluded that the summary scores are generally poor
predictors of primary and secondary measures of performance. Specifically,
they find that the TCL and ISS ratings are negatively related to the future
firm performance of the rated firms. This is not the case for GMI ratings
where there is a positive association between GMI ratings and future firm
performance of the rated firms. In this respect, it may argue that the
methodology used by each rating agency may be different and therefore
have a different impact on firm performance across the rated firms.
In a related study, Spellman and Watson (2009) evaluate the claims made
by GMI that their corporate governance ratings produced from 2003 onwards
are useful to shareholders in assessing future firm performance during 2003
to 2008. Using a sample size between 1002 to 1742 listed firms for the study
period, their findings suggest that the GMI ratings is statistically significant
and positively associated with both past shareholder returns, accounting
returns and future shareholder returns. They further noted that high and
medium GMI portfolios significantly outperformed the low GMI scoring
portfolio over the five year study period. Similarly, Daines et al (2010)
examined whether commercially available corporate governance rankings
provide useful information for shareholders for the 2005 to 2009 study
period. Using the ratings produced by Accounting and Governance Risk
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(AGR), ISS, GMI and TCL, the authors findings suggest that these ratings
have either limited or no success in predicting firm performance or other
outcomes of interest to shareholders. Specifically and unlike the ISS, GMI
and TCL ratings, they find stronger and predictive evidence for the
governance rating produced by AGR on both future operating performance
and excess stock price returns.
Fundamentally, the governance index-performance relationship evidence
from North America has provided mixed results which may be attributed to
the way these indices are developed. In particular, studies in Canada have
failed to provide any relationship between governance index and firm
performance relative to the US where there is evidence of a positive and
statistically significant association between the two in some cases. The
inconsistent evidence in North America may be due to lack of code of best
practices of which the sample firms’ governance practices are benchmarked.
Although, and as can be seen from the review, researchers have mainly used
commercial rating agencies governance data, and in some cases the indices
developed by GIM and BCF, the governance data from rating agencies are
not used in this thesis for two reasons. First, there is no readily available
data from rating agencies in Ghana where this thesis is based. Second, since
this thesis intends to investigate the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian
Code, employing the methodology used by these rating agencies, GIM and
BCF who integrated corporate governance practices not based on code of
best practices will not achieve the objective of this thesis. In particular, the
subjective nature of the independent professionals involved in the corporate
governance data gathering by the rating agencies may account for error and
bias in relation to the firms included. As will be explained in chapter five, the
development of the GCGI will be based on the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code from the Ghanaian listed firms’ annual reports.
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European studies
Due to the inadequate corporate governance data in Europe from the
commercial rating agencies, very limited studies have been conducted on
governance index-performance relationship compared with their North
American counterparts where data on corporate governance variables are
readily available from commercial rating agencies. In Europe, one of the first
of these studies was conducted in Germany, where Drobetz et al (2004)
investigated whether differences in the quality of firm-level corporate
governance can also help to explain firm performance with a sample size of
91 listed firms from 1998 to 2002. They developed a corporate governance
rating (CGR) using questionnaire survey based on the recommendations of
the Germany Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) which can be voluntarily
adopted by a particular firm’s management. The dimensions incorporated in
the CGR include corporate governance commitment, shareholder rights,
transparency, management supervisory, board matters and auditing with
Tobin’s Q and MTBV used as performance measures. Consistent with GIM,
the authors documented a positive relationship between CGR and firm
performance. In other words, better corporate governance is highly
correlated with better operating performance, higher stock returns and
higher market valuation. Further, the study indicates that for the median firm
a one standard deviation increase in the governance rating results a 24%
change in the value of Tobin’s Q.
By contrast, Bassen et al (2008) recent evidence in Germany suggests that
compliance with the GCGC is significant and negatively related to firm
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Unlike Drobetz et al (2004), the authors
ranked 100 listed firms corporate governance practices based on the publicly
available information such as annual report, declaration of conformity with
GCGC, agenda of the general meetings, charter of the firm and its website
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during 2005. They however contend that three12 of the eleven
recommendations with the lowest compliance rates by the GCGC have no
relationship with any firm performance variables (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, MTBV
and stock returns) used in the study at all. But a significant positive
(negative) association between four13 (four)14 of the recommendations was
established. The differences in the findings of Drobetz et al (2004) and
Bassen et al (2008) in the same country may be due to the methodology
used to develop the governance index. In this respect, Drobetz et al (2004)
used questionnaire surveys to gather the governance data while Bassen et al
(2008) used the binary objective questions with great reliance on the publicly
available corporate governance information for the development of the
governance index. This suggests that there may be some measurement error
or bias in the methodology used by one of the studies and this might have
accounted for the inconsistent results.
In Switzerland, Beiner et al (2006) used a broad CGI and additional variables
related to ownership structure, board characteristics and leverage to examine
their relationship with firm performance. Using the same corporate
governance dimensions and methodology as in the case of Drobetz et al
(2004), their developed CGI is based on responses to a detailed
questionnaire, which was largely based on the suggestions and
recommendations of the Swiss Code of Best Practices with Tobin’s Q as the
firm performance measure. The findings support the widespread hypothesis
12 The recommendations with no relationship and firm performance include: (1) fixed and performance
related compensation for supervisory board members, (2) disclosure of payments to the supervisory board
individually or agencies shall be listed separately, and (3) the 90 or 45 days requirement of the publication
of the firm’s financial statements or interim reports at the financial year end.
13 The recommendations with a positive relationship and firm performance include: (1) compensation of the
management board shall be related to demanding and relevant comparison parameters, (2) disclosure of
individual members of the management board compensation in the consolidated Financial statements, (3)
An age limit for the members of the Management Board shall be specified, and (4) the components of the
members of the Supervisory Board compensation shall be reported in the financial statements.
14 The recommendations with a negative relationship and firm performance include: (1) Directors and
Officers liability insurance with an agreed suitable deduction, (2) a cap on the members of the Management
Board compensation shall be agreed for by the Supervisory Board, (3) The election of the members of the
Supervisory Board shall take into account the activities of the enterprise, potential conflict of interest and
age limit, and (4) The Chair and the Deputy Chair shall determine the compensation of the members of the
Supervisory Board.
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of a positive association between CGI and firm performance. In this respect,
a one-point increase of the CGI causes an increase of the market
capitalisation by roughly 8.5% on an average of a firm’s asset book value.
More importantly, the evidence of the positive association between the Swiss
CGI and firm performance is consistent with their German study with the
same methodology used to develop the CGI.
Following comply or explain philosophy in the UK, Arcot and Bruno (2007)
investigated the effects of corporate governance on firm performance in the
context of a flexible regulatory regime. The authors assumed that non-
compliant with better explanation of the 1998 Combined Code are the same
as compliant with the code. In this respect, they manually constructed a
compliant and non-compliant index by hand collecting details of both
compliance and explanation for non-compliance from 245 listed firms’ annual
report for the 1999 to 2004 study period. They reported that firms departing
from best practices for valid reasons perform exceptionally well and
outperformed the fully compliant ones. In other words, a mere compliance
with the 1998 Combined Code provisions does not necessary result in better
firm performance in the UK. This evidence supports the study in the US
where Epps and Cereola (2008) caution investors that good governance
ratings does not guarantee better firm performance.
Padgett and Shabbir (2008) also investigated the link between compliance
with the UK code of corporate governance and firm performance from 2000
to 2003 inclusive. Taking a more holistic view of corporate governance, they
developed a non-compliance index for a panel of FTSE 350 firms with a total
shareholder returns (TSR), Q-ratio, ROA and ROE as performance measures
in the study. The non-compliance index is based on the UK 1998 corporate
governance code where 0 is a perfect compliance and 12 is complete non
compliance for 478 total firm-year observations. Their objective was to look
at the compliance of the code in a holistic approach to governance but not an
isolated mechanism. They hold that compliance of the UK code matters, not a
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box ticking exercise but a real change in the governance of listed companies
for which investors are prepared to pay a premium for shares of those
companies who have good governance structures in place. In particular, the
findings suggest that the non-compliance index is inversely related to the
TSR, implying that more compliant firms enjoy higher TSR in the sample
firms.
Using the UK Combined Code 2003 for their study, Clacher et al (2008)
investigated the impact of internal governance structures on firm
performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q during 2003 to 2005. The
authors manually constructed a governance index from 63 FTSE 100 listed
firms with board structure, disclosure, ownership, shareholder rights and
compensation as its dimensions. The results suggest that corporate
governance is an important determinant of firm performance in the UK. The
authors further reported that firms with more formal governance structures,
that is, a greater degree of compliance with the recommendations of the
Combined Code 2003, receive a higher market valuation, have better
performance and lower levels of investment expenditure. But it is suggested
that not all governance attributes of the firm have the same impact on
performance. In particular, and consistent with prior studies (Durnev and
Kim, 2005; Zheka, 2006; Cheung et al, 2007), disclosure sub-index has a
positive and significant relationship with firm performance, while ownership
and remuneration policies improves firm performance but not significant.
They noted that compliant with the Combined Code 2003 recommendations
overall improves resource allocation efficiency and enhances shareholder
value through lower information asymmetry and weaker agency problems.
In a further study in the UK, Shabbir (2008) also investigated how firms
change their compliance with corporate governance practices over time with
particular emphasis on the associated factors for these changes during 2000
to 2003. Similar to the work of Padgett and Shabbir (2008), the author
developed a non-compliance index from 337 firm-year observations with
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earning before interest and taxation (EBIT) and market returns as
performance measures. The evidence indicates that the better the
performance in the preceding year, the lesser the compliance with corporate
governance in the current year and vice versa, implying that the UK firms
take corporate governance seriously when they are underperforming.
Specifically, firms became compliant following the decline in their market
returns as well as operating performance for the study period 2000 to 2003.
In Greece, Toudas and Karathanassis (2007) investigated compliance of
corporate governance effect on firm performance from 2004 to 2005 for 262
quoted firms on the Athens stock exchange. They developed a governance
index based on questionnaire surveys and focus on whether shareholder
rights are restricted or not by using a number of provisions promulgated by
the European and the US regulators. In this respect, they classified the firms
into democracies, semi-democracies and dictatorships and reported higher
Tobin’s Q ratio for democracies followed by semi-democracies and
dictatorships. In particular, the evidence suggests that good corporate
governance as measured by shareholder rights appear to be positively
related to Tobin’s Q as opposed to a significant negative association with
abnormal returns for shareholder-friendly firms and manager-friendly firms.
Arguably, and unlike the North American studies discussed earlier where the
commercial rating agencies governance data are available, the European
governance index-performance relationship studies have focused on
researcher-developed governance index. When compared the results with
North America studies, there is more consistent evidence indicating a positive
impact of better corporate governance on firm performance in Europe. This
suggests that the objective of the development of code of best practices has
been achieved in Europe relative to the North American counterpart. The
differences in findings might not be surprising as the researcher-developed
governance indices used in Europe relies greatly on a particular country’s
code on corporate governance. Given the unavailability of commercial rating
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agencies governance data in Ghana, and following the European studies, this
thesis employs the researcher-development governance index methodology
with great reliance on the Ghanaian Code for the development of the GCGI
from the Ghanaian listed firms’ annual reports.
Other developed countries
Miyajima (2005) investigated the performance effects and determinants of
corporate governance reform in Japan for the study period 2001 to 2002.
Through the administration of questionnaires, the author created a corporate
governance score (CGS) with 26 measures and found that a high CGS is
associated with better performance. Also, grouping the sample size of 755
listed firms into quartiles according to the CGS, the findings suggest that the
higher the CGS, the higher the average of Q (ROA) and the standardised Q
(ROA). In their study in Hong Kong, Cheung et al (2007) examined whether
there is a relation between corporate governance and firm performance.
Using a sample size of 168 largest listed firms, they rated corporate
governance practices based on the revised OECD 2004 principles of corporate
governance with shareholder rights, equitable treatment of shareholders,
disclosure and transparency, board responsibility and composition as its
dimensions. Their evidence suggests that the CGI is positively related to firm
performance but noted that disclosure and transparency sub-index drives the
relationship with firm performance measured by ROE and MTBV.
Chen et al (2007) also tested the relationship between ownership/leadership
structure and firm performance for firms listed in Taiwan from 1992 to 2007.
The authors constructed a governance index based on four different aspects
of a firm’s corporate governance structure including CEO duality, size of the
board of directors, managerial shareholdings and block shareholdings. Using
3233 firm-year observation, they reported that firms under strong
governance measured by the index outperformed those under weak
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governance. In Australia, Henry (2008) has provided evidence regarding the
likely impact of the release of the principles of good corporate governance
and best practice recommendations by the ASX corporate governance council
in March 2003 using 116 listed firms for the study period 1992 to 2002. The
author developed a governance index based on the recommendations by the
ASX from listed firms’ annual reports with Tobin’s Q used as performance
measure. Consistent with prior studies, he reported a statistically significant
and positive association between the developed governance index and firm
performance. Similarly, Cui et al (2008) investigated the relationship
between CGS and firm performance during pre 2003 and post 2003
introduction of the ASX principles of good corporate governance and best
practice recommendations. The authors developed a CGS based on the
corporate governance ratings provided by the Horwath Report for both pre
(2001) and post (2004) from the 100 largest listed firms with MTBV and ROA
used as performance measures. Contrary to Henry (2008) evidence, their
findings show no association between CGS and firm performance during
2001. But a positive association was established between CGS and firm
performance during 2004, where a higher ranking is associated with better
performance during 2004 and vice versa. The inconsistency of the findings
between Henry (2008) and Cui et al (2008) may have been caused by the
methodology used to construct the governance index and the number of
years involved in each study.
Although the methodology used for the development of the governance index
in other developed countries is based on a mixture of commercial rating
agencies governance data and researcher-developed governance index, the
evidence is more consistent with the European studies. As in the case of the
European studies, most of the governance data used is based on a country-
specific code of best practices which suggests that the objective of these
codes of aligning shareholders and managers interests appears to be working
where better governed firms perform better than their poorly-governed
counterparts. As will be described in chapter five, and in line with the
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European studies discussed earlier, the researcher-developed governance
index based on the Ghanaian listed firms’ annual reports will be adopted in
this thesis. The next subsection reviews the governance index-performance
relationship studies in developing countries.
4.3.2 Governance index-performance studies in developing countries
This subsection covers the governance index-performance relationship
studies in developing countries separated into non-African and African
developing countries.
Non-African developing countries
As explained in section 4.3, the literature on governance index-performance
relationship studies began in a developing country with the seminal work of
Black (2001) on his investigation of the relationship between corporate
governance behaviour and market value for a sample of 21 Russian firms.
Using a corporate governance rankings developed by a Russian investment
bank and a value ratio of actual market capitalisation for these firms
determined by an independent second Russian investment bank during 1999,
he found that the correlation between firm performance measured by value
ratio and governance rankings is statistically strong. The study also showed
that a one standard deviation change in the governance rankings predicts a
seven-fold increase in firm value. Even though the sample size was small, by
using non parametric test, the results suggest that corporate governance
behaviour has a powerful effect on market value in Russia where legal and
cultural constraints are poor.
By contrast, Kravchenko and Yusupova (2005) used a larger sample size of
82 Russian listed firms during 2004 to investigate the relationship between
corporate governance and firm performance measured by P/E and P/S ratios.
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The index dimensions used include shareholder rights, role of stakeholder in
corporate governance, transparency, disclosure and audit, board and
remuneration to establish the relationship. Consistent with the earlier
findings of Black (2001), they reported that investors tend to pay less for
firms with lower corporate governance rating in Russia. This means that
investors pay a higher price for firms with better corporate governance.
Black et al (2006a) criticised the use of cross-sectional data for previous
studies and focused on time-series evidence from Russia from 1999 to 2005
in their investigation into the relationship between corporate governance
indices and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Using two methods of
estimation in the form of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effects
framework, they find economically important and statistically strong
association between corporate governance and firm performance both in OLS
and Fixed Effects framework but suggested large differences in coefficients
and significant levels, including some sign reversals, between OLS and Fixed
Effects specifications. They reported that the differences cast doubt on OLS
results on most previous studies and maintained that the cross-sectional
results may be unreliable.
The authors however noted that the way corporate governance practices are
measured does matter in establishing the governance index-performance
relationship. In particular, the developed governance indices used in Russia
were measured by several institutions including Brunswick Warburg
Investment Bank, The Troika Dialog Investment Bank, S&P, The Institute for
Corporate Law and Governance and The Russia Institute of Directors (RID).
However, the findings of the combined governance index of the four
institutions and the individual indices show large differences between OLS
and Fixed Effects specifications indicated earlier. For example, Brunswick
index is insignificant related to firm performance using OLS but a positive
and significant with firm fixed effects. By contrast, the RID index showed a
positive and highly significant related to firm performance in OLS but
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insignificant and a negative with a firm fixed effects. The differences in these
findings may be due to the measurement error or bias in the different
methodology used by the rating agencies to measure corporate governance
practices in Russia or the different estimators.
In their study on corporate governance and value in Brazil, Leal and
Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005) created a corporate governance index (CGI)
based on 24 binary objective questions for the study period 1998 to 2002
with a sample of 250 non financial firms for each year. The governance index
dimensions used include disclosure, board composition and functioning,
ethics and conflict of interest and shareholder rights with firm performance
measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and dividend payout ratio (DPR). The authors
would offer “yes” if asked whether good corporate governance practices
increase firm performance in Brazil. They also reported that corporate
governance practices levels have improved in Brazil and the CGI components
demonstrate that Brazilian firms perform much better in disclosure than any
other aspects of corporate governance. In this respect, the developed CGI
maintains a positive, significant and robust relationship with firm
performance. They noted that a worst-to-best improvement in CGI in 2002
would lead to .38 increases in Tobin’s Q representing a 95% rise in the stock
value of firm with average leverage and Tobin’s Q ratio.
In Korea, Black et al (2006b) developed a Korean corporate governance
index (KCGI) based on Korean Stock Exchange survey of 515 listed firms
during 2001 to investigate whether corporate governance predicts firm
performance or not. The KCGI dimensions used in their study include
shareholder rights, board structure, board procedure, disclosure and
ownership parity with Tobin’s Q, MTBV and MTSV used as the market-based
performance measures. The authors reported a strong connection between
corporate governance and firm performance. Using OLS as a method of
estimation, they hold that a worst-to-best change in KCGI predicts 0.47
increases in Tobin’s Q. In another study of Korea, Black et al (2010) studied
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how corporate governance affects firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q.
Using panel data from 1998 to 2004 with the same KCGI dimensions as in
their previous study, they documented that firms with higher scores of an
overall KCGI have higher firm performance with the result being driven by
board structure sub-index of the KCGI. They however were of the view that
shareholder rights and board procedure sub-indices are not significantly
associated with firm performance.
Kouwenberg (2006) investigated whether voluntary adoption of corporate
governance code increases firm performance for the period 2000 to 2005 in
Thailand. Using a sample size of 320 listed firms, the author constructed a
CGI based on the Stock Exchange of Thailand ratings with shareholder rights,
board structure and independence, disclosure and good governance policy as
the index dimensions to investigate the relationship. The findings suggest a
positive association between corporate governance and firm performance and
that, a one standard deviation increase in a firm-level code adoption index is
related to a 10% increase in firm value during the period 2003 to 2005.
Even though compliance to governance code has been effective from
accounting year 2002 onwards, only performance variables for the period of
no code compliance was included in the study without the corresponding
governance practices. This means that the code adoption index was created
from the period where compliance to the code was mandatory and failed to
justify whether compliance to the code initiated in 2002 has affected the
code adoption index and hence firm performance. These weaknesses will be
addressed in this thesis to establish whether the publication of the Ghanaian
Code provision discussed in chapter three have had some impact on
Ghanaian listed firms’ performance.
Zheka (2006) examined the overall levels as well as separate elements of
corporate governance impact on firm performance of Ukraine listed firms for
three years from 2000 to 2002. The author used unique data on corporate
governance choices for over 5000 firms and developed an overall Ukraine
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corporate governance index (UCGI) with shareholder rights,
transparency/information disclosure, board independence and chairman
independence as its dimensions. The evidence suggests that corporate
governance predicts firm performance in the transitional economy context. In
this case, one point increase in the UCGI would result in around 0.4%-1.9%
in firm performance. The author also documented a statistically strong effect
of shareholder rights, transparency/information disclosure and board
structure sub-indices on firm performance. Surprisingly, the chairman
independence sub-index is not positively associated with firm performance.
Javed and Igbal (2007) examined the relationship between corporate
governance indicators and firm value in Pakistan for the study period 2003 to
2005 following the introduction of the code of best practices. The findings
broadly suggest that corporate governance matter in Pakistan but not all
elements are important to firm performance. Whereas board composition and
ownership and shareholding sub-indices influence firm performance,
disclosure and transparency sub-index has no significant effect on firm
performance. The authors contend that those adequate firm-level governance
standards cannot replace the solidity of the firm and concluded that the low
production and bad management practices cannot be covered with
transparent disclosures. However, their evidence does not support the work
of Durnev and Kim (2005) and Zheka (2006) where the transparency or
information disclosure sub-index is found to have a statistically strong effect
on firm performance. The differences in findings between these studies of
each country may be attributed to the regulatory environment, the available
corporate governance provisions which these firms adopt and the
methodology used to develop the index. For example, Javed and Igbal
(2007) manually developed their governance index based on the existing
code of best practices in Pakistan, while Durnev and Kim (2005) relied on the
CLSA rating agency to construct the governance index.
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Ponnu and Ramthandin (2008) investigated the relationship between
corporate governance and firm performance in Malaysia from 2005-2006.
The assessment of corporate governance practices regarding the 100 listed
firms used in their study is based on the level of disclosure made in the firms’
annual reports with stock price returns and ROA used as performance
measures. The evidence suggests a significant and positive association
between corporate governance and firm performance when ROA is used as a
performance measure. They however found insignificant and negative
association between corporate governance and stock price returns but
attributed this relationship to the fact that the market is always efficient, and
so all information has been fully absorbed by the stock prices. Garay and
Gonzalez (2008) studied the relationship between corporate governance and
firm performance in Venezuela. They developed a CGI which is in the same
spirit as Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005) who used 24 binary objective
questions for their study but ended up with 17 questions that are applicable
to the Venezuela situation. The dimensions of the CGI include information
disclosure, board composition and performance, ethics and conflict of interest
and shareholder rights with Tobin’s Q, price-to-book value (PTBV) and DPR
used as performance measures. Unlike Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005),
their sample consisted of only 46 listed firms during 2004 but the results
revealed that CGI is positively associated with firm performance. Consistent
with prior studies, they showed that an increase of 1% in the CGI results in
an average increase of 11.3% in DPR, 99% of PTBV and 2.7% in Tobin’s Q.
Saxena (2009) examined the role of corporate governance and firm
performance with a simple correlation analysis in India. The author’s overall
composite index of corporate governance (CICG) was based on data from a
rating agency published in 2003 and economic value added per unit of capital
employed (EVA/CE) as a performance measure. Using a sample size of 63
listed firms, they reported that CICG is positively associated with firm
performance. As a further study of India, Balasubramanian et al (2010)
investigated the relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm
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performance during 2006. The authors developed an Indian corporate
governance index (ICGI) based on a questionnaire survey of 506 listed firms
from which 301 firms were used in the study during 2006. Board structure,
disclosure, related party, shareholder rights and board procedures were used
as dimensions of ICGI with Tobin’s Q and MTBV also used as performance
measures. The findings indicate that there is a positive and statistically
significant association between ICGI and firm performance. Consistent with
Zheka (2006), shareholder rights sub-index is individually marginally
significant and positively related to firm performance. However, this is not
the case for other sub-indices such as board structure, disclosure, board
procedure and related party. The finding of board structure sub-index of no
significant association with firm performance contradicts other studies
(Zheka, 2006; Black, et al, 2010). Notwithstanding the above evidence of a
positive relationship between the overall governance index and firm
performance, other studies in developing non-African countries have found
either a negative relationship or no relationship between governance index
and firm performance (Gruszczynski, 2007; Yan-Leung et al, 2008; Price et
al, 2010). This may be due to the sample size used in a particular study and
the country specific issues such as its regulatory environment in respect of
whether the adoption of corporate governance is based on principles or rules.
For example, Gruszczynski (2007) relied on Polish Corporate Governance
Forum (PCGF) and Polish Institute of Directors (PID) corporate governance
ratings for the study in Poland. Using a small sample size of 25 and 34 listed
firms for 2004 and 2005 respectively, the author attempts to find out the
relationship between the governance ratings and firm performance provided
findings that are mixed and disappointing. The ordered logit model used as a
method of estimation hardly indicated any pattern of relationship between
the governance ratings and firm performance measured by profitability,
liquidity, activity and debt ratios. But using the activity ratios, the association
between the ratings and firm performance showed significant and negative
association between them. In this respect, the author attributed the
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inconclusive results to mainly the small sample sizes used in the study for
each year. However, this might not be the case for the inconclusive results
since Black (2001) used in his study 21 Russian listed firms but found a
statistically significant and positive association between corporate
governance and firm performance measured by value ratio. Therefore the
type of performance measures used in these studies and the method of
estimation may be an important factor for the mixed findings.
Yan-Leung et al (2008) assessed the quality of corporate governance
practices in order to evaluate whether corporate governance matters to
Chinese listed firms performance during 2004. They developed a CGI based
on the revised OECD 2004 principles of corporate governance with 86
questions (including sub-questions) categorised into shareholder rights,
equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and
transparency and board responsibility. Using a sample size of 100 largest
listed firms, they reported no statistically significant association between CGI
and firm performance measured by MTBV and Tobin’s Q among firms in the
sample. Further evidence suggests that firms with better corporate
governance do not have higher performance. They however noted that the
benefits of corporate governance appear not to have been fully incorporated
into the firm performance measures of the Chinese listed firms during 2004.
In a further study as an improvement to the above, Cheung et al (2010)
evaluated the progress of corporate governance practice in Chinese listed
firms from 2004 to 2006. In this respect, they extended the study period
used in their study in 2008 but with the same data and methodology and
developed a CGI to measure the quality of corporate governance practices of
the Chinese 100 listed firms. Their evidence suggests that the CGI of Chinese
listed firms have improved from 2004 to 2006. Using fixed effects as a
method of estimation, they reported a positive relation between the overall
corporate governance practices and firm performance. This indicates that
firms with better overall corporate governance practices tend to have higher
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firm performance with the shareholder rights sub-index found to be the main
force of the relationship. From the above studies in China, two important
lessons can be learned from the findings. In this case, and as has been
admitted by the authors in their 2008 study, the effect of corporate
governance on firm performance might take a little longer than one year
period before any realistic conclusions can be drawn on the relationship.
Also, the estimation method used in a particular study might have an
influence on the results. For example, the authors used different estimation
methods in the two studies, thus OLS for the 2008 study and fixed effects for
the 2010 study. The different application of the estimation methods might
also have contributed to the findings of the two studies. This is evidenced in
the work of Black et al (2006a) in Russia where large differences were found
between the OLS and fixed effects results in the same study. As indicated
earlier, they stated that the differences cast doubt on OLS results on most
previous studies. This suggests that the two methods of estimation might
provide different results within and between studies as in the case of Russia
and China.
Price et al (2011) have also provided further evidence of no association
between governance index and firm performance in Mexico. The authors
examined the impact of governance reform on firm performance and
transparency from 2000 to 2004 with a sample size of 107 listed firms. A
researcher-developed governance index based on compliance data from the
code of best practices disclosed annually by listed firms was used with
transparency, board composition and audit committee as its dimensions for
the study. They reported a significant increase in compliance with corporate
governance during 2000 to 2004, indicating that Mexican firms view non-
compliance as costly. As noted earlier, they however find no association
between the governance index and firm performance and noted that
monitoring mechanisms alone are not enough to cause fundamental change
in the economic behaviour of Mexican listed firms. This evidence is consistent
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with Yan-Leung et al (2008) who failed to establish any relationship between
firms with better corporate governance and higher performance in China.
Fundamentally, two key issues are found in non-African developing countries
literature. First, and similar to North America studies, over reliance on
commercial rating agencies is eminent than the researcher-developed
governance index found in Europe and therefore the results are mixed as in
the case of North America. Second, relatively very few researchers relied on
the available code of best practices specific to their country of study. This
suggests that the governance provisions that were used to evaluate
corporate governance quality may not be suitable in these countries.
However, of particular interest to this thesis is the binary objective questions
used by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005) and latter followed in spirit by
Garay and Gonzalez (2008). This thesis in employing researcher-developed
governance index will follow the same spirit for the development of the
GCGI.
African developing countries
Studies on governance index-performance relationship in African countries
are limited. But, of particular interest to this thesis is the work of Abdo and
Fisher (2007) in South Africa where they examined the impact of reported
corporate governance disclosure on firm performance. The authors developed
a corporate governance score (G-Score) with board effectiveness,
remuneration, accounting and auditing, internal audit, risk management,
sustainability and ethics as its dimensions for their study. With careful
analysis of the principles outlined in the King II report, these dimensions
were selected and used in their study. Using a sample size of 97 listed firms
from 2003-2006, they reported a positive association between the G-Score
and firm performance measured by share price returns. This implies that
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investors place a premium on South African firms with good corporate
governance practices than those with bad corporate governance practices.
Recently, Ntim (2009) has also provided further evidence of the adoption of
the South African Code (King II Report) and its impact on firm performance
for the study period 2002 to 2006. Of important interest to this thesis is in
respect of the integration of the eleven specific governance mechanisms15
and a developed South African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI) to
investigate whether better-governed listed firms tend to perform better than
their poorly-governed counterparts based on their annual reports governance
data in the same study and context. Using a sample of 100 South African
listed firms with a total of 500 firm-year observations and OLS regression
estimate, the evidence suggests that there is statistically significant and
positive relationship between the SACGI and firm performance measured by
ROA and Tobin’s Q, evidence supported by prior governance index studies
(Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Beiner et al; 2006; Cui et al,
2008; Padgett and Shabbir, 2008; Henry; 2008). By contrast, the results
based on the specific governance mechanisms were found to be highly mixed
regardless of the firm performance measure used. These results further
support the notion that not all governance mechanisms are effective in
improving firm performance, but it appears that developing a set of these
mechanisms into an index is more effective in having a positive and
statistically significant impact on firm performance.
In Ghana, there is no empirical evidence on the relationship between a
developed governance index and firm performance apart from the limited
studies on disclosure index and corporate governance practices. In this
regard, Tsemanyi et al (2007) used disclosure scores to examine corporate
governance practices of the Ghanaian listed firms. Using objective
methodology, the authors created disclosure scores based on 36 items to
15 These eleven specific governance mechanisms include board diversity, frequency of board meetings,
audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee, board size, CEO duality, percentage of
non-executive directors, director share ownership, director share ownership squared and cubed.
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measure corporate governance disclosure from a sample of 22 listed firms for
the study period 2001 to 2002. They assessed the listed firms’ disclosure
scores from the available information in their annual reports with ownership
structure, financial transparency and board and management process as its
dimensions. The findings suggest that disclosure levels in Ghana are
generally low with the average of 52% compared to the 60% suggested. In
particular, the extent of disclosure among firms listed on GSE varies widely
and ranging from 33% to 83% but recorded a positive change of disclosure
scores from 2001 to 2002. This means that, while disclosure levels are
generally low, some of the listed firms have made moderate improvements in
terms of disclosure.
As an improvement to the Tsamenyi et al (2007) study, Bokpin and Isshaq
(2009) extended the study period from 2002 to 2007 to examine the effect
of corporate governance and disclosure on the foreign ownership of the firms
listed on the GSE. Contrasting the study of Tsamenyi et al (2007), they used
S&P transparency and disclosure items instead of 36 items used by Tsamenyi
et al (2007) for the development of the transparency and disclosure index
with financial disclosures, corporate governance disclosures and voluntary
disclosures as its dimensions. Using a sample of 27 listed firms and a panel
data methodology with unrelated regression approach, they reported a
statistically significant interaction between corporate disclosures and foreign
share ownership among the sample firms. Also, the results showed that the
market value of equity influences corporate disclosure. In particular, the
findings suggest an inverse relationship between foreign share ownership and
corporate disclosures implying that the more foreign owners a firm has, the
less the firm discloses. In other words, the less the firm discloses, the more it
attracts foreign owners. This is not however the case for the relationship
between foreign share ownership and the market value of equity where the
findings show a statistically significant and a positive relationship. The study
also suggests no association between foreign ownership and ROE.
123
As can be seen from African developing countries including Ghana, there are
only two available governance index-performance relationship studies in
South Africa but no study in any other African countries including Ghana
where this thesis is based except the disclosure index studies which failed to
link the index with firm performance. Although, the methodology used in
Ghana for the development of the disclosure indices is similar in spirit with
regard to S&P transparency and disclosure items, they are not used in this
thesis because the items focus on corporate governance disclosure as well as
actual corporate governance practices which will not help to achieve the
objective of this thesis of investigating the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code and its impact on firm performance. As will be explained in
chapter five, the development of the GCGI will be based on the
recommendations of the Ghanaian Code relative to the listed firms’ actual
governance practices from their annual reports.
4.3.3 Comparative Governance index-performance studies involving
developed and developing countries
This subsection presents comparative studies on a mixture of developed and
developing countries as well as those of developed countries. The
comparative governance index-performance relationships in a mixture of
developed and developing countries have been studied by Klapper and Love
(2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Chen et al (2009) and Morey et al (2009).
There are also other studies involving only developed countries with their
governance index typically based on rating agencies governance data. These
include those studied by Bauer et al (2004), Aggarwal et al (2007), Renders
et al (2010), Bruno and Claessens (2010) and Ammann et al (2011).
With regard to a mixture of developed and developing countries comparative
governance index-performance relationship studies, Klapper and Love (2004)
used data on firm-level corporate governance ranking created by Credit
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), an Investment Bank for 14 countries of
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which 11 are from Asia, 2 from South America and 1 from Africa for the
period 1999. The authors reported that firms in countries with weak legal
systems on average have lower governance rankings in a sample of 374
firms. They noted that better governance is highly correlated with better firm
performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q, and this relationship becomes
stronger in countries with weak legal systems. Also, the relationship becomes
as twice as large and statistically more significant after adjusting for country
fixed effects. Similarly, Durnev and Kim (2005) used CLSA ratings and S&P
with a broader sample of 859 firms in 27 countries and have found that
companies with better corporate governance and better disclosure standards
have, on average, higher Tobin’s Q and investments. The study reports that
a 10 point increase (out of 100) in the CLSA corporate governance index
increases a firm’s value by 13.3%; while a 10 point increase (out of 98) in
the S&P disclosure and transparency index increases a firm’s market value by
16.3%. Recently, Chen et al (2009) examined the effects of firm-level
corporate governance on the cost of equity capital and how the effect is
influenced by country-level legal protection of investors among 17 countries
of which 10 are from Asia, 4 from South America, 2 from Europe and 1 from
Africa during 2001 to 2002. Based on the CLSA survey, they developed a CGI
and reported that firm-level corporate governance has significant and
negative effect on costs of equity capital in these countries. This implies that
investors in these countries seem to ask for lower cost of equity from firms
with good corporate governance in place, which presupposes that the
reduced cost of equity can lead to an economically significant premium in
firm performance.
Using a new dataset from AllianceBemstein monthly firm-level corporate
governance for 21 countries of which 9 are from Asia, 5 from South America,
5 from Europe and 2 from Africa, Morey et al (2009) examined how changes
in corporate governance ratings impact on firm performance for the 2002 to
2006 study period. Using OLS as a method of estimation, the findings
suggest that improvements in corporate governance result in significantly
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better firm performance. As reported earlier, and consistent with the findings
of Klapper and Love (2004), there is a positive and significant association
between corporate governance and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q
and price-to-book ratio. They further examined whether improvements in
country specific risk are associated with improvements in firm-level
governance. In this respect, they find support for this idea that the majority
of countries in the sample showed that lower country risk is associated with
improvements in firm-level governance.
In the developed countries comparative studies, Bauer et al (2004) is one of
the first to conduct a comparative study of 15 European countries to analyse
whether good corporate governance leads to higher firm performance in
Europe during 2000 and 2001. Using Deminor corporate governance ratings
for firms included in FTSE Eurotop 300, the authors separated the analysis
due to two currency areas into the UK and the European Monetary Union
(EMU). They developed value weighted portfolios consisting of well-governed
and poorly governed firms and compare their performance measured by
NPM, ROE, Tobin’s Q and stock returns. The authors however reported
mixed evidence depending on firm performance measures used. In this
respect, there is a positive relationship between corporate governance and
the market-based performance measures (Tobin’s Q and stock returns). But
the relationship weakens substantially after adjusting for country differences.
For example, the impact of corporate governance on firm performance
measured by Tobin’s Q is stronger in EMU countries than that of the UK.
Whereas a 10% increase in the corporate governance rating of the EMU
results in 0.14% increase in Tobin’s Q, the time-series coefficient in the UK is
statistically insignificant and close to zero. With regard to corporate
governance and accounting-based performance measures (NPM and ROE),
the findings suggest a negative relationship among EMU countries but do not
provide any relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance in the UK. Unlike the market-based performance measures, the
findings remained the same after adjusting for country effect for EMU
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countries, the results not being consistent with the work of Gompers et al
(2003) in the US.
Similarly, Renders et al (2010) recently conducted a cross-European study
among 14 European countries regarding the relationship between corporate
governance ratings and firm performance for the 1999 to 2003 study period.
Based on Deminor corporate governance ratings, they controlled for sample
selection bias and endogeneity simultaneously by using OLS and 3SLS as
methods of estimation. The findings suggest that corporate governance
ratings have a highly significant and positive impact on firm performance
measured by Tobin’s Q, market-to-sales ratio, MTBV, ROA and ROE after
controlling for sample selection bias and endogeneity simultaneously.
Without controlling for these econometric problems, the relationship is
insignificant or negative in some cases. This suggests that controlling for
econometric problems is an important determinant of particular study
findings. With respect to individual European countries, the evidence
suggests that firms in countries with strong shareholder rights or extensive
corporate governance recommendations have better corporate governance
ratings but the impact on firm performance is smaller compared to the
countries with weak shareholder rights. Given the potential problems of
endogeneity in the study of the relationship between corporate governance
and firm performance (Black, 2001), this evidence may have serious
implications for a majority of prior studies who have not addressed these
econometrics problems and may cast doubt on their results.
Aggarwal et al (2007) undertook a comparative study among 23 developed
countries corporate governance practices in order to examine its relationship
with shareholder wealth during 2005. Similar to Bauer et al (2004), they
separated the sample into US firms (5,296) and foreign firms (2,235) to
compare the governance practices. Using ISS corporate governance data, the
authors developed a global governance index (GOV44) with 44 attributes that
are common for both US and foreign firms with board, audit, anti-takeover
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and compensation and ownership as its sub-indices for the study. Their
evidence suggests that firm-level governance of foreign firms is worse on
average than the US firms and noted that 92% of the foreign firms have
worse governance compared to US firms. The difference in compliance
among US and foreign firms may be due to the rules-based versus principles-
based approaches of corporate governance practised in these countries.
Further, Aggarwal et al (2007) also calculated a governance index gap based
on the difference between the governance index of a foreign firm and the
governance index of a comparable US firm, so that a firm with a positive
governance index gap has better governance than its matching US firm. As a
result, 8% of the foreign firms were adjudged to have a positive governance
gap and the majority of these firms are either in the UK or Canada. In
establishing the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance, they used the governance index gap to help explain whether
the foreign firms perform better than the US counterpart. In this respect, the
findings suggest that the value of foreign firms increases with the
governance index gap implying that the foreign firms are rewarded by the
markets for having better governance than their US peers. They however
noted that the relationship is influenced by the board and audit committee
independence sub-indices.
Following that, Bruno and Claessens (2010) also used ISS corporate
governance data and the same 23 developed countries used by Aggarwal et
al (2007) to conduct their multiple countries study but with a longer study
period from 2003 to 2005. The authors developed three main indices
including board committee index, entrenchment index and board
independence index with Tobin’s Q, ROA and MTBV used as performance
measures. They reported that over monitoring and absence of flexibility in
country regulations generate costs, harm managerial initiative, and lead to
lower returns and valuations. However, the study provides consistent
evidence that firms with better governance in the form of board
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independence index and board committee index performed better in any
legal regime among the 23 developed countries, the findings consistent with
Aggarwal et al (2007) who earlier noted that their governance index-firm
performance relationship is influenced by board independence and board
committee sub-indices.
In contrast, Ammann et al (2011) investigated the relationship between firm-
level corporate governance of 22 developed countries excluding US and firm
performance based on a large and previously unused dataset from GMI
governance ratings for the 2003 to 2007 study period. Using all the 64
attributes of corporate governance provided by GMI, they constructed two
alternative addictive indices with equal weights attributed to the governance
attributes and one index derived from principal component analysis. In all the
three indices, they reported a strong and positive association between firm-
level corporate governance and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q.
Unlike the previous studies, their results are robust to different techniques
used to construct the governance indices, a breakdown of the sample into
both country and calendar year and dynamic panel general methods of
moments (GMM) also used as a method of estimation. In this respect, they
are of the view that better corporate governance practices are reflected in
statistically and economically significant higher firm performance, and that
for the average firm in the sample, the costs of the implementation of
corporate governance mechanisms seem to be smaller than the benefits
accrued to the firm.
Fundamentally, all the comparative studies reviewed have used commercial
rating agencies governance data but the evidence is more consistent than
the North America results that as well used the rating agencies governance
data. This is not surprising because most of the countries included in the
comparative studies come from developed countries other than US and
Canada as well as developing countries. However, only South Africa has been
consistently included in the comparative developed and developing countries
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studies due to commercial rating agencies governance data availability in the
country. As indicated earlier, the lack of commercial rating agencies
governance data in Africa further supports the researcher-developed
governance index methodology employed in this thesis.
Beyond looking at the specific governance mechanisms-performance
relationship in the literature, a substantial body of literature reviewed earlier
has considered the governance index-performance relationship as an
emerging approach but with fairly mixed results. Although, the evidence is
highly mixed in North America studies, it is more consistent in European
Countries, other developed countries and developing countries. In particular,
Abdo and Fisher (2007) and Ntim (2009) found a positive and statistically
significant relationship between their governance index and firm performance
in South Africa. In Ghana, only disclosure and transparency index have been
developed to examine corporate governance practices among Ghanaian listed
firms without linking it to firm performance (Tsamenyi et al, 2007; Bokpin
and Isshaq, 2009). Arguably, and as indicated in chapter three, the Ghanaian
Code recommends six main sets of good corporate governance practices,
including board composition, audit committee, remuneration committee,
shareholder rights, financial affairs and auditing and disclosure practices. The
Ghanaian listed firms are expected to comply or provide explanation in any
areas of non-compliance with the Ghanaian Code. As will be discussed in
chapter five, the developed GCGI contains 36 requirements that cover all the
six main areas of the Ghanaian Code included in this thesis. Given that the
governance index-performance relationship studies in developed and
developing countries provide positive and consistent results in countries with
the prevalence of code of best practices than the rules-based approach
counterpart, the sixth relevant hypothesis is operationalised in the following
form:
Ho5: There is a significant positive association between the Ghanaian
Corporate Governance Index (GCGI) and firm performance.
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Given that the previous two sections have provided prior empirical evidence
on the governance-performance relationship based on regression estimates,
the next section discusses the directors’ opinions studies on corporate
governance and firm performance.
4.4 DIRECTORS’ OPINIONS STUDIES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
The objective of the first two sections of this chapter was to focus on prior
empirical evidence based on the regression estimates of the governance-
performance relationships. This section discusses the studies on whether the
adoption of corporate governance provisions is beneficial to firm performance
from the company directors’ point of view. Empirically, there is limited
evidence with regard to the directors’ opinion on the adoption of corporate
governance provisions and its benefit to firm performance. However, it may
be suggested that the directors of a particular firm assume the responsibility
for the adoption of good corporate governance regardless of the jurisdiction
in which a firm operates. Of particular interest to this thesis is to review the
existing literature in order to ascertain whether directors value the adoption
of corporate governance provisions as enhancing performance mechanisms
or not.
In the UK, prior studies have looked into the directors’ opinions on the
adoption of corporate governance provisions and its benefit to firm
performance. One of these studies is the work of CBI/Touche Ross (1995)
who surveyed CEOs and chairmen of 347 listed firms to investigate whether
the adoption of the Cadbury recommendations is beneficial to their firm’s
performance. In this respect, 90% of the respondents thought that the
Cadbury recommendations have had no positive impact on their firms’
performance. Similarly, Moxey et al (2004) sent questionnaires to 1,650
chairmen and finance directors of firms from the top 1000 listed firms by
market value and assessed their opinions on corporate governance and
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wealth creation. He reported that the response is skewed towards corporate
governance having little influence on profitability, with 12% of respondents
noting that corporate governance does not influence profitability at all, and
only 2% viewing it as beneficial. The above results suggest that the directors
of the UK listed firms who are responsible for the implementation of good
corporate governance in their firms mostly do not consider the adoption of
corporate governance provisions as beneficial to their firm performance. By
contrast, the directors’ opinion survey of the South African listed firms rated
corporate governance high in contributing to their firm’s performance
(Jenkins-Ferrett, 2001). In particular, the findings suggest that 85% of the
respondent said corporate governance is of utmost important to important in
contributing to investors confidence in the firms, while 83% rated corporate
governance as utmost important to important in contributing to their firm’s
performance. This indicates that the South African directors who are
responsible for the implementation of good corporate governance in their
various firms valued the adoption of corporate governance provisions as
beneficial to their firms’ performance.
With the introduction of SOX, Reed et al (2006) specifically assessed the
perceptions of financial executives on whether privately-held firms not
required to implement SOX have done so. The authors used a questionnaire
survey approach with 161 respondents who suggested that SOX is an
influential piece of legislation and see some positive benefits to their firms as
a result of its implementation. Of particular interest to this thesis is an open-
ended question that asked respondents to identify other benefits that could
be derived from the voluntary implementation of SOX. Their findings suggest
that private-held firms get better financing options, better credit
opportunities and the opportunities to take the firm public following the
implementation of some of the provisions of the SOX Act. This indicates that
the cost of financing a particular firm’s operations is expected to be lower
and therefore give better performance.
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In Ghana, the available evidence is the directors’ opinions studies on the
state of corporate governance practices16. In this respect, Ocran (2001)
conducted a research consisting of completed 30 questionnaires from the
CEOs and directors of companies selected from the Association of Ghana
Industries, Ghana’s Top 100 companies, companies under the state
enterprises Commission and other institutions. Assessing the degree of
compliance with the specific governance mechanisms, the results showed the
following relevant practices which are central to this thesis. In respect of
board composition, the findings show that 100% of the respondents from
both the public sector and institutions have executive and non-executive
members on the board. This is not however the case for the private sector
where 20% of the respondents have executive and non-executive directors in
place. The findings also indicate that 80% of the respondents from the public
sector have their CEO and chairman positions separated relative to 20% who
have the CEO acting as the chairman. By contrast, 50% of the respondents
from the private sector and institutions have the two roles separated with the
other half having one person for the two roles. Notably, 20% of the
respondents indicate that their firms have no policy in place for separating
the two roles.
With regard to board committees, the findings suggest that 80% of the
respondents from both public sector and institutions acknowledged to work
through board committees relative to 20% of respondents who have no
committees in place. By contrast, 80% of the respondents in the private
sector acknowledged not working through board committees relative to 20%
of respondents who have committees in place. That notwithstanding, the
findings failed to specify the type of board committees that are being put in
place by these firms at the time of the research. Other areas investigated
16 It is worth noting that there is no available study on the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and
firm performance in Ghana.
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include shareholder rights17 and disclosure practices of which 75% of the
respondents from the public sector acknowledged having some measures in
place to allow shareholders to recognise their rights during AGM. In this
respect, the remaining 25% in the public sector have the government as
their major shareholder. Interestingly, 100% of the respondents from both
private sector and institutions acknowledged to have such measures in place
to enable shareholders recognise their rights. Concerning the disclosure
practices, whether a statement of the board responsibilities in relation to the
preparation of the financial statements included in the annual report and its
subsequent publication was highly rated by institutions. Specifically, 100% of
the respondents suggest to have complied with the statement and publish
their accounts for each year, whereas 80% and 60% of respondents from the
public and private sectors complied with the statement respectively.
Overall, the findings reveal that the concept of corporate governance has
gained ground in Ghana, with the public sector spearheading it. It however
noted that, the private sector is lagging behind and has some long way to go
in order to fully embrace the concept of corporate governance. The survey
also highlighted the importance of a fundamental framework for corporate
governance and maintained that, corporate governance and its supporting
framework should be relevant to the country’s unique legal environment and
cultural values. Arguably, and apart from CBI/Touche Ross (1995), Jenkins-
Ferrett (2001), Moxey et al (2004) and Reed et al (2006) whose opinion
studies have provided conflicting results, very little is known about those
responsible for the implementation of good corporate governance and its
influence on firm performance from the existing literature and in particular in
Ghana. The mixed results and limited studies in the international context
warrant further investigation into how directors’ value corporate governance
as beneficial to their firm’s performance.
17 The respondents were asked whether they have measures such as the right on voting procedures,
preparation of agenda for AGM, the decisions concerning the amendment to the statutes and the freedom to
ask questions during the AGM.
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Fundamentally, and as has been discussed in section 3.3 of chapter three,
the Ghanaian Code provisions imposed on the Ghanaian listed firms are
adopted based on the decisions of the board to comply or provide
explanation for non-compliance with a particular provision to shareholders.
To date, there is no available evidence regarding the Ghanaian listed firms’
directors’ opinions on the effective adoption of the Ghanaian Code other than
the Ocran (2001) study on the state of corporate governance in Ghana
discussed earlier, but it failed to ask directors whether implementing good
corporate governance is beneficial to their firm’s performance. Thus, given
the mixed findings of the directors’ opinions on the adoption of corporate
governance and its impact on firm performance, this thesis determines
whether the directors view the adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions as
beneficial to their firms’ performance. As will be explained in chapter five,
and given hypotheses one to six operationalised in this thesis, the directors’
responses will be used to test these hypotheses in order to validate and
complement the regression results from the Ghanaian listed firms’ annual
report data.
4.5 CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS FROM THE LITERATURE AND
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
This section provides critical observations from the literature reviewed and
the thesis potential contributions. It identifies the limitations and the relevant
gaps in the existing literature and explains how this thesis attempts to
partially fill these gaps. In this respect, four main limitations can be identified
from the literature reviewed as follows. First, prior empirical evidence may be
limited by the type of governance data used in each study. For example, the
specific governance mechanisms versus a set of governance mechanisms
developed into a governance index or the directors’ opinions on corporate
and firm performance chosen for a particular study may significantly have
impact on the research findings. In addition, some researchers relied heavily
on a country-specific code of best practices on corporate governance,
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whereas other researchers used general corporate governance principles to
assess governance qualities of their sample firms, which could have a serious
effect on the conclusion drawn on the research findings. This is very
important because not all governance recommendations may be applicable to
all jurisdictions and therefore using data based on corporate governance
provisions not specific to a particular country’s culture and legal framework
can affect the research findings. Unlike prior governance-performance
relationship studies that mostly use questionnaires and interviews to gather
governance data in Ghana (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; 2006b),
the governance data in this thesis regarding the specific governance
mechanisms and the development of the GCGI are collected directly from the
annual reports of the Ghanaian listed firms. The findings from this
governance data will also be validated through questionnaire administration
from the directors of the same listed firms. Prior studies have not addressed
this problem.
Second, prior empirical evidence can also be limited by the methodology
used for the development of the governance index. In particular, a majority
of the governance index-performance relationship studies relied heavily on
commercial rating agencies governance data relative to the researcher-
developed governance index. This raises questions about the uniformity of
how the governance index should be developed and therefore the impact on
the findings. Also, relatively few studies that focused on country-specific
codes of best practices selectively ignored some of the provisions with the
assumption that these provisions are not value relevant (Padgett and
Shabbir, 2008; Henry, 2008). This provides serious doubt about the findings,
suggesting that some of the governance mechanisms are more important
than others. Although, the researcher-developed governance index approach
has been criticised on the grounds of judgemental error and bias on the part
of the researcher (Core, 2001), it is adopted in this thesis as Arcot and Bruno
(2007) and Garay and Gonzalez (2008), that the methodology provides a
useful approach for the development of a governance index.
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Thirdly, prior empirical evidence is limited by the problems of endogeneity
which is always an issue in governance-performance relationship studies
(Black, 2001). As will be explained in chapter five, the problems of
endogeneity occurs where the governance-performance relationship is jointly
determined within the regression model because of an omitted variable,
measurement error, or simultaneity (Wooldridge, 2003). As a result,
corporate governance as an explanatory variable will be correlated with the
error term and may have affected most of the previous governance-
performance relationship studies to be inconsistent and biased. In this
respect, relatively very few prior studies in the literature address the
potential problems of endogeneity and in some cases without testing for its
existence before addressing the problem (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Weir
et al, 2002; Bruno and Claessens, 2010). This raises questions about the
reliability of the research findings. In this thesis, and as in the case of
Cheung et al (2007) and Padgett and Shabbir (2008), the researcher will first
test for the existence of endogeneity before addressing the problem. Finally,
the use of different governance data sources in different studies limits the
scope for comparison of research findings within the same study and context.
In addition, comparisons across studies with different governance data
impact on firm performance become difficult due to sample size, selection
criteria as well as code versus non code-based studies. This thesis therefore
uses multiple governance data18 to study governance-performance
relationship in the same study and context to allow for comparison of
findings within this thesis.
Given the limitations from the existing literature and the proposals to
improve them, this thesis partially fills the following four relevant gaps. First,
and as explained in chapter three, it is almost a decade since the Ghanaian
Code was introduced but no research to date has examined the degree of
18 For example, data on governance index and the specific governance mechanisms will be validated and
complemented by the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm performance.
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compliance with its provisions and the impact on firm performance. In this
respect, this thesis attempts to fill this gap by investigating the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions directly collected from the
Ghanaian listed firms’ annual reports. Based on the development of the GCGI
and its sub-indices, this thesis will help to determine the level of compliance
with the Ghanaian Code provisions for the first time across Ghanaian listed
firms. Empirically, assessing the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian
Code provisions will provide an opportunity to significantly contribute to the
existing corporate governance literature.
Second, governance-performance relationship studies have mainly focused
on one type of governance data or overlooked the others within the same
study based on either methodological choices or from a particular theoretical
standpoint. This leaves an opportunity for this thesis to use multiple
governance data in the same study and context in order to help determine
whether data on specific governance mechanisms or the developed
governance index or the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and
firm performance have likely influence on particular research findings.
Employing the multiple governance data in the same study will also help to
validate and complement the specific governance mechanisms and the
developed governance index findings from the perspective of directors who
are responsible for the implementation of good corporate governance
practices. In this respect, more light can be shed on the application of the
Ghanaian Code in this thesis and where possible it should be able to capture
areas of which data on the specific governance mechanisms and the
governance index may not be able to cover in the analysis.
Third, prior governance-performance relationship studies in Ghana have
failed to address the potential problems of endogeneity and therefore their
regression analysis may be inconsistent and biased. As result, this thesis with
particularly emphasis on addressing these problems in Ghana provides an
opportunity to considerably contribute to the existing literature. Finally, only
138
a few studies in the literature reviewed have incorporated pre and post
adoption of a particular code on corporate governance to ascertain whether
the adoption of these codes matter to firm performance or not. In this
respect, there is no available study in developing countries and in particular
Africa and the lack of evidence leave room for this thesis to provide a
significant contribution to the existing literature. This thesis will particularly
focus on pre and post adoption of the Ghanaian Code in order to investigate
how the governance-performance relationship is impacted by the formal
adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions.
4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed prior empirical studies on governance-
performance relationships from the existing literature. Its objective has been
on three main approaches to the study of corporate governance and firm
performance. These approaches include the specific governance mechanisms,
the developed governance index and the directors’ opinions on corporate
governance and firm performance. Fundamentally, prior studies have so far
used one approach and disregarded the others within the same study based
on either methodological choices or from a particular theoretical perspective.
However, whichever approach used has led to mixed results between studies,
thus a positive, negative and no relationship between corporate governance
and firm performance. Arguably, the specific governance mechanisms impact
on firm performance is considered to be more inconsistent than the other two
approaches. Although, the evidence regarding the governance index-
performance relationship is contradictory within the context of North
America, it is more consistent in the European countries, other developed
countries and developing countries. This consistent evidence could be
attributed to the principles-based approach to corporate governance
practised in most of these countries with the prevalence of the code of best
practices. Also, while the governance index-performance relationship studies
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are predominantly in North America, limited studies were found in Europe,
other developed countries and developing countries where in Africa, only two
studies were available for review in this thesis. The limited evidence
regarding the governance index-performance relationship studies in Africa
provides an opportunity in this thesis to make a considerable contribution to
the existing literature by investigating the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions across listed firms.
Further, the review indicates that prior corporate governance and firm
performance studies have extensively employed data on the specific
governance mechanisms and the governance index without validating or
complementing the findings with the views of those who are responsible for
the implementation of corporate governance. This offers an opportunity to
extend prior studies by incorporating questionnaire surveys regarding
directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm performance in this
thesis to help validate and complement findings from the governance index
and the specific governance mechanisms impact on firm performance. Given
that prior studies have failed to address the potential problems of
endogeneity in Ghana, it also provides an opportunity in this thesis to
address these problems for the first time. Finally, only a few studies in the
literature incorporated pre and post adoption of a particular corporate
governance rules or code of best practices in their study to assess whether
the changes matter to firm performance or not. In this respect, there is no
study in developing countries and in particular Africa and the lack of evidence
provide an opportunity for this thesis to make a substantial contribution to
the existing literature.
The next chapter provides a discussion on data considerations and analysis
procedures.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DATA CONSIDERATIONS AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses data considerations and analysis procedures used in
an effort to achieve the thesis objectives. Given that the thesis is focusing on
pre and post adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions, it is important to
compile a suitable database for the specific governance mechanisms and the
development of the GCGI, as well as the questionnaire data from the
directors of the Ghanaian listed firms. In this respect, the thesis focuses on
the Ghanaian listed firms from 2000 to 2009. Specifically, this thesis adopted
simultaneous data triangulation methods to investigate whether the adoption
of the Ghanaian Code provisions is beneficial to firm performance in Ghana.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses
data, sample and the development of the GCGI as the main explanatory
variable. Section 5.3 explains the dependent variables employed in this
thesis. Section 5.4 accounts for the control variables adopted. Section 5.5
describes a panel data analytical framework and how the thesis will address
the potential problems of endogeneity. Section 5.6 focuses on the
questionnaire development and the analysis procedures of the directors’
opinions on corporate governance and firm performance, while section 5.7
summarises the chapter.
5.2 DATA, SAMPLE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GCGI
5.2.1 Data and sample
This thesis uses multiple governance data to investigate whether the
adoption of good corporate governance really matters to firm performance in
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Ghana. Unlike prior studies that have focus on only one type of governance
data such as the specific governance mechanisms or the developed
governance index or the directors opinions on corporate governance to
investigate whether the adoption of corporate governance is beneficial to firm
performance, this thesis employs governance data on all the three types
triangulated simultaneously as shown in Figure 5-1 below.
As can be seen from Figure 5-1, multiple governance data was employed to
investigate whether the adoption of corporate governance is beneficial to firm
performance based on the specific governance mechanisms, the governance
index and the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance at the same time. The multiple governance data adopted in this
thesis is very important because no researcher to date has applied all the
three types of data in the same study and context. Although Bhagat and
Bolton (2009) and Ntim (2009) have used the specific governance and the
GOVERNANCE
INDEX DATA
DIRECTORS
OPINIONS
DATA
SPECIFIC
GOVERNANCE
MECHANISMS
DATA
GOVERNANCE-PERFORMANCE
RELATIONSHIP
Figure 5-1: MULTIPLE GOVERNANCE DATA
Simultaneous data triangulation
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developed index in the same study and context, the extension in this thesis
will allow the regression results from the listed firms’ annual report data to
be validated by the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance. Fundamentally, the methodological objective in this thesis is
whether the use of the multiple governance data has the potential to affect
the governance-performance relationship findings.
In this respect, data on the relationship between the specific governance
mechanisms as well as the GCGI and firm performance is collected from the
firms listed on the GSE. Firms listed on the GSE were selected because listed
firms are widely used by prior governance-performance relationship studies
reviewed in developed and developing countries (see chapter four). These
firms cover the most economically important firms for data collection
purposes and will make this thesis comparable to other prior studies. In
addition, the Ghanaian Code is formally imposed on listed firms rather than
non-listed firms. The listed firms are classified by the GSE according to
twelve industrial sectors and as at the end of 2009, the total number of firms
listed on the GSE were 35. The official list of the listed firms and the
classified industrial sectors were directly obtained from the GSE Fact Book
2010 and the list was also confirmed against the list provided on the GSE
official website at www.gse.com.gh accessed on January 2011. Table 5-1
presents the breakdown according to the industrial sectors.
Table 5-1: Breakdown of the Ghanaian listed firms by industrial sectors
Industrial Sectors Number of firms % of each sector
Agro Processing 3 8.6
Banking 9 25.7
Beverage 3 8.6
Distribution 1 2.9
Insurance 2 5.7
IT Solutions 2 5.7
Manufacturing 4 11.4
Mining 2 5.7
Petroleum 2 5.7
Paper Conversion Printing 3 8.6
Pharmaceutical 2 5.7
Vehicle Dealership 2 5.7
Total financial and non-financial firms 35 100
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The sample size selected was based on a compromise between limitations of
manual data collection and the need to have sufficient data to achieve the
objectives of the thesis. As the study period was from the 31st December
2000 to 31st December 2009, a number of factors also dictated the selection
of the final sample. An important point concerning statistical problem is
survivorship bias (see below) during the study period where a specific part of
the sample required to be selected as at the beginning of the study period
disappears from the listing of the GSE over the study period. To ensure a
representative analysis of corporate governance and firm performance over
the study period, it is important to include firms delisted or newly listed firms
during the study period.
As indicated earlier, the survivorship bias is a common form of a sample-
selection bias where information on firms that are no more in existence or
due to the data unavailability for a study period are excluded from the
sample. In this thesis, corporate governance and firm performance data are
analysed over a period of ten years regarding the specific governance
mechanisms and the developed governance index. During this period firms
entered and exited the GSE. To avoid focusing on firms that survive during
the study period, corporate governance and firm performance data gathered
were from firms listed on the GSE at the end of each financial year during the
ten year period. For example, British America Tobacco Ghana was delisted in
2006 but the data from the financial year end 2000 to 2005 were included in
the analysis. Also, Ghana Breweries Ltd and Guinness Ghana Ltd merged in
2006 and have changed to a new name as Guinness Ghana Breweries Ltd. In
this respect, the corporate governance and firm performance data for the
individual firms from the financial year end 2000 to 2005 and the merged
firm from 2006 to 2009 were included in the analysis.
One option would have been to select firms that were listed on the GSE at
the end of the study period. But this would have failed to account for firms
that disappeared between 2000 and 2009. However, and as indicated earlier,
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all firms that were listed on the GSE at the end of each financial year end
during the study period were selected. As shown in Table 5-2, the significant
portion of the firms listed on GSE as at the end of 2000 increases over the
study period from 21 in 2000 to 35 in 2009 with a total firm year
observations of 283. This represent 97% of firms listed on GSE in each
financial year. Further, and to be selected in the final sample, the annual
reports of a particular firm that has been listed on the GSE during the study
period must be available through either hand collection, postal delivery, the
official website of the firm or via the GSE library. The corresponding share
price and the financial accounting information must also be available in the
GSE Fact Books 2005 and 2010. In this regard, corporate governance data
was manually obtained from the firms’ annual reports, while financial data
was collected from the GSE Fact Books 2005 and 2010.
Data on the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance to validate and complement the specific governance
mechanisms and the governance index regression results was collected from
the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms between May 2011 and October
2011. The prospective respondents for the questionnaire survey were mainly
executive and non-executive directors from the same listed firms selected for
the regression analysis. This is because these directors could influence the
adoption of good corporate governance in their various firms and therefore
their opinions will add to the findings of whether the adoption of the
Ghanaian Code is beneficial to firm performance or not. In this respect, 70
directors were selected from 35 firms listed on the GSE as at the end of 2009
financial year end. The main reasons for selecting respondents from firms
listed on the GSE are that they are required to comply with the Ghanaian
Code or provide an explanation for non-compliance to their shareholders. In
this respect, the CEO and the Chairman of the board were selected to
represent the executive and non-executive directors from each of the 35
listed firms.
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Table 5.2: A list of the names and the number of sample firms in each year
Company
Symbol
Financial Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Firm-Years
ACI
AGC
AGA
ABL
ALW
AYRTN
BOPP
BAT
CAL
CFAO
CLYD
CMLT
CPC
EBG
EGL
ETI
FML
GCB
GBL
GGL
GGBL
GOIL
GSR
GWEB
HFC
MLC
MGL
MOGL
PBC
PKL
PZC
SCB
SG-SSB
SIC
SPL
SWL
TBL
TOTAL
TRANSOL
UNIL
UTB
Total
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
21
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
21
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
23
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
25
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
29
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
31
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
31
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
32
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
35
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
35
10
4
6
10
10
5
6
6
6
10
6
10
7
4
10
4
10
10
6
6
4
3
2
5
10
10
3
6
10
10
10
10
10
2
6
8
8
4
4
10
2
283
5.2.2 The development of the GCGI as the main explanatory variable
The main explanatory variable examined in this thesis to investigate the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is the
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GCGI. The selection of this variable and its dimensions was based on prior
studies and the Ghanaian Code provisions imposed on the Ghanaian listed
firms. More importantly, the relevant dimensions that have been used in
accounting and finance literature as well as the suitability of these
dimensions in the context of Ghana were initially identified. The final
selection of the dimensions used for the GCGI represent a set of the
Ghanaian Code provisions imposed on the Ghanaian listed firms. This was
also determined after the researcher had meetings with four institutional
heads19 involved in the introduction, enforcement and implementation of
good corporate governance in Ghana to check for the reliability and validity
of the binary objective questions used for the construction of the GCGI.
To date, two main approaches of developing governance index have been
employed in the extant literature. The first approach has been the rating
agencies that use ranking methodologies to evaluate the degree of
compliance with corporate governance practices of firms which is usually
conducted by independent professionals in the field of corporate governance.
As a result, studies dominated by the North American researchers (e. g.
Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2006;
Erthugul and Hedge, 2009) have relied on these agencies databases where
data on corporate governance variables are readily available from such
agencies (e.g. IRRC, CLSA, ISS, TCL, GMI, S & P) for the determination of a
particular study governance index. However, the real practical problem with
the governance data from the rating agencies is that no comparable datasets
are available in many other countries and in particular Ghana. Besides, the
subjectivity of the independent professionals in the field of corporate
governance may account for errors and bias on the part of the firms involved
in a particular agency’s rankings. As indicated in section 4.3 of Chapter four,
this approach is not adopted in this thesis.
19 The four institutions are the SECG, GSE, ICAG and the Institute of Directors-Ghana
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The second approach has been the researcher-developed governance index
where researchers manually construct their governance index for a particular
firm based on the publicly available source of corporate governance
information such as a firm’s annual reports (e.g. Leal and Carvalhal-da-
Silver, 2005; Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Ponu and Ramthandin, 2008; Garay
and Gonzalez, 2008, Bassen et al, 2008; Price et al, 2011) or based on a
questionnaire survey by the researchers (e.g. Drobetz et al, 2004; Beiner et
al, 2006; Miyajima, 2005; Toudas and Karathansis, 2007). However, this
approach also has some limitations regarding the researcher being vulnerable
to judgemental errors and bias (Core, 2001) as well as the likely labour
intensive task involved with respect to the gathering of the corporate
governance information from the firms’ annual reports. Notwithstanding
these limitations, this thesis adopts the researcher-developed governance
index approach for many reasons. First, and as explained in section 4.3 of
chapter four, there is no corporate governance data readily available from
any rating agencies in Ghana where the specific corporate governance
practices have been used to assess the degree of compliance with corporate
governance among Ghanaian listed firms. Second, the rating agencies
methodologies are standardised in such a way that it might not be applicable
to the Ghanaian situation. Accordingly, all of the corporate governance
information used for the development of the GCGI comes from the annual
reports of the selected Ghanaian listed firms.
The traditional approach of using annual reports was preferred as the sources
of corporate governance information for the development of the GCGI.
Fundamentally, the annual reports are considered to be the common
communication instrument employed by firms to disclose relevant
information regarding corporate governance practices (Healy and Palepu,
2001). In addition, the listing requirements of the GSE and the SECG require
all listed firms to disclose certain information in relation to corporate
governance practices in their annual reports. In view of this, the
development of the GCGI is exclusively based on corporate governance
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information that Ghanaian firms provide in their annual reports. In particular,
the firm’s annual reports as the source of the corporate governance
information is also consistent with prior governance index-performance
studies which can facilitate direct comparison with their findings (e.g. Leal
and Carvalhal-da-Silver, 2005; Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Ponu and
Ramthandin, 2008; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; Bassen et al, 2008; Price et
al, 2011).
The GCGI is developed by scoring each aspect of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions disclosed in the firm’s annual report. A similar
method has been used by prior studies where binary objective questions
were used to score the degree of compliance with corporate governance
(Gompers et al, 2003; Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silver, 2005; Padgett and
Shabbir, 2008; Henry, 2008; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008). This scoring
method involves assigning ‘1’ point for compliance with each aspect of the
Ghanaian Code provisions complied and disclosed in the firm’s annual report
or ‘0’ otherwise. The corporate governance provisions included in the GCGI
are solely based on the Ghanaian Code with six broad sets of corporate
governance best practices that Ghanaian listed firms are required to comply
or provide explanation for non-compliance. With this scoring method, a firm’s
developed governance index in a particular financial year end can vary
between 0 and 36, with 0 indicating perfect non-compliance and 36
indicating complete compliance.
In this respect, the final 36 binary objective questions categorised into six
comprehensive dimensions for each firm constitute the developed GCGI.
These dimensions include: (1) board composition; (2) audit committee; (3)
remuneration committee; (4) shareholder rights; (5) financial affairs and
auditing; and (6) disclosure practices. Appendix 1 shows the six dimensions
and their operationalisation. However, and while Gompers et al (2003)
focused on only shareholder rights as their index dimension; Padgett and
Shabbir (2008) who relied on the UK 1998 Combined Code also developed
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their non-compliance index on only board of directors with twelve provisions,
entirely disregarding the other dimensions such as accounting and auditing,
internal audit and shareholder rights. Equally, Henry (2008) developed a
governance index with particular emphasis on only eight provisions of the
2003 ASX Code, proposing that the other provisions may not be value
relevant. In contrast, the six dimensions of the constructed GCGI are broader
and equally distributed compared with much of the prior studies (e.g. Leal
and Carvalhal-da-Silver, 2005; Cheung et al, 2007; Abdo and Fisher, 2007;
Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; Yan-Leung et al, 2008).
Arguably, the developed GCGI fails to include a nomination committee
experienced worldwide as this has not been provided by the Ghanaian Code
for firms to comply or provide explanation for non-compliance. In this
respect, the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance investigation will address this problem. In practical terms, the
six dimensions of the developed GCGI replicated the original Ghanaian Code
provisions. This approach is in line with the previous studies that used similar
national or international codes on corporate governance practices (Germany
Corporate Governance Code, 2000; Swiss Code of Best Practice, 2002; OECD
Principles, 2004; King Report, 2002; UK: Combined Code, 1998; Combined
Code, 2003; Australia Code of best practice, 2003) in the development of
their governance indices (Drobetz et el, 2004; Beiner et al, 2006; Cheung et
al, 2007; Abdo and Fisher, 2007; Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Clacher et al,
2008; Henry, 2008).
It is worth noting that the development of the GCGI has a lot of benefits as
opposed to the use of a specific governance mechanism. As advocated by
Brown and Caylor (2006), the index considers a broader scope of governance
practices, allows coverage for more firms as well as reflecting the current
changes of the corporate governance environment. This means that a well
developed governance index will allow for an evaluation of the effectiveness
of corporate governance practices in a particular country or across countries
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and how firms have applied the existing code of best practices on corporate
governance. Consistent with the accounting and finance literature, the
methodology also has the advantage of transparency and is easily
reproducible as reported by Gompers et al (2003). Through the use of the
binary objective questions, the problem of subjectivity in the case of
qualitative method could be reduced since concepts of governance practices
could be quantified for firms and compared in order to determine the ones
with good governance structures. However, there are some limitations
surrounding the development of the governance index. In particular, the
development of the index may fail to capture all appropriate governance
variables. Also in view of what constitute good corporate governance
practices to one firm may not be the same for another firm depending on
each firm’s perception on the existing corporate governance practices.
Arguably, it is appropriate to develop a corporate governance index in the
case of Ghana since little is known about the effectiveness and the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code introduced in 2003. Moreover,
governance variables based on questionnaire surveys and interviews may not
reflect the actual practices during pre 2003 and post 2003 adoption of the
Ghanaian Code as in the case of Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a,
2006b) and Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu (2008).
To account for the effect of the specific governance mechanisms which may
individually have an impact on firm performance instead of the index, this
thesis also employs CEO duality (CEODUAL), board size (BODSIZE),
proportion of non-executive directors (PNEDs), the existence of audit
committee (AUCOM) and a remuneration committee (RECOM) as additional
explanatory variables. Table 5-3 presents the measurement of the additional
explanatory variables based on the Ghanaian Code provisions.
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Table 5-3: Measurement of the additional explanatory variables
Variable Name Acronym/Code Operationalisation of the variable
CEO Duality CEODUAL A binary number of ‘1’ if the CEO also holds the
position of chairman or ‘0’ if both positions are
separated
Board Size BODSIZE The total number of directors on the board of a firm
at the end of each financial year
Proportion of NEDs PNEDs The number of NEDs divided by the number of
directors on the board of a firm at the end of each
financial year
Audit Committee AUCOM A binary number of ‘1’ if a firm has an audit
committee in place at the end of each financial year
or ‘0’ if otherwise
Remuneration Committee RECOM A binary number of ‘1’ if a firm has a remuneration
committee in place at the end of each financial year
or ‘0’ if otherwise
5.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLES (FIRM PERFORMANCE)
The empirical evaluation of the relationship between corporate governance
and firm performance necessitates the selection of suitable firm performance
measures for objective analysis. Even though there has been no consensus
on which firm performance measures are more appropriate (Cochran and
Wood, 1984; Dalton et al, 1998; Ittner and Larcker, 2003), prior studies
evaluating the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance have traditionally used various firm performance measures
covering: return on investment (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Boyd et al,
1997), ROE (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Baliga et al, 1996; Labelle, 2002;
Cheung et al, 2007; Epps and Cereola; 2008), earning per share (Pearce and
Zahra, 1992), ROA (Daily and Dalton, 1993; Laing and Weir, 1999; Core et
al, 2006; Larcker et al, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu, 2008; Price et
al, 2011), Tobin’s Q (Yermack, 1996; Weir et al, 2002; Gompers et al, 2003;
Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2009; Bozec et al, 2010), stock
returns (Brickley et al, 1997; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Fodor and
Diavatopoulos, 2010), price earnings ratio (Faccio and Lasfer, 1999; Sanda
et al, 2010), sales growth (Kouwenberg, 2006; Erthugul and Hedge, 2009),
economic value added (Saxena, 2009) and net profit margin (Bauer et al,
2010). These firm performance measures used in the existing literature can
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be grouped into accounting-based and market-based firm performance
measures. In this respect, firm performance measures from the perspective
of insiders (management) and outsiders (investors) of a particular firm is
needed for the purpose of this thesis. In particular, Black et al (2006a) are of
the view that insiders and outsiders value firm performance differently. As a
result, this thesis used accounting-based measures of ROA and ROE as
indicators to capture the value effects of corporate governance mechanisms
from the point of view of insiders, while the market-based measure of Tobin’s
Q is used to demonstrate firm valuation resulted from effective governance
mechanisms from the perspective of outsiders. It is important to note here
that these firm performance measures are used for both the specific
governance mechanisms and the developed governance index in this thesis.
Subsections 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 present the definitions of the selected
firm performance variables and how they are measured.
5.3.1 Return on assets (ROA)
ROA is defined in this thesis as operating profit after tax at the end of each
financial year divided by book value of total assets for the same period (Pi
and Timme, 1993; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). As indicated earlier, ROA has
been used in numerous studies and represents what a particular firm’s
management has achieved at the end of each financial year with the given
resources in the form of assets. According to agency theory, managers are
likely to exploit the available resources to their own interest, leaving less
return to shareholders. Thus, ROA is a measure of operating performance
directly related to the earnings management has generated from the efficient
use of a firm’s assets, which effectively belong to shareholders. The higher
ROA indicates efficiency on the part of management’s ability to use firm’s
assets to maximise shareholders investment given effective corporate
governance mechanisms in place. In contrast, lower values of ROA suggest
less effective management and governance mechanisms in place. However,
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the reliance on ROA as an accounting-based firm performance measure has
been criticised on the grounds that the accounting earnings used may not
reflect economic earnings and the book value of assets may not reflect the
market values (Pi and Timme, 1993). This means that the accounting
earnings and the book value of assets under the control of management may
be subjected to managerial manipulations which could result in
overstatement of earnings and understatement of assets due to changes of
accounting policies relating to depreciation, inventory valuation, treatment of
certain revenue and expenditure.
Notwithstanding these related weaknesses, ROA is preferred in this thesis
because of its ability to eliminate the potential problem of size which
effectively allows for straightforward comparison across firms (Lev and
Sunder, 1979). Beside, other competing accounting based firm performance
measures indicated earlier may not be reliably measured as in the case of
ROE. For example, a drawback of ROE is that the higher level of debt could
affect the level of ROE and this may not accurately reflect the efficiency of
management (Cui et al, 2008). In this case, ROA is not influenced by the
capital structure of a particular firm and therefore considered to be a more
reliable firm performance measure. Also, Core et al (2006) use ROA as firm
performance measure and find a negative and significant association with G-
Index, evidence that is contrary to Gompers et al (2003) who could not
establish a similar relationship when using ROE as firm performance
measure. Hence, it is suitable to use ROA in this thesis. The data on the
operating profit after tax and the book value of total assets are collected
from the GSE Fact Books 2005 and 2010 during the study period.
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5.3.2 Return on equity (ROE)
As an alternative to ROA, ROE is also used in this thesis as an accounting
based firm performance measure to determine management’s ability to
generate returns for shareholders. Following the work of Baliga et al (1996)
and Cheung et al (2007), ROE is defined in this thesis as operating profit
after tax divided by book value of equity at the end of each financial year.
Like the ROA, the higher the value of ROE, the more effective the governance
mechanisms and the better the management’s ability to generate returns for
shareholders’ investment of the firm. In contrast, the lower the ROE, the less
effective the governance mechanisms and the greater management’s
inefficiency to generate returns for shareholders. As has been explained
above, a drawback of ROE as firm performance measure is the influence that
the level of debt of a particular firm may have on its computation. Also, the
operating profit after tax and the book value of equity are based on the
judgement of management and therefore may be subjected to managerial
manipulations regarding overstatement of earnings and understatement of
shareholders equity. Above all, different levels of debt may not allow for
common comparison across firms since individual firms may have different
capital structures.
Nonetheless, the conflicting evidence of Core et al (2006) and Gompers et al
(2003) using the same G-Index but with different accounting based firm
performance measures (ROA and ROE) necessitate an attempt in this thesis
to assess the robustness of the findings against both ROA and ROE as
accounting based firm performance measures. Therefore, it is appropriate to
use ROE in this thesis. The data on the operating profit after tax and the
book value of equity are collected from the GSE Fact Books 2005 and 2010
during the study period.
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5.3.3 Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio)
Tobin’s Q is defined in this thesis as the market value of total assets divided
by the book value of total assets, where the market value of total assets is
measured by the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets
minus the book value of equity (Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love,
2004; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008). This firm performance measure from the
point of view of outsiders’ valuation of the firm represents an approximation
of the original Tobin’s Q, which is defined as the ratio of market value of debt
and equity of the firm to the replacement value of the firm (Nor et al, 1999).
But, due to the computational difficulties in relation to the market value of
debt and the replacement cost of the firm in the context of Ghana and as
experienced in the case of Malaysia (Nor et al, 1999) and Nigeria (Kajola,
2008; Sanda et al, 2010), this thesis follows Klapper and Love (2004) for the
computation of the modified Tobin’s Q, where the market value of total
assets is divided by the book value of the total assets of the firm at the end
of each financial year. As in the case of ROA and ROE, a higher Tobin’s Q
indicates more effective governance mechanisms and the better outsiders’
perception of the firm’s performance. In contrast, the lower Tobin’s Q
suggests less effective governance mechanisms and a greater managerial
control.
Although, Tobin’s Q has been used extensively as a firm performance
measure in the extant literature (Mocrk et al, 1988; Yermack, 1996; Kiel and
Nicholson, 2003; Core et al, 2006; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Renders et al,
2010, amongst others), it has also been criticised for using accounting
variables prepared under historical accounting (Padgett and Shabbir, 2008),
which appears to be subjected to managerial manipulations levelled against
the computation of ROA and ROE. For example, the total book value of assets
has been used for the approximation of the replacement cost of a firm’s total
assets (Nor et al, 1999; Sanda et al 2010) and that could lead to suffer a
similar drawback of ROA in relation to undervaluation of assets. Arguably,
156
and as in Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) and Sanda et al (2010),
the Tobin’s Q is a useful market based firm performance measure to use in
this thesis due to data limitations in the context of Ghana. Besides, and as
has been indicated above, Tobin’s Q (hereafter Q-ratio) has been extensively
used for empirical research and that makes the findings of this thesis more
valid. The data on the market value of total assets and the book value of
total assets are collected from the GSE Fact Books 2005 and 2010 during the
study period.
5.4 CONTROL VARIABLES
In order to identify the specific effect of corporate governance on firm
performance, it is necessary to include control variables in order to limit
potential omitted variable bias. These control variables are not confined by
corporate governance mechanisms in affecting firm performance. To mitigate
for the omitted variable bias, this thesis employed appropriate control
variables that are potential determinants of corporate governance as well as
firm performance. This approach is integrated into the design of the current
thesis, but the selection of control variables is dictated by the extant
literature and data availability. In the regression models, four control
variables were used including gearing (GEAR), firm size (SIZE), growth
opportunity (GROWTH) and firm age (AGE). However, there may be other
likely control variables that may affect firm performance and corporate
governance but are not captured in this thesis due to unavailability of data in
the context of Ghana. The rationale for each of these control variables
included in the regression models and their measurement is described below.
Gearing: Gearing can influence both corporate governance and firm
performance. Whereas debt can act as self-enforcing governance mechanism
and force management to generate cash to pay interest and capital
obligations (Gillian, 2006), firm performance may be affected through a
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change in cost of capital. Following Klapper and Love 2004, Black et al
(2006a), Garay and Gonzalez (2008), Bozec et al (2010), amongst others,
this thesis controlled for gearing which is defined as the ratio of total debt to
capital, where capital is the sum of total debt and equity. According to Rajan
and Zingales (1995), this approach to the measure of gearing focuses on the
capital employed and best represents the effects of past financing decisions.
Firm size: The existing literature suggests that firm size is positively
associated with superior corporate governance practices (e.g. Jensen, 1986;
Beiner et al, 2006). In particular, larger firms may attract greater public
scrutiny, and therefore size may affect the choice of their corporate
governance practices (Durnev and Kim, 2005). But, Cheung et al (2007) is of
the view that larger firms tend to have lower firm performance measures
such as ROA and MTBV. In line with prior corporate governance studies (e.g.
Shin, 2000; O’Sullivan, 2003; Core et al, 2006; Cheung et al, 2007; Henry,
2008), firm size is controlled in the regression models and measured as the
natural log of the book value of a firm’s total assets at the end of its financial
year.
Growth opportunities: It is suggested that faster growing firms may have
higher valuation, as they are expected to receive better future firm
performance (Klapper and Love, 2004). Equally, faster growing firms may
also differ from slow growing firms with regard to corporate governance
practices (Black, et al, 2006a). Following Weir et al (2002), Gompers et al,
2003, Drobetz et al, 2004, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), amongst others, this
thesis controlled for growth in the regression models and measured as the
percentage of the difference between current year’s sales and previous year’s
sales divided by the previous year’s sales of a firm at the end of its financial
year.
Firm age: Firm age is another important control variable that needs to be
considered in this thesis. According to Black et al (2006a), corporate
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governance practices of older firms may differ from their younger
counterparts. Moreover, age may also be connected with firm performance,
as its profitability is expected to rise and then fall at the maturity stage (Cui
et al, 2008). In line with the likely effects of firm age on corporate
governance as well as its performance, and following Shin and Stulz (2000),
Gompers et al (2003), Arcot and Bruno (2007) and Bozec et al (2010),
amongst others, this thesis controlled for firm age in the regression models
and measured it as the number of years since a particular firm’s
incorporation to the end of 2009 financial year.
5.5 A PANEL DATA ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND ENDOGENEITY
This thesis employs a panel data analytical framework to investigate the
relationship between the specific governance mechanisms as well as the
GCGI and firm performance20 with a proposal to address the potential
problems of endogeneity in chapter nine. In this case, the method of analysis
is that of multiple regressions and the method of estimation may be pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS), random effects or fixed effects as described
later in this section. In a panel data set, the regression analysis with both a
spatial and temporal dimension is appropriate. According to Mills (1999), the
spatial dimension in a panel data set is a composite of the cross section
dimension and in this case consists of the Ghanaian listed firms in this thesis.
In contrast, the temporal dimension in this thesis relates to a number of
observations of a set of variables representing these firms over a particular
period of time. As indicated earlier, data for 2000 to 2009 on corporate
governance practices and firm performance measures was collected for this
thesis and therefore covers a period of ten years. Initially, the panel data
regression model in its general form was estimated as follows:
20It is worth noting that a panel data analytical framework adopted in this thesis is consistent with prior
governance-performance relationship studies by Klapper and Love (2003), O’Sullivan (2003), Durnev and
Kim (2005), Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a), Kajola (2008), Henry (2008), amongst others.
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Yit = β0 + β1Xit + ………+ βkXkit + uit ………………… (1)
Where:
 Yit is dependent variable
 Xit represents explanatory variable
 i = 1……, N firms
 t = 1……, T time periods
 β0 represents the constant term
 β1 is the coefficient of the explanatory variables
 uit represents the error term
The error term can further be decomposed into two components in the form
of a firm-specific error vi and an idiosyncratic error
21
it. Thus:
uit = vi + it …………………….. (2)
However, and depending on the behaviour of the error term uit and whether
the explanatory variable is serially correlated with the components of the
error term vi and it would determine the empirical model specification.
Fundamentally, there are three standard panel data regression models that
arise from the general model described in equation (1) above with specific
assumptions in relation to the explanatory variables, the properties of the
error term, and the association between the explanatory variables and the
error term. In addition, further assumptions need to be made regarding the
variability of the regression coefficient across firms. In this respect, and as
has been indicated earlier, a panel data regression model in this thesis may
be estimated by pooled OLS, random effects or fixed effects and are
discussed as follows:
(i) Pooled OLS assumes constant coefficients, that is, referring to
both intercepts and slopes. In the event that there is neither a
21 It is important to note that the idiosyncratic error term in panel data changes over time and across firms.
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significant firm-specific effect nor significant temporal effects, it
could be possible to pool all of the data and run a pooled OLS
regression model. Thus, the typical assumptions of constant
variance and uncorrelated observations must continue to hold.
However, this model is not appropriate if t, the time period is
small (Gujarati, 1995). In this thesis the Pooled OLS regression
is estimated in the following general form:
Yit = β0 + β1Xit + uit ………………… (3)
Basically, the estimated Pooled OLS regression will be biased
because of unobserved heterogeneity (Xit and uit are correlated).
But the bias may be lower because the Pooled OLS regression
relies on between firm comparisons as well as within variation
compared to the cross-sectional OLS regression.
(ii) A random effects model assumes that the unobserved
differences are not correlated with any of the explanatory
variables. That is, vi are treated as random constant terms
(Greene, 2012) where the intercept is a random outcome
variable. The specific benefit of using the random effects model
is that, the regressors allowed time-invariant variables to be
included. In this instance, the random error vi is heterogeneity
specific to a cross sectional unit and in this case, firms. This
random error is assumed to be constant over time. The equation
of the random effects regression becomes:
Yit = β0 + β1Xit + vi + it …………………….. (4)
Where vi is between-firm error and it is within-firm error. Thus,
vi are assumed to be random variables and that Cov (Xit, vi) = 0.
But if Cov (Xit, vi) ≠ 0 the random effects estimator will be
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biased. In this respect, and as will be discussed in subsection
5.5.2 and estimated in chapter eight, this thesis will use the
Hausman specification test on whether the random effects
estimator is biased or not.
(iii) The fixed effects model assumes constant slopes but different
intercepts for cross sectional (group) units, and in this case
individual firms. Thus, the intercept is the cross section (group)
specific that differs from firm to firm. Further, the error term
( it) is assumed to be correlated with the explanatory variables.
Even though there are no significant temporal effects when
using fixed effects model, there are significant differences
among firms. Thus, the fixed effects model is employed
whenever one is only interested in analysing the impact of
variables that may vary over time. In this respect, it may be
used to explore the relationship between the explanatory
variables (corporate governance variables) and performance
within a firm. This means that each firm has its own individual
characteristics that may or may not affect the explanatory or
the dependent variables. If these individual characteristics
within a firm may impact or bias the explanatory variables or
the dependent variables, then one needs to control for these
individual firm characteristics. In this thesis, the fixed effects
model is in the following general form:
Yit = β1Xit + vi + it …………………….. (5)
Where vi is the unobservable firm-specific effects which differ
between firms and are time-invariant.
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5.5.1 The benefits of using panel data analysis techniques
The benefits of using panel data analysis in this thesis cannot be
underestimated. For example, the increased number of observations based
on n x t as defined in equation (1) help to improve the efficiency of the
estimators because the larger the sample size the lower the bias found in the
estimations. Also, the problem of multicollinearity faced by time series
studies is eased when using panel data set which provides more informative
data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of
freedom and efficiency (Klevmarken, 1989 and Hsiao, 2003). Moulton (1986,
1987) noted that the time series and cross section studies does not control
for individual heterogeneity and run the risk of obtaining biased results. In
this respect, panel data analytical framework makes a distinction between a
residual heterogeneity related to changes over time (period effects) and
across firms (group effects). This permits for a better identification of the
issues leading to changes in corporate governance and firm performance.
5.5.2 The choice of empirical model specification
For the purpose of empirical model specification for data analysis, the
assumptions of panel regression models discussed above need to be tested in
order to determine the best fit empirical model specification for the unique
data set used in this thesis. Unlike Kajola (2008) who failed to test these
assumptions before choosing pooled OLS as a method of estimation, and as
will be explained in chapter seven, this thesis in choosing between pooled
OLS regression and the alternatives of random effects and fixed effects used
Breusch and Pagan (1980)’s Langrange Multiplier test to determine whether
or not there is heterogeneity. If the pooled OLS estimator is found to be
inconsistent and biased due to unobserved variables, then, the choice
between random effects or fixed effects is decided by the Hausman
specification test to help distinguish between the consistency and efficiency
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of the estimators. Fundamentally, if this thesis employs pooled OLS
regression and the unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the error term
(uit) and the independent variables when the random effects regression is
suitable, the OLS estimator will be consistent but not efficient. However, if
there are no unobserved variables which are unlikely to hold in this thesis,
then OLS will be efficient. Otherwise, the random effects regression will be
more consistent and efficient. In the same vein, if a pooled OLS regression is
employed when a fixed effect regression is suitable, the OLS estimator will be
inconsistent while the fixed effects model will be consistent. Also, if a random
effect regression is used when fixed effects regression is suitable, then the
random effect model will be inconsistent. In this respect, one needs to be
very careful in choosing a suitable estimator in this thesis. As will be
explained in chapter seven, the suitability of the empirical model specification
in this thesis is determined after first applying Breusch and Pagan (1980)’s
Langrange Multiplier test. This test statistics will enable the researcher to
make the choice between the suitability of pooled OLS regression and the
alternative random and fixed effects regression. Following that, the Hausman
specification test will be used to distinguish between random and fixed
effects regressions for the empirical analysis in chapter eight.
5.5.3 Endogeneity: causes, consequences and proposed responses
Endogeneity is “a term used to describe the presence of endogenous
explanatory variable in a multiple regression model that is correlated with the
error term, either because of an omitted variable, measurement error, or
simultaneity” (Wooldridge, 2003, p.835). It is one of the key challenges
recognised in econometric analysis which produces biased estimates for both
coefficients and standard errors. Apart from the panel data analytical
framework described above that allows controlling for individual unobserved
heterogeneity, endogeneity test will be conducted in this thesis in order to
check the robustness of the results. Black (2001) has documented that
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endogeneity is always an issue for studies dealing with the relationship
between corporate governance and firm performance. Within the accounting
and finance literature where the use of econometrics is dominant, corporate
governance variable is said to be exogenously determined by environmental
factors such as legal efficiency, regulation and rules (Hammelberg, 2002). In
Ghana, the most important exogenous environmental factor is the Ghanaian
Code. However, Coles et al (2008) noted that firm-level corporate
governance must be treated as endogenous because most of the corporate
governance constructs are choice variables (Larcker et al, 2007) which can
be a cause of endogeneity. According to Chenhall and Moers (2007), a
variable is said to be endogenous if it is determined within the context of the
model, whilst an exogenous variable is said to be correlated with the
dependent variable, but its values are determined outside the model. Even
with the use of the panel data analytical framework, if the assumption of
(strict) exogeneity is violated (Cov (Xit, vi) = 0), then endogeneity in this
sense is a problem. Recognising the potential problems of endogeneity in this
thesis, sub-subsections 5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.2 and 5.5.3.3 present the causes and
consequences, testing and proposed responses respectively.
5.5.3.1 Causes and consequences of endogeneity
Researchers have identified four major causes of endogeneity faced in
governance-performance relationship studies to include omitted variables or
unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity or reverse causation, measurement
error and equilibrium conditions (Borch and Koke, 2002; Wooldridge, 2002;
Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007; Roberts and Whited,
2011) and are discussed in turn.
(i) Omitted variables endogeneity occurs if the true model
underlying the data does not capture all the relevant variables.
For example, if the relevant control variable (see section 5.4) is
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omitted from equation (1) due to data unavailability
(Wooldridge, 2009) but the said control variable is correlated
with Xi, then variable Xi will be endogenous if it is correlated
with the control variable. With regard to governance-
performance relationship studies, the appointment of non-
executive directors to serve on the board may signal “managers’
intent” to treat outside investors fairly but in practice, this might
not influence the behaviour of managers (Black et al, 2006a). As
a result, a positive estimate on corporate governance may be
attributed to the managers’ intent (omitted variable) rather than
the appointment of non-executive directors.
(ii) Simultaneity or reverse causation endogeneity occurs when one
or more of the independent variables Xi, is jointly determined
with the dependent variable Yi, typically through equilibrium
mechanism (Wooldridge, 2009). In the governance-performance
relationship studies, firm performance variables and the right
hand side variables may be simultaneously determined.
According to Chidambaran et al (2006), corporate governance
changes can impact on performance when firms experience
performance declines. Conversely, Beiner et al (2006) noted
that firms experiencing large performance improvements might
adopt good corporate governance as they seek to strengthen
their performance because they have better investment
opportunities and depend more on external financing. In fact,
Bozec et al (2010) argued that the relation between governance
and performance might run from performance to governance
instead of from governance to performance as is frequently
thought. In this case, the relationship between firm performance
(dependent variable) and corporate governance (explanatory
variable) runs both ways which causes simultaneity
endogeneity.
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(iii) Measurement error endogeneity arises if variables of interest
are imperfectly measured (Roberts and Whited, 2011). In this
regard, if the measurement error is in the dependent variable
(firm performance); the statistical implications are similar to the
omitted variables endogeneity (Roberts and Whited, 2011)
discussed above. However, if the measurement error is in the
independent variable, then the GCGI which is designed to
measure the firm-level quality corporate governance is
incorrectly measured and generally produces endogeneity. As a
result, the measurement error in the GCGI generally produces
inconsistent coefficients, even when it is uncorrelated with other
independent variables.
(iv) Equilibrium conditions endogeneity is based on the assumption
that if all firms operate at equilibrium, given their
circumstances, then it is inappropriate to suggest that firm
performance can be explained by the adoption of good corporate
governance (Chenhall and Moers, 2007). In particular, if firms
optimally adopt corporate governance provisions, then there will
be no relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance since every firm is expected to be at equilibrium
and therefore the choice of corporate governance cannot make
any difference to their performance (McKnight and Weir, 2009).
Generally, the consequences of the problems of endogeneity are that the
true regression model makes the coefficient of the explanatory variables
inefficient and unreliable in affecting the robustness of the governance-
performance relationship results. Beyond the omitted variables or
unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity or reverse causation, measurement
error and equilibrium conditions endogeneity, there is the need to investigate
the potential problems of endogeneity in this thesis. Arguably, the
governance-performance relationship studies reviewed in chapter four have
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provided mixed results. But, apart from few previous studies that clearly
dealt with the problems (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Weir et al, 2002;
Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al, 2006a; Cheung et al, 2007; Padgett and
Shabbir, 2008; Henry, 2008; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008, Bruno and Claessens,
2010), most of them failed to address these econometric problems which
raises questions regarding the reliability of the results of substantial numbers
of the governance-performance relationship studies reviewed in chapter four
and in particular Ghana. In this respect, the presence of the problems of
endogeneity among the variables in this thesis will be confirmed based on
the application of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (1978) exogeneity test.
5.5.3.2 Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test
The existence of the problems of endogeneity is frequently assumed by
researchers without testing for its existence before addressing it (Agrawal
and Knoeber, 1996; Weir et al, 2002, Bruno and Claessens, 2010). However,
and in addressing the potential problems of endogeneity in this thesis, the
main variable of interest is the GCGI for testing. This is because it integrates
the additional explanatory variables used in respect of the specific
governance mechanisms in this thesis. In testing for the problems of
endogeneity, and as has been indicated earlier, the most famous Durbin-Wu-
Hausman (1978)22 exogeneity test will be conducted in chapter nine to
determine whether the main explanatory variable of interest (GCGI) is
confirmed to be endogenous based on the null hypothesis of no endogeneity.
In particular, the test follows a two step approach. First, and as will be tested
in chapter nine, the developed GCGI will be made to be exogenous by
creating a new GCGI variable (R-GCGI). This variable is created by
regressing all the control variables on the GCGI and saving the residuals
from the regression as the new variable (R-GCGI). The individual control
22 This particular test have been extensively used by previous researchers in governance-performance
relationship studies (For example, Beiner et al, 2006; Cheung et al, 2007; Padgett and Shabbir, 2008;
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008)
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variables are called instrumental variables or instruments. Given that the
new variable is created from the control variables, it should not be correlated
with the error term, and can be regarded as exogenous. In the second step,
firm performance will be regressed on the GCGI, control variables and the
residual left over created from the first step. At this point, if the t-statistics of
R-GCGI is high enough, then the null hypothesis of no endogeneity can be
rejected suggesting that the developed GCGI is endogenously correlated with
firm performance which will be subjected to correction in chapter nine.
Arguably, the lagged governance variables23 and the instrumental variable
(IV) estimations are suitable to address the potential problems of
endogeneity.
5.5.3.3 Proposed responses to endogeneity
In this thesis, the potential problems of endogeneity will be addressed in
chapter nine through the use of lagged governance variables by one year and
the instrumental variable estimations. However, using the instrumental
variable to address the potential problems of endogeneity requires careful
consideration as researchers argue that it is not obvious how to determine
this problem unless exogenous instruments can be identified and n-stage
least squares techniques are used in the estimation (Larcker, 2003; Bozec et
al, 2010; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). Notwithstanding the difficulties in
implementing good instrumental variables, some researchers have used
instrumental variable estimations to correct the potential problems of
endogeneity (Drobetz et al, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al,
2006a; Zheka, 2006). In particular, Black et al (2006b) are the ones that
found reasonably good instruments where they used asset size dummy
variables for Korean firms with assets value over 2 trillion won because
different corporate governance is applied to such firms (Bozec et al, 2010).
23 As will be discussed in chapter nine, the lagged governance-performance relationship will be estimated
to address the potential problems endogeneity because of time–lag. This is because the governance
provisions adopted in one year may have influence on firm performance the following year.
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In this respect, their instrumental variable is only suitable in the Korean case
and therefore has not been employed in this thesis because there is no
different corporate governance applied to Ghanaian listed firms with different
asset value.
5.5.3.3.1 Determination of instrumental variable (IV) and the GCGI
As indicated earlier, one response to mitigate the problems caused by
endogeneity is to use instrumental variables (Henry, 2008; Bozec et al,
2010). As has been discussed in sub-subsection 5.5.3.2, if the GCGI is
endogenously correlated with firm performance, it may possibly be that an
important control variable or variables has or have been omitted from the
regression model or that the GCGI is incorrectly measured. In this regard,
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) suggested IV model as a response to the
potential problems of endogeneity. Notably, the IV method follows a two
level procedure. On one level, a proxy variable (the instrument) which is
assumed to be strongly correlated with the GCGI, but uncorrelated with the
error term needs to be identified. The second level involves the
replacement of the GCGI by the proxy variable (the instrument) in the
regression model. As a result, the coefficient of the GCGI will be consistent
and unbiased. Arguably, it is important to point out some limitations of using
the IV model. In particular, it is very difficult to establish an instrument that
is correlated with the GCGI (Chenhall and Moers, 2007). Beside, the
assumption of an instrument uncorrelated to the error term can never be
tested for its validity (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Larcker and Rusticus; 2010).
That notwithstanding, two strategies based on the instrumental variable
estimations will be used to address the potential problems of endogeneity in
this thesis. First, and following Padgett and Shabbir (2008), three
instruments will be initially identified in chapter nine to include board size,
director holding and block holdings to establish whether these are good
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instruments to proxy the GCGI. Second, and following the procedure
suggested by Henry (2008), a two-stage instrumental variable fixed effects
regression methodology will be used to address the endogenous element of
the GCGI if the fixed effects regression is appropriate for the empirical
analysis in chapter eight. The procedure involves two stages. In the first
stage, a dummy variable was employed as an instrument called the Ghanaian
Code Change (GCC), indicating the introduction of the 2003 Ghanaian Code
discussed in section 3.3 of chapter three. This dummy variable is coded 1 if
sample firms year ends are on 31st December 2004; and 0 if a firm year ends
on or before 2003. The appropriateness of this dummy variable as an
instrument is based on the anticipation that the adoption of the Ghanaian
Code provisions introduced in 2003 will impact on firm performance post
2003. Such anticipation is in agreement with a growing literature suggesting
that the introduction of code on corporate governance brings about either
corporate governance changes or improvement in the degree of compliance
with corporate governance, and does significantly influence firm
performance.
For example, Cui et al (2008) reported a positive association between
corporate governance changes from pre 2003 to post 2003 ASX
recommendations and change in firm performance during the same period.
Additionally, Cheung et al (2010) reported an improvement of the degree of
compliance with corporate governance by Chinese firms from 2004 to 2006
and suggested a positive relation between their overall CGS and firm
performance. Arguably, and for the dummy variable to be a very good
instrument for the GCGI, its coefficient is expected to be positive and highly
significant, indicating that the GCGI is significantly higher after the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code provisions. This will suggest that the GCC
dummy variable is a good instrument for the GCGI. The next section
discusses the questionnaire development and analysis procedures in respect
of the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm performance.
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5.6 THE QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
5.6.1 The objectives of employing the questionnaire survey
There are two main objectives of employing questionnaire survey in this
thesis. The first of these objectives is to help the researcher to gain insight
into the usefulness of the Ghanaian Code provisions and its effect on the
Ghanaian listed firms’ corporate governance practices. By seeking the
opinions of the directors responsible for the implementation of the Ghanaian
Code provisions, it can help in identifying factors affecting corporate
governance practices which cannot be captured by the specific governance
mechanisms and the GCGI data analysis. In particular, factors such as the
Ghanaian listed firms’ preparedness to comply with further corporate
governance requirements that are not captured by the existing Ghanaian
code can be addressed. Second, the responses from the directors can also
help to get better understanding of the directors’ opinions on the adoption of
the Ghanaian Code and its benefit to their firms’ performance. In this
respect, their responses will help to validate and complement the regression
results from the annual report data.
5.6.2 The development and operationalisation of the questionnaire
Since one of the objectives of this thesis is to empirically evaluate the
perceptions of the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms on the adoption of
the Ghanaian Code provisions and its benefit to their firm performance, a
postal questionnaire was developed to obtain directors’ opinions directly. The
questionnaire was developed and piloted on the executives and non-
executives directors of three randomly selected Ghanaian listed firms after
reviewing a number of studies that had used questionnaires for their studies.
In particular, questionnaires developed by Jenkins-Ferrett (2001), Moxey et
al (2004) and Reed et al, (2006) in their directors’ opinions on corporate
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governance and firm performance studies and the feedback from the pilot
study provided some insight into the development of the questionnaire for
this thesis. Consistent with the literature, the use of questionnaires is an
appropriate technique to gather data regarding directors’ opinions on
corporate governance and its benefits to firm performance, which also allows
for an improvement in the response rate at a reasonably low cost. If the
response rate is low, it is suggested that providing self addressed stamped
returned envelopes for the respondents, sending follow-up letters and
keeping the questionnaires brief are some of the practical ways to improve
the response rate (Sekaran, 2006).
The questions employed in this thesis are shown in Appendix 2. As indicated
earlier, the questionnaire was designed in order to obtain the perceptions of
directors on two main themes (corporate governance practices and its benefit
to firm performance) to validate and complement the regression results from
the annual report data. The questionnaire was divided into four sections and
consists of five pages when set out on a single-sided A4 paper. The first
section contains general information on respondents’ background as directors
and their familiarity with the Ghanaian Code provisions. The second section
attempted to obtain respondents opinions on corporate governance practices.
The third section was to obtain the respondents’ opinions on the benefit of
corporate governance to their firms’ performance. The final section obtained
information for follow-up questions and a space for comments if required. A
cover letter from the Robert Gordon University was attached with a detailed
explanation of the purpose of the study and also confirms that all information
would be managed in the strictest confidence. This letter was signed by the
researcher and the researcher’s principal supervisor name and contact details
were included for the attention of the respondents. The letter was anticipated
to increase the respondents’ confidence in the research project in order to
encourage them to participate.
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Closed-ended questions which offer a choice of replies are used in this thesis
(Oppenheim, 1992) because of the particular interest in obtaining opinions
on corporate governance practices, which can have influence on firm
performance. The questions are in the form of a rating scale that would allow
a numerical value to be given to opinions, and can be regarded as simple for
respondents to answer and easier for the researcher to code and analyse
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Close-ended questions would also help to make
comparison with the regression results from the annual report data.
Nonetheless, close-ended questions may have some limitations due to the
loss of inexpressiveness (Oppenheim, 1992) as well as limited freedom for
reasoning on answers. To overcome these limitations, a space was provided
at the end of all the questions for additional comment(s). With regard to the
opinions on corporate governance and its likely benefit to firm performance,
a five point Likert scale was used in the questionnaire (Saunders et al,
2009), where 1 denoting ‘strongly disagree or least beneficial’, 2 for ‘disagree
or less beneficial’, 3 for ‘neutral or no view’, 4 for ‘agree or more beneficial’,
and 5 for ‘strongly agree or most beneficial’. It is important to note here that
the confidentiality of the responses and anonymity of the respondents were
clearly stated in the cover letter to encourage the respondents in
collaborating with the researcher and providing honest information for the
purpose of this thesis.
5.6.3 Questionnaire distribution and follow-up
A total of 70 questionnaires were sent via post to the directors of the
Ghanaian listed firms on 10th May 2011. In this respect, a cover letter was
prepared to accompany each questionnaire to explain the purpose of this
thesis, introduce the researcher and explain how to return the completed
questionnaire to the researcher. In particular, each questionnaire was also
accompanied by a prepaid envelope addressed directly to the researcher in
Ghana. The letter was addressed to the CEOs and the Chairmen of the listed
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firms as these directors are assumed to be responsible for the
implementation of good corporate governance. The questionnaires sent were
serially numbered to match each firm included in the sample for follow-up
purposes. A follow-up questionnaire was posted approximately six weeks
after the first mailed questionnaires. In this regard, all responses were
returned directly to the researcher’s postal address in Ghana and after six
weeks of sending the questionnaire, 28 were received from the directors
which triggered reminder letters to be sent out. As will be explained in
chapter ten, the final number of 43 completed questionnaires received
represents a response rate of 61%. The high response rate was achieved
partly because the researcher has a network of contacts and a very good
working knowledge of the Ghanaian business environment, making it easier
to obtain responses from the respondents.
5.6.4 Analysis procedures of the questionnaire data
The responses from the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms were analysed
using simple statistical procedures (Oppenheim, 1992). The analyses are
mainly based on the rating of the questionnaires received via post. In this
respect, inferential statistical analysis was used to establish frequencies,
means and standard deviations from the responses to each question. The
responses were then grouped into themes, tabulated and categorised for
interpretation and presentation in chapter ten.
5.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed data considerations and analysis procedures
adopted in this thesis with particular emphasis on data collection procedures
and the method of analysis in achieving the thesis objectives. First, it
attempted to describe the data, sample and the development of the GCGI
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where the sources of data were comprehensively explained. In particular, the
corporate governance information for the development of the GCGI as the
main explanatory variable and the specific governance mechanisms as
additional explanatory variables were mainly collected from the Ghanaian
listed firms’ annual reports. The selection of the GCGI and the specific
governance mechanism, the reason in choosing annual reports as the main
data source for investigating the degree of compliance with corporate
governance, the scoring method are then described and discussed.
Second, the firm performance measures as the dependent variables and the
control variables were also collected from the GSE Fact Books. Following
that, the justification in choosing the accounting-based (ROA, ROE)
performance measures, market-based (Tobin’s Q) performance measures
and the control variables were discussed. Beginning 31st December 2000 to
31st December 2009, a range of 21 to 35 firms were listed each year on the
GSE of which the full data needed was collected over ten years, resulting in a
total of 283 firm-year observations. Third, a panel data analytical framework
was adopted in this thesis where the multiple regression models were used
as method of analysis for the GCGI and the specific governance mechanisms
impact on firm performance. In particular, the robustness of the empirical
results to the existence of the potential problems of endogeneity was
examined. In this respect, a lagged governance-performance relationship and
instrumental variable estimations were adopted in addressing the
endogenous element in the empirical results.
Finally, the chapter described how the data on the directors’ opinions on
corporate governance practices and firm performance was collected through
questionnaire administration. It explicitly discussed how the 70 participants
were selected from the same 35 Ghanaian listed firms, followed by
questionnaire development and operationalisation, pilot study, its distribution
and follow-up procedures. The analysis and the reporting procedures were
described to include the simple statistical analysis in validating and
176
complementing the findings from the GCGI and the specific governance
mechanisms impact on firm performance.
The next chapter presents the analysis of the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions.
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CHAPTER SIX
ANALYSIS OF THE DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
GHANAIAN CODE PROVISIONS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the results of the investigation into the degree of
compliance with corporate governance among Ghanaian listed firms over a
period of ten years, 2000-2009. The issues investigated are the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions using a number of descriptive
statistics. In particular, the summary descriptive statistics of the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions based on the full sample are
reported. This includes the Ghanaian Corporate Governance Index (GCGI),
sub-indices, pre 2003 and post 2003 compliance levels and the analysis of
other specific corporate governance mechanisms. Following that, a test for
differences in the degree of compliance based on pre 2003 and post 2003
GCGI are conducted. The findings are reported as follows. Section 6.2
presents the descriptive statistics of the degree of compliance with the GCCI
based on the full sample. Section 6.3 describes and explains descriptive
statistics based on sub-indices. Section 6.4 examines descriptive statistics
based on pre 2003 and post 2003 degree of compliance. Section 6.5 reports
descriptive statistics of other specific governance mechanisms. Section 6.6
further tests for the differences in pre 2003 and post 2003 GCGI. The results
are summarised and discussed in section 6.7, while section 6.8 provides
summary for the chapter.
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6.2 THE DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE GCGI BASED ON THE
FULL SAMPLE (ALL THE 283 FIRM YEARS)
Table 6-1 shows the descriptive statistics of the degree of compliance with
the GCGI based on the full sampled firms.
Table 6-1: Descriptive statistics for the GCGI based on the full sample
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown.
The results indicates that the pattern in the distribution of the means GCGI
over the ten years has the lowest mean (53%) in the year 2000, and has
progressively improved over the next nine years to 73% in 2009, suggesting
that firms were becoming more compliant over this period. This trend is
further supported by the mode increasing from 42% in 2000 to 69% in 2009.
Although, 69% mean GCGI for the whole ten years has been recorded for the
full sampled firms, the overall compliance levels stabilised during 2002-2003,
2004-2005 and 2006-2008 with the compliance levels at 62%, 71% and
75% respectively. The mean GCGI however reduces in the year 2009 to
73%, a trend that necessitates further investigation as examined below.
INDEX
Year-by-year index (%)
ALL 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Mean
Median
Mode
Std Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observations
69
72
69a
15.080
39
100
283
53
47
42a
14.485
42
89
21
55
50
44
14.949
42
89
21
62
53
44
16.757
42
89
23
62
61
47
16.492
39
89
25
71
72
72
14.025
44
97
29
71
72
72a
12.917
44
97
31
75
72
69a
10.791
50
100
31
75
74
69
9.928
50
100
32
75
75
69
11.345
50
100
35
73
72
69
12.392
42
100
35
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Figure 6-1: Trends in the behaviour of the GCGI over time (2000-2009)
Using the computed means, Figure 6-1 shows the trend in behaviour of the
GCGI which compares year-by-year compliance levels among the sampled
firms and the yearly increase in percentage point. As Figure 6-1 indicates,
the sampled firms recorded increase percentage point of 20 (i.e. from 53% in
2000 to 73% in 2009), the findings consistent with the 20 percentage point
increase (i.e. from 48% in 2002 to 68% in 2006) in South Africa for the
adoption of King II Report (Ntim, 2009). In this respect, the highest increase
in percentage point is in the first year when the Ghanaian Code became
operational. In this case, 2004 recorded the highest increase percentage
point of 9 (i.e. from 62% in 2003 to 71% in 2004), evidence consistent with
the 9 percentage point increase (i.e. from 48% in 2002 to 57% in 2003)
experienced in South Africa during the second year of King II Report (Ntim,
2009). However, the subsequent five years of the GCGI saw the compliance
levels increasing at a decreasing rate from the minimum of -0.48 to a
maximum of 3 percentage point.
A positive relationship between the degree of compliance and time findings in
Ghana is further supported by prior studies in the UK, Australia and South
Africa (Shabbir and Padgett, 2008; Henry, 2008, Cui et al, 2008; Ntim,
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2009) where a considerable improvement in the degree of compliance were
recorded over time among listed firms. This positive increase is driven by the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code provisions which show substantial
improvement from 2003 to 2004, suggesting that firms might have adopted
the provisions in response to the pressure they felt of being listed on the
GSE. However, and to facilitate comparison for each of the thirty-six
provisions used for the development of the GCGI, it is important to
investigate the variability or otherwise of the specific governance provisions
as against the aggregate compliance levels which are grouped into six
categories for the full sampled firms. The six categories include board
composition, audit committee, remuneration committee, shareholder rights,
financial affairs and auditing and disclosure practices. Tables 6-2 to 6-7
report the degree of compliance among the sampled firms with all the thirty-
six Ghanaian Code provisions that constitute the GCGI.
Table 6-2: Board composition specific provisions compliance levels for the
full sample
As Table 6-2 indicates above, there are considerable variations in the degree
of compliance with the board composition specific governance provisions
across the sampled firms. It ranges from 0% complete non-compliance for
the first four years (from 2000 to 2003) regarding six board meetings held in
a year (BODMEET) to 100% perfect compliance in the case of the proportion
Specific governance provision in
relation to board composition The degree of compliance among firms (%)
A
L
L
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Board Composition
Role separation (ROLESEP)
Six board meetings held (BODMEET)
The size of the board (BODSIZE)
Proportion of INEDs on the board (PINED)
Existence of finance directors (FD)
Office of the company secretary (COSEC)
Observations
84 86 86 83 84 83 77 81 84 86 89
6 0 0 0 0 7 10 10 6 9 11
63 71 76 74 68 62 65 58 59 57 51
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
34 43 38 35 32 34 32 29 28 34 34
100
283
100
21
100
21
100
23
100
25
100
29
100
31
100
31
100
32
100
35
100
35
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of independent non-executive directors on the board (PINED) and the
existence of the office of the company secretary (COSEC) for all the sampled
firms during the ten year period.
A closer look at the data for the reasons accounting for the variability
indicates that the 0% complete non-compliance of BODMEET for the first four
years is because the Ghanaian Code was first introduced in the year 2003.
However, the degree of compliance did not get any better over the
subsequent years with the highest compliance levels of 11% in 2009, the
findings not consistent with the frequency of board meetings in South Africa
where the degree of compliance ranges from 65% in 2002 to 84% in 2006
(Ntim, 2009). The poor compliance levels in relation to BODMEET suggest
that the provisions of six board meetings a year may not be appropriate in
the Ghanaian context. This is very important because the specific number of
board meetings provided by the Ghanaian Code is not supported by other
world codes24. In respect of the South African King Reports, no specific
number of board meetings has been provided so as the UK codes. Instead,
firms are encouraged to have frequent board meetings of which the adoption
of this provision is supported by listed firms in these countries.
The 100% perfect compliance in relation to the PINED and COSEC is
consistent with the provisions of the revised GSE Listing Rules and the
Ghanaian Companies Code. Whereas the GSE Listing Rules mandate every
listed firm to have two or 25% of the board to be independent non-executive
directors, the Companies Code on the other hand mandate listed firms to
appoint a company secretary. Arguably, the findings of these two provisions
with no variation indicate that linking the specific governance provisions to
24 For example, and as explained in section 3.4 of chapter three, the UK and the South African Codes are
not specific about the number of meetings that should be held by their respective listed companies. Instead,
they have recommended for frequent board meetings. Also, a close examination of the listed firms annual
reports did not indicate any reasons for non-compliance with some of the Ghanaian Code provisions.
Although, the code specifically requested for listed firms to provide reasons for combining the post of the
CEO and the Chairman of the board to shareholders, 16% of the pooled sampled firms did not provide any
reasons for combining the two roles. This suggests weakness in the enforcement of the corporate
governance provisions in Ghana.
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firm performance may not be methodologically correct if all the sampled
firms complied with these provisions.
For the role separation (ROLESEP), and as Table 6-2 indicates above, 84% of
the sampled firms complied with this provision over the ten year period,
evidence consistent with the findings in the UK, US, Nigeria and South Africa
(Conyon, 1994; Rayton and Cheng, 2004; McKnight and Weir, 2009; Linck et
al, 2009; Kajola, 2008; Ntim, 2009). However, the degree of compliance for
the first three years when the Ghanaian Code was not mandated is higher
(85%) than the following six years (83%) after the Code was introduced.
Arguably, listed firms in Ghana progressively complied with this provision at
the rate of 86% in 2000 to 89% in 2009 compared with the South African
listed firms where the levels of compliance ranges from 61% in 2002 to 86%
in 2006. The findings in this thesis has also shown improvement from prior
studies in Ghana (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; Abor and Biekpe,
2007). In particular, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) reported 75%
levels of compliance in ROLESEP among Ghanaian listed firms. Although, the
authors used questionnaires and personal interviews to gather the
governance data, it clearly shows that the Ghanaian listed firms appear to
attach importance to ROLESEP and therefore the recommendations of the
Ghanaian Code have reinforced the levels of compliance.
Also, and as Table 6-2 indicates above, 63% of the sampled firms complied
with the board size (BODSIZE) provision during the ten year period but the
highest compliance levels were also recorded in the first three years (i.e.
71% in 2000, 76% in 2001 and 74% in 2002) when the Ghanaian Code was
not operational. After the introduction of the Ghanaian Code, the sampled
firms’ compliance levels started to decrease from 71% in 2000 to 51% in
2009, a decrease of 20%. This evidence is supported by Cosh et al (2008)
who reported a decline of board size among the UK listed firms after the
introduction of the Cadbury recommendations. A possible reason for the
reduction of the degree of compliance may be that the provision for the
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Ghanaian listed firms to have a board size between a minimum of eight and a
maximum of sixteen is not feasible in the Ghanaian context. By contrast, the
remaining board composition provision recorded low compliance levels at the
rate of 34% in respect of the existence of finance director (FD). On a yearly
basis, the FD recorded its highest compliance levels (43%) in 2000 but later
reduced to 34% in 2009. A general examination from reading the listed firms’
annual reports suggests that most of the firms have only the CEO to sit on
the board. In this case, finance managers are assigned the responsibility of
the finance function in most of the firms instead of the finance director as
recommended by the Ghanaian Code.
Table 6-3 reports the audit committee specific provisions degree of
compliance for the full sampled firms
Table 6-3: Audit committee specific provisions compliance levels for the full
sample
In general, the evidence from Table 6-3 is that the sampled firms are more
likely to comply with some of the audit committee specific governance
provisions than others. For example, 70% of the sampled firms have in
existence of audit committee (AUCOM), but only 43% of them have some of
its members with financial knowledge. Also, whereas 64% of the sampled
firms comply with the composition of the audit committee (AMEMB), 62%
provide disclosure of audit committee members (AUMEMDIS) in their annual
Specific governance provision in
relation to audit committee The degree of compliance among firms (%)
A
L
L
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Audit committee
Existence of audit committee (AUCOM)
Composition of audit committee (AMEMB)
Members with fin. Knowledge (ACOMFK)
Chairman of audit committee (AUCHAIR)
Disc of audit com. members (AUMEMDIS)
Report on audit com. Activities (AAUCOM)
Observations
70 24 29 48 48 79 84 87 91 83 86
64 24 29 48 44 76 77 81 81 74 71
43 14 14 26 24 45 48 58 59 57 57
58 19 24 39 40 72 71 77 72 66 66
62 24 29 43 40 76 81 81 78 69 69
67
283
24
21
29
21
48
23
44
25
76
29
77
31
87
31
88
32
80
35
80
35
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reports. Interestingly, 67% of the sampled firms report on audit committee
activities (AAUCOM) with 58% having a non-executive director as the
Chairman of the audit committee (AUCHAIR). That notwithstanding, the
mean AUCOM (70%) for the full sample is an improvement from the work of
Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu (2008) who reported 38% compliance level
of AUCOM among SMEs in Ghana.
Arguably, and as Table 6-3 indicates above, there is no perfect compliance
with any of the audit committee specific provisions even though the
provisions for the establishment of audit committee is consistent with the
provisions in the SECG regulation and the revised GES Listing Rules. Both
regulations require listed firms to provide written evidence regarding the
operation and effectiveness of audit committee. Notwithstanding these
mandatory requirements, and as indicated earlier, 70% of the sampled firms
met this requirement, suggesting that mandatory requirements do not
guarantee perfect compliance, the findings supported by the work of Carcello
et al (2002) in the US who recorded 85% audit committee compliance levels
based on the rule-based approach to corporate governance. By contrast,
Weir et al (2002) recorded the highest (96%) audit committee compliance
levels in the UK during 1996, the evidence supported by Ntim (2009) with
95% compliance levels among South African listed firms in 2006.
However, the Ghanaian listed firms have experienced progressive
improvement in relation to year-by-year compliance levels from 2000 to
2007 for all the audit committee specific governance provisions. This is not
the case in 2008 and 2009 where the compliance levels started to drop as
shown in Table 6-3. One possible reason may be that some of the sampled
firms did not record the audit committee related information in their annual
reports used to benchmark the compliance levels but rather provided a
written evidence of the operation and effectiveness of the audit committee to
their regulators which could affect the degree of compliance with the audit
committee specific provisions recorded in this thesis.
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Table 6-4 below presents results of the degree of compliance with the
remuneration committee specific provisions among the full sampled firms.
For the five out of the six specific governance provisions, the compliance
levels are comparatively low. In particular, only 28% or less of the sampled
firms complied with these provisions. They include the existence of
remuneration committee (RCOM), the composition of remuneration
committee, disclosure of the remuneration committee membership
(RMEMDIS), having non-executive director as the chairman of remuneration
committee (RCHAIR) and the board receiving remuneration in stock
(STOCKREM). By contrast, only aggregate compensation paid to directors
(AGCOMP) provision recorded perfect compliance (100%) for all the sampled
firms. One possible reason for the perfect compliance may be that the
AGCOMP is consistent with the provisions in the Ghanaian Companies Code
that mandates firms in Ghana to provide a note in their annual reports the
directors’ total remuneration.
Table 6-4: Remuneration committee specific provisions compliance levels
for the full sample
With regards to the pattern of distribution of the compliance levels over the
ten years, it can be seen that the lowest compliance levels for the sampled
firms started in the year 2000 with marginal improvement after the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003. Arguably, the highest compliance
levels (38%) in relation to RCOM during 2007 is not consistent with the
Specific governance provision in
relation to remuneration committee The degree of compliance among firms (%)
A
L
L
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Remuneration committee
Existence of Remuneration com. (RCOM)
Composition remuneration com.(RMEM)
Disc of remuneration com. (RMEMDIS)
Chairman of remuneration com.(RCHAIR)
Aggregate compensation paid (AGCOMP)
Bod. remuneration in stock (STOCKREM)
Observations
28
23
23
22
100
8
283
14
14
14
14
100
5
21
14
14
14
14
100
10
21
22
22
22
22
100
9
23
16
16
16
16
100
8
25
28
24
24
24
100
10
29
29
23
23
23
100
10
31
32
26
26
23
100
10
31
38
28
28
25
100
6
32
34
26
26
23
100
6
35
34
29
29
26
100
6
35
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findings in the UK and South Africa where Weir and Laing (2000) and Ntim
(2009) reported compliance levels of 95% in 1995 and 95% in 2006
respectively. Also, and as Table 6-4 indicates, the board of the Ghanaian
listed firms receive less remuneration in stock (mean of 8%) contrary to the
provisions imposed by the Ghanaian Code. These findings further support the
weak enforcement strategy by regulatory institutions in Ghana.
Table 6-5 presents shareholder rights specific provisions compliance levels
for the full sample.
Table 6-5: Shareholder rights specific provisions compliance levels for the
full sample
As Table 6-5 indicates above, of the six shareholder rights specific provisions,
the sampled firms have experienced perfect compliance (100%) of the three
provisions at the aggregate level and in any given year. They include
adequate notice and information for annual general meeting (AGM), approval
to board re-election (BODELEC) and to facilitate voting by proxy (VBP). A
closer look at the provisions for the reason accounting for complete
compliance indicates that the AGM, BODELEC and VBP are all consistent with
the provisions in the Ghanaian Companies Code and the revised GSE Listing
Rules. Both regulations mandate Ghanaian listed firms to provide adequate
notice towards an AGM, the board to submit themselves for re-election and
to facilitate voting by proxy. By contrast, there are variations in the degree of
compliance with the remaining three provisions including the opportunity to
Specific governance provisions in
relation to shareholder rights The degree of compliance among firms (%)
A
L
L
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Shareholder rights
Adequate notice and info. for AGM (AGM)
Approval to board re-election (BODELEC)
Facilitate voting by proxy (VBP)
Opportunities to vote by mail (VBM)
Info. on related party trans (RPTRANS)
Board share ownership (BSOWN)
Observations
100
100
100
2
61
83
283
100
100
100
0
33
76
21
100
100
100
0
38
71
21
100
100
100
0
65
78
23
100
100
100
0
60
84
25
100
100
100
0
59
83
29
100
100
100
0
55
81
31
100
100
100
3
58
87
31
100
100
100
3
59
84
32
100
100
100
6
77
89
35
100
100
100
3
83
91
35
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vote by mail (VBM), information on related party transaction (RPTRANS) and
board share ownership (BSOWN). In particular, the VBM recorded near
complete non-compliance with only 2% of the sampled firms complying with
the provision, suggesting that it may be unsuitable in the Ghanaian context
and therefore not supported by the Ghanaian Companies Code, the revised
GSE Listing Rules and the SECG regulations. Although the RPTRANS and the
BSOWN are consistent with the provisions in the revised GSE Listing Rules,
61% and 83% of the sampled firms complied with these provisions,
suggesting that the revised GSE Listing Rules do not guarantee perfect
compliance. However, the sampled firms experienced progressive
improvement over time with respect to RPTRANS and BSOWN as shown in
Table 6-5. Arguable, the shareholder rights specific provisions and in
particular the provision related to AGM findings is consistent with the World
Bank corporate governance country assessment report on Ghana (World
Bank, 2005). In particular, the report highlighted that the shareholder rights
in Ghana related to AGM was 75% largely observed.
Table 6-6 provides financial affairs and auditing specific provisions
compliance levels for the full sample firms.
Table 6-6: Financial affairs and auditing specific provisions compliance
levels for the full sample
Specific governance provisions in
relation to financial affairs and
auditing
The degree of compliance among firms (%)
A
L
L
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Financial affairs and Auditing
Annual report at required date (ARLRD)
Use of recognized audit firm (RAF)
Systems to monitor risk (SMR)
Assessment of operating results (AFOR)
Use of GNAS or other standards (GNAS)
External auditors fee paid (FPEAUD)
Observations
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
72 24 24 43 48 76 81 90 91 100 97
99 95 100 100 96 100 100 97 97 100 100
75 29 33 43 56 79 84 90 94 94 97
100
283
100
21
100
21
100
23
100
25
100
29
100
31
100
31
100
32
100
35
100
35
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The results in Table 6-6 above indicate that the degree of compliance with
the financial affairs and auditing specific provisions is comparatively high. In
particular, annual report required date (ARLRD), the use of recognized audit
firm (RAF) and the fee paid to external auditors (FPEAUD) experienced
perfect compliance. In this case, 100% of the sampled firms complied with
these provisions at the aggregate level and year-on year basis. One reason
accounting for the perfect compliance may be that ARLRD, RAF and FPEAUD
are all consistent with the provisions in the Ghanaian Companies Code and
the SECG Regulations. However, there are variations in compliance levels
regarding internal control to monitor risk (SMR) and the use of the Ghana
National Accounting Standards (GNAS) or any other standards recommended
by ICAG. Whereas the sampled firms experienced a reasonable 72% (SMR)
and 75% (GNAS) aggregate compliance levels, the yearly compliance started
less than 30% in 2000 for these provisions but progressively improved to
97% for each provision in 2009. Although, the assessment of operating
results (AFOR) is supported by the provisions in the Companies Code, the
sampled firms could not achieve perfect compliance levels. Instead, the
sampled firms at the aggregate levels recorded 99% (AFOR) compliance
levels with insignificant variations over time, suggesting the first time in
which the Ghanaian Code provision supported by the Companies Code is not
perfectly complied.
Table 6-7 reports disclosure specific provisions compliance levels for the full
sample. The results below suggest that the degree of compliance with the
disclosure specific provisions at an aggregate level (i.e. ranges from 61% to
100%) is generally high compared with the previous findings of World Bank
(2005) and Tsamenyi et al (2007) who reported 50% and 52% levels of
disclosure standards in Ghana respectively. In particular, and on a yearly
basis, the pattern of distribution of having adequate internal control (DSAIC)
and disclosure of compliance with corporate governance (DSCCG) started as
low as 19% compliance levels in 2000 for both provisions, they saw
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significant improvement in the degree of compliance after the introduction of
the Ghanaian Code to 86% and 91% in 2009 respectively.
Table 6-7: Disclosure specific provisions compliance levels for the full
sample
Even though the SECG Regulations and the revised GSE Listing Rules
encourage disclosure practices among Ghanaian listed firms, the six
disclosure specific provisions are not consistent with the provisions by both
regulators. However, the sampled firms achieved perfect compliance (100%)
with respect to the disclosure of the statement of directors’ responsibility in
the preparation of the financial statements (DSRPFS) and the disclosure of
being a going concern (DSBGC) at the aggregate level and on yearly basis.
In addition, 98% and 99% of the sampled firms complied with the disclosure
of current and future prospect (DCFP) and the compliance with the law
(DSCL) respectively. These findings suggest that even among the provisions
that are not supported by the Companies Code, SECG Regulations and the
GSE Listing Rules, the degree of compliance is comparatively high,
suggesting that the formulation, implementation and enforcement of the
Ghanaian Code has contributed to the disclosure compliance levels in the
country.
Figure 6-2 presents a comparison of the aggregate degree of compliance with
the GCGI across the twelve industries computed means.
Specific governance provisions in
relation to disclosure The degree of compliance among firms (%)
A
L
L
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
6. Disclosure practices
Disc of current and future prosp (DCFP)
Disc statement of responsibility (DSRPFS)
Disc of adequate internal control (DSAIC)
Disc of compliance with the law (DSCL)
Disc compliance with corp. gov.(DSCCG)
Disc of being a going concern (DSBGC)
Observations
98 95 95 96 92 97 97 100 100 100 100
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
61 19 24 39 40 59 65 77 78 83 86
99 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 97 97 97
70 19 24 39 48 76 74 90 94 94 91
100
283
100
21
100
21
100
23
100
25
100
29
100
31
100
31
100
32
100
35
100
35
190
Figure 6-2: GCGI based on Industrial Classification for the full sample
As Figure 6-2 indicates above, the degree of compliance with the 36
Ghanaian Code provisions is consistently higher in the cases of mining
(92%), banking (77%), agro processing (75%), IT solution (73%) and
pharmaceutical (73%) than the overall mean GCGI (69%). Although, the
compliance levels of each of the other 7 industries are lower than the GCGI,
they did not fall below 50% compliance levels of the 36 Ghanaian Code
provisions. In this respect, most industries have a mean GCGI close to or
above 60%.The differences in compliance levels with governance standards
by industry classification is consistent with prior governance index studies
(Black et al, 2006a; Abdo and Fisher, 2007; Henry, 2008). In particular,
Abdo and Fisher (2007) reported higher differences between industrial
sectors with the banking sector topping the nine sectors with the G-Score of
70% compliance levels. They however reported that the media and
publishing sector score below 50% with most of the sectors having a mean
G-Score close to or above 60%. Arguably, the differences in the degree of
compliance between industries is high with the mining sector by far achieving
the highest (92%) compliance levels in terms of the mean GCGI, while the
paper covers and printing sector recorded the lowest (54%) mean GCGI.
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These compliance levels achieved by the Ghanaian listed firms are better
than what Abdo and Fisher (2007) reported across the South African listed
firms. One possible reason for the high degree of compliance in the mining
industry is the dual listing status25 which comes with additional corporate
governance requirements in their respective overseas countries (i.e.
Australia, South Africa, UK and the US) resulting in strong GCGI for this
industry.
6.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SUB-INDICES FOR THE FULL
SAMPLE
Table 6-8 provides the degree of compliance among the sample firms with all
the six sub-indices that form the Ghanaian Corporate Governance Index
(GCGI). As indicated earlier, they include board composition, audit
committee, remuneration committee, shareholder rights, financial affairs and
auditing and disclosure practices.
Table 6-8: The degree of compliance with the sub-indices of the GCGI for
the full sample
They key finding from Table 6-8 above is that the degree of compliance with
the six sub-indices that form the GCGI improves over time. Apart from the
25 It is important to note that the 4% of the sampled firms representing the mining sector have multiple or
dual listing status. Whereas AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) is listed on the GSE, ASX, NYSE and London
Stock Exchange (LSE), Golden Star Resources (GSR) is listed on GSE and the NYSE.
SUB-INDICES
Aggregate and year-by-year sub-indices (%)
A
L
L
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Board composition index
Audit committee index
Remuneration committee index
Shareholder rights index
Financial affairs and auditing index
Disclosure index
Observation
64 66 66 64 63 65 65 63 64 64 64
61 17 21 38 39 72 75 81 81 72 70
34 27 28 33 29 35 34 36 38 36 37
74 67 67 73 73 74 73 75 75 79 79
91 73 75 81 84 93 94 97 97 99 99
88 71 72 79 81 90 90 95 96 95 94
283 21 21 23 25 29 31 31 32 35 35
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board composition index in which there is a reduction of a 2 percentage
points from 66% in 2000 to 64% in 2009 in the levels of compliance, the
remaining 5 sub-indices experienced consistent significant improvements in
the degree of compliance among the sampled firms. A closer look at the data
for the reasons accounting for such 2 percentage points decrease indicates
that the BODSZE (FD) compliance levels which form part of the board
composition index, and as reported in Table 6-3, experienced significant
reduction from 71% (43%) in 2000 to 51% (34%) in 2009 and might have
accounted for the decrease in board composition index. Excluding the board
composition index, the sub-index with the least increase over the ten-year
period is the remuneration committee index recording a 10 percentage point
improvement (i.e. from 27% in 2000 to 37% in 2009). However, this is
reasonable because the degree of compliance is relatively low in 2000.
By contrast, the audit committee index experienced the highest increase over
the ten-year period with a 53 percentage point increase (i.e. from 17% in
2000 to 70% in 2009) in the degree of compliance among the sampled firms.
This is not surprising because the operation and effectiveness of the audit
committee is supported by the SECG Regulations and the GSE Listing Rules.
Unlike the audit committee index, the shareholder rights, financial affairs and
auditing and disclosure indices recorded the highest compliance levels in
2000 and therefore the sampled firms experienced 12%, 26% and 23%
increased percentage points respectively (i.e. from 67%, 73% and 71% in
2000 to 79%, 99% and 94% in 2009). Table 6-8 also compares the
aggregate levels of compliance with the sub-indices across the sampled
firms. In this respect, financial affairs and auditing index recorded the
highest compliance levels at 91% followed by the disclosure index (88%);
shareholder rights index (74%) and board composition index (64%)
respectively. However, and as expected, the remuneration committee index
recorded the least (34%) compliance levels. These findings also support the
earlier results that the degree of compliance with corporate governance has
significantly improved among Ghanaian listed firms.
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6.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PRE 2003 AND POST 2003
COMPLIANCE LEVELS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE
Table 6-9 presents the descriptive statistics for the pre 2003 and post 2003
degree of compliance with corporate governance for the full sampled firms.
Table 6-9: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 compliance levels of the GCGI (%)
INDEX PRE (2000-2002) POST (2004-2009) OVERALL INDEX
Mean 57 73 69
Median 50 72.22 72.22
Mode 44 69a 69a
Std. Deviation 15.637 12.988 15.080
Minimum 42 39 39
Maximum
Observations
89
65
100
218
100
283
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown.
In general, and as Table 6-9 indicates above, the full sampled firms mean of
the GCGI is 69% and a standard deviation of 15.080 for the ten-year period
is consistent with comparable prior index studies (Abdo and Fisher, 2007;
Aggarwal et al, 2007). Whereas Abdo and Fisher (2007) found a mean G-
Score of 61% in South Africa, Aggarwal et al (2007) in their cross-country
study reported mean GOV44 of 69%, 61%, 57% and 56% for Canada, US,
Finland and the UK respectively. These findings suggest that the Ghanaian
listed firms’ degree of compliance with corporate governance provisions is
above average compared with the compliance levels in the other parts of the
world. However, the pre 2003 and post 2003 GCGI show some notable
differences between the subsamples. As Table 6-9 indicates above, the pre
2003 (i.e. from 2000 to 2002) recorded a mean of 57% and a standard
deviation of 15.637, and post 2003 (i.e. from 2004 to 2009) mean of 73%
and a standard deviation of 12.958. This shows a 28 percentage change (i.e.
from 57 pre 2003 to 73% post 2003), the general pre and post percentage
change not consistent with prior comparable index studies. For example, Cui
et al (2008) reported a general change from a mean of 66% in 2001 to 71%
in 2004 (i.e. an 8 percentage change). However, it can be noted that the
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extent of change among Ghanaian listed firms is significantly higher than the
change experienced by Australian listed firms, suggesting that the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code is helping to improve corporate
governance standards among the Ghanaian listed firms.
Arguably, one reason that might have contributed to the significant
percentage change among Ghanaian listed firms is the study period covered
in the pre and post publication of the Ghanaian Code. Whereas Cui et al
(2008) covered only one year before and one year after the introduction of
the ASX corporate governance recommendations, the degree of compliance
among the Ghanaian listed firms in this thesis covers three years before and
six years after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. Fundamentally, the
period of study covered in this thesis is supported by Yan-Leung et al (2008)
who noted that it may take longer before the adoption of a particular code
provisions is embedded on firms activities, hence the significant percentage
change from pre to post degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code.
More importantly, and as Table 6-9 indicates above, the descriptive statistics
also show large variability (large standard deviations) in the degree of
compliance with the overall as well as the pre 2003 and post 2003 GCGI,
suggesting that the Ghanaian Code provisions and the sampled firms have
been satisfactorily selected to achieve sufficient variation. As indicated
earlier, this may minimize potential selection bias that has limited much of
the prior governance-performance relationship studies (Klapper and Love,
2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Chen et al, 2009; Morey et al, 2009).
Table 6-10 indicates the mean index for both pre 2003 and post 2003 degree
of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions for each of the six sub-
indices of the GCGI. The last two columns show the percentage increase
(decrease) and the percentage change from pre (2000-2002) and post
(2004-2009) compliance levels of the Ghanaian Code provisions.
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Table 6-10: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 compliance levels of the sub-indices (%)
SUB-INDEX
PRE
(2000-2002)
Mean %
POST
(2004-2009)
Mean %
Increase
or
(Decrease) % CHANGE
Board Composition Index
Audit Committee Index
Remuneration Committee Index
Shareholder Rights Index
Financial Affairs&Auditing Index
Disclosure Index
Mean
65
26
29
69
77
74
57
64
75
36
76
97
93
73
(1)
49
7
7
20
19
16
(1.5)
188
24
10
26
26
28
From the Table 6-10 above, the best and worst compliance levels of the sub-
indices are clearly indicated. As indicated earlier, a comparison of the pre
2003 and post 2003 shows a positive change of 28% degree of compliance
among the full sampled firms. This further demonstrates an increase in
quantity and quality of corporate governance provisions adopted by firms, as
they try to understand many of the provisions of the Ghanaian Code. It is a
reasonable expectation that firms will continually seek to improve and
enhance the levels of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions over
time. As Table 6-10 indicates above, the biggest improvement from pre 2003
to post 2003 occurred in the audit committee index where a 188 positive
percentage change was recorded. This would appear to bring into line with
the current trends in the adoption of audit committee requirements
worldwide. Another possible reason for the surge of the audit committee
index in post 2003, and as indicated earlier, is the implementation initiatives
by SECG Regulations and the GSE Listing Rules during 2004 to 2009, where
the audit committee related provisions are consistent with the provisions of
these regulations. It must be also emphasized that the audit committee
substantially contributed into the post 2003 GCGI degree of compliance.
The lowest sub-index in each period of assessment was the remuneration
committee index (i.e. 29% in pre 2003 and 36% in post 2003), indicating
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that not all listed firms appear to understand the importance and role of the
remuneration committee. As indicated earlier in Table 6-4, the highest
specific provisions compliance level was the aggregate compensation paid to
directors, given that the Ghanaian Companies Code require the total
compensation paid to the current and previous directors to be recorded in the
firm’s annual reports. However, and as Table 6-10 indicates above, the
remuneration committee index recorded 24 percentage change, a little lower
than the financial affairs and auditing and disclosure indices that recorded 26
and 26 percentage changes respectively, even though the degree of
compliance in each period is at the highest levels for both indices. Arguably,
the shareholder rights index recorded the highest compliance levels in pre
2003 but with an insignificant percentage change (10) compared with the
percentage change (24) in remuneration committee index. This suggests
that, although the remuneration committee index is at the lowest level in
each period, it experienced significantly more improvement from pre 2003 to
post 2003 than the shareholder rights.
Of particular concern is the reduction of the degree of compliance (i.e. a
negative 1 percentage change) registered for board composition index26. This
sub-index included aspects of governance relating to the board size, an
important vehicle for promoting effectiveness and ensuring representational
needs of the board for decision making. Also, and as indicated in subsection
4.2.2, empirical findings suggest that board size does matter to firm
performance. In this respect, the Ghanaian listed firms are expected to have
a board size between eight and sixteen members. However, and as noted in
Table 6-2, the degree of compliance with the board size specific provisions
have affected the board composition index negatively. This suggests that
listed firms have not come to terms with the importance and the role played
by having a representational board size for effective board decision making.
26 The board composition index was based on the degree of compliance with the following Ghanaian Code
provisions: role separation, frequency of board meetings, board size, proportion of INEDs, existence of
finance director and office of the company secretary.
197
6.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF OTHER SPECIFIC GOVERNANCE
MECHANISMS
Tables 6-11 to 6-14 report the descriptive statistics of other specific
corporate governance mechanisms
Table 6-11: Descriptive statistics for the board size based on the full sample
As Table 6-11 indicates above, board size ranges from a minimum of 4 to a
maximum of 18 with the overall mean of 8.52 of the listed firms studied. This
finding is very important because it is within the recommended efficient and
effective mean board size (i.e. between 8 and 9) as reported by Lipton and
Lorsch (1992). However, the respective year-by-year mean board size
reduced from 9 in 2000 to 8 in 2009. That notwithstanding, the overall mean
board size as well as year-by-year means are within the provisions of the
Ghanaian Code. As indicated in chapter three, it recommends that a listed
firm must have a board size ranging from a minimum of eight to a maximum
of sixteen. Arguably, the mean board size of 8.52 is also consistent with the
findings of prior studies in Ghana (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe; 2006a;
2006b). Whereas Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) reported the
mean board size of 8.22, with a minimum and a maximum of 5 and 13,
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006b), and in particular focusing on the
Ghanaian listed and non-listed banks, found a mean board size of 9.82 with a
minimum of 4 and a maximum of 15 respectively. These findings are of
particular importance because the overall mean board size and the year-by-
BOARD SIZE
Year-by-year board size
ALL 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Mean
Median
Mode
Std Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observations
8.52
8
7
2.154
4
18
283
9
9
7
2.364
5
15
21
9
9
9
2.265
5
13
21
9
9
9
1.817
5
13
23
8
9
9
2.039
5
12
25
8
8
8
2.128
5
15
29
8
8
7
2.363
5
17
31
9
8
7
2.623
5
18
31
8
8
7
1.951
5
14
32
8
7
7
2.007
4
13
35
8
7
7
2.002
5
14
35
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year averages in this thesis show that the Ghanaian firms have relatively
moderate board sizes, suggesting efficient and effective boards.
Table 6-12 provides pre 2003 and post 2003 descriptive statistics of board
size for the full sampled firms.
Table 6-12: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 board size
BOARD SIZE PRE (2000-2002) POST (2004-2009) ALL
Mean 9.03 8.17 8.52
Median 9 8 8
Mode 9 7 7
Std. Deviation 2.121 2.146 2.154
Minimum 5 4 4
Maximum
Observations
15
65
18
218
18
283
As Table 6-12 indicates above, the pre 2003 recorded a mean board size of
9.03 and a standard deviation of 2.121, while the post 2003 mean board size
was 8.17 with a standard deviation of 2.146. This shows a decrease of about
1 average board size from 9.03 during pre 2003 to 8.17 post 2003, the
findings consistent with prior studies in the UK. For example, Cosh and
Hughes (1997a) reported a decline in average board size from 14 in 1980/81
to 13 in 1995/96 and further reduced to 11 in 2005/06 as reported by Cosh
et al (2008), suggesting that the adoption of a code of good corporate
governance causes the average board size to decline over time. However,
this is not the case for the US firms as they experienced decline in the
average board size pre 2002 by 5.6%, but this was reversed post 2002 (i.e.
after the introduction of SOX) to 8.4% increase as reported by Linck et al
(2009). This suggests that, whereas the findings in this thesis based on the
principles-based approach to corporate governance is consistent with the UK
studies, the rules-based approach to corporate governance findings in the US
after the introduction of SOX is in the opposite direction with average board
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size increasing. This difference is very important and worth looking into
because the principles-based approach to corporate governance appears to
provide some flexibility which encourages firms to choose the board sizes
that fit into their business objectives, hence the decline over time. In
particular, and as Lipton and Lorsch (1992) showed that larger board size is
less effective for firm performance, the principles-based approach to
corporate governance findings appears to achieve efficient and effective
board sizes in order to improve their firm performance.
Table 6-13: Descriptive statistics for the proportion of NEDs based on the
full sample
Table 6-13 above reports the proportion of non-executive directors on the
Ghanaian boards. It clearly indicates that the Ghanaian corporate boards on
average of 76% are dominated by non-executive directors with a minimum
of 22% and a maximum of 91% for the full sampled firms. Arguably, and
consistent with other specific governance mechanisms, the average
percentage point increased from 74% in 2000 to 77% in 2009. Although, the
Ghanaian boards experienced insignificant increase in relation to the
proportion of non-executive directors on the board, they are more
independent. These findings are in line with John and Senbet (1998) who
noted that the more outsiders there are on the board, the more independent
the board. However, this evidence is not supported by prior Ghanaian studies
(Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006b; Abor and Biekpe, 2007). For
example, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006b) reported an average of
PROP OF
NEDS
Year-by-year proportion of NEDs (%)
ALL 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Mean
Median
Mode
Std Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observations
76
80
86
13.096
22
91
283
74
80
86
16.303
22
90
21
75
80
89
15.283
30
90
21
76
80
89
13.968
40
90
22
75
80
80
13.356
40
90
25
76
80
88
13.657
40
90
29
75
78
88
12.158
50
90
31
75
80
86
13.599
40
90
31
76
80
86
12.479
40
90
32
76
78
86
12.481
43
91
35
77
80
86
11.289
44
91
35
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25% of outside directors on the Ghanaian board across listed and non-listed
banks, suggesting that the Ghanaian banks boards are less independent.
That notwithstanding, it can be stated that the governance data used in their
study were not objectively assessed but rather based on questionnaire
administration and interviews, which might not have reflected the
governance data over time. Also, and contrary to this thesis, the non-listed
banks that were part of the sample used in their study are not required to
adopt the Ghanaian Code even if it was in place during the study period.
Arguably, this might have caused the differences in findings across studies in
Ghana.
Table 6-14: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 proportion of NEDs
PROP OF NEDs PRE (2000-2002) POST (2004-2009) ALL
Mean 75 76 76
Median 80 80 80
Mode 89 86 86
Std. Deviation 14.951 12.522 13.096
Minimum 22 40 22
Maximum
Observations
90
65
91
218
91
283
Table 6-14 above further presents the pre 2003 and post 2003 proportion of
non-executive directors on the board. It appears that there have not been
any significant differences between pre 2003 (75%) and post 2003 (76%)
mean proportion of non-executive directors on the Ghanaian boards. This
suggests that the Ghanaian boards were more independent before and after
the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. This evidence is not surprising
because in reading the annual reports, it was clear that most of the listed
firms have the CEO as the only executive member of the board. In particular,
and because of the moderate board sizes across the Ghanaian listed firms,
they prefer to engage the services of managers to be the head of various
departments but not executive directors as practised in the other countries.
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6.6 DIFFERENCES IN THE DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE BASED ON PRE
2003 AND POST 2003 GCGI
To investigate whether there are significant differences in the degree of
compliance with corporate governance during pre 2003 and post 2003
introduction of the Ghanaian Code, two statistical tests were performed
including independent-samples T test and non-parametric Mann-Whitney U
Test respectively. The first hypothesis in this thesis on the improvement in
the degree of compliance from pre 2003 to post 2003 by the Ghanaian listed
firms was tested in the following form:
Ho1: There is significant improvement in the degree of compliance with
corporate governance practices by listed firms during pre 2003 and
post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code.
Table 6-15 reports the summary results of the differences in pre 2003 and
post 2003 GCGI as well as its sub-indices across Ghanaian listed firms. The
independent samples t-test and the Mann-Whitney U Test support
hypothesis one that there is significant improvement in the degree of
compliance with corporate governance practices by listed firms during pre
2003 and post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code. This suggests that
the sampled firms were more compliant after the introduction of the
Ghanaian Code than when the code was not in place. As Panel A of Table 6-
15 indicates below, the overall GCGI results has a t=-7.232 and p-value =
.000, indicating a real improvement in the means between pre 2003 and post
2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code. The real improvement in means
GCGI is also supported by the Mann-Whitney U Test with z=-6.126 and p-
value = .000. To see the direction, it is important to look once again at the
means of the two groups. Post 2003, it turns out, first to have the degree of
compliance at a higher mean GCGI (73 vs. 57) than pre 2003, suggesting the
possibility of different findings based on the whole as well as the pre 2003
and post 2003 GCGI.
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Table 6-15: Differences in GCGI across Ghanaian listed firms (%)
INDEX
PRE
(2000-2002)
Mean %
POST
(2004-2009)
Mean % T-TEST
MANN
WHITNEY U
Test
Panel A: Overall index
GCGI
Panel B: Sub-indices
BOARDINDEX
AUCOMINDEX
RECOMINDEX
SHOLDINDEX
FAAINDEX
DISCINDEX
57
65
26
29
69
77
74
73
64
75
36
76
97
93
-7.232***
0.563
-7.933***
-1.511
-4.167***
-11.405***
-8.851***
-6.126***
-0.747
-6.780***
-1.695
-3.877***
-10.035***
-7.644***
Note: The t-test and test statistics in columns 4 and 5 are the independent-samples t-test and Mann
Whitney U test based on pre 2003 and post 2003 GCGI (Ghanaian corporate governance index) and its
sub-indices. The sub-indices include BOARDINDEX (board composition index), AUCOMINDEX (audit
committee index), RECOMINDEX (remuneration committee index), SHOLDINDEX (shareholder rights
index), FAAINDEX (financial affairs and auditing index) and DISCINDEX (disclosure index). The mean
differences in panel A test for equality of means between pre 2003 and post 2003 of the overall GCGI,
while the mean differences in Panel B test for equality of means between pre 2003 and post 2003 sub-
indices. A mean difference with (***) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is
rejected at the 1% significant level.
As Panel B of Table 6-15 indicates above, the differences in compliance based
on the pre 2003 and post 2003 sub-indices were tested where four out of the
six sub-indices recorded significant improvement. In particular, AUCOMIDEX,
SHOLDINDEX, FAAINDEX and DISCINDEX all recorded significant differences
from pre 2003 to post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code at 1%
significant level in respect of both tests in columns 4 and 5. Although, and as
Panel B of Table 6-15 indicates above, the BOARDINDEX and the
RECOMINDEX recorded some differences but these are not significant,
indicating that the different sub-indices should not be used in isolation
because each of the pre 2003 and post 2003 sub-indices can affect firm
performance differently.
However, the analyses based on pre 2003 and post 2003 GCGI and its sub-
indices may bring out different sets of governance variables which can
influence firm performance, thus helping to present a clearer explanation on
the governance-performance relationship findings in chapter eight.
Researchers who provide only post introduction of a particular code of
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corporate governance index in their study should interpret the results in
context specific to the governance index used. For example, if an
investigation of the impact of a particular code provisions on firm
performance is the focus of the study, then the period where there was no
code on corporate governance should also be investigated in order to
ascertain the real effect of the adoption of a particular code provisions on
firm performance. This is particularly important because it will help to
distinguish between governance-performance relationships findings before
and after the introduction of a particular code of corporate governance
Fundamentally, the evidence of differences in means confirms significant
improvement in corporate governance standards across the sampled firms
from pre 2003 to post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code. This finding
is also supported by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) who noted that the
adoption of a code of good corporate governance appears to have generally
improved the corporate governance standards of countries that have adopted
them. For example, prior index studies such as Shabbir and Padgett (2008),
Cui et al (2008), Henry (2008), Ntim (2009), amongst others, have all
reported improvement in their listed firms’ corporate governance standards
after the adoption of code of best practices in the UK, Australia and South
Africa respectively. Notably, the period of code of good corporate governance
adoption witnessed improved compliance compared to the period with no
formal adoption of code of good corporate governance as established in this
thesis.
6.7 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The degree of compliance with corporate governance provisions in the annual
reports across Ghanaian listed firms was investigated from 2000-2009. These
were the overall GCGI for the full sampled firms, sub-indices, pre 2003 and
post 2003 levels of compliance as well as other specific governance
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mechanisms. The nine out of the thirty-six GCGI framework which were least
compliant include the frequency of board meetings, existence of finance
director, members of audit committee with adequate financial knowledge,
existence of a remuneration committee, composition of remuneration
committee, disclosure of remuneration committee membership, non-
executive director as the chairman of remuneration committee, board
remuneration in stock and the opportunity for shareholders to vote by mail. A
majority of firms, however on average, complied with the remaining twenty-
seven of the GCGI framework from 2000 to 2009.
Arguably, the introduction of the Ghanaian Code did improve significantly the
degree of compliance with corporate governance by the listed firms
considered in this thesis. In particular, there were changes in the levels of
compliance with corporate governance across the listed firms in the entire
thirty-six GCGI framework with some decreasing and others increasing in the
degree of compliance after the formal adoption of the Ghanaian Code. That
notwithstanding, the listed firms considered in this thesis had adopted thirty-
four out of the thirty-six GCGI framework prior to the formal introduction of
the Ghanaian Code where only frequency of board meetings and the
opportunity to vote by mail experienced non-compliance. However, the
formal adoption of the Ghanaian Code did not make any significant difference
among the nine provisions indicated earlier in this section. It was also
observed during the reading of the annual reports that twelve of the
provisions supported by either the Companies Code or SECG Regulations or
GSE Listing Rules experienced perfect compliance throughout the ten-year
period by the listed firms studied. Overall, the trend and behaviour of the
GCGI over time is positive with statistically significant improvement among
listed firms.
Grouping the listed firms into industrial categories, mining sector experienced
the highest compliance level in relation to the GCGI over time, with the paper
covers and printing sector scoring the lowest GCGI. The mining sector with
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the highest degree of compliance is not surprising because the listed firms in
this sector were the only firms among the sampled firms who had dual listing
in countries with strong corporate governance frameworks of which the
Ghanaian Code conformed to the requirements. As a result, compliance with
these governance provisions amounted to compliance with the Ghanaian
Code provisions. The major area of concern to which the Ghanaian Code has
to direct attention is the absence of any provision regarding the
establishment of a nomination committee. The observation by McKnight and
Weir (2009) that the nomination committee’s key function is to ensure that
director appointments, whether executive or non-executive, are made on
merit rather than patronage does not appear to be the case in Ghana as the
provision for the establishment of a nomination committee is not addressed
by the Ghanaian Code.
That notwithstanding, two further problems with the adoption of the
Ghanaian Code provisions across listed firms were identified. Based on the
‘comply or explain philosophy, there was complete lack of explanation for
non-compliance by the listed firms in their annual reports to shareholders,
given that the Ghanaian Code mandates directors’ to provide explanation for
one individual combining the roles of the CEO and the Chairman. In this
respect, some listed firms consistently combined the two roles during the ten
year period without providing any explanation to shareholders in the annual
report. In other cases, the Ghanaian Code has not been subjected to revision
since its introduction and therefore has exhibited some inconsistencies with
other regulatory frameworks governing the operation of companies in Ghana.
In particular, the observed pattern of the distribution of the thirty-six GCGI
framework investigated in this thesis provides clear indication of non-
compliance of specific provisions that are not backed by the Companies
Code, SECG Regulations or the GSE Listing Rules. In this respect, the SECG
and the GSE must strengthen their effort in improving corporate governance
practices in Ghana.
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The analyses based on the six sub-indices that form the GCGI also
experienced consistent improvement over time in the degree of compliance
with the Ghanaian Code. However, the listed firms appear not to value the
importance attached to a remuneration committee with the least compliance
levels compared with other five sub-indices. The least compliance level of the
remuneration committee index is not surprising because five out of the six
specific provisions scored less than 30% compliance levels. Consequently,
the least compliance with the remuneration committee index affected the
overall GCGI. That notwithstanding, the six sub-indices with different
provisions may bring out different sets of governance indices influencing firm
performance which can help provide a clearer explanation or picture and a
richer understanding of which sub-indices are more influential to firm
performance. This, therefore, justifies grouping of the thirty-six GCGI
framework into sub-indices for the association testing between firm
performance measures used in chapter eight.
Arguably, the analyses of the other specific corporate governance
mechanisms have also shown some interesting findings. The board sizes of
the listed firms studied appears to be moderate, making the Ghanaian boards
more efficient and effective. However, the recommendations of the Ghanaian
Code for listed firms to have a minimum of eight and a maximum of sixteen
board size have affected Ghanaian boards marginally to decrease over time.
That notwithstanding, the mean board size was within the Ghanaian Code
recommendations. This is particularly important because the GCGI only
focused on whether the listed firms have board sizes between eight and
sixteen but not the absolute number for the full sample. In the association
testing in chapter eight, this will provide further evidence whether the
compliance index or the absolute board size is more important to firm
performance. In other cases, the Ghanaian boards appear to be more
independent before and after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code with
most having the CEO as the only executive board member.
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In general, the findings suggest variability in the degree of compliance during
pre 2003 and post 2003 GCGI. For example, the post 2003 experienced
higher compliance level than the pre 2003. This is very important because it
can help to test the association between pre 2003 as well as post 2003 GCGI
and firm performance in chapter eight. This association testing can also help
to understand whether the formal adoption of the Ghanaian Code matters to
firm performance or not. In particular, the improvement in the GCGI from
pre 2003 to post 2003 may help to explain improvement in firm performance
during the same period. The post 2003 higher degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code is also indicative of a formal adoption of the Ghanaian Code
provisions by the listed firms studied. Overall, the GCGI experienced
significant improvement from pre 2003 to post 2003 introduction of the
Ghanaian Code.
6.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the results of the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions across listed firms. The impact of the Ghanaian
Code provisions on the degree of compliance with corporate governance was
investigated during pre 2003 and post 2003. Given that the adoption of good
corporate governance enhances firm performance, this chapter has so far
presented only a partial insight into the governance-performance relationship
in Ghana. The next chapter will discuss the descriptive statistics and the test
of panel regression assumptions.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND THE TEST OF PANEL
REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, the analysis of the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions was considered. This chapter discusses the data
and the test of panel regression assumptions. In particular, it seeks to
achieve three main objectives. First, it presents the descriptive statistics for
the dependent (firm performance) and the control variables. Second,
correlation analysis is conducted to examine the relationship between all the
variables used in this thesis. Finally, it tests the panel regression
assumptions to determine whether pooled OLS and the alternative random or
fixed effects regression model should be used as the method of estimation.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 reports the descriptive
statistics for the dependent and the control variables. Section 7.3 presents
correlation analysis for all the variables used in this thesis. Section 7.4 tests
the panel regression assumptions. Section 7.5 provides summary of the
results and discussion, while section 7.6 summarises the chapter.
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
MEASURES AND CONTROL VARIABLES
This section reports the detailed descriptive statistics for the dependent (firm
performance) and the control variables. Whereas, subsection 7.2.1 focuses
on the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, subsection 7.2.2
presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables.
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7.2.1 Descriptive statistics of the dependent (financial performance)
variables
Table 7-1 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables based
on the full sampled firms.
Table 7-1: Summary descriptive statistics of the dependent variables
based on all (283) firm-year observations
In terms of the accounting-based performance measures, and as can be seen
from Panel A of Table 7-1, the pattern of the distribution over the ten year
period has the highest mean (12.38%) of ROA in the year 2001 but with
consistent decline in profitability to the lowest mean (1.33%) of ROA in
2008. However, the overall mean 5.69% and the standard deviation of
11.32% during the ten year period suggest a significant variation in ROA
across the sampled firms. As an alternative to ROA, Panel B of Table 7-1
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Year-by-year performance variables
A
L
L
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Panel A: Return on assets (%)
Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Panel B: Return on equity (%)
Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Panel C: Tobin’s Q
Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observations
5.69
11.32
-20.86
31.59
18.67
39.77
-31.88
68.25
1.13
1.67
-0.06
7.01
283
9.20
12.34
-10.25
44.65
39.67
61.48
21.44
53.6
1.32
1.34
0.40
4.97
21
12.38
15.83
-6.32
70.67
26.77
79.81
-40.10
70.30
1.51
1.64
0.37
5.95
21
8.91
8.29
-6.51
25.19
26.53
26.44
-14.16
93.64
1.39
1.55
0.24
5.92
23
9.59
8.86
-9.24
26.53
30.35
33.68
-24.9
54.9
1.14
0.98
0.38
3.91
25
5.77
9.06
-18.42
24.35
20.35
36.82
-55.64
61.22
1.68
2.92
0.21
15.00
29
5.44
9.41
-16.76
22.64
16.01
29.09
-57.99
96.76
1.39
2.72
0.10
15.00
31
5.28
8.29
-16.26
26.93
16.64
23.76
-29.75
91.47
1.14
1.58
0.16
7.85
31
3.73
9.34
-22.03
22.77
12.18
35.83
-46.93
62.90
0.68
0.36
0.06
1.86
32
1.33
12.75
-43.1
22.55
6.52
32.94
-33.12
51.81
0.77
0.76
0.09
4.84
35
1.40
13.48
-59.74
29.65
8.52
22.59
-37.52
45.90
0.68
0.96
-2.59
4.81
35
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shows that ROE was at its highest (39.67%) in the year 2000 with the lowest
(6.52%) recorded in 2008. The overall mean of 18.67% and the standard
deviation of 39.77% over the ten year period show a significant variation
among the sampled firms. In comparison, the Ghanaian firms appear to be
performing better in relation to ROE than ROA based on the year-by-year
percentage points and the overall mean. The significant differences in the
average accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROA = 5.69% and
ROE = 18.67%) for the sampled firms will provide interesting results for the
hypotheses testing in chapter eight.
By contrast, and as can be seen from Panel C of Table 7-1, the Q-ratio as the
market-based performance measure was at its highest mean (1.68) in the
year 2004. This appears to be because, the market value, and in line with
the overall declining profitability of the firms, was falling during 2001, 2002
and 2003. The Q-ratio appears to have made a recovery in the year 2004 but
with a significant decline to a mean of 0.68 in 2009. However, the overall
mean (1.13) of Q-ratio for the full sample and the standard deviation of 1.67
suggest that there is significant variation in the market-based performance
measure across the sampled firms. It is important to note here that, as
firms experienced a decline in their profitability in 2004, reflected in ROA and
ROE, the Q-ratio recovered that year. However, both accounting-based and
the market-based performance measures consistently decline up to the year
end 2008 with slight increase in 2009. Arguably, the decline in profitability
for both accounting-based and the market-based performance measures
appears to be partly because of the global recession during the years 2007 to
2009. The firms appear to have made substantial decline in profitability and
market value as reflected in the ROA, ROE and Q-ratio during 2007 to 2009.
Interestingly, the mean ROA, ROE and the Q-ratio as shown in Panel A, B
and C of Table 7-1 are not consistent with prior studies in Ghana
(Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; Abor and Biekpe, 2007;
Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu, 2008). For example, Kyereboah-Coleman
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and Biekpe (2006a) reported mean ROA and Q-ratio of 20% and 0.67 among
Ghanaian listed firms compared with 5.69% and 1.13 found in this thesis.
This suggests that the Ghanaian firms performed slightly better with regards
to Q-ratio than ROA compared with Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a)
findings. Using SMEs in their study, Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu (2008)
also reported mean ROA and ROE of 15.28% and 47.50% respectively. Given
the study period and the sampled firms used in each study, the differences in
performance measures in Ghana are not surprising because the Ghanaian
economy might have performed poorly in 2007, 2008 and 2009 which has
affected the overall mean of ROA, ROE and Q-ratio in this thesis.
Table 7-2 presents the descriptive statistics of the pre 2003 and post 2003
financial performance measures. As shown in column 6 of Table 7-2, there
are significant differences between pre 2003 and post 2003 mean
accounting-based firm performance measures used in this thesis at 1%
significant level. This suggests that the Ghanaian firms on average performed
better during pre 2003 than post 2003. In particular, the pre 2003 recorded
a mean ROA of 10.13% compared with 4.38% during post 2003. The
difference of 5.75% decrease over the two periods represents 57% change in
ROA among the sampled firms. That notwithstanding, the pre 2003 and post
2003 ROA are not consistent with the work of Cui et al (2008). Whereas
Ghanaian firms experienced decrease in mean ROA from 10.13% to 4.38%
(i.e. from pre 2003 to post 2003), Cui et al (2008) reported mean ROA
marginally increasing from 6.4% in 2001 to 6.68% in 2004 respectively.
However, the operational environment, sample size and the study period of
the two studies are significantly different and might have accounted for the
differences. As Table 7-2 indicates below, the pre 2003 also recorded a mean
ROE of 30.86% compared with 15.03% post 2003. Although, the decrease
(15.83%) in the percentage point is higher than ROA, the percentage change
(51%) in ROE is less than what was recorded by ROA (57%). That
notwithstanding, both accounting-based performance measures experienced
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significant changes between pre 2003 and post 2003 introduction of the
Ghanaian Code. Arguably, and as in line with changing profitability, the
market-based performance measure also experienced differences but not at
the rate found in both accounting-based performance measures. In this
regard, the pre 2003 recorded a mean Q-ratio of 1.41 compared with 1.05
post 2003, indicating insignificant decrease of 0.36 over the two periods. This
represents 26% change, a figure that is approximately half of the change
experienced by ROA (57%) and ROE (51%) respectively.
Table 7-2: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 dependent variables
DEPENDENT
VARIABLES
PRE
(2000-2002)
Mean
POST
(2004-2009)
Mean
Increase
or
(Decrease)
%
CHANGE T-test
Return on assets (%)
Return on equity (%)
Tobin’s Q
Observations
10.13
30.86
1.41
65
4.38
15.03
1.05
193
(5.75)
(15.83)
(0.36)
(57)
(51)
(26)
3.67***
2.85***
1.54
Note: The t-test in column 6 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means between pre 2003
and post 2003 firm performance. The mean difference with (***) indicates that the null hypothesis that
the means are equal is rejected at 1% significant level.
Fundamentally, most of the firms appear not to be doing well with respect to
post 2003 firm performance measures compared with pre 2003. However,
the change experienced by the accounting-based performance measures
(ROA = 57% and ROE = 51%) between the two periods is significantly higher
than the change in the market-based performance measure (Q-ratio = 26%).
It is important to note that the different levels of the firm performance
measures between the two periods will provide interesting results in the
hypotheses testing in chapter eight.
7.2.2 Descriptive statistics of the control variables
Panels A to D of Table 7-3 report the summary descriptive statistics for the
control variables. It was found that, and as Panel A of Table 7-3 shows, the
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mean GEAR increased from 19.50% in 2000 to 33.68% in 2009 with the
overall average of 26.95% for the full sample. This suggests that the
Ghanaian listed firms are moderately geared, the findings supported by prior
studies in Ghana (Abor and Biekpe, 2007), who reported SMEs to have GEAR
of about 38%. Panel B of Table 7-3 suggests that the firm size as proxied by
a natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets increased from 6.22 in 2000 to
6.34 in 2009 with an overall mean of 6.50 and standard deviation of 1.32.
This suggests that the average firm size during the study period did not
experience any significant change.
Table 7-3: Summary descriptive statistics of the control variables
based on all (283) firm-year observations
CONTROL VARIABLES
Year-by-year control variables
A
L
L
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0
0
0
2
0
0
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2
0
0
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Panel A: Gear (%)
Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Panel B: Firm Size
Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Panel C: Sales Growth
Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Panel D: Firm Age
Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observations
26.95
26.09
0.00
73.53
6.50
1.32
4.23
8.83
0.09
0.52
-0.57
1.36
32.78
13.99
5.3
60.5
283
19.80
22.52
0.00
83.16
6.22
1.34
4.02
8.34
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
32.33
12.88
8
56
21
26.51
39.20
0.00
80.32
6.29
1.35
4.01
8.44
0.42
0.36
-0.13
1.52
33.33
12.88
9
57
21
19.42
21.13
0.00
80.34
6.39
1.32
3.92
8.54
0.17
0.24
-0.19
0.85
32.35
14.08
5
58
23
19.53
20.19
0.00
80.72
6.64
1.35
3.89
8.72
0.37
0.43
-0.08
2.03
33.12
13.82
6
59
25
21.69
21.77
0.00
74.78
6.73
1.30
4.44
8.78
0.27
0.63
-0.53
3.30
33.10
13.73
7
60
29
26.14
23.41
0.00
72.39
6.87
1.20
5.08
8.85
0.09
0.40
-1.00
1.02
33.94
13.46
8
61
31
25.53
24.36
0.00
85.97
6.88
1.12
5.09
9.03
0.09
0.38
-1.00
1.30
31.00
15.07
1
62
31
35.17
27.90
0.00
87.94
6.24
1.37
3.98
9.06
-0.71
0.43
-1.00
0.77
32.25
14.89
2
63
32
33.85
25.45
00.00
85.01
6.28
1.42
3.99
9.22
0.22
0.54
-1.00
2.01
32.66
14.85
3
64
35
33.68
28.56
00.00
87.87
6.34
1.39
4.07
9.28
0.14
0.35
-0.81
0.81
33.66
14.85
4
65
35
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As Panel C of Table 7-3 indicates above, and consistent with the ROA and
ROE, the highest mean sales growth was recorded in 2001 at 0.42, but least
in 2007 at -0.71. Overall, the mean combined firm’s sales grew by 0.09
during the ten year period. In terms of firm age, and as can be seen from
Panel D of Table 7-3, the Ghanaian listed firms are generally long established
firms with a mean of about 33 years compared with the findings of Abor and
Biekpe (2007) who reported SMEs age of about 10 years in Ghana.
Table 7-4 presents the descriptive statistics of pre 2003 and post 2003
control variables for the full sampled firms.
Table 7-4: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 control variables
CONTROL
VARIABLES
PRE
(2000-2002)
Mean
POST
(2004-2009)
Mean
Increase
or
(Decrease)
% CHANGE T-test
Gear (%)
Firm Size
Sales Growth
Firm Age
Observations
21.83
6.31
0.19
32.66
65
28.48
6.56
0.06
32.81
193
6.65
0.25
(0.13)
0.15
30
4
(68)
0.45
-1.81
-1.70
2.58***
-
Note: The t-test in column 6 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means between pre 2003
and post 2003 control variables. The mean difference with (***) indicates that the null hypothesis that the
means are equal is rejected at 1% significant level.
As Table 7-4 indicates above, GEAR increased from 21.83% in pre 2003 to
28.48% in post 2003, indicating 6.65% increase but not statistically
significant. This represents a 30% positive change in GEAR between the two
periods which could have been motivated by an insignificant 4% change in
firm size. The average sales growth of the sampled firms grew from 0.19 in
pre 2003 to 0.06 in post 2003, indicating 0.13 a statistically significant
decrease between the two periods. This represents a significant negative
68% change, which may also be suggestive of a low level of firm
performance post 2003, for which the analysis in this chapter found evidence
of significant decrease in ROA, ROE and Q-ratio. In particular, the statistically
significant decrease in profitability measured by ROA and ROE in post 2003,
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discouraging investors to invest more in the shares of the firms over the
period may have also affected the Q-ratio to decrease during the same
period.
7.3 CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR ALL THE VARIABLES
Table 7-5 reports Pearson’s correlation matrix for the firm performance,
corporate governance and the control variables of the sampled firms during
the whole period. In particular, there are large positive correlation
coefficients between the GCGI and its sub-indices (i.e. BOARDINDEX,
AUCOMINDEX, RECOMINDEX, SHOLDINDEX, FAAINDEX and DISCINDEX). In
addition, high collinearity also exists between ROA and ROE (0.69) and
between BOARDINDEX and BOARDSIZE (0.73) as well as AUCOMINDEX
highly correlated with RECOMINDEX (0.70), FAAINDEX (0.57) and
DISCINDEX (0.73). Although, and similar to the work of Abdo and Fisher
(2007), the equal weighting used for the different sub-indices in developing
the GCGI makes no attempt to accurately mirror the relative importance of
the specific governance provisions, it has the benefit of being transparent
and does help for easy interpretation. It is important also to note here that,
and following the work of Abdo and Fisher (2007), the decision not to weight
sub-indices avoids double-counting by not assigning unjustified weights to
some governance provisions which might have led to biases in the aggregate
GCGI. That notwithstanding, and given the high collinearity, these variables
will therefore be included in different regression models in chapter eight for
empirical analysis.
Apart from the large correlation coefficients between the GCGI and its sub-
indices during the whole period, ROA and ROE, BOARDINDEX and
BOARDSIZE, AUCOMINDEX and RECOMINDEX, FAAINDEX as well as
DISCINDEX, the Pearson correlation coefficients across other variables are
moderately low, suggesting that there is no serious multicollinearity problem
216
between the variables. In particular, and based on the market-based
performance measure, there is a positive correlation between the GCGI and
the Q-ratio (i.e. 0.03). The BOARDINDEX, however, indicates the highest
positive correlation, while the FAAINDEX and DISCINDEX have a negative
correlation with Q-ratio. In respect of the accounting-based performance
measures, there is a positive correlation between the GCGI and both ROE
and ROA.
Table 7-6 reports the pre 2003 and post 2003 correlation matrix for the firm
performance, corporate governance and the control variables of the sampled
firms. As Table 7-6 indicates, the top right half represents the pre 2003
Pearson’s correlation coefficients, while the bottom left of the table indicates
post 2003 Pearson’s coefficients. In this respect, there is high collinearity
between the GCGI and its sub-indices during both periods. However, and as
shown in Table 7-6, the Pearson’s coefficients of the pre 2003 are higher
than post 2003, indicating that the variables during both periods need to be
included in separate regression models in chapter eight for empirical
analysis. In addition, the GCGI is significant and positively correlated with
both accounting-based (ROA and ROE) and the market-based (Q-ratio)
performance measures pre 2003 period. This is however not the case for
post 2003 where both the accounting-based and market-based firm
performance measures indicate insignificant positive correlation with the
GCGI. That notwithstanding, and similar to the earlier analysis, the Pearson’s
coefficients of other variables are relatively low.
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Table 7-5: Correlation matrix of firm performance and all the continuous variables for the whole sample
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ROA 1
ROE .685** 1
Q-ratio .177** .184** 1
GCGI .001 .065 .032 1
BOARD
INDEX
.047 .168* .157** .481** 1
AUCOM
INDEX
-.038 .031 .018 .873** .194** 1
RECOM
INDEX
.034 .094 .083 .679** .337** .700** 1
SHOLD
INDEX
.118* .098 -.037 .460** .286** .229** .164* 1
FAA
INDEX
-.093 -.097 -.088 .643** .136* .589** .109 .397** 1
DISC
INDEX
-.022 -0.54 -0.85 .810** .253** .732** .323** .385** .429** 1
BODSIZE .124* .242** .135* .399** .729** .186** .364** .232** -.021 .197** 1
PNEDs -.209** -.165** -.193** .006 -.311** .078 .185** -.224** -.093 .034 -.180** 1
GEAR -.214** -.216** .031 .177** .137* .150* .216** -.105 .135** 0.38 .139* .130* 1
SIZE -.066 .027 -.112 .018 -.135* .039 .093 -.024 .018 -.034 .129* -.015 .197** 1
GROWTH .134* .161** .058 -.064 .028 -.070 .027 -.006 -.158** -.128* .070 .048 -.039 .144** 1
AGE .144** -.005 -.045 -.102 .072 -.214** -.008 .092 -.048 -.115 .002 -.025 -.189** -.052 -.052 1
Notes: The table indicates Pearson’s correlation coefficients. ** and * denote correlation is significant at the 1% and 5% level (two tailed). ROA is the return on assets, ROE is the
return on equity, Q-ratio is the Tobin’s Q, GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate governance index, BOARDINDEX is the board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit committee
index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index, SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and auditing index, DISCINDEX is the
disclosure index, BODSIZE is the board size, PNEDs is the proportion of non-executive directors, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and
AGE is the firm age.
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Table 7-6: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 correlation matrix of firm performance and all continuous variables
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ROA 1 .623** .374** .476** .181 .414** .547** .241 .109 .361** .245* -.332** -.137 .028 -.070 .285*
ROE .737** 1 .326** .345** .234 .321** .444* .118 -.036 .147 .252* -.189 -.365** .029 -.097 .149
Q-ratio .100 .115 1 .465** .354** 485** .423** .043 .097 .300* .354* -.303* .020 -.193 -.207 -.198
GCGI -.047 .034 -.039 1 .486** .950** .792** .479** .573** .810** .469** -.199 .042 -.001 -.142 -.117
BOARD
INDEX
-.005 .140* .105 .575** 1 .309* .285* .192 .089 .353** .819** -.453** .060 -.196 -.082 .082
AUCOM
INDEX
-.068 .000 -.057 .797** .212** 1 752** .354** 536** .755** .287* -.094 .000 -.053 -.125 -.221
RECOM
INDEX
-.096 -.044 .016 .698** .356** .349** 1 .269** .114 .442** .439** .055 .115 .080 -.281* .060
SHOLD
INDEX
.155* .168* .033 .378** .340** .052 .114 1 .323** .244* .268* -.299* -.100 .305* .072 .132
FAA
INDEX
.026 .042 -.088 .512** .242** .393** .059 .327** 1 .718** -.073 -.172 .064 .115 .076 -.274*
DISC
INDEX
-.011 -.042 -.146* .746** .290** .623** .289** .344** .542** 1 .297* -.208 .020 -.133 -.065 -.197
BODSIZE .051 .227** .067 .524** .706** .277** .365** .276** .133* .292** 1 -.317* .242 .025 -.070 .080
PNEDs -.159* -.152* -.160* .077 -.264** .146* .226** -.212** -.123 .166 -.131 1 .205 -.081 .031 -.030
GEAR -.220** -.111 .048 .188* .168* .160* .238** -.149** .098 -.026 .127 .097 1 .313* -.153 -.180
SIZE -.077 .051 -.083 -.024 -.155 .023 .089 -.162* -.098 -.065 .174* .005 .150* 1 .084 -.093
GROWTH .152* .244** .084 .005 .041 -.003 .082 .013 -.161* -.094 .078 .058 -.006 .169* 1 .053
AGE .106 -.066 -.009 -.115 .070 -.252** -.025 .083 .008 -.113 -.018 -.024 -.195** -.042 -.067 1
Notes: The top right half of the table represents Pre 2003 Pearson’s correlation coefficients, while the bottom left of the table indicates Post 2003 Pearson’s correlation coefficients. **
and * denote correlation is significant at the 1% and 5% level (two tailed). ROA is the return on assets, ROE is the return on equity, Q-ratio is the Tobin’s Q, GCGI is the Ghanaian
corporate governance index, BOARDINDEX is the board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index,
SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and auditing index, DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, BODSIZE is the board size, PNEDs is the
proportion of non-executive directors, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age.
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7.4 TEST OF PANEL REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS
As has been explained in section 5.5 of chapter five, panel data technique is
used to test all the hypotheses that have been developed in chapter four. In
this respect, the panel data regression assumptions are tested in this section
to help choose between pooled OLS and the alternative random and fixed
effects regression models. First, and as indicated in section 5.5 of chapter
five, Breusch and Pagan (1980) Langrange Multiple (LM) test will be
conducted to choose between pooled OLS and the alternative random or
fixed effects. Following that, the Hausman specification test will help to
differentiate between random and fixed effects regression models.
7.4.1 Choosing between pooled OLS and the alternative random and
fixed effects
In a panel data analysis, the assumptions27 underlying pooled OLS model are
not likely to be met, and in particular, when there is unobserved
heterogeneity which differs across the sampled firms. Thus, ignoring the
heterogeneity makes the pooled OLS estimator inconsistent because the
likely firm specific-effect cannot be addressed by the pooled OLS regression
model. In this thesis, LM test will help to decide between pooled OLS
regression and the alternative random or fixed effects regression. The null
hypothesis in the LM test is that there is no significant difference across firms
(i.e. no panel effect). Table 7-7 reports the test statistics which differentiate
between pooled OLS regression and the alternative random or fixed effects
regression. The results show that the pooled OLS regression model is
inappropriate and the alternative random or fixed effects regression is
preferable at this stage, suggesting that the null hypothesis of no significant
difference across sampled firms in this thesis is rejected. For example, and as
Table 7-7 indicates below, the regression models of the firm performance
27 For example, Green (2012) noted the classical model assumptions to include zero conditional mean of
the error term, homoscedasticity, independence across observations, and strict exogeneity of the
independent variables.
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measures (i.e. ROA, ROE and Q-ratio) and the GCGI showed X2 of 50.70,
92.71 and 148.09 (i.e. at 1 degrees of freedom with p-value = 0.0000)
suggesting that the alternative of random or fixed effects regression is
appropriate.
Table 7-7: Breusch-Pagan Langrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics
Variables ROA ROE Q-ratio Decision
X2 p-value X2 p-value X2 p-value
OLS,
RE/FE
GCGI 50.70 0.0000 92.71 0.0000 148.09 0.0000 RE/FE
CEODUAL 56.44 0.0000 105.24 0.0000 158.89 0.0000 RE/FE
BODSIZE 48.00 0.0000 62.84 0.0000 110.30 0.0000 RE/FE
PNEDS 50.43 0.0000 101.72 0.0000 145.82 0.0000 RE/FE
AUCOM1 49.35 0.0000 100.59 0.0000 152.85 0.0000 RE/FE
RECOM1 53.13 0.0000 103.30 0.0000 148.32 0.0000 RE/FE
Note: Variables are defined as follows: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q (Q-
ratio), the Ghanaian corporate governance index (GCGI), CEO duality (CEODUAL), board size (BODSIZE),
proportion of non-executive directors (PNEDs), audit committee (AUCOM1), remuneration committee
(RECOM1) ordinary least square (OLS), random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE). The X2 represents the
test of difference across firms with p-value at 1% significant level.
As Table 7-7 indicates above, the regression models of the firm performance
measures and the specific governance mechanisms (i.e. CEODUAL, BODSIZE,
PNEDs, AUCOM1 and RECOM1) are all in favour of random or fixed effects
regression model rather than pooled OLS regression model due to the high
value of X2 (i.e. a minimum and a maximum of 48.00 and 158.89,
respectively) at the 1% significant level. Arguably, putting all the five specific
governance mechanisms in one regression model does not make any
difference in choosing between pooled OLS and the alternative random or
fixed effects regression model. In particular, the regression model based on
ROA, ROE and Q-ratio provided X2 of 41.73, 64.15 and 126.72 respectively,
with the p-value = 0.0000 for all the three models. This evidence further
suggests that the alternative of random or fixed effects regression is
appropriate as an estimation method for the specific governance
mechanisms.
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7.4.2 The decision between random and fixed effects regression
model
Given the suitability of the random effects or fixed effects as a method of
estimation in this thesis, and following McKnight and Weir (2009), the
Hausman specification test is used to differentiate between the two
estimation methods for the hypotheses testing in chapter eight. In this
respect, and as explained in subsection 5.5.2 of chapter five, the Hausman
specification test null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the
unique errors and the independent variables used in the regression model,
suggesting a test of strict exogeneity. The decision is as follows: if there is no
correlation between the unique errors and the independent variables, random
effects regression model is suitable. Otherwise, use the fixed effects model if
there is correlation between the unique errors and the independent variables.
Table 7-8 reports the Hausman specification test and Wald statistics to
differentiate between random effects and fixed effects regression models.
Table 7-8: Hausman specification test statistics (Random vs. Fixed)
Variable
s
GCGI
Specific Governance
Mechanisms Decision
X2
Critical Value
(Wald
Statistics)
P-value X2
Critical
Value
(Wald
Statistics) P-value
Random
Vs.
Fixed
ROA 45.01
11.07
(18.33) 0.0000 17.33
16.92
(26.44) 0.0438
Fixed
effects
ROE 82.22
11.07
(35.83) 0.0000 21.61
16.92
(45.03) 0.0102
Fixed
effects
Q-ratio 7.11
11.07
(1.22) 0.2129 22.51
16.92
(22.05) 0.0074
Random/
Fixed
effects
Note: Variables are defined as follows: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q (Q-
ratio), the Ghanaian corporate governance index (GCGI). The specific governance mechanisms in one
regression model represents CEO duality (CEODUAL), board size (BODSIZE), proportion of non-executive
directors (PNEDs), audit committee (AUCOM1) and a remuneration committee (RECOM1). The X2
represents the test of difference among random and fixed effects estimates with p-value at 5% significant
level. The critical value represents Wald statistics of 5 and 9 degrees of freedom from the X2 Table.
In respect of the specific governance mechanisms, and using ROA, ROE and
Q-ratio as firm performance measures, the Hausman test gave X2 of 17.33,
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21.61 and 22.51 (p-value=0.0438, 0.0102 and 0.0074, respectively) as
shown in Table 7-8, suggesting that the hypothesis of no correlation between
the unique errors and the specific governance mechanisms (i.e. CEODUAL,
BODSIZE, PNEDs, AUCOM1 and RECOM1) as independent variables is
rejected at 5% significant level. In this respect, random effects regression
model is rejected in favour of fixed effects regression model as a method of
estimation in chapter eight. This evidence is further supported by the critical
value from the X2 table and the Wald statistics with 9 degrees of freedom. As
can be seen from Table 7-8, the Wald statistics of ROA (26.44), ROE (45.03)
and Q-ratio (22.05) are all higher than the critical value of 16.92 for all the
three firm performance measures, indicating that the fixed effects regression
model is appropriate to test the related hypotheses in chapter eight. In
addition, Hausman test (for the purposes of brevity is not reported here)
indicated that the hypothesis of no correlation between the unique errors and
each of the specific governance mechanisms as independent variable
supported the earlier findings of the suitability of the fixed effects regression
model.
Using the GCGI, and as column 2 of Table 7-8 indicates above, the Hausman
test provided X2 of 45.01 (p-value = 0.0000) in relation to ROA as a
performance measure, rejecting the null hypothesis of no correlation
between the unique errors and the independent variable (GCGI) at 1%
significant level. This suggests that the fixed effects regression model is
appropriate with the ROA as a performance measure; evidence supported by
the critical value and the Wald statistics with 5 degrees of freedom. As shown
in Table 7-8, the critical value of 11.07 from the X2 table with 5 degrees of
freedom is lower than the Wald statistics of 18.33 hence the random effects
regression model is rejected in favour of the fixed effects regression model.
Further Hausman test (for the purposes of brevity is not reported here)
based on the sub-indices (i.e. board composition index, audit committee
index, remuneration committee index, shareholder right index, financial
affairs and auditing index and disclosure index) as the independent variables
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supports the fixed effects regression model as suitable for ROA performance
measure.
With regard to ROE, the Hausman test gave X2 of 82.22 (p-value = 0.0000)
so the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected and accepts that fixed
effects regression model is appropriate for the ROE performance measure.
This suggests that the unique errors and the GCGI as an independent
variable are correlated; evidence supported by the critical value from the X2
table and the Wald statistics. In particular, and as shown in Table 7-8, the
Wald statistics of 35.83 with 5 degrees of freedom is more than three times
of the critical value of 11.07, indicating that the fixed effects regression
model is appropriate. As in the case of ROA, the Hausman test (for the
purposes of brevity is not reported here) of the sub-indices as the
independent variables supported the overall GCGI that the fixed effects
regression model is suitable for the ROE performance measure.
By contrast, and using Q-ratio as firm performance measure, the Hausman
test with X2 of 7.11 (p-value=0.2129) supports the null hypothesis of no
correlation between the unique error and the independent variable (GCGI),
suggesting that the random effects regression model is appropriate with Q-
ratio as firm performance measure. As expected, the critical value from the
X2 table and the Wald statistics with 5 degrees of freedom support the
suitability of random effects regression model over fixed effects regression
model. In particular, the Wald statistics of 1.22 is much lower than the
critical value of 11.07 as shown in Table 7-8 hence the random regression
model is preferred. Additionally, the Hausman test (for the purposes of
brevity is not reported here) showed no correlation between the unique
errors and the sub-indices as independent variables and therefore supported
the random effects regression model as the method of estimation with the Q-
ratio performance measure.
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7.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In general, and based on the full sample firms studied in Ghana, firms
performance measured are relatively low except Q-ratio which was found to
be higher than the findings of previous studies in Ghana (Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; Abor and Biekpe, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman
and Amidu, 2008). However, the results are consistent with studies in Egypt,
Nigeria and South Africa (Elsayed, 2007; Kajola, 2008; Ntim, 2009). That
notwithstanding, the pre 2003 showed that the Ghanaian firms studied
performed better than post 2003, suggesting that the Ghanaian economy
might have generally experienced poor performance post 2003. This is
particularly important, and with the recent global recession, firm
performance measured significantly declined from the year 2007 to 2009 and
might have accounted for the low performance measures in this thesis
compared with the findings from prior studies in Ghana noted earlier.
Based on the findings from the whole, pre 2003 and post 2003 periods, the
researcher argues that the Ghanaian listed firms are moderately geared.
However, the debt level of these firms has increased over time but not
significant, suggesting that when listed firms are planning to increase their
capital structure, they focus more on their shareholders and are hence
relatively low geared. Although, the listed firms studied experienced
insignificant increase in size during pre 2003 and post 2003, and as indicated
earlier (see Table 7-4), this might have motivated their debt level to increase
over time. While the increase in gearing is suggested to have been motivated
by the increase in size, the listed firms studied growth rate was found to
decrease significantly despite all the investment made during the study
period through their debt level increase noted earlier. This suggests that the
well established Ghanaian listed firms performance were affected by the
significant decrease in growth rate which might have been resulted from the
recent global recession and the poor performance of the Ghanaian economy
in the recent past.
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Arguably, and based on the pooled sample firms studied, the correlation
matrix across all variables used in this thesis during the whole, pre 2003 and
post 2003 shows dissimilar results. In this respect, the GCGI was found to be
positively correlated with its sub-indices, suggesting that the decision to use
equal weighting for the sub-indices is appropriate for the aggregate GCGI. As
an initial analysis, the GCGI was also found to be positively correlated with
all the firm performance measures. However, the pre 2003 and post 2003
correlation analysis provided interesting findings. Whereas the GCGI was
found to be highly correlated with its sub-indices during both periods, the pre
2003 showed significant positive correlation between the GCGI and all firm
performance measures but not post 2003 where both accounting-based and
the market-based firm performance measures were found to have
insignificant positive correlation with the GCGI. It is important to state that
these findings provide the foundation for the hypotheses testing in chapter
eight where different models will be used as a result of large collinearity
between some of the independent variables. For example, and as noted
earlier, separate regression models will be used for the GCGI, its sub-indices
as well as the specific governance mechanisms in relation to each firm
performance measure (i.e. ROE, ROA and Q-ratio) used in this thesis.
Overall, and given that the data used in this thesis is of a panel nature, a test
of panel regression assumptions was conducted to determine the appropriate
regression model (s) for the hypothesis testing in chapter eight. In this
respect, the fixed effects regression model was considered to be appropriate
for both accounting-based (i.e. ROA and ROE) and market-based (Q-ratio)
performance measures when using specific governance mechanisms as
independent variables. Using the GCGI as the independent variable, the fixed
effects regression model was found to be appropriate for the accounting-
based firm performance measures of ROA and ROE. In particular, and as
noted earlier, a test for the sub-indices also supported the fixed effects
regression model as suitable. However, and using the GCGI as the
independent variable, the random effects regression model was found to be
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suitable for the Q-ratio performance measure, the findings supported by the
test for the sub-indices.
Fundamentally, the strategies adopted in this thesis to decide between
pooled OLS and the alternative random or fixed effects regression model is
supported by prior studies (Black et al, 2006a; McKnight and Weir, 2009).
Whereas Black el al (2006a) reported the results of both OLS and fixed
effects regression models but suggested large differences in the coefficients
with the conclusion that the differences cast doubt on OLS results, McKnight
and Weir (2009) in their panel data analysis tested for the suitability of
random or fixed effects and reported the results accordingly. As much as the
OLS assumptions are not likely to be met because of the unobserved
heterogeneity, the researcher argues that testing to establish the consistent
and efficient model to test the related hypotheses is very important to
provide reliable and valid results in this thesis.
7.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has considered the description of data and testing of the panel
data regression assumptions. It attempted to achieve three key objectives.
First, it sought to present a comprehensive description of the dependent
(firm performance) and the control variables using descriptive statistics.
Second, it sought to provide correlation analysis. In this respect, Pearson’s
correlation coefficients were presented. Finally, it sought to test the panel
regression assumptions to decide between pooled OLS and the alternative
random or fixed effects regression model. As a result, LM test was first
conducted to choose between pooled OLS and the alternative random or
fixed effects regression model followed by the Hausman specification test to
decide between random and fixed effects regression models. The results of
these tests were reported of which fixed effects regression model was found
to be appropriate in most cases except the market-based performance
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measure of Q-ratio which favoured random effects regression model as
suitable. In the next chapter, the key estimated fixed and random effects
regressions based on the specific governance mechanisms and the GCGI are
reported.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
GOVERNANCE-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP: THE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Following the panel regression assumptions tested in section 7.4 of chapter
seven, this chapter reports the initial key estimated regression results of the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. It
specifically seeks to achieve two main objectives as follows. First, it examines
whether the adoption of corporate governance provisions is associated with
firm performance as proxied by return on assets (ROA), return on equity
(ROE) and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). In this respect, the estimated fixed effects
and random effects regression results based on the specific governance
mechanisms and the Ghanaian corporate governance index (GCGI) are
reported and discussed. Second, it investigates the pre 2003 and post 2003
periods’ governance-performance relationship based on the specific
governance mechanisms and the GCGI. The chapter is organised as follows.
Section 8.2 reports the empirical findings of the full sample based on the
specific governance mechanisms and the GCGI to test hypotheses two to six.
Section 8.3 presents the empirical findings of pre 2003 and post 2003
periods of governance-performance relationship. Section 8.4 provides a
summary of the results and discussion, while section 8.5 summarises the
chapter.
8.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PANEL DATA REGRESSION ANALYSES
This section presents the initial panel data regression results for the full
sample firms. In particular, the estimated fixed effects regression results
based on the specific governance mechanisms are reported in subsection
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8.2.1 to test hypotheses two to five. Following that, subsection 8.2.2
discusses the estimated fixed effects and random effects regression results
for the GCGI to test hypothesis six. For each subsection, the findings based
on the accounting-based performance measures (ROA & ROE) are first
presented, followed by the market-based performance measure (Q-ratio).
Overall, five hypotheses are tested in this chapter as follows:
HO2 The separation of the roles of CEO and the Chairman should lead to
higher firm performance.
HO3 The smaller the board size should lead to higher firm performance.
HO4 The higher the proportion of non-executive directors, the lower the
firm performance.
HO5 The presence of an audit committee and a remuneration committee
should lead to better firm performance.
HO6 There is a significant positive association between the Ghanaian
corporate governance index (GCGI) and firm performance.
As indicated earlier, the findings are reported in the ensuing subsections
(8.2.1 and 8.2.2) with further analysis presented in section 8.3. Notably, the
panel regression models applied in the subsequent analysis are based on the
panel regression assumptions tested in section 7.4 of chapter seven.
8.2.1 Empirical findings: The specific governance mechanisms and
firm performance
8.2.1.1 Findings based on the accounting-based performance
measures (ROA & ROE)
Table 8-1 reports panel data fixed effects regression results of the specific
governance mechanisms based on the accounting-based performance
measure of ROA. A positive coefficient indicates high firm performance and a
negative one low firm performance. CEO duality is found to be statistically
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insignificant but positively related to firm performance measured by ROA,
evidence not supported by hypothesis two. However, this finding is
consistent with some of the prior Ghanaian (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe,
2006b) and international (Ntim, 2009) studies. In particular, Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe (2006b) found CEO duality to be positively related to
ROA of listed banks in Ghana. By contrast, this finding does not provide
empirical support to the Ghanaian Code recommendations of the role
separation between the CEO and the Chairman. In addition, the evidence is
different from prior Ghanaian (Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei, 2008) and
international (Bozec, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) studies which
reported negative relationship between CEO duality and ROA. It may be
argued that the differences in findings between this thesis and that of
Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) in Ghana are due to the different
samples used by each study. In particular, and whereas this thesis focuses
on the Ghanaian listed firms, Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) use
microfinance institutions (MFIs) to establish the relationship between the two
where the leadership structures of the firms may be different.
The board size is found to be statistically insignificant but positively related
to ROA in all the models of Table 8-1, suggesting that hypothesis three is not
supported. This finding although insignificant lends empirical support to prior
studies in Ghana (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; 2006b; Abor and
Biekpe, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei; 2008) and other international
studies (Kiel and Nicolson, 2003; Jackling and Johl, 2009). For example,
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) reported positive relationship
between board size and ROA among Ghanaian listed firms. However, the
findings differ from other prior studies in Ghana (Kyereboah-Coleman and
Amidu, 2008), as well as other international studies (Eisenberg, 1998;
Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009) who reported negative and statistically significant
association between board size and ROA. Arguably, larger board size is less
effective in the context of Ghana and therefore the optimum board size
should be encouraged for effective firm performance. Contrary to the
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provisions of the Ghanaian Code to have a minimum of 8 and a maximum of
16 board size, it appears that this finding lends empirical support to the
board size of between 8 and 9 suggested by prior researchers (Lipton and
Lorch, 1992; Jensen, 1993).
Table 8-1: Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of specific governance
mechanisms and return on assets (ROA)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 14.406 14.043 16.040
(1.85)* (1.99)** (2.41)**
CEODUAL 1.224 1.173 1.188
(0.52) (0.51) (0.51)
BODSIZE1 0.578 0.568 0.546
(1.40) (1.41) (1.34)
PNEDs1 -0.177 -0.176 -0.177
(2.50)** (2.50)** (2.45)**
AUCOM1 2.689 2.970 0.238
(1.38) (1.55) (0.13)
RECOM1 0.468 0.470 0.419
(0.23) (0.24) (0.21)
GEAR -0.090 -0.091 -0.092
(3.17)*** (3.24)*** (3.30)***
SIZE -0.069 - -
(0.11) - -
GROWTH 2.402 2.377 2.310
(2.04)** (2.06)** (2.02)**
AGE 0.055 0.055 -
(0.74) (0.74) -
Observations 283 283 283
Groupa 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.121 0.120 0.111
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). CEODUAL is the CEO duality, BODSIZE1 is
the board size, PNEDs1 is the proportion of non-executive directors, AUCOM1 represents the existence of
audit committee, RECOM1 represents the existence of remuneration committee, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE
is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-
statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
The proportion of non-executive directors (PNEDs) is found to be statistically
significant and negatively related to ROA, suggesting that hypothesis four is
supported. Although this finding is contrary to the expectation of the
Ghanaian Code which recommends to have a balance of executive and non-
executive directors for effective performance, it is consistent with prior
studies in Ghana (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; 2006b) and other
international studies (Bozec, 2005; Guest, 2009). That notwithstanding, it
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does not lend empirical support to the findings of prior Ghanaian studies of
Abor and Biekpe (2007) and Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu (2008) who
reported statistically significant and positive relationship between the PNEDs
and ROA among SMEs in Ghana. The differences in findings between this
thesis and prior Ghanaian studies may be because of the differences in the
sample each study used where the PNEDs of SMEs and listed firms in Ghana
may be different.
The presence of an audit committee and a remuneration committee are
found to be statistically insignificant but positively related to ROA which
means that hypothesis five is not supported. However, these findings are
consistent with prior Ghanaian (Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu, 2008) and
international (Weir and Laing, 1999) studies. For example, Weir and Laing
(1999) reported that the presence of audit and remuneration committees do
positively affect ROA. However, the statistically insignificance of these board
committees in explaining ROA defeats the recommendations of the Ghanaian
Code for the establishment of the audit and remuneration committees. As
indicated in chapter six, and given the high (low) adoption rate of audit
(remuneration) committees, two possible explanations of these findings are
put forward. First, more than 70% of the sampled firms do not have a
remuneration committee in existence and that appears to affect the
variability in explaining firm performance measured by ROA. Second, the
70% adoption rate of an audit committee also suggests that the existence of
board committees may matter but its impact on firm performance may not
be seen in isolation unless the composition requirements of such committees
are met.
With regard to the relationship between the control variables and ROA,
gearing is found to be statistically significant and negatively related with ROA
for all the three models, suggesting that lower levels of gearing decrease
profitability in Ghana. The negative coefficients lend empirical support to
prior Ghanaian studies (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; Abor and
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Biekpe, 2007). Although statistically insignificant, the negative relationship
between firm size and ROA offers empirical support to previous findings in
Ghanaian (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; Abor and Biekpe, 2007)
and international (Zhou, 2005) studies who indicate a negative relationship
between the two. By contrast, sales growth and firm age are found to be
positively related to ROA. However, only sales growth is statistically
significant, evidence consistent with Klapper and Love (2004) who reported
that firms that generate higher sales are more likely to report higher
profitability.
Table 8-2 presents the panel data fixed effects regression results of the
specific governance mechanisms and the accounting-based performance
measure of ROE. Contrary to ROA, CEO duality is found to be negatively
related to ROE for all the models. However, the insignificant negative
coefficient does not support hypothesis two that the separation of the roles of
the CEO and the Chairman should lead to higher firm performance. That
notwithstanding, this evidence is consistent with prior international studies
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Kajola, 2008; Sanda et al, 2010) who reported
the role Separation to have a positive impact on ROE. Consistent with ROA,
the finding does not offer empirical support to the Ghanaian Code provision
on the CEO and the Chairman roles separation.
Board size is found to be statistically significant and positively related to ROE,
suggesting that hypothesis three is supported. The positive coefficient lends
empirical support to previous evidence of Kajola (2008) and also the
Ghanaian Code provisions of firms having a minimum and a maximum board
size of eight and sixteen28. Consistent with ROA, the PNEDs is found to be
statistically significant and negatively related to ROE, indicating that
hypothesis four is supported. However, this finding does not lend empirical
support to past evidence, which suggests that the PNEDs is significant and
positively related to ROE (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Daily and Dalton, 1993).
28 It is important to note that the Ghanaian listed firms’ board size ranges between 8 and 9.
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As in the case of ROA, both audit and remuneration committees are found to
be positively related to ROE. The insignificant positive coefficient for both
committees suggests that hypothesis 5 is not supported. This finding also
does not offer empirical support to previous studies which reported a
negative relationship between audit committee and ROE (Kajola, 2008). As
in Black et al (2006a) who reported large differences between OLS and fixed
effects estimations, the differences in findings between this thesis and Kajola
(2008) may be due to the different method of estimations used by each
study.
Table 8-2: Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of specific governance mechanisms
and return on equity (ROE)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 41.029 47.007 37.070
(1.56) (1.98)** (1.69)*
CEODUAL -5.344 -4.267 -4.441
(0.67) (0.55) (0.58)
BODSIZE1 2.511 2.722 2.853
(1.80)* (2.00)** (2.12)**
PNEDs1 -0.446 -0.449 -0.441
(1.88)* (1.90)* (1.89)*
AUCOM1 3.310 3.564 3.101
(0.62) (0.67) (0.58)
RECOM1 3.230 3.284 3.130
(0.48) (0.49) (0.47)
GEAR -0.535 -0.522 -0.507
(5.54)*** (5.49)*** (5.37)***
SIZE 1.294 - -
(0.62) - -
GROWTH 7.825 8.339 8.590
(1.95)* (2.11)** (2.17)**
AGE -0.259 -0.254 -
(1.04) (1.04) -
Observations 283 283 283
Groupa 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.135 0.136 0.138
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE). CEODUAL is the CEO duality, BODSIZE1 is
the board size, PNEDs1 is the proportion of non-executive directors, AUCOM1 represents the existence of
audit committee, RECOM1 represents the existence of remuneration committee, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE
is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-
statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
With respect to the relationship between the control variables and ROE, and
similar to ROA, gearing is found to be statistically significant and negatively
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related to ROE. However, firm size is found to be positively related to ROE,
the findings dissimilar to what is reported between ROA. The statistically
significant and positive relationship between sales growth and ROE is
consistent with what is reported between sales growth and ROA.
Interestingly, firm age is found to have a negative relationship with ROE,
evidence not consistent with what is reported earlier between age and ROA.
8.2.1.2 Findings based on the market-based performance
measure (Q-ratio)
Table 8-3 reports the panel data fixed effects regression results of the
specific governance mechanisms and the market-based performance
measure of Q-ratio. Consistent with ROA, CEO duality is found to be
statistically insignificant but positively related to the market-based
performance of Q-ratio, suggesting that hypothesis two is not supported. In
addition, the statistically insignificant and positive coefficient contradicts past
Ghanaian (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a) and international (Kiel
and Nicholson, 2003; Jackling and Johl, 2009, Sanda et al, 2010) evidence,
which suggests that CEO duality is negatively related to Q-ratio. For
example, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) reported statistically
significant and negative association between CEO duality and Q-ratio across
Ghanaian listed firms. However, the differences in findings between this
thesis and that of Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) may be attributed
to the different governance data sources and estimation methods used by
both studies. Whereas this thesis collected governance data directly from
firm annual reports with fixed effects estimation method, Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) gathered the governance data through
interviews and questionnaire techniques with generalized least squares (GLS)
as the estimation method. This is particularly important because the
governance data through interviews and questionnaire techniques may not
reflect the governance practices during the past periods firm performance.
Also, the GLS and fixed effects regressions may provide differences in
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coefficients and significant levels given the differences in the two methods of
estimation.
Similar to the accounting-based performance measure of ROE, board size is
found to be statistically significant and positively related to the Q-ratio,
suggesting that hypothesis three is supported. In particular, the statistically
significant and positive coefficient lends empirical support to the Ghanaian
(Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a) and other international (Coles et al,
2008; Henry, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Sanda et al, 2010; Adams and
Mehran, 2012) studies. However, this finding is not in agreement with past
researchers who reported negative and statistically significant association
between board size and Q-ratio (Yermack, 1996; Cheng, 2008; Guest,
2009). Effectively, smaller board size in Ghana is perceived by the market as
more effective than the larger board size as reflected in the findings of this
thesis and that of Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a).
Consistent with the accounting-based performance measures of ROA and
ROE, the PNEDs is found to be statistically significant and negatively related
to Q-ratio for all the models. This further lends empirical support to
hypothesis four that the higher the PNEDs, the lower the firm performance.
Empirically, this finding is consistent with past Ghanaian (Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a) and international (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996;
Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Mangena et al, 2012) evidence, which suggests
that when there are more outside board members, performance of the firm is
likely to be worse. However, this finding does not lend empirical support to
other prior international studies (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Jackling and
Johl, 2009). Whereas Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found no impact of the
PNEDs on Q-ratio, Mangena et al (2012) reported statistically significant and
negative relationship between the PNEDs and Q-ratio. Arguably, and given
the Ghanaian Code provisions for firms to have a balance of executive and
non-executive directors on the board, it appears that the Ghanaian listed
firms have more (76%) outside directors (see section 6.5 of chapter six) on
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the board than inside directors which might have resulted in poor
performance.
Table 8-3: Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of the specific governance
mechanisms and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 8.479 8.284 8.372 8.365
(4.65)*** (4.61)*** (4.94)*** (4.94)***
CEODUAL 0.489 0.452 0.465 0.459
(1.25) (1.17) (1.24) (1.23)
BODSIZE1 0.231 0.231 0.227 0.228
(2.84)*** (2.84)*** (2.94)*** (2.95)***
PNEDs1 -0.039 -0.038 -0.038 -0.038
(2.57)** (2.53)** (2.58)** (2.62)***
AUCOM1 -0.240 -0.251 -0.259 -0.258
(0.90) (0.95) (1.00) (1.00)
RECOM1 0.066 0.086 0.081 0.093
(0.19) (0.24) (0.23) (0.27)
GEAR 0.003 - - -
(0.65) - - -
SIZE -0.002 -0.016 - -
(0.02) (0.15) - -
GROWTH 0.064 0.069 0.063 -
(0.39) (0.42) (0.40) -
AGE -0.086 -0.082 -0.082 -0.081
(2.30)** (2.23)** (2.24)** (2.22)**
Observations 283 283 283 283
Groupa 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Notes: The dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). CEODUAL is the CEO duality, BODSIZE1 is the
board size, PNEDs1 is the proportion of non-executive directors, AUCOM1 represents the existence of audit
committee, RECOM1 represents the existence of remuneration committee, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is
the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics
which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
In contrast with the accounting-based performance measures of ROA and
ROE, the audit committee existence is found to be negatively related to Q-
ratio for all the models. Although statistically insignificant, the negative
coefficient lends empirical support to the evidence reported in the UK by Weir
et al (2002). However, and consistent with ROA and ROE, the presence of a
remuneration committee is found to be positively related to Q-ratio. These
findings suggest that hypothesis five which states that the presence of audit
and remuneration committees should lead to better firm performance is not
supported. Arguably, the differences in findings between the board
committees when using Q-ratio suggest that the adoption of the Ghanaian
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Code provision in relation to the remuneration committee is slightly valued
more by the market than the audit committee. This is because, and as
indicated in chapter six, the adoption of the remuneration committee is
recommended only by the Ghanaian Code, whilst the adoption of the audit
committee is supported by the Ghanaian Code, SECG regulation and the
revised GSE Listing Rules and therefore might not be value relevant but a
box ticking exercise to satisfy shareholders and regulator.
In relation to the control variables, gearing, firm size and sales growth did
not show any significant impact on Q-ratio for all the models. However, firm
age is found to be statistically significant and negatively related to Q-ratio.
The negative coefficient lends empirical support to the earlier findings of firm
age and ROE. As reported in model 4 of Table 8-3, the coefficients of all the
specific governance mechanisms did not change significantly after excluding
the control variables (i.e. gearing, firm size and sales growth) from the
model. This suggests that these control variables are less effective in
explaining the market-based performance measure than the accounting-
based performance measures.
8.2.2 Empirical findings: The GCGI and firm performance
8.2.2.1 Findings based on the accounting measures of firm
performance (ROA & ROE)
Table 8-4 reports the panel data fixed effects regressions of the GCGI and
firm performance measure of ROA. The GCGI is found to be positively related
to ROA for all the three models. However, the insignificant positive coefficient
suggests that hypothesis six is rejected. That notwithstanding, this finding
lends empirical support to prior index-performance relationship studies in
developed (Clacher et al, 2008; Bassen et al, 2008; Gupta et al, 2009) and
other developing (Larcker et al, 2007; Price et al, 2011) countries. For
example, Price et al (2011) found positive but insignificant relationship
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between their index and ROA among Mexican listed firms because better
governed firms were forced to adopt costly measures that have no benefit to
their profitability.
Table 8-4: Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of the GCGI and ROA
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 29.068 32.819 34.007
(3.25)*** (4.55)*** (4.75)***
GCGI 0.042 0.059 0.058
(0.51) (0.74) (0.72)
GEAR -0.084 -0.080 -0.080
(2.70)*** (2.62)*** (2.62)***
SIZE -0.526 - -
(0.71) - -
GROWTH 1.289 1.497 -
(1.08)* (1.30) -
AGE 0.840 0.888 0.919
(2.90)*** (3.15)*** (3.27)***
Observations 283 283 283
Groupa 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.010 0.010 0.012
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate governance
index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm
age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
*Significant at 10% level
However, the findings differ from prior studies in both developed and
developing countries who reported a statistically significant and positive
relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance
(Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Ponnu and Ramthandin,
2008; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Ntim, 2009; Gupta et al, 2009; Renders et
al, 2010; Bauer et al, 2010). In particular, and in the context of Africa where
this thesis is based, Ntim (2009) found a statistically significant and positive
relationship between the South African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI)
and ROA. Given the differences in findings, two possible explanations can be
put forward. First, this thesis included periods (i.e. from 2000 to 2009) of
both pre and post introduction of the Ghanaian Code provisions, whereas
Ntim (2009) only focused on the post King II Report to develop the SACGI
(i.e. from 2002 to 2006) which might have affected the findings when using
the pooled data. Second, and as reported by Black et al (2006a) regarding
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large differences of the coefficients of OLS and fixed effects regressions and
significant levels, including signs reversals in their studies of which they cast
doubts on the OLS results, the differences in findings between this thesis and
that of Ntim (2009) may be attributed to the fixed effects and OLS
regressions used as estimation methods.
The findings based on the relationship between the GCGI and ROA suggest
that corporate governance in Ghana does not matter to firm performance.
That notwithstanding, the results do not completely reveal the impact of sub-
indices of the GCGI to firm performance measured by ROA. Table 8-5
presents the findings regarding the relationship between the six sub-indices29
and ROA and all the control variables. Although not statistically significant,
the board composition, remuneration committee and the shareholder rights
indices are found to have a positive impact on ROA. This is not the case of
the audit committee, financial affairs and auditing and disclosure indices
where the results indicate negative impact and in some cases have
significant impact on ROA. In this respect, the positive coefficients of the
board composition, remuneration committee and the shareholder rights
indices reveal the level of importance of these sub-indices with firm
performance measured by ROA. This finding lends empirical support to prior
studies (Clacher et al, 2008; Gupta et al, 2009). Whereas Gupta et al (2009)
found board composition, remuneration committee and shareholder rights
indices to be positively related to ROA, Clacher et al (2008) only supported
remuneration committee and shareholder rights indices with board
composition index having a negative relationship with ROA.
Interestingly, the negative coefficient of the audit committee, financial affairs
and auditing and disclosure indices do not lend empirical support to prior
studies (Clacher et al, 2008; Gupta et al, 2009; Price et al, 2011). In
particular, Clacher et al (2008) and Gupta et al (2009) reported a positive
relationship between disclosure index and ROA, while Price et al (2011) found
29 It is important to note that the p-values of the sub-indices when put in the model individually do not
change to significant levels (for the purpose of brevity these results are not reported here)
241
statistically significant and positive association between audit committee
index and ROA. Fundamentally, the insignificant positive relationship
between the overall GCGI and ROA is driven by the statistically significant
and negative coefficient of the financial affairs and auditing as indicated in
models 1 and 2 of Table 8-5.
Table 8-5: Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of the sub-indices and return
on assets (ROA)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Mode 5
Intercept 14.580 15.490 11.533 12.452 14.981
(1.85)* (2.29)** (1.51) (2.00)** (2.45)**
BOARDINDEX 0.085 0.086 0.071 0.072 0.080
(1.42) (1.46) (1.19) (1.22) (1.35)
AUCOMINDEX - - -0.008 -0.008 -0.009
- - (0.45) (0.42) (0.45)
RECOMINDEX 0.010 0.011 - - -
(0.30) (0.33) - - -
SHOLDINDEX 0.010 0.010 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027
(0.13) (0.13) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
FAAINDEX -0.157 -0.155 - - -
(1.99)** (1.98)** - - -
DISCINDEX -0.087 -0.087 - - -
(1.30) (1.31) - - -
GEAR -0.080 -0.079 -0.088 -0.087 -0.088
(2.76)*** (2.76)*** (3.09)*** (3.10)*** (3.13)***
SIZE -0.169 - -0.145 - -
(0.27) - (0.23) - -
GROWTH 2.255 2.327 2.274 2.335 2.267
(1.91)* (2.02)** (1.93)* (2.03)** (1.98)**
AGE 0.078 0.079 0.059 0.060 -
(1.00) (1.01) (0.76) (0.77) -
Observations 283 283 283 283 283
Groupa 39 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.057 0.059 0.042 0.044 0.031
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). BOARDINDEX is the board composition
index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index,
SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and auditing index,
DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth
opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients
are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
*Significant at 10% level
The findings of firm performance measured by ROA including control
variables are in most cases consistent with prior studies. Specifically, gearing
is found to be statistically significant and negatively related to ROA when
using both the GCGI and its sub-indices as governance variables, the findings
supported by Renders et al (2010). It is however does not lend empirical
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support to other prior studies (Clacher et al, 2008) who reported a positive
association between gearing and ROA. Although not statistically significant,
the coefficient of firm size is negative in both the GCGI and its sub-indices
based on ROA, evidence consistent with Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005)
and Bauer et al (2010). That notwithstanding, sales growth and firm age are
found in most cases to be statistically significant and positively related to
ROA. The positive coefficient of sales growth lends empirical support to prior
studies in the developed30 (Clacher et al, 2008; Renders et al, 2010) and
developing31 (Ntim, 2009) countries. Empirically, the positive coefficient of
firm age is not supported by prior index studies (Clacher et al, 2008; Renders
et al, 2010) who reported an insignificant negative association between firm
age and ROA.
Table 8-6 presents the panel data fixed effects regression of the GCGI and
the accounting-based firm performance measure of ROE. Consistent with
ROA, the GCGI is found to be positively related to ROE for all the three
models but does not support hypothesis six. However, the positive coefficient
lends empirical support to prior studies which reported statistically
insignificant but positive association between the Germany Corporate
Governance Code (GCGC) index and ROE (Bassen et al, 2008). This finding
however does not lend empirical support to other prior studies which
reported statistically significant and positive association between their
respective index and ROE (Cheung et al, 2007; Bauer et al, 2010; Renders et
al, 2010). For example, Renders et al (2010) found a negative association
between their overall index and ROE for the initial analysis but after
controlling for the sample selection bias and endogeneity, the negative sign
changed to positive and statistically significant. As in the case of Renders et
al (2010), an endogeneity test will be conducted in chapter nine to support
or deny the initial analysis of findings of this thesis based on the GCGI as the
main explanatory variable.
30 These include UK and 14 European countries
31 South Africa
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Table 8-6: Panel-data fixed effects regressions of the GCGI and ROE
Variables Model1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 79.098 96.110 100.386
(2.57)** (3.87)*** (4.07)***
GCGI 0.310 0.384 0.381
(1.08) (1.40) (1.39)
GEAR -0.606 -0.590 -0.590
(5.67)*** (5.59)*** (5.58)***
SIZE 2.386 - -
(0.94) - -
GROWTH 4.447 5.387 -
(1.09) (1.36) -
AGE -2.479 -2.697 -2.807
(2.49)** (2.78)*** (2.90)***
Observations 283 283 283
Groupa 39 39 39
R2 0.012 0.010 0.010
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE). GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate governance
index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm
age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
Arguably, and similar to ROA, the findings based on the association between
the overall GCGI and ROE does not reveal the importance of each sub-index
in contributing to firm performance. Table 8-7 reports the findings in respect
of the relationship between the six sub-indices and firm performance
measured by ROE. The board composition index is found to be statistically
significant and positively related to ROE for all the models. This finding does
not lend empirical support to the work of Cheung et al (2007) who reported
positive but insignificant association between board composition and ROE.
Although insignificant, audit committee, remuneration committee and
shareholder rights indices are found to be positively related to ROE for all the
models. The positive coefficient of shareholder rights however differs from
prior studies which reported negative association with ROE (Cheung et al,
2007). In contrast, financial affairs and auditing and disclosure indices are
found to have negative relationship with ROE. However, the negative
coefficient of disclosure index is not consistent with the findings of Cheung et
al (2007) who reported statistically significant and positive association
between disclosure index and ROE.
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Table 8-7: Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of the sub-indices and return
on equity (ROE)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 22.104 16.154 17.582 12.132
(0.86) (0.64) (0.71) (0.50)
BOARDINDEX 0.344 0.338 0.347 0.339
(1.81)* (1.80)* (1.82)* (1.79)*
AUCOMINDEX - - 0.025 0.032
- - (0.40) (0.51)
RECOMINDEX 0.125 0.124 - -
(1.21) (1.20) - -
SHOLDINDEX 0.124 0.131 0.246 0.270
(0.49) (0.53) (1.04) (1.16)
FAAINDEX -0.120 -0.144 - -
(0.45) (0.54) - -
DISCINDEX -0.063 -0.047 - -
(0.28) (0.21) - -
GEAR -0.522 -0.506 -0.535 -0.525
(5.32)*** (5.21)*** (5.57)*** (5.49)***
SIZE 2.418 2.409 2.362 2.331
(1.19) (1.19) (1.15) (1.14)
GROWTH 6.789 7.064 7.125 7.413
(1.64) (1.71)* (1.75)* (1.82)*
AGE -0.228 - -0.226 -
(0.99) - (0.95) -
Observations 283 283 283 283
Groupa 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.12 0.11 0.097
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE). BOARDINDEX is the board composition
index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index,
SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and auditing index,
DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth
opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients
are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
*Significant at 10% level
The differences in findings between this thesis and that of Cheung et al
(2007) among Hong Kong listed firms may be possibly explained in two
ways. First, whereas this thesis focuses on the country-specific corporate
governance provisions to develop the GCGI and its sub-indices, Cheung et al
(2007) used the five principles32 of the revised OECD 2004 as its sub-indices
for the overall corporate governance index (CGI). This is particularly
important because the provisions in the revised OECD principles may not be
specific to the operational environment of the Hong Kong listed firms and
therefore may not show the country specific governance impact on firm
32 These include rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure
and transparency, board responsibility and composition.
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performance. Second, and as noted by Black et al (2006a), the differences in
findings may have also been caused by the large differences of the
coefficients of OLS and fixed effects regressions including significant levels
and sign reversals. Arguably, and as indicated earlier, the overall GCGI
positive coefficient is driven by the statistically significant level of the board
composition index, suggesting that the adoption of corporate governance
provisions regarding the board composition does matter in Ghana.
The results of firm performance measured by ROE including control variables
lend empirical support to prior studies (Cheung et al, 2007; Renders et al,
2010). In particular, and consistent with ROA, gearing is found to be
statistically significant and negatively related to ROE when using the GCGI
and its sub-indices as shown in Tables 8-6 and 8-7 respectively. Although,
firm size and growth are also found to be positively related to ROE when
using the GCGI, firm growth shows statistically significant with respect to the
sub-indices and ROE. This is however not the case for firm age which is
found to be statistically significant and negatively related to ROE when using
the GCGI but shows an insignificant negative coefficient when using the sub-
indices.
8.2.2.2 Findings based on the market measure of firm performance
(Q-ratio)
Table 8-8 reports the panel data random effects regressions of the GCGI and
firm performance measured by Q-ratio. Consistent with the accounting-based
performance measures of ROA and ROE, the GCGI is found to be positively
related to Q-ratio for all the models. However, the positive coefficient does
not support hypothesis six that there is a significant and positive association
between the GCGI and firm performance.
246
Table 8-8: Panel-data random-effects regression of the GCGI and Q-ratio
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept 1.930 1.928 1.614 1.614 1.491
(2.33)** (2.34)** (2.48)** (2.48)** (2.70)***
GCGI 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.71) (0.71) (0.81) (0.81) (0.85)
GEAR 0.000 - - - -
(0.06) - - - -
SIZE -0.055 -0.055 - - -
(0.62) (0.63) - - -
GROWTH -0.004 -0.003 -0.026 - -
(0.03) (0.02) (0.16) - -
AGE -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -
(0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) -
Observations 283 283 283 283 283
Groupa 39 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001
Notes: The dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate governance
index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm
age. The model provides z-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
Nevertheless, the positive coefficient lends empirical support to prior studies
in the developed (Bauer et al, 2004; Gupta et al, 2009; Aggarwal et al,
2007; Bruno and Claessens, 2010) and developing (Kouwenberg, 2006;
Garay and Gonzalez; 2008; Cheung et al, 2010) countries who reported a
positive association between their various indices and Q-ratio. That
notwithstanding, the finding in this thesis does not lend empirical support to
other prior studies in developed (Gompers et al, 2003; Drobetz et al, 2004;
Beiner et al, 2006; Brown and Caylor et al, 2006; Clacher et al, 2008;
Ammann et al, 2011; Bauer et al, 2010) and developing (Klapper and Love,
2004; Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; Black et al, 2006a; Javed and
Igbal, 2007; Black et al, 2010; Balasubramanian et al, 2010) countries who
reported statistically significant and positive association between their
governance indices and firm performance measured by Q-ratio.
Specifically, the differences in findings between this thesis and other prior
studies may be explained by the different methodologies used for the
development of their indices and the estimation methods. For example, and
as indicated earlier, Black et al (2006a) found between OLS and fixed effects
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regressions large differences in coefficients and significant levels including
sign reversals of which they cast doubts on OLS results. In this respect, most
of the prior studies33 used OLS as their estimation methods and their findings
may be unreliable.
As in the case of the accounting-based performance measures of ROA and
ROE, the findings based on the association between the GCGI and Q-ratio
indicate that corporate governance does not matter in Ghana. However, the
findings do not fully show the effect of each of the six sub-indices of the
GCGI to firm performance measured by Q-ratio. Table 8-9 contains the
results based on each of the six sub-indices and Q-ratio including all the
control variables. Board composition and remuneration committee indices are
found to be positively related to Q-ratio, evidence supported by prior
international studies (Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; Kouwenberg, 2006;
Aggarwal et al, 2007; Yan-Leung et al, 2008; Gupta et al, 2009;
Balasubramanian et al, 2010). For example, Gupta et al (2009) found
positive coefficients of board composition and remuneration committee
indices but the impact on Q-ratio of each sub-index is insignificant as in the
case of this thesis. These findings as well as the no relationship between the
audit committee and Q-ratio do not lend empirical support to the work of
Bauer et al (2010) who reported statistically significant and positive
association between board composition, audit committee and remuneration
committee indices and Q-ratio.
In contrast, shareholder rights, financial affairs and auditing and disclosure
indices are found to be negatively related to Q-ratio. The negative coefficient
of shareholder rights index lends empirical support to prior international
studies (Yan-Leung et al, 2008; Clacher et al, 2008; Gupta et al, 2009; Black
et al, 2010) who reported negative association between shareholder rights
index and Q-ratio. However, this finding contradicts the evidence of Leal and
33 These studies include Klapper and Love (2004), Clacher et al (2008), Bauer et al (2010),
Balasubramanian et al (2010), among others.
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Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005), Kouwenberg (2006) and Toudas and
Karathanassis (2007) who found insignificant positive relationship between
the two. Similarly, the negative coefficient of disclosure index lends empirical
support to the work of Kouwenberg (2006) and Yan-Leung et al (2008) who
reported negative association between disclosure index and Q-ratio. That
notwithstanding, the negative coefficient is in disagreement with other prior
studies which reported positive and in some cases statistically significant
association between disclosure index and Q-ratio (Leal and Carvalhal-da-
Silva, 2005; Clacher et al, 2008; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; Gupta et al,
2009; Balasubramanian et al, 2010). Arguably, none of the six sub-indices
appear to have strongly driven the relationship between the overall GCGI and
Q-ratio because of their insignificant impact. However, the positive
coefficients of the board composition and remuneration committee indices
outweighed the negative coefficients of shareholder rights, financial affairs
and auditing as well as disclosure indices which may have accounted for the
positive association between the GCGI and Q-ratio.
Interestingly and for the first time in this thesis, none of the control variables
shows any significant impact on firm performance measured by Q-ratio when
using the GCGI or its sub-indices as explanatory variables. However, the
insignificant positive (i.e. gearing) and negative (i.e. firm size, growth and
age) coefficients lend empirical support in most cases to prior studies (Leal
and Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; Kouwenberg, 2006; Clacher et al, 2008; Garay
and Gonzalez, 2008; Balasubramanian et al, 2010). This suggests that the
Ghanaian listed firms’ level of gearing, size, sales growth and their age does
not have any significant impact on Q-ratio because the market does not
consider these control variables as value relevant. In contrast, the
insignificant impact of the control variables on Q-ratio contradicts other prior
studies. In particular, Bauer et al (2010) and Black et al (2010) found
gearing (firm size, age and sales growth) to be statistically significant and
positively (negatively) related to Q-ratio.
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Table 8-9: Panel-data random-effects regressions of the sub-indices and
Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 3.170 2.529 3.088 2.488
(2.75)*** (2.64)*** (2.74)*** (2.80)***
BOARDINDEX 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.012
(1.42) (1.27) (1.45) (1.38)
AUCOMINDEX - - 0.000 0.000
- - (0.04) (0.14)
RECOMINDEX 0.004 0.004 - -
(0.86) (0.82) - -
SHOLDINDEX -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.92) (0.88) (0.86) (0.89)
FAAINDEX -0.011 -0.009 - -
(0.94) (0.83) - -
DISCINDEX -0.012 -0.012 - -
(1.21) (1.23) - -
GEAR 0.000 - 0.001 -
(0.03) - (0.26) -
SIZE -0.082 - -0.079 -
(0.92) - (0.88) -
GROWTH 0.023 - 0.027 -
(0.14) - (0.16) -
AGE -0.004 - -0.002 -
(0.29) - (0.18) -
Observations 283 283 283 283
Groupa 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.012
Notes: The dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). BOARDINDEX is the board composition index,
AUCOMINDEX is the audit committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index,
SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and auditing index,
DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth
opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides z-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients
are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
Given the inconsistent, and in most cases the insignificant association
between the adoption of corporate governance and firm performance during
the whole period, this thesis in the next section tries to conduct further
analysis to better characterise the variables into sub-periods and understand
the surprising results based on the whole period.
8.3 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PRE 2003 AND POST 2003 PERIODS
GOVERNANCE-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP
Following the initial analysis for the whole period, the pre 2003 (2000-2002)
and post 2003 (2004-2009) governance-performance relationship based on
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hypotheses two to six is presented in this section. Consistent with Cui et al
(2008) and Bhagat and Bolton (2009), 2003 is used as a seminal year
because of the introduction of the Ghanaian Code provisions and is excluded
from the analysis of pre 2003 and post 2003 sub-periods. Specifically, the
estimated fixed effects regression results based on the specific governance
mechanisms are reported in subsection 8.3.1 to test hypothesis two to five.
Subsection 8.3.2 presents the fixed/random-effects regressions results based
on the GCGI to test hypothesis six. Similar to section 8.2, the results based
on the accounting-based performance measures (ROA & ROE) are first
presented, followed by the market-based performance measure (Q-ratio).
8.3.1 Pre 2003 and Post 2003 findings based on the specific
governance mechanisms
8.3.1.1 Pre 2003 and Post 2003 findings based on the accounting
measures of performance (ROA & ROE)
Table 8-10 reports pre 2003 and post 2003 panel data fixed effects
regression results of the specific governance mechanisms based on the
accounting-based performance measure of ROA. Interestingly, and
inconsistent with hypothesis two, pre 2003 CEO duality is found to be
negatively associated with ROA for models 1 to 3. However, and as shown in
models 4 to 6 of Table 8-10, the post 2003 period experienced sign reversals
where CEO duality is found to be positively associated with ROA. The positive
coefficient during the post 2003 period may be attributed to the decline of
compliance with separating the two roles from 85% (pre 2003) to 83% (post
2003). In particular, some of the Ghanaian listed firms slightly changed their
leadership structure and that might have impacted positively on firm
performance measured by ROA post 2003.
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Table 8-10: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of
specific governance mechanisms and return on assets (ROA)
Pre (2000-2002) Post (2004-2009)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 22.813 24.423 26.077 8.501 7.210 9.021
(1.29) (1.71)* (1.91)* (1.02) (0.93) (1.26)
CEODUAL -0.289 -0.277 -0.550 1.599 1.406 1.515
(0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.59) (0.53) (0.57)
BODSIZE1 0.332 0.383 0.523 0.541 0.484 0.468
(0.37) (0.44) (0.65) (1.15) (1.07) (1.04)
PNEDs1 -0.278 -0.284 -0.299 -0.083 -0.083 -0.083
(2.40)** (2.57)** (2.89)*** (1.05) (1.06) (1.06)
AUCOM1 2.423 2.332 2.218 0.173 0.191 0.215
(0.52) (0.51) (0.49) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11)
RECOM1 14.012 14.473 14.770 -1.170 -1.148 -1.103
(2.21)** (2.37)** (2.46)** (0.52) (0.52) (0.49)
GEAR -0.025 -0.021 - -0.088 -0.089 -0.091
(0.46) (0.42) - (2.59)*** (2.66)*** (2.73)***
SIZE 0.130 - - -0.275 - -
(0.11) - - (0.43) - -
GROWTH -2.248 -2.285 -2.633 2.098 2.003 1.959
(0.50) (0.52) (0.61) (1.88) (1.84) (1.81)
AGE 0.237 0.237 0.245 0.050 0.051 -
(2.07)** (2.12)** (2.25)** (0.60) (0.63) -
Observations 65 65 65 193 193 193
Groupa 23 23 23 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.420 0.421 0.421 0.103 0.098 0.095
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). CEODUAL is the
CEO duality, BODSIZE1 is the board size, PNEDs1 is the proportion of non-executive directors, AUCOM1
represents the existence of audit committee, RECOM1 represents the existence of remuneration
committee, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the
firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
However, this finding does not lend empirical support to the work of Bhagat
and Bolton (2009) who found CEO duality to be statistically significant and
positively related to ROA during their pre 2002 and post 2002 periods. That
notwithstanding, the panel data regressions with fixed effects as estimation
methods in this thesis as opposed to OLS and 2SLS estimation methods used
by Bhagat and Bolton (2009) may have accounted for the differences in
findings. Contrary to hypothesis three, the board size is found to be
consistently but insignificantly positively related to ROA during pre 2003 and
post 2003 periods. This finding is not surprising because the board size of the
Ghanaian listed firms on average did not change significantly (i.e. from 9.03
during pre 2003 to 8.17 post 2003). Therefore, the consistent positive
coefficient during pre 2003 and post 2003 periods suggests that the board
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size between 8 and 9 among Ghanaian listed firms appears to be effective
and efficient for decision making that influences firm performance.
Similarly to the whole period, and consistent with hypothesis four, the PNEDs
is found to be statistically significant and negatively related to ROA during
pre 2003 period. This is not the case for post 2003 where the relationship is
negative but not statistically significant, given that the proportion of non-
executive directors did not change significantly (i.e. from 75.20% during pre
2003 to 75.99% post 2003). This suggests that the Ghanaian firms have a
greater proportion of non-executive directors than the code34 recommended
and therefore poorer performance during both periods. However, the pre
2003 statistically significant and negative relationship between the PNEDs
and firm performance measured by ROA lends empirical support to
international pre and post studies (Bhagat and Bolton, 2009). For example,
Bhagat and Bolton (2009) reported board independence to be statistically
significant and negatively related to ROA during pre 2002 SOX (i.e. from
1998 to 2001).
That notwithstanding, the insignificant negative association between the two
during post 2003 in this thesis contradicts Bhagat and Bolton (2009) who
experienced sign reversals with board independence found to be statistically
significant and positively associated with ROA for their post 2002 (i.e. from
2003 to 2007) findings. In this case, two possible explanations for the
differences in findings between the two studies can be put forward. First, the
US boards became more independent post 2002 adoption of SOX, whereas
the proportion of non-executive directors of the Ghanaian counterparts did
not change significantly although there was a greater proportion of non-
executive directors’ pre 2003. Second, the differences may be attributed to
the different methods of estimation. Whereas this thesis adopted panel data
34 The Ghanaian Code recommends that firms should have a balance of executive and non-executive
directors to sit on the board. However, and as indicated earlier, most of the firms have only the CEO as an
executive director to sit on the board.
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regressions with fixed effects estimation, Bhagat and Bolton (2009) used OLS
and 2SLS to investigate the relationship between the two.
With regards to the existence of board committees during pre 2003 and post
2003 periods, the audit committee is found to be positively associated with
firm performance measured by ROA for both periods, evidence not consistent
with hypothesis five. By contrast, and consistent with hypothesis five, the
remuneration committee is found to be statistically significant and positively
related to ROA during pre 2003 but experienced sign reversal during post
2003 where the relationship became negative. This evidence is particularly
important because the adoption of the remuneration committee as a
governance mechanism does not support the Ghanaian Code provision during
the post 2003 period. This suggests that compliance with the establishment
of a remuneration committee does not guarantee performance as both
periods have exhibited different relationships even though the Ghanaian
listed firms’ experienced marginal improvement (i.e. from 17% during pre
2003 to 30% post 2003) in the establishment of a remuneration committee
post 2003.
Table 8-11 presents pre 2003 and post 2003 panel data fixed effects
regression results of the specific governance mechanisms and the
accounting-based firm performance measure of ROE. Consistent with the
whole period, CEO duality is found to be negatively related to ROE during pre
2003 and post 2003 periods. The insignificant negative association during
both periods does not support hypothesis two that the separation of the two
roles should lead to higher firm performance. As Table 8-11 indicates below,
the pre 2003 and post 2003 board size are also found to have consistent
positive association with ROE similar to the whole period. However, and
consistent with hypothesis three, the post 2003 board size-ROE relationship
is statistically significant, suggesting that the marginal reduction of the
Ghanaian listed firms board sizes from 9.03 (pre 2003) to 8.17 (post 2003)
affected firm performance measured by ROE more significantly than ROA
where the relationship experienced no significant change.
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Table 8-11: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of
specific governance mechanisms and return on equity (ROE)
Pre (2000-2002) Post (2004-2009)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept -55.381 -40.620 -35.069 27.069 25.808 15.720
(0.69) (0.52) (0.47) (1.16) (1.19) (0.80)
CEODUAL -0.905 -0.501 -0.123 -0.306 -0.455 -0.856
(0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12)
BODSIZE1 5.835 5.257 5.364 2.903 2.869 3.001
(1.44) (1.33) (1.37) (2.21)** (2.29)** (2.42)**
PNEDs1 -0.052 -0.145 -0.153 -0.247 -0.248 -0.244
(0.10) (0.29) (0.31) (1.12) (1.13) (1.13)
AUCOM1 4.917 0.906 1.096 1.368 1.359 1.070
(0.22) (0.04) (0.05) (0.25) (0.24) (0.19)
RECOM1 55.251 63.374 65.442 -7.445 -7.408 -7.688
(1.87)* (2.33)** (2.52)** (1.19) (1.19) (1.25)
GEAR -1.039 -0.991 -1.002 -0.234 -0.234 -0.223
(3.94)*** (3.90)*** (4.04)*** (2.52)** (2.55)** (2.44)**
SIZE 7.486 6.657 6.525 0.220 - -
(1.44) (1.32) (1.31) (0.13) - -
GROWTH -16.116 - - 7.969 7.923 8.164
(0.72) - - (2.70)*** (2.75)*** (2.83)***
AGE 0.186 0.142 - -0.275 -0.269 -
(0.36) (0.28) - (1.12) (1.11) -
Observations 65 65 65 193 193 193
Groupa 23 23 23 39 39 39
R2 0.420 0.415 0.414 0.139 0.139 0.134
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE). CEODUAL is the
CEO duality, BODSIZE1 is the board size, PNEDs1 is the proportion of non-executive directors, AUCOM1
represents the existence of audit committee, RECOM1 represents the existence of remuneration
committee, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the
firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
Consistent with the whole period, the PNEDs is found to be consistent and
negatively associated with ROE during pre 2003 and post 2003 periods,
evidence not supported by hypothesis four that the higher the PNEDs, the
lower the firm performance. However and contrary to ROA where the pre
2003 is found to be statistically significant, both pre 2003 and post 2003
periods PNEDs-ROE relationship are negative but not significant. Similar to
the pre 2003 and post 2003 audit committee-ROA relationship, and
consistent with the whole period of ROE, the pre 2003 and post 2003
existence of an audit committee is found to be positively related to ROE,
evidence not supported by hypothesis five that the presence of audit
committee should lead to better firm performance. Although, the coefficients
of audit committee and ROE during both periods are positive, the significant
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improvement in compliance level from pre 2003 (34%) to post 2003 (80%)
did not have any significant impact on firm performance. Interestingly, and
consistent with the pre 2003 and post 2003 remuneration committee-ROA
relationship, there is statistically significant and positive association between
the existence of a remuneration committee and ROE during pre 2003,
indicating that hypothesis five is supported. This is however not the case for
post 2003 where the remuneration committee-ROE relationship experienced
sign reversals with insignificant negative relationship. The sign reversal is
consistent with the post 2003 findings of ROA but contradictory to the whole
period of the remuneration committee-ROE relationship where the
relationship is positive. This suggests that the positive association found
during the whole period is driven by the statistically significant and positive
association between the two during the pre 2003 period.
8.3.1.2 Pre 2003 and Post 2003 findings based on the market
measure of performance (Q-ratio)
Table 8-12 reports the pre 2003 and post 2003 panel data fixed effects
regression results of the specific governance mechanisms and the market-
based performance measure of Q-ratio. In line with ROA, the pre 2003 CEO
duality is found to be negatively related to Q-ratio, evidence not supported
by hypothesis two. By contrast, the post 2003 CEO duality is found to be
positively associated with Q-ratio, suggesting that the positive relationship
experienced by the whole period is driven by the post 2003 relationship
between the two. Although not statistically significant, these findings also
lend empirical support to the work of Bhagat and Bolton (2009) who found
CEO duality to be negatively related to Q-ratio during pre 2002 and a positive
association between the two during the post 2002 period.
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Table 8-12: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of
specific governance mechanisms and Tobin’s (Q-ratio)
Pre (2000-2002) Post (2004-2009)
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6
Intercept 3.913 3.952 3.616 2.796 2.828 2.427
(1.60) (1.70)* (1.66)* (2.01)** (2.05)** (1.88)*
CEODUAL -0.844 -0.817 -0.838 0.422 0.418 0.355
(1.02) (1.02) (1.07) (0.96) (0.96) (0.83)
BODSIZE1 0.046 0.037 0.037 0.027 0.025 0.005
(0.43) (0.36) (0.37) (0.34) (0.32) (0.07)
PNEDs1 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.018 -0.018 -0.017
(0.19) (0.29) (0.32) (1.34) (1.35) (1.32)
AUCOM1 0.099 0.109 0.109 -0.031 -0.019 -0.027
(0.30) (0.34) (0.34) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09)
RECOM1 0.543 0.551 0.547 -0.181 -0.166 -0.160
(1.02) (1.08) (1.08) (0.49) (0.45) (0.43)
GEAR 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 - -
(1.13) (1.13) (1.15) (0.25) - -
SIZE -0.250 -0.249 -0.243 -0.082 -0.080 -
(1.01) (1.05) (1.05) (0.83) (0.81) -
GROWTH -0.026 - - 0.027 0.028 0.058
(0.10) - - (0.17) (0.17) (0.37)
AGE -0.010 -0.010 - -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.45) (0.48) - (0.16) (0.16) (0.12)
Observations 65 65 65 193 193 193
Groupa 23 23 23 39 39 39
R2 0.245 0.273 0.246 0.045 0.041 0.028
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). CEODUAL is the CEO
duality, BODSIZE1 is the board size, PNEDs1 is the proportion of non-executive directors, AUCOM1
represents the existence of audit committee, RECOM1 represents the existence of remuneration
committee, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the
firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
Similar to pre 2003 and post 2003 board size-ROA relationship, the board
size is found to have a consistent positive relationship with Q-ratio during pre
2003 and post 2003 sub-periods, suggesting that hypothesis three is not
supported. However, the insignificant positive coefficients for all the models
of Table 8-12 contradict what is reported with respect to the whole period
where board size is found to be statistically significant and positively
associated with Q-ratio. This suggests that the overall average board size of
8.52 appears to be more effective than the pre 2003 (9.03) and post 2003
(8.17) board sizes, hence the positive and statistically significant level at 1%
for the whole period.
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Unlike the whole period where the PNEDs is found to be statistically
significant and negatively associated with Q-ratio, the pre 2003 and post
2003 PNEDs are consistently and negatively related to Q-ratio for all the
models of Table 8-12, suggesting that hypothesis four is not supported.
These insignificant negative coefficients are supported by the findings of pre
2003 and post 2003 accounting-based performance measure of ROE where
similar relationships are established. However, these findings do not lend
empirical support to the Bhagat and Bolton (2009) study where there is an
insignificant negative association between board independence and Q-ratio
during pre 2003 but a sign reversal during the post 2003 period to a
statistically significant and positive relationship between the two. That
notwithstanding, both the accounting-based and the market-based
performance measures used in this thesis are negatively affected by the
PNEDs significantly with poorer firm performance during the whole period
than pre 2003 and post 2003 sub-periods.
Contrary to the pre 2003 and post 2003 consistent positive association
between audit committee and ROA as well as ROE, the audit committee is
only found to be positively related to Q-ratio during pre 2003 (see models 1
to 3 of Table 8-12) but experiences sign reversals to negative. These findings
contradict the negative association reported earlier between the two during
the whole period, suggesting that the relationship is driven by the post 2003
negative association between audit committee and Q-ratio. Similarly, and as
indicated in models 1 to 3 of Table 8-12, the pre 2003 remuneration
committee is found to be positively related to Q-ratio but experienced sign
reversals to negative during post 2003 period. These findings are consistent
with pre 2003 and post 2003 sign reversals using the accounting-based firm
performance measures of ROA and ROE discussed earlier. However, and
unlike the audit committee, the positive relationship during the whole period
is driven by the pre 2003 positive association between the remuneration
committee and Q-ratio.
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8.3.2 Pre 2003 and Post 2003 findings based on the GCGI
8.3.2.1 Pre 2003 and Post 2003 findings based on the accounting
measures of performance (ROA & ROE)
Table 8-13 presents pre 2003 and post 2003 panel data fixed effects
regression results of the GCGI based on the accounting-based performance
measure of ROA. The GCGI is found to be statistically significant and
positively related to ROA during the pre 2003 period, suggesting that
hypothesis six is supported. However, the post 2003 experienced sign
reversals where the GCGI is found to be negative and in most cases
statistically significant and positively related to ROA. These findings suggest
that the positive association between the GCGI and ROA reported during the
whole period is driven by the pre 2003 significant positive association
between the two. Arguably, the pre 2003 positive coefficient is not surprising
because, and as indicated in section 6.7 of chapter six, the majority of the
Ghanaian listed firms have already complied with thirty-four out of the thirty-
six provisions that constitute the GCGI before the formal adoption of the
Ghanaian Code provisions post 2003. However, the significant improvement
of the GCGI from 57% (pre 2003) to 73% (post 2003) did affect firm
performance negatively during the post 2003 period, suggesting that the
adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions does not guarantee improvement
in performance measured by ROA. That notwithstanding, these findings do
not lend support to prior empirical pre and post index studies (Cui et al,
2008). Even though Cui et al (2008) found insignificant negative association
between their corporate governance scores (CGS) and firm performance
measured by ROA during pre 2003, they experienced sign reversals with
statistically significant and positive association between their CGS and firm
performance measured by ROA in the post 2003 period.
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Table 8-13: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of
the GCGI and return of assets (ROA)
Pre (2000-2002) Post (2004-2009)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept -24.657 -19.040 -17.487 9.960 9.925 11.497
(2.39)** (2.62)*** (2.38)** (1.40) (1.65)* (2.20)**
GCGI 0.365 0.361 0.342 -0.065 -0.065 -0.067
(3.97)*** (3.91)*** (3.62)*** (0.90) (0.90) (0.93)
GEAR -0.058 -0.049 -0.053 -0.088 -0.088 -0.090
(1.18) (1.03) (1.12) (2.64)*** (2.66)*** (2.70)***
SIZE 0.872 - - -0.003 - -
(0.72) - - (0.01) - -
GROWTH -0.417 -0.944 - 1.947 1.947 1.910
(0.10) (0.24) - (1.77) (1.82) (1.79)
AGE 0.299 0.292 0.288 0.042 0.042 -
(2.59)*** (2.50)** (2.35)** (0.50) (0.50) -
Observations 65 65 65 193 193 193
Groupa 23 23 23 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.361 0.350 0.351 0.068 0.068 0.063
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). GCGI is the
Ghanaian corporate governance index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth
opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients
are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
Fundamentally, three possible explanations can be put forward for the
differences in findings between this thesis and that of Cui et al (2008). First,
whereas this thesis used researcher-developed index methodology and is
purely based on the Ghanaian Code provisions, Cui et al (2008) adopted the
Horwath Report, a commercial rating agency in Australia of which the
authors are not aware of what is in the ratings that constitute the CGS. They
noted that the ratings are not exactly the same as the ASX recommendations
but the Report was used as a proxy for the degree of compliance with the
ASX recommendations. Second, the pre 2003 and post 2003 periods in this
thesis incorporate three years (pre 2003) and seven years (post 2003) sub-
periods, whereas Cui et al (2008) only used the ratings of 2001 (one year
before) and 2004 (one year after) ASX recommendations. This is particularly
important because one year before and one year after might not be sufficient
for the impact to be examined where the relationship between the adoption
of the governance provisions and firm performance could change in the
longer term. Finally, this thesis adopted panel data regression with fixed
effects as a method of estimation, whereas Cui et al (2008) used OLS for
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their investigation. The above three reasons may have accounted for the
differences in findings between both studies.
The results based on the association between pre 2003 and post 2003 GCGI
and ROA indicate that corporate governance does matter more during the pre
2003 period. However, and as indicated earlier, the findings do not show
which of the six sub-indices of the GCGI affects firm performance
significantly during the pre 2003 period. Table 8-14 contains the relationship
between the sub-indices and ROA during pre 2003 and post 2003 periods.
Although insignificant, board composition index is found to be positively
associated with ROA during the pre 2003 period. This is however not the case
for post 2003 where the relationship became negative and might have been
caused by the marginal decrease of the compliance level from 65% (pre
2003) to 64% (post 2003). This suggests that the positive relationship
between board composition index and ROA found during the whole period is
driven by the pre 2003 positive association between board composition index
and ROA. Unlike the whole period where the audit committee is found to be
statistically insignificant but negatively associated with ROA, the pre 2003
audit committee index is found to be statistically significant and positively
associated with ROA but the relationship experienced sign reversals to
insignificant negative association between the two during post 2003.
Similarly, the pre 2003 remuneration committee index is found to be
statistically significant and positively related to ROA but the post 2003
relationship became negative. Both shareholder rights and the financial
affairs and auditing indices are found to have consistent but insignificant
positive association with ROA during pre 2003 and post 2003 periods. This is
however not the case for the disclosure index-ROA relationship where pre
2003 is found to be positive but experienced sign reversals to negative
association between the two. Given the statistically significant and positive
nature of audit committee and remuneration committee indices during pre
2003, it can be argued that the significant relationship between pre 2003
GCGI and ROA is driven by the board committees’ sub-indices.
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Table 8-14: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 panel-data fixed-effects regressions of
the sub-indices and return on assets (ROA)
Pre (2000-2002) Post (2004-2007)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -15.131 -10.449 6.843 9.404
(1.04) (0.84) (0.68) (1.09)
BOARDINDEX 0.022 0.034 -0.007 -0.012
(0.21) (0.33) (0.10) (0.19)
AUCOMINDEX - 0.131 - -0.017
- (3.24)*** - (0.74)
RECOMINDEX 0.186 - -0.028 -
(2.74)*** - (0.78) -
SHOLDINDEX 0.023 0.052 0.025 0.025
(0.18) (0.37) (0.29) (0.30)
FAAINDEX 0.135 0.020
(0.73) (0.20)
DISCINDEX 0.255 -0.002
(1.57) (0.02)
GEAR -0.065 -0.055 -0.091 -0.089
(1.30) (1.05) (2.65)*** (2.64)***
SIZE 1.058 1.333 -0.068 -0.056
(0.75) (0.96) (0.11) (0.09)
GROWTH -2.846 -0.336 2.118 2.034
(0.69) (0.08) (1.86)* (1.82)*
AGE 0.261 0.346 0.055 0.045
(2.10)** (2.73)*** (0.68) (0.54)
Observations 65 65 193 193
Groupa 23 23 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.435 0.339 0.072 0.066
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). BOARDINDEX is the
board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration
committee index, SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and
auditing index, DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is
the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis.
Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
Table 8-15 presents the pre 2003 and post 2003 panel data fixed effects
regressions results based on the GCGI and firm performance measure of
ROE. Consistent with the pre 2003 GCGI-ROA relationship, the GCGI is found
to be statistically significant and positively related to ROE during pre 2003,
suggesting that hypothesis six is supported. Although not statistically
significant, the relationship between the GCGI and ROE remains positive
during post 2003, the findings not consistent with the post 2003 period
where the relationship is negative between the GCGI and ROA. Also, and as
in the case of ROA, the significant improvement of the degree of compliance
with the adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions from 57% (pre 2003) to
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73% (post 2003) failed to have any significant effect on firm performance
measured by ROE. These findings suggest that the significant improvement
in the adoption of corporate governance provisions does not guarantee
improvement in performance among Ghanaian listed firms. Arguably, the
consistent positive association between the GCGI and ROE during pre 2003
and post 2003 sub-periods is a case for the positive association between the
GCGI and ROE during the whole period, indicating that the relationship is
driven by the pre 2003 statistically significant and positive relationship
between the two.
Table 8-15: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of
the GCGI and return on equity (ROE)
Pre (2000-2002) Post (2004-2009)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept -94.271 -97.084 -68.976 32.840 38.017 26.011
(2.14)** (2.15)** (1.63) (1.64) (2.24)** (1.78)*
GCGI 1.351 1.396 1.263 0.086 0.079 0.068
(3.30)*** (3.37)*** (2.91)*** (0.42) (0.39) (0.34)
GEAR -0.903 -0.884 -1.032 -0.251 -0.246 -0.238
(3.74)*** (3.69)*** (4.27)*** (2.72)*** (2.68)*** (2.59)***
SIZE 8.449 7.739 8.005 0.873 - -
(1.66)* (1.50) (1.44) (0.53) - -
GROWTH -26.538 - - 7.560 7.937 8.222
(1.23) - - (2.57)** (2.77)*** (2.85)***
AGE 0.612 0.585 - -0.334 -0.336 -
(1.25) (1.16) - (1.31) (1.33) -
Observations 65 65 65 193 193 193
Groupa 23 23 23 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.322 0.3044 0.284 0.057 0.057 0.052
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE). GCGI is the
Ghanaian corporate governance index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth
opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients
are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
Similar to the pre 2003 and post 2003 GCGI-ROA relationship, the findings
based on the relationship between the GCGI and ROE during pre 2003 and
post 2003 periods suggest that corporate governance in Ghana does matter.
However, the results do not fully reveal the impact of each sub-index of the
GCGI to performance measure of ROE during the sub-periods. Table 8-16
reports the results of the relationship between the sub-indices and ROE.
Unlike the pre 2003 board composition index-ROA relationship, and as can be
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seen from models 1 and 2 of Table 8-16, the board composition index is
found to be statistically significant and positively related to ROE during the
pre 2003 period but experienced insignificant positive association between
the two during the post 2003 period. This suggests that the positive and
statistically significant findings between the two during the whole period is
driven by the pre 2003 board composition index-ROE relationship results.
Interestingly, and consistent with the pre 2003 board committees-ROA
relationship, both audit and remuneration committees indices are found to be
statistically significant and positively related to ROE during pre 2003 period.
However, they experienced sign reversals to have insignificant negative
impact on ROE during post 2003, evidence consistent with post 2003 ROA
findings. These findings also suggest that the positive association found
during the whole period between audit and remuneration committees indices
and ROE are driven by the pre 2003 positive and statistically significant
results.
Although not significant in model 1 of Table 8-16, shareholder rights index in
model 2 is found to be statistically significant and positively associated with
ROE during pre 2003 period. However, and similar to the post 2003
shareholder rights index-ROA relationship, the post 2003 experienced
insignificant positive association between the two. Arguably, the consistent
positive association between the shareholder rights index and ROE during pre
2003 and post 2003 sub-periods may be the reason for the positive
association reported earlier for the whole period. Contrary to the pre 2003
financial affairs and auditing index-ROA positive relationship, the pre 2003
financial affairs and auditing index is found to be negatively associated with
ROE but experienced sign reversals to positive association between the two.
In fact, this is the first time one of the sub-indices has experienced sign
reversals from negative to positive impact on ROE, suggesting that the
improvement of the financial affairs and auditing index from 77% (pre 2003)
to 95% (post 2003) has a positive effect on ROE. These findings also suggest
that the negative relationship between the financial affairs and auditing index
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and ROE found during the whole period is driven by the pre 2003 negative
association between the two.
Table 8-16: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 panel-data fixed-effects regressions of
the sub-indices and return on equity (ROE)
Pre (2000-2002) Post (2004-2009)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -33.512 -60.471 10.739 24.185
(0.56) (1.22) (0.39) (1.01)
BOARDINDEX 0.811 0.849 0.272 0.212
(1.92)* (2.02)** (1.57) (1.19)
AUCOMINDEX - 0.531 - -0.030
- (3.01)*** - (0.47)
RECOMINDEX 1.035 - -0.088 -
(3.59)*** - (0.90) -
SHOLDINDEX 0.836 1.112 0.086 0.133
(1.40) (1.79)* (0.36) (0.59)
FAAINDEX -0.020 - 0.151 -
(0.02) - (0.55) -
DISCINDEX 0.202 - -0.101 -
(0.27) - (0.50) -
GEAR -1.092 -1.029 -0.260 -0.263
(4.63)*** (4.23)*** (2.79)*** (2.85)***
SIZE 11.262 15.566 1.111 0.972
(2.00)** (2.75)*** (0.66) (0.58)
GROWTH -7.911 -25.347 7.900 7.543
(0.37) (1.20) (2.55)** (2.51)**
AGE 0.206 0.862 -0.283 -0.310
(0.42) (1.69)* (1.28) (1.28)
Observations 65 65 193 193
Groupa 23 23 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.446 0.380 0.101 0.077
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE). BOARDINDEX is the
board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration
committee index, SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and
auditing index, DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is
the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis.
Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
Consistent with the pre 2003 and post 2003 disclosure index-ROA
relationship, the pre 2003 disclosure index is found to be positively related to
ROE but experienced sign reversals during the post 2003 period to negative.
However, and unlike ROA, the negative relationship between the disclosure
index and ROE during the combine period is driven by the post 2003 negative
association between the two. As indicated in models 1 to 3 of Table 8-15,
and given the statistically significant and positive association between the
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GCGI and ROE pre 2003, it may be concluded that the significant positive
association between the two is driven by the statistically significant and
positive impact of board composition, audit and remuneration committees
indices on ROE reported in models 1 and 2 of Table 8-16. This is particularly
important because not all the six sub-indices are influential to firm
performance measured by ROE.
8.3.2.2 Pre 2003 and Post 2003 findings based on the market
measure of performance (Q-ratio)
Table 8-17 reports pre 2003 and post 2003 panel data random effects
regression results of the GCGI based on the market-based performance
measure of Q-ratio.
Table 8-17: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 Panel-data random-effects regressions
of the GCGI and the Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio)
Pre (2000-2002) Post (2004-2009)
Variables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6
Intercept 2.644 2.674 2.235 2.200 2.179 1.766
(1.65)* (1.69)* (1.60) (1.88)* (1.88)* (2.07)**
GCGI 0.013 0.013 0.013 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010
(1.30) (1.33) (1.37) (0.84) (0.82) (0.84)
GEAR 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.001 - -
(1.17) (1.23) (1.25) (0.22) - -
SIZE -0.272 -0.278 -0.272 -0.052 -0.051 -
(1.24) (1.29) (1.29) (0.56) (0.55) -
GROWTH -0.050 - - 0.050 0.051 -
(0.20) - - (0.32) (0.32) -
AGE -0.012 -0.012 - -0.003 -0.002 -
(0.57) (0.59) - (0.16) (0.15) -
Observations 65 65 65 193 193 193
Groupa 23 23 23 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.208 0.203 0.175 0.005 0.003 0.002
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). GCGI is the Ghanaian
corporate governance index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth
opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides z-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients
are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
In this respect, and as can be seen from Table 8-17 above, the GCGI is found
to be positively related to Q-ratio during the pre 2003 period. However, and
contrary to the accounting-based firm performance measures of ROA and
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ROE, the insignificant positive coefficient suggests that hypothesis six is not
supported. In contrast, the post 2003 experienced sign reversals where the
relationship between the GCGI and Q-ratio became negative, evidence
consistent with the post 2003 GCGI-ROA relationship. These findings also
lend empirical support to the work of Bhagat and Bolton (2009) who did not
find any consistent significant relationship between their pre 2002 and post
2002 index and Q-ratio. Arguably, the positive association reported during
the whole period between the GCGI and Q-ratio is driven by the pre 2003
positive relationship between the two.
As in the case of pre 2003 and post 2003 ROA and ROE, the results based on
the relationship between the GCGI and Q-ratio during pre 2003 and post
2003 suggest that corporate governance does not have any consistent
significant impact. In particular, the results do not fully indicate the impact of
each sub-index of the GCGI to the performance measure of Q-ratio during
the sub-periods. Table 8-18 presents the results of the relationship between
the sub-indices and Q-ratio. Except for the shareholder rights index where
there is no relationship between the two during pre 2003, the other five sub-
indices35 are found to be positively related to Q-ratio during pre 2003 period.
However, the pre 2003 findings are in most cases not consistent with post
2003 results. Specifically, and as can be seen from models 3 and 4 of Table
8-18, the audit committee, financial affairs and auditing and disclosure
indices experienced sign reversals to negative with financial affairs and
auditing having negative and statistically significant association with Q-ratio.
In contrast, the post 2003 board composition and remuneration committee
indices are positively related to Q-ratio, the findings consistent with the pre
2003 period.
35 These include board composition, audit committee, remuneration committee, financial affairs and
auditing and disclosure.
267
Table 8-18: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 panel-data random-effects regressions
of the sub-indices and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio)
Pre (2000-2002) Post (2004-2009)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 3.107 3.108 2.736 3.250
(1.47) (1.54) (1.67)* (2.26)**
BOARDINDEX 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.24) (0.05) (0.14) (0.06)
AUCOMINDEX - 0.004 - -0.001
- (1.15) - (0.35)
RECOMINDEX 0.010 - 0.003 -
(1.26) - (0.53) -
SHOLDINDEX 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.023
(0.02) (0.00) (2.15)** (1.80)*
FAAINDEX 0.003 - -0.025 -
(0.16) - (1.65)* -
DISCINDEX 0.006 - -0.015 -
(0.43) - (1.29) -
GEAR 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.000
(1.14) (1.18) (0.20) (0.08)
SIZE -0.283 -0.262 -0.063 -0.063
(1.13) (1.12) (0.68) (0.67)
GROWTH -0.018 -0.050 0.043 0.041
(0.07) (0.19) (0.27) (0.26)
AGE -0.010 -0.010 -0.001 0.001
(0.47) (0.47) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 65 65 193 193
Groupa 23 23 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.215 0.193 0.004 0.001
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the Table’s Q (Q-ratio). BOARDINDEX is the
board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration
committee index, SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and
auditing index, DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is
the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides z-statistics which are in parenthesis.
Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 5% level
Interestingly, the shareholder rights also experienced sign reversals from no
association to positive and statistically significant association with Q-ratio
during the post 2003 period. However, this finding is not consistent with post
2003 ROA and ROE where the relationship is positive but insignificant.
Arguably, the positive and statistically significant relationship found between
shareholder rights index and Q-ratio during post 2003 is as a result of the
significant improvement of the degree of compliance with shareholder rights
from 69% (pre 2003) to 76% (post 2003).
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8.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
An empirical investigation into the relationship between the degree of
compliance with corporate governance and firm performance in Ghana has
been conducted for the study period 2000 to 2009. Fundamentally, the
governance variables were grouped into the specific governance mechanisms
and the GCGI with firm performance measured by return on assets (ROA),
return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). In line with previous studies,
the findings based on the specific governance mechanisms during the whole
period suggest statistically significant but in most cases weak relationships
between the five specific governance mechanisms and all the firm
performance variables. Although not statistically significant, the findings
based on the GCGI indicate a positive relationship with all the firm
performance variables during the whole period. This suggests that not all the
Ghanaian Code provisions are important to improving firm performance
measured by ROA, ROE and Q-ratio during the whole period, evidence
supported by Diacon and O’Sullivan (1995) who reported strongly that some
governance mechanisms are more effective than others in promoting
profitability.
However, and focusing on the likely differences in findings before and after
2003 where the Ghanaian Code provisions were formally adopted by the
Ghanaian listed firms, this thesis finds a shift in the relationship between
corporate governance and firm performance after 2003. Prior to 2003 and
based on the specific governance mechanisms, a remuneration committee is
found to be statistically significant and positively related to the accounting-
based firm performance measures of ROA and ROE. After 2003, a negative
but insignificant association between a remuneration committee and the
accounting-based firm performance measures was established. The most
consistent relationship found concerns the PNEDs and board size. The
relationship between the PNEDs and all the firm performance variables is
consistently negative during pre 2003 and post 2003 sub-periods but only its
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relationship with ROA is statistically significant during pre 2003. On the other
hand, the relationship between board size and all the firm performance
variables is consistently positive through each of the sub-periods but only its
relationship with ROE is statistically significant during post 2003 period.
Following that, this thesis also finds that the relationship between the GCGI
and all the firm performance variables experienced in most cases sign
reversals and changes in significant levels following 2003. During the pre
2003 period, the GCGI is found to have a statistically significant and positive
relationship with the accounting-based firm performance measures of ROA
and ROE. After 2003, the GCGI switches sign to insignificant negative
relationship with respect to ROA. However, the relationship between the
GCGI and ROE remained positive but not significant during post 2003. The
findings of the six sub-indices indicate that the statistically significant and
positive relationship between the GCGI and the accounting-based firm
performance measures is driven by the audit and remuneration committees’
indices where the relationship between these sub-indices and the accounting-
based firm performance measures are found to be positive and statistically
significant during the pre 2003 period. Arguably, these findings are not
surprising because, and as indicated earlier, thirty-four out of the thirty-six
provisions imposed by the Ghanaian Code have already been complied with
and disclosed in the firms annual reports before the formal adoption in the
post 2003 period.
Overall, the findings suggest that a positive relationship between the GCGI
and the accounting-based firm performance existed in pre 2003, but not post
2003. This indicates that the adoption of corporate governance provisions
really matter to operating performance before the adoption of the Ghanaian
Code was made mandatory. The lack of positive impact after the adoption of
the Ghanaian code could be explained by the fact that many of the firms
studied have already complied with most of the provisions before they were
made mandatory. In addition, the significant improvement in compliance
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with the Ghanaian Code provisions during post 2003 appears to be in line
with good corporate governance practices but the general adoption does not
allow for variability in the governance data and therefore makes it very
difficult to establish the impact of the GCGI on firm performance. These
findings may lead to the suggestion that the Ghanaian firms have engaged in
a box ticking exercise believing that compliance will satisfy the shareholders
and regulators that they have good corporate governance structures in place.
Furthermore, the findings support the argument that the sub-periods
analyses might be preferred to the analysis of the whole period due to the
possible differences in corporate governance influencing firm performance
across periods.
8.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has reported the initial empirical results and discussion of the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The
impact of the specific governance mechanisms and the GCGI on firm
performance in Ghana from 2000 to 2009 has been investigated using the
whole period and sub-periods data. The specific governance mechanisms and
the GCGI were found to have had varying relationships with firm
performance in Ghana. These findings supported some prior empirical studies
in other countries but the critical issue here is that the potential existence of
endogeneity is ignored in the analysis of findings. It is therefore
acknowledged in this thesis that the relationship between the GCGI and firm
performance could be spurious and therefore the findings should be
interpreted with this condition in mind. In the next chapter, endogeneity
tests and checks for robustness will be conducted to confirm the stability of
the initial results in this chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE
ENDOGENEITYAND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
9.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter conducts endogeneity tests and a series of robustness checks to
examine whether there is indeed stability in the initial results presented in
chapter eight. The main objective is to show the robustness of the reported
results to different explanations and estimations. In particular, and after
testing for the exogeneity of the GCGI as the main explanatory variable36,
the results reported in chapter eight will be subjected to a set of robustness
checks including lagged governance-performance relationship and panel
instrumental variable (IV) regressions to address the endogeneity problems.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 tests to
determine the exogeneity of the GCGI as the main explanatory. Section 9.3
presents the findings based on the lagged governance-performance
relationship. Section 9.4 reports the findings of the GCGI-performance
relationship based on panel instrumental variable regressions. Section 9.5
presents summary of the results and discussion, while section 9.6 provides a
summary to the chapter.
9.2 TESTS FOR DETERMINING THE EXOGENEITY OF THE GCGI
As noted earlier in sub-subsection 5.5.3.2 of chapter five, most prior studies
assumed endogeneity but did not test it (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Weir
et al, 2002; Bruno and Claessens, 2010) as a possible reason for the lack of
strong relationship between governance variables and firm performance
36 As noted in sub-subsection 5.5.3.2, the GCGI is used as the main explanatory variable for the exogeneity
test because it integrates the other specific governance mechanisms when developing the index.
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measures. Fundamentally, and as suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2010),
an exogeneity test needs to be performed on the main explanatory variable
in this thesis to determine whether it is indeed endogenous or not. Using
panel data, and given that the main explanatory variable of interest in this
thesis is the GCGI, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test, which requires
estimating the model via both OLS and instrumental variable (IV) models and
comparing the resultant coefficients is important. The differences between
the two coefficients give rise to a test statistic for the null hypothesis that the
OLS model is consistent and fully efficient. Using instrumental variable (IV)
for the purpose of consistency must also be balanced against expected loss
of efficiency and therefore a test for the suitability of the OLS, and the need
to employ instrumental variable (IV) would be very helpful in addressing the
endogeneity problems. To the best of my knowledge, no study in Ghana has
addressed the problem of endogeneity in a methodologically sound manner.
As indicated earlier in sub-subsection 5.5.3.2 of chapter five, and following
prior governance-performance relationship studies (Beiner et al, 2006;
Cheung et al, 2007; Shabbir and Padgett, 2008; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008,
Ntim, 2009), the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test is performed in this
thesis. As explained in sub-subsection 5.5.3.2 of chapter five, the test follows
a two step approach. First, the GCGI is assumed to be endogenous and
therefore regressed on the four control variables37 considered to be
exogenous to the GCGI. The resulting residuals from the OLS regression are
then saved and named as RGCGI. Second, the financial performance
measures (ROA, ROE and Q-ratio) are regressed one by one on the GCGI,
the residuals (RGCGI) and other explanatory variables. The decision is as
follows: if the coefficient of the residuals is found to be statistically
significant, then the GCGI is accepted as endogenously related to the firm
performance measures. By contrast, if the coefficient of the residuals is found
37 As indicated in section 5.4 of chapter five, the control variables include gearing (GEAR), firm size
(SIZE), growth opportunity (GROWTH) and firm age (AGE).
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to be statistically insignificant, the GCGI is accepted as exogenously related
to the firm performance measures.
Table 9-1 reports the findings of the OLS estimates (first stage) and Durbin-
Wu-Hausman exogeneity test (second stage). In the first stage, and as in
column 2 of Table 9-1, the GCGI is statistically significant and positively
related to GEAR suggesting that the debt level of the Ghanaian listed firms
has a positive influence on the degree of compliance with corporate
governance and also lends empirical support to the proposition that debt can
act as a self-enforcing governance mechanism (Gillian, 2006).
Table 9-1: Two-Stage regression results with Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for
determining the exogeneity of the GCGI
First stage Second Stage
GCGI ROA ROE Q-ratio
GCGI - 0.821 3.655 0.037
(2.97)*** (3.77)*** (0.87)
GEAR 0.094 - - -
(2.66)*** - - -
SIZE -0.107 -0.475 1.093 -0.167
(0.15) (0.94) (0.62) (2.18)**
GROWTH -1.754 1.624 4.629 0.317
(1.01) (1.16) (0.94) (1.48)
AGE -0.080 0.027 -0.371 -0.002
(1.24) (0.49) (1.89)* (0.19)
RGCGI - 0.863 3.960 -0.034
- (3.08)*** (4.04)*** (0.79)
Observations 283 283 283 283
R2 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.02
Notes: The dependent variables are the return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and the Tobin’s Q
(Q-ratio). GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate governance index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size,
GROWTH is the growth opportunity, AGE is the firm age and the RGCGI are the residuals from the
regression of the GCGI against its explanatory variables. The model provides t-statistics which are in
parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
***Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
In the second stage, and as can be seen from Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9-1,
the coefficient of the RGCGI is highly statistically significant and positively
related to the accounting-based firm performance measures of ROA and ROE,
suggesting that the GCGI is endogenously related to the accounting-based
firm performance measures. However, the statistically insignificant and
negative correlation between the RGCGI and the market-based firm
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performance measure of Q-ratio in column 5 of Table 9-1 suggests that the
GCGI is accepted as exogenously related to Q-ratio. To further confirm the
above findings, and given that the initial results on ROA and ROE in chapter
eight were based on the fixed effects regression model, the Wooldridge
(2006) formal endogeneity test38 was performed (see Appendix 3) and found
the GCGI to be endogenously related to ROA and ROE. These findings show
that the original fixed effects regression model reported in chapter eight does
indeed suffer from endogeneity.
Given that the GCGI is endogenously related to the accounting-based firm
performance measures of ROA and ROE, the remaining analysis in this
chapter will focus on addressing the endogeneity problems associated with
them. This suggests that, and consistent with Padgett and Shabbir (2008)39,
the findings based on the market-based firm performance measure reported
in chapter eight will not be considered for further analysis because the GCGI
is accepted as exogenously related to the Q-ratio and therefore the findings
reported in chapter eight are considered robust. In the following sections, the
problems of the endogeneity of the accounting-based firm performance
measures will be addressed through lagged governance-performance
relationship estimation and panel instrumental variable (IV) regressions.
38 Using fixed effects regression model, Henry (2008) confirmed the endogeneity of his corporate
governance score through the Wooldridge formal endogeneity test. The test involves estimating the fixed
effects regression model augmented by the inclusion of leading (forward) lag values for the potentially
endogenous variable (GCGI) and if the coefficients of the leading (forward) lag variable are statistically
significant, then the GCGI is endogenous. In this case only the lagged GCGI is found to be statistically
significant and positively related to the accounting-based firm performance measures.
39 The authors found statistically insignificant and negative relationship between their non-compliance
index and Q-ratio initially and therefore did not subject their index-Q-ratio relationship to robustness
checks. This is particularly important, and as in the case of this thesis, the initial analysis in Chapter eight
established insignificant relationship between the two, and in addition to the exogeneity test, will not
subject the GCGI-Q-ratio to robustness checks.
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9.3 LAGGED GOVERNANCE-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP
This section reports findings based on the lagged governance-performance
relationship to deal with the problems of endogeneity that resulted from
time-lag40 in the governance-performance relationship reported in chapter
eight. Estimating lagged governance-performance relationship is consistent
with what has been suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2010) as one of the
ways of addressing the problems of endogeneity. Also, and given the
likelihood that the current governance variables might be jointly determined
with firm performance (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2003) within the regression
model, the specific governance mechanisms and the GCGI in the subsequent
two subsections are lagged by one year to address the problems of
endogeneity in relation to the accounting-based firm performance measures
of ROA and ROE. Of important interest in lagging the governance variables is
that a firm’s governance provisions in place at a particular year may yield
results in the following year. Specifically, subsection 9.3.1 presents the
findings based on estimating lagged specific governance mechanisms-
performance relationship, while subsection 9.3.2 reports the findings based
on the lagged GCGI-performance relationship.
9.3.1 Findings from lagged specific governance-performance (ROA
and ROE) relationship estimation
Table 9-2 presents the findings obtained from lagged specific governance
mechanisms and the accounting-based firm performance measures of ROA
and ROE estimation during the whole period. As proposed by Larcker and
Rusticus (2010), and to facilitate comparison, models 1 and 2 of Table 9-2
repeat un-lagged specific governance mechanisms-performance estimation
reported in model 1 of Tables 8-1 and 8-2 of chapter eight, while models 3
40 The Wooldridge formal endogeneity test confirmed lagged GCGI to be statistically significant and
positively related to the accounting-based firm performance measures using the fixed effects regression
model. In this case, lagging the endogenous variable (s) by one year can help to address the problems of
endogeneity (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002).
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and 4 of Table 9-2 report the findings based on the lagged specific
governance mechanism-performance estimation.
Table 9-2: Panel data fixed-effects regressions of the lagged specific
governance mechanisms and accounting-based performance measures (ROA
& ROE)
Un-lagged estimation Lagged estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ROA ROE ROA ROE
Intercept 14.406 41.029 17.791 50.350
(1.85)* (1.56) (2.09)** (1.89)*
CEODUAL 1.224 -5.344 -0.237 -6.640
(0.52) (0.67) (0.10) (0.86)
BODSIZE1 0.578 2.511 0.373 2.260
(1.40) (1.80)* (0.84) (1.64)*
PNEDs1 -0.177 -0.446 -0.197 -0.582
(2.50)** (1.88)* (2.56)** (2.47)**
AUCOM1 2.689 3.310 1.020 4.037
(1.38) (0.62) (0.64) (0.79)
RECOM1 0.468 3.230 1.009 7.967
(0.23) (0.48) (0.48) (1.20)
GEAR -0.090 -0.535 -0.079 -0.528
(3.17)*** (5.54)*** (2.64)*** (5.49)***
SIZE -0.069 1.294 -0.165 1.152
(0.11) (0.62) (0.26) (0.57)
GROWTH 2.402 7.825 2.187 8.803
(2.04)** (1.95)* (1.91)* (2.34)**
AGE 0.055 -0.259 0.061 -0.232
(0.74) (1.04) (0.70) (0.91)
Observations 283 283 244 244
Groupa 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.121 0.135 0.120 0.175
Notes: The dependent variables are the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). CEODUAL is
the CEO duality, BODSIZE1 is the board size, PNEDs1 is the proportion of non-executive directors,
AUCOM1 represents the existence of audit committee, RECOM1 represents the existence of remuneration
committee, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the
firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
As can be seen from Table 9-2 above, two important issues can be observed
when comparing un-lagged and lagged estimations. First, the sign of the CEO
duality coefficient under ROA in model 1 has changed from positive to
negative in model 3 but remains statistically insignificant. Second, the
remaining 4 and 5 specific governance mechanisms under ROA and ROE
respectively, remain unchanged whether un-lagged or lagged estimated. This
indicates that a majority of the findings based on the un-lagged specific
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governance mechanisms-performance relationship reported in chapter eight
are not sensitive to the time-lag.
In general, and consistent with the findings of the specific governance
mechanisms-performance relationship reported in chapter eight, the results
based on a lagged specific governance mechanisms-performance relationship
are mixed. Specifically, the direction and the significant level of the
coefficients on a majority of the 5 specific governance mechanisms
considered remain unchanged under ROA and ROE except a lagged CEO
duality which shows some level of sensitivity to ROA. Fundamentally, the
sensitivity of the CEO duality under ROA may suggest that there is in fact
governance-performance time-lag for the CEO duality. It can also be argued
that the differences in the number of observations between the un-lagged
(283) and the lagged (244) estimations may have accounted for the
sensitivity of the CEO duality under ROA. Arguably, the findings based on the
whole period lend additional support to previous results in chapter eight that
there is a statistically significant but in most cases weak relationship between
the five specific governance mechanisms and the accounting-based firm
performance measures of ROA and ROE.
Table 9-3 reports the findings based on pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged
specific governance mechanisms-performance relationship. To facilitate
comparison, and as proposed by Larcker and Rusticus (2010), models 1 and
2 of Table 9-3 repeat the pre 2003 findings based on un-lagged specific
governance mechanisms-performance relationship reported in model 1 of
Tables 8-10 and 8-11 of chapter eight, while models 4 and 5 of Table 9-3
contain the pre 2003 findings based on a lagged specific governance
mechanisms-performance relationship. Similarly, models 5 and 6 of Table 9-
3 repeat the findings based on post 2003 un-lagged specific governance
mechanisms-performance relationship reported in model 4 of Tables 8-10
and 8-11 of chapter eight, while models 7 and 8 of Table 9-3 present the
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post 2003 findings based on a lagged specific governance mechanisms-
performance relationship.
As can be seen from Table 9-3 below, the pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged
specific governance mechanisms are more sensitive to the accounting-based
firm performance measures of ROA and ROE than the whole period discussed
earlier. Whereas the coefficient of pre 2003 lagged board size under ROE
changed to positive and statistically significant at 5% level, the PNEDs during
the same period under ROA changed from negative and statistically
significant at 5% level (un-lagged) to negative but statistically insignificant
(lagged). Similarly, the pre 2003 lagged remuneration committee changed
from positive and statistically significant at 5% level to positive but
statistically insignificant. Although not statistically significant, the lagged
audit committee experienced sign reversal under ROE from positive (un-
lagged) to a negative (lagged) relationship between the two. It is interesting
to note that the lagged CEO duality did not experience any significant
changes whether un-lagged or lagged estimated during pre 2003 period. This
suggests that estimating lagged CEO duality-accounting-based firm
performance measures relationship is effectively the same during the pre
2003 period.
With regard to post 2003, the lagged board size under ROA experienced sign
reversal from positive to a negative relationship between the two. Also, the
post 2003 lagged board size under ROE changed from positive and
statistically significant at 5% level to a positive but statistically insignificant
relationship between the two. Interestingly, the lagged PNEDs remained
negative but statistically significant under both ROA and ROE during the post
2003 period relative to un-lagged estimation. Although not statistically
significant, the lagged remuneration committee during post 2003
experienced sign reversal under both ROA and ROE from positive (un-lagged)
to a negative (lagged) relationship between the two. Arguably, a lagged CEO
duality and audit committee under both ROA and ROE are effectively the
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same during the post 2003 period, suggesting that the CEO duality and audit
committee during post 2003 are robust to the estimation of the lagged
model.
In general, the lagged estimation based on the pre 2003 and post 2003
specific governance mechanisms-performance relationship indicates that the
majority of the specific governance mechanisms under ROA and ROE are
sensitive to the lagged estimation, although these are not statistically
significant. However, the findings based on the pre 2003 suggest that a
lagged governance-performance relationship exists between board size and
ROE, evidence not consistent with the un-lagged board size-ROE relationship
reported in chapter eight. Similarly, the results based on the post 2003
lagged specific governance mechanisms-performance relationship exist
between PNEDs and firm performance (ROA and ROE), evidence not
supported by the un-lagged PNEDs-performance relationship presented in
chapter eight. Comparatively, and on the basis of the pre 2003 and post
2003 lagged specific governance mechanisms-performance relationship, it
appears that the conclusion in chapter eight that there are differences in
findings before and after 2003 is supported.
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Table 9-3: Panel data fixed-effects regressions of the pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged specific governance
mechanisms and accounting-based performance measures (ROA & ROE)
Pre 2003 Un-lagged
estimation
Pre 2003 lagged
estimation
Post 2003 Un-lagged
estimation
Post 2003 Lagged
estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE
Intercept 22.813 -55.381 10.352 -71.757 8.501 27.069 14.067 48.134
(1.29) (0.69) (0.42) (0.79) (1.02) (1.16) (1.54) (1.86)*
CEODUAL -0.289 -0.905 -2.439 -19.169 1.599 -0.306 0.416 -1.086
(0.07) (0.05) (0.42) (0.84) (0.59) (0.04) (0.15) (0.14)
BODSIZE1 0.332 5.835 0.148 9.047 0.541 2.903 -0.075 0.731
(0.37) (1.44) (0.14) (2.21)** (1.15) (2.21)** (0.15) (0.52)
PNEDs1 -0.278 -0.052 -0.178 0.030 -0.083 -0.247 -0.162 -0.518
(2.40)** (0.10) (1.05) (0.05) (1.05) (1.12) (1.94)* (2.19)**
AUCOM1 2.423 4.917 1.855 -11.884 0.173 1.368 1.970 7.037
(0.52) (0.22) (0.19) (0.35) (0.08) (0.25) (0.95) (1.18)
RECOM1 14.012 55.251 15.260 78.856 -1.170 -7.445 0.174 1.058
(2.21)** (1.87)* (1.25) (1.84)* (0.52) (1.19) (0.07) (0.16)
GEAR -0.025 -1.039 -0.039 -1.156 -0.088 -0.234 -0.072 -0.253
(0.46) (3.94)*** (0.56) (4.90)*** (2.59)*** (2.52)** (1.94)* (2.40)**
SIZE 0.130 7.486 0.478 5.134 -0.275 0.220 -0.046 1.066
(0.11) (1.44) (0.28) (0.78) (0.43) (0.13) (0.07) (0.58)
GROWTH -2.248 -16.116 -1.189 8.999 2.098 7.969 1.385 7.188
(0.50) (0.72) (0.21) (0.50) (1.88) (2.70)*** (1.25) (2.22)**
AGE 0.237 0.186 0.238 0.051 0.050 -0.275 0.082 -0.249
(2.07)** (0.36) (1.27) (0.07) (0.60) (1.12) (0.88) (0.98)
Observations 65 65 42 42 193 193 154 154
Groupa 23 23 21 21 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.420 0.420 0.425 0.635 0.103 0.139 0.104 0.115
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variables are the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). CEODUAL is the CEO duality, BODSIZE1 is
the board size, PNEDs1 is the proportion of non-executive directors, AUCOM1 represents the existence of audit committee, RECOM1 represents the existence of
remuneration committee, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-
statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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9.3.2 Findings from the lagged GCGI-performance (ROA and ROE)
relationship estimation
Table 9-4 reports the findings based on a lagged GCGI-performance (ROA
and ROE) relationship estimation during the whole period. To facilitate
comparison, and as proposed by Larcker and Rusticus (2010), models 1 and
2 of Table 9-4 repeat the findings based on the un-lagged GCGI-performance
relationship reported in model 1 of Tables 8-4 and 8-6 in chapter eight, while
models 3 and 4 of Table 9-4 contain findings based on a lagged GCGI-
performance relationship. Interestingly, and as can be seen from Table 9-4
below, the coefficient on the GCGI under both ROA and ROE remain positive,
but whereas the coefficient under ROA remains statistically insignificant, the
ROE experienced statistical significance at 5% level. However, the magnitude
of the coefficient on the GCGI under both ROA and ROE increased from 0.042
and 0.310 respectively in models 1 and 2 to 0.095 and 0.578 in models 3
and 4 of Table 9-4. Also, the statistical significance at 5% level of the
coefficient under ROE could be explained by a time-lag in the governance-
performance relationship (Vefeas, 1999a, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).
Fundamentally, the findings based on a lagged GCGI-performance
relationship estimation are effectively the same under ROA relative to the un-
lagged estimation during the whole period. This evidence supports the earlier
conclusion in chapter eight that there is a positive but insignificant
relationship between the GCGI and ROA during the whole period. However, a
lagged GCGI-performance relationship estimation under ROE experienced a
number of changes in the magnitude and statistically significant levels during
the whole period. These findings suggest that the GCGI-performance
relationship estimation reported in chapter eight under ROA is robust
whether un-lagged or lagged estimated relative to the level of sensitivity
under ROE. The level of sensitivity under ROE, and as has been noted earlier,
suggests that there is certainly governance-performance time-lag for the
sensitive corporate governance measured by the GCGI, evidence not
supported by the conclusion on the GCGI-ROE relationship that there is
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positive and insignificant association between the two reported in chapter
eight.
Table 9-4: Panel data fixed-effects regressions of the lagged GCGI and
accounting-based performance measures (ROA & ROE)
Un-lagged estimation Lagged estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ROA ROE ROA ROE
Intercept 29.068 79.098 38.806 82.509
(3.25)*** (2.57)** (3.92)*** (2.47)**
GCGI 0.042 0.310 0.095 0.578
(0.51) (1.08) (1.14) (2.06)**
GEAR -0.084 -0.606 -0.068 -0.606
(2.70)*** (5.67)*** (2.15)** (5.66)***
SIZE -0.526 2.386 -0.105 1.053
(0.71) (0.94) (0.15) (0.44)
GROWTH 1.289 4.447 0.602 4.659
(1.08) (1.09) (0.53) (1.22)
AGE 0.840 -2.479 1.117 -2.846
(2.90)*** (2.49)** (3.38)*** (2.55)**
Observations 283 283 244 244
Groupa 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.014
Notes: The dependent variables are the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). GCGI is the
Ghanaian corporate governance index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth
opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients
are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
As indicated in chapter eight, the findings based on the lagged GCGI and the
accounting-based firm performance during the whole period show that ROA is
indeed robust whereas ROE is sensitive to the GCGI of which the relationship
between the two is statistically significant. However, the findings do not
completely reveal the contribution of each of the six sub-indices with a
lagged estimation. Table 9-5 reports the results based on the lagged sub-
indices and the accounting-based firm performance measures of ROA and
ROE during the whole period. To facilitate comparison, and as proposed by
Larcker and Rusticus (2010), models 1 to 4 of Table 9-5 repeat the results
based on un-lagged sub-indices and performance relationship reported in
models 1 and 2 of Tables 8-5 and 8-7 of chapter eight, while models 5 to 8 of
Table 9-5 present the lagged sub-indices and performance relationship under
ROA and ROE.
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As can be seen from Table 9-5 below, five main cases of sensitivity in a
lagged sub-indices and performance relationship can be recognised. First, the
significant levels of the board composition index under both ROA and ROE in
models 1 to 4 have changed to statistically significant in the case of ROA,
with ROE experiencing statistically insignificant in models 5 to 8. In
particular, the coefficients on board composition index under ROA in models
1 and 2 which were statistical insignificance have now changed to statistically
significant in models 5 and 6 at 5% and 10% significant levels respectively.
On the contrary, the coefficients on board composition index under ROE in
models 3 and 4 which were statistically significant at 10% level have now
changed to statistically insignificant in models 7 and 8 of Table 9-5.
Second, and as can be seen from Table 9-5 below, the statistical
insignificance of the coefficient on remuneration committee index under ROE
in model 3 has now changed to statistically significant at 10% level in model
7. Third, the statistical insignificance of the coefficients on shareholder rights
index under both ROA and ROE in models 1 and 3 have now changed to
statistically significant at 10% level in models 5 and 7. Fourth, the financial
affairs and auditing index although remained negative under ROA, the
significant level has now changed from 5% in model 1 to 1% in model 5
respectively. Finally, the statistical insignificance of the coefficient on
disclosure index under ROA in model 1 has now changed to statistically
significant at 10% in model 5. Arguably, and during the whole period, the
findings of the relationship between the lagged sub-indices and the
accounting-based firm performance measures suggest some level of
sensitivity, hence the existence of time-lag for some of the sub-indices.
Basically, only the audit committee index is robust under ROA and ROE
whether un-lagged or lagged estimated.
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Table 9-5: Panel data fixed-effects regressions of the lagged sub-indices and accounting-based performance
measures (ROA & ROE)
Un-lagged estimation Lagged estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
ROA ROA ROE ROE ROA ROA ROE ROE
Intercept 14.580 11.533 22.104 17.582 13.226 8.814 4.139 -9.042
(1.85)* (1.51) (0.86) (0.71) (1.61) (1.08) (0.16) (0.36)
BOARDINDEX 0.085 0.071 0.344 0.347 0.130 0.114 0.148 0.191
(1.42) (1.19) (1.81)* (1.82)* (2.01)** (1.76)* (0.77) (0.98)
AUCOMINDEX - -0.008 - 0.025 - -0.018 - 0.035
- (0.45) - (0.40) - (0.94) - (0.57)
RECOMINDEX 0.010 - 0.125 - 0.013 - 0.189 -
(0.30) - (1.21) - (0.39) - (1.81)* -
SHOLDINDEX 0.010 -0.027 0.124 0.246 0.129 -0.058 0.444 0.265
(0.13) (0.38) (0.49) (1.04) (1.66)* (0.79) (1.77)* (1.12)
FAAINDEX -0.157 - -0.120 - -0.261 - -0.388 -
(1.99)** - (0.45) - (3.33)*** - (1.49) -
DISCINDEX -0.087 - -0.063 - -0.123 - -0.070 -
(1.30) - (0.28) - (1.83)* - (0.31) -
GEAR -0.080 -0.088 -0.522 -0.535 -0.056 -0.069 -0.470 -0.493
(2.76)*** (3.09)*** (5.32)*** (5.57)*** (1.86)* (2.30)** (4.72)*** (5.02)***
SIZE -0.169 -0.145 2.418 2.362 -0.144 -0.036 1.730 1.665
(0.27) (0.23) (1.19) (1.15) (0.23) (0.06) (0.87) (0.83)
GROWTH 2.255 2.274 6.789 7.125 1.721 1.916 7.025 8.469
(1.91)* (1.93)* (1.64) (1.75)* (1.54) (1.67)* (1.81)* (2.18)**
AGE 0.078 0.059 -0.228 -0.226 0.092 0.057 -0.204 -0.214
(1.00) (0.76) (0.99) (0.95) (1.00) (0.62) (0.85) (0.87)
Observations 283 283 283 283 244 244 244 244
Groupa 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.057 0.042 0.12 0.097 0.081 0.052 0.153 0.131
Notes: The dependent variables are the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). BOARDINDEX is the board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the
audit committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index, SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and
auditing index, DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The
model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
*Significant at 10% level
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Table 9-6 presents the findings based on pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged
GCGI-performance relationship. To facilitate comparison, and as proposed by
Larcker and Rusticus (2010), models 1 and 2 of Table 9-6 repeat the pre
2003 findings based on un-lagged GCGI-performance relationship reported in
model 1 of Tables 8-13 and 8-15 of chapter eight, while models 3 and 4 of
Table 9-6 contain the pre 2003 results based on a lagged GCGI-performance
relationship. Equally, models 5 and 6 of Table 9-6 repeat the results based
on post 2003 un-lagged GCGI-performance reported in model 4 of Tables 8-
13 and 8-15 of chapter eight, while models 7 and 8 of Table 9-6 reports the
post 2003 results based on a lagged GCGI-performance relationship. As can
be seen from Table 9-6 below, the pre 2003 un-lagged GCGI which was
positive and statistically significant at 1% under both ROA and ROE in models
1 and 2 has remained positive but statistically insignificant in models 3 and 4
based on a lagged estimation.
In respect of the post 2003, and as can be seen from models 5 and 7 of
Table 9-6 below, the lagged GCGI under ROA although not statistically
significant experienced sign reversal from negative to a positive relationship
between the two. In contrast, the lagged GCGI under ROE in model 8 of
Table 9-6 although statistically insignificant remains positive between the
two. Arguably, the magnitude of the coefficient on the post 2003 lagged
GCGI under ROE has experienced significant increase from 0.086 (model 6)
to 0.463 (model 8). These findings suggest that a lagged GCGI is sensitive
under both ROA and ROE based on pre 2003 and post 2003, evidence not
supported by an un-lagged GCGI-performance relationship reported in
chapter eight. Fundamentally, the differences in findings based on the pre
2003 and post 2003 GCGI un-lagged and lagged estimations may be
explained by the differences in the number of observation between pre 2003
(42) and post 2003 (154) lagged estimation. As explained earlier, these
differences may indicate that there is in fact a governance-performance time-
lag for the sensitive GCGI.
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Table 9-6: Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of the pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged GCGI and accounting-based
performance measures (ROA & ROE)
Pre 2003 Un-lagged
estimation
Pre 2003 lagged
estimation
Post 2003 Un-lagged
estimation
Post 2003 Lagged
estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE
Intercept -24.657 -94.271 157.144 454.147 9.960 32.840 21.636 81.665
(2.39)** (2.14)** (0.75) (0.63) (1.40) (1.64) (1.44) (1.86)*
GCGI 0.365 1.351 0.627 2.035 -0.065 0.086 0.055 0.463
(3.97)*** (3.30)*** (0.95) (0.90) (0.90) (0.42) (0.52) (1.51)
GEAR -0.058 -0.903 -0.063 -1.471 -0.088 -0.251 -0.051 -0.263
(1.18) (3.74)*** (0.65) (4.43)*** (2.64)*** (2.72)*** (1.11) (1.96)*
SIZE 0.872 8.449 2.823 3.895 -0.003 0.873 -0.079 -0.157
(0.72) (1.66)* (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.53) (0.11) (0.07)
GROWTH -0.417 -26.538 -3.241 -9.728 1.947 7.560 0.619 5.101
(0.10) (1.23) (0.42) (0.37) (1.77)* (2.57)** (0.56) (1.57)
AGE 0.299 0.612 -5.791 -15.527 0.042 -0.334 -0.602 -2.803
(2.59)*** (1.25) (0.97) (0.76) (0.50) (1.31) (1.36) (2.18)**
Observations 65 65 42 42 193 193 154 154
Groupa 23 23 21 21 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.361 0.322 0.048 0.003 0.068 0.057 0.007 0.012
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variables are the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate
governance index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics which
are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
*Significant at 10% level
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As explained earlier, the findings based on the pre 2003 and post 2003
lagged GCGI and ROA show that the lagged GCGI is indeed sensitive to ROA.
Nevertheless, the findings do not completely reveal the impact of each of the
six sub-indices within the lagged model. Table 9-7 reports the findings based
on pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged sub-indices and ROA relationship. To
facilitate comparison, and as proposed by Larcker and Rusticus (2010),
models 1 and 2 of Table 9-7 repeat the pre 2003 findings based on un-
lagged sub-indices and ROA relationship reported in models 1 and 2 of Table
8-14 of chapter eight, while models 3 and 4 of Table 9-7 contain the pre
2003 results based on a lagged sub-indices and ROA relationship. Similarly,
models 5 and 6 of Table 9-7 repeat the results based on post 2003 un-lagged
sub-indices and ROA relationship reported in models 3 and 4 of Tables 8-14
of chapter eight, while models 7 and 8 of Table 9-7 reports the post 2003
results based on a lagged sub-indices and ROA relationship.
As can be seen from models 1 to 4 of Table 9-7 below, the pre 2003 lagged
sub-indices have slightly changed in both the magnitude of the coefficients
and significance levels compared with the un-lagged estimation. For
example, the audit committee index in model 4 statistically significant level
remains unchanged at 1% whether un-lagged or lagged estimated, but the
magnitude of the coefficient has increased from 0.131 in model 2 to 0.175 in
model 4 respectively. In contrast, a lagged remuneration committee
statistically significant level has decreased from 1% in model 1 to 5% level in
model 3. Although statistically insignificant, the lagged board composition,
shareholder rights, financial affairs and auditing and disclosure indices during
the pre 2003 period still remain statistically insignificant but the magnitude
of the coefficients of each sub-index has slightly changed. This suggests that
the pre 2003 sub-indices appear to be less sensitive to time-lag under ROA,
suggesting that the results based on the pre 2003 lagged sub-indices lend
support to the previous evidence reported in chapter eight.
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Table 9-7: Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of the pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged sub-indices and return on
assets (ROA)
Pre 2003 Un-lagged
estimation
Pre 2003 lagged
estimation
Post 2003 Un-lagged
estimation
Post 2003 Lagged
estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
ROA ROA ROA ROA
Intercept -15.131 -10.449 -22.778 -18.848 6.843 9.404 -5.719 -4.594
(1.04) (0.84) (1.11) (1.22) (0.68) (1.09) (0.52) (0.49)
BOARDINDEX 0.022 0.034 0.008 0.032 -0.007 -0.012 -0.094 -0.092
(0.21) (0.33) (0.06) (0.26) (0.10) (0.19) (1.34) (1.33)
AUCOMINDEX - 0.131 - 0.175 - -0.017 - -0.006
- (3.24)*** - (2.97)*** - (0.74) - (0.23)
RECOMINDEX 0.186 - 0.234 - -0.028 - -0.010 -
(2.74)*** - (2.28)** - (0.78) - (0.25) -
SHOLDINDEX 0.023 0.052 0.115 0.053 0.025 0.025 0.155 0.150
(0.18) (0.37) (0.51) (0.25) (0.29) (0.30) (1.66)* (1.68)*
FAAINDEX 0.135 - 0.017 - 0.020 - 0.069 -
(0.73) - (0.06) - (0.20) - (0.68) -
DISCINDEX 0.255 - 0.144 - -0.002 - 0.081 -
(1.57) - (0.56) - (0.02) - (1.04) -
GEAR -0.065 -0.055 -0.058 -0.043 -0.091 -0.089 -0.050 -0.054
(1.30) (1.05) (0.81) (0.60) (2.65)*** (2.64)*** (1.32) (1.47)
SIZE 1.058 1.333 0.569 1.448 -0.068 -0.056 -0.140 -0.077
(0.75) (0.96) (0.31) (0.80) (0.11) (0.09) (0.22) (0.12)
GROWTH -2.846 -0.336 -0.550 -1.774 2.118 2.034 1.244 1.198
(0.69) (0.08) (0.10) (0.34) (1.86)* (1.82)* (1.13) (1.09)
AGE 0.261 0.346 0.220 0.378 0.055 0.045 0.102 0.096
(2.10)** (2.73)*** (1.23) (2.33)** (0.68) (0.54) (1.09) (1.02)
Observations 65 65 42 42 193 193 154 154
Groupa 23 23 21 21 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.435 0.339 0.453 0.411 0.072 0.066 0.091 0.098
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). BOARDINDEX is the board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit
committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index, SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and
auditing index, DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The
model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Interestingly, the post 2003 lagged sub-indices have remained the same
except for some limited changes compared with un-lagged estimation.
Specifically, the positive and statistically insignificant post 2003 lagged
shareholder rights index has now changed to statistically significant at 10%
level under ROA. By contrast, the post 2003 lagged disclosure index although
not statistically significant in models 5 and 6 has now changed from negative
to positive but statistically insignificant in models 7 and 8. Similar to pre
2003, a lagged board composition, audit committee, remuneration
committee and financial affairs and auditing indices during post 2003 still
remain statistically insignificant but the magnitude of the coefficients have
slightly changed. Arguably, a majority of the lagged sub-indices during the
pre 2003 and post 2003 period are robust to the time-lag although there are
differences in the number of observations between both periods.
Comparatively, the results based on the lagged sub-indices reinforce a
majority of the pre 2003 and post 2003 findings reported in chapter eight
under ROA.
With regard to the six sub-indices under ROE, Table 9-8 reports the findings
based on pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged sub-indices and ROE relationship.
To facilitate comparison, and as proposed by Larcker and Rusticus (2010),
models 1 and 2 of Table 9-8 repeat the pre 2003 findings based on un-
lagged sub-indices and ROE relationship reported in models 1 and 2 of Table
8-16 of chapter eight, while models 3 and 4 of Table 9-8 contain the pre
2003 results based on a lagged sub-indices and ROE relationship. Equally,
models 5 and 6 of Table 9-8 repeat the results based on post 2003 un-lagged
sub-indices and ROE relationship reported in models 3 and 4 of Tables 8-16
of chapter eight, while models 7 and 8 of Table 9-8 reports the post 2003
results based on a lagged sub-indices and ROE relationship.
As has been indicated in Table 9-8 below, the pre 2003 lagged board
composition index statistically significant level has now improved from 10%
in model 1 to 5% in model 3. In contrast, the lagged audit committee and
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shareholder rights indices statistically significant levels have decreased from
1% and 10% respectively in model 2 to 5% and statistically insignificant in
model 4 of Table 9-8 during pre 2003 period. Surprisingly, the pre 2003
lagged remuneration committee, financial affairs and auditing and disclosure
indices are robust under ROE, suggesting that these sub-indices statistically
significant or insignificant levels remain unchanged other than the magnitude
of coefficients that experienced slight changes. In respect of post 2003, a
limited lagged sub-indices such as audit committee and shareholder rights
experienced significant changes. Whereas a lagged audit committee index
experienced sign reversal from statistically insignificant negative association
with ROE in model 6 to positive and statistically insignificant in model 8, the
shareholder rights remained positive but statistically significant at 10% level
in model 7 of Table 9-8.
Interestingly, and as shown in Table 9-8 below, the lagged board
composition, remuneration committee, financial affairs and auditing and
disclosure indices have experienced some slight changes in the magnitude of
the coefficients of these sub-indices but still remained statistically
insignificant whether un-lagged or lagged estimated. Overall, and as in the
case of ROA, a majority of the lagged sub-indices during the pre 2003 and
post 2003 period are robust to the time-lag although there are slight changes
in the magnitude of coefficients of the sub-indices under ROE. It may also be
highlighted that the results based on the lagged sub-indices strengthen a
majority of the pre 2003 and post 2003 findings reported in chapter eight
under ROE.
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Table 9-8: Panel-data fixed-effects regressions of the pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged sub-indices and return on
assets (ROE)
Pre 2003 Un-lagged
estimation
Pre 2003 lagged
estimation
Post 2003 Un-lagged
estimation
Post 2003 Lagged
estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
ROE ROE ROE ROE
Intercept -33.512 -60.471 -31.356 -117.502 10.739 24.185 -24.112 -21.444
(0.56) (1.22) (0.41) (1.67) (0.39) (1.01) (0.78) (0.80)
BOARDINDEX 0.811 0.849 1.210 1.142 0.272 0.212 0.097 0.064
(1.92)* (2.02)** (2.56)** (2.05)** (1.57) (1.19) (0.51) (0.33)
AUCOMINDEX - 0.531 - 0.624 - -0.030 - 0.030
- (3.01)*** - (2.47)** - (0.47) - (0.43)
RECOMINDEX 1.035 - 1.611 - -0.088 - -0.001 -
(3.59)*** - (4.27)*** - (0.90) - (0.01) -
SHOLDINDEX 0.836 1.112 0.111 0.478 0.086 0.133 0.459 0.414
(1.40) (1.79)* (0.14) (0.52) (0.36) (0.59) (1.74)* (1.62)
FAAINDEX -0.020 - -0.402 - 0.151 - -0.038 -
(0.02) - (0.37) - (0.55) - (0.13) -
DISCINDEX 0.202 - 1.345 - -0.101 - 0.019 -
(0.27) - (1.43) - (0.50) - (0.09) -
GEAR -1.092 -1.029 -1.172 -1.184 -0.260 -0.263 -0.209 -0.224
(4.63)*** (4.23)*** (4.58)*** (4.17)*** (2.79)*** (2.85)*** (1.94)* (2.11)**
SIZE 11.262 15.566 5.148 13.689 1.111 0.972 1.746 1.646
(2.00)** (2.75)*** (0.76) (1.72)* (0.66) (0.58) (0.95) (0.90)
GROWTH -7.911 -25.347 -9.908 -5.615 7.900 7.543 6.837 6.566
(0.37) (1.20) (0.51) (0.30) (2.55)** (2.51)** (2.03)** (2.01)**
AGE 0.206 0.862 0.016 0.925 -0.283 -0.310 -0.227 -0.227
(0.42) (1.69)* (0.02) (1.27) (1.28) (1.28) (0.98) (0.92)
Observations 65 65 42 42 193 193 154 154
Groupa 23 23 21 21 39 39 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.446 0.380 0.671 0.529 0.101 0.077 0.120 0.116
Notes: The pre 2003 and post 2003 dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE). BOARDINDEX is the board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit
committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index, SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and
auditing index, DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The
model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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9.4 FINDINGS OF THE GCGI BASED ON PANEL INSRUMENTAL
VARIABLE (IV) REGRESSIONS
This section presents the findings of the GCGI based on panel instrumental
variable regressions to address the problems of endogeneity determined in
table 9-1 of this chapter. As indicated in sub-subsection 5.5.3.3 of chapter
five, and given that the GCGI is endogenously related to ROA and ROE,
instrumental variable analysis is one response to address the problem
(Zheka, 2006; Henry, 2008; Bozec et al, 2010) in this thesis. As discussed in
sub-subsection 5.5.3.3 of chapter five, and following Padgett and Shabbir
(2008), three instruments were initially identified in the first stage of the
instrumental variable analysis to include board size (BODSIZE1)41, director
holdings (DIRHOLD)42 and block holdings (BLOCKHOLD)43 with a mean of
8.52, 8.58% and 72.62% respectively, to instrument the GCGI in the first
stage.
The correlation matrix, as indicated in Table 9-9 below, shows that the
correlation between the two instrumental variables (BODSIZE1 and
DIRHOLD) and the GCGI are statistically significant but with different signs.
However, BLOCKHOLD appear not to be highly correlated with the GCGI,
suggesting that the subsequent analysis in this chapter excludes this variable
from examination because it has low correlation and has failed the
orthogonality test. In particular, the GCGI is highly significant and positively
correlated with the BODSIZE1, while the correlation between the GCGI and
DIRHOLD is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the
BODSIZE1 and DIRHOLD can be valid instruments for the GCGI.
41 As indicated earlier, this is defined as an average board size of the Ghanaian listed firms. Prior index
studies have noted that the board size has a positive influence on the level of compliance with corporate
governance (Shabbir and Padgett, 2008; Ntim, 2009)
42 Directors’ holding is defined as the proportion of shares held by board of directors to the total
shareholdings. Based on prior studies, directors holding are considered as a measure of the power of the
directors over the board and therefore their ability to control its structure, composition and functioning
(Shabbir and Padgett, 2008) which expected to affect compliance negatively.
43 Researchers have defined block holdings as the proportion of shares held by substantial shareholders in
excess of 5% of total shareholdings (Tsamenyi et al, 2007; Ntim, 2009). In this thesis, any shareholding in
excess of 5% among Ghanaian listed firms is considered as block holding.
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Table 9-9: Correlation matrix of the GCGI and instrumental variables
1 GCGI BODSIZE1 BODOWN BLOCKOWN
GCGI 1
BODSIZE1 .399*** 1
DIRHOLD -.129** -.363*** 1
BLOCKHOLD -.086 .262*** -.140** 1
Note: The table indicates Pearson’s Correlation matrix of the Ghanaian Corporate Governance Index and
the instrumental variables. GCGI is the Ghanaian Corporate governance index, BODSIZE1 is the board
size, DIRHOLD is the directors’ holdings and BLOCKHOLD is block holdings. *** , ** and * denote
correlation is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level (two tailed).
Table 9-10 reports the instrumental variables fixed-effects regression results
based on ROA and all the control variables during the whole, pre 2003 and
post 2003 periods. Using the GCGI instrumented by BODSIZE1 and
DIRHOLD, the coefficient during the whole period in model 1 of Table 9-10
remains statistically insignificant and positively related to ROA after
addressing the endogeneity problems, but the magnitude of the regression
coefficient increased from 0.042 as in model 1 of Table 8-4 of chapter eight
to 0.480 in model 1 of Table 9-10 below. Although not statistically significant,
this suggests that there has been an improvement using the instrumental
variables fixed-effects regression model, relative to the results presented in
Table 8-4 of chapter eight. This evidence is also consistent with the
proposition of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test that the GCGI is
indeed endogenously related to ROA.
However, the increase in the coefficient on the instrumented GCGI under
ROA is not surprising because prior governance index-performance
relationship studies (Zheka, 2006; Beiner et al, 2006; Henry, 2008) have
noted that the instrumental variables over-predict, relative to un-
instrumented coefficients. For example, Zheka (2006) experienced an
increased coefficient from his initial estimate of 0.0049 to 0.0051 after
instrumented the Ukraine corporate governance index (UCGI). That
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notwithstanding, the findings based on un-instrumented GCGI comparative
to instrumented GCGI suggest that the positive and statistically insignificant
relationship between the GCGI and the accounting-based firm performance
measure of ROA reported in chapter eight during the whole period is robust.
Generally, the findings support the previous conclusion in chapter eight that
corporate governance does not matter to firm performance measured by ROA
in Ghana during the whole period.
Table 9-10: Instrumental variables fixed-effects regression results
based on return on assets (ROA)
The whole period Pre 2003 Post 2003
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept -22.616 -28.157 -23.240
(1.20) (1.90)* (1.41)
GCGI 0.480 0.420 0.355
(1.51) (2.12)** (1.70)*
GEAR -0.147 -0.058 -0.103
(3.21)*** (1.16) (2.65)***
SIZE -0.271 0.877 0.224
(0.35) (0.74) (0.33)
GROWTH 3.025 0.462 1.181
(2.07)** (0.11) (0.98)
AGE 0.010 0.308 0.079
(0.11) (2.65)*** (0.84)
Observations 283 65 193
Groupa 39 23 39
R2 (Overall) 0.020 0.362 0.017
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate governance
index instrumented by BODSIZE1 (board size) and DIRHOLD (directors holdings), GEAR is the gearing,
SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-
statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
*Significant at 10% level
Interestingly, and grouping the sample into pre 2003 and post 2003 periods,
the instrumented GCGI in model 2 of Table 9-10 is found to remain
statistically significant and positively related to ROA during the pre 2003
period. Although, and as expected, the magnitude of the coefficient of the
GCGI has increased from 0.365 as in model 1 of Table 8-13 of chapter eight
to 0.420 in model 2 of Table 9-10, the statistically significant level has
decreased from 1% to 5% after addressing the endogeneity problems. This
suggests that the GCGI is indeed exogenously related to ROA during pre
2003 period. Fundamentally, and unlike the whole period, the positive and
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statistically significant relationship between the instrumented GCGI under
ROA provides additional confidence to the earlier conclusion in chapter eight
that corporate governance does matter more in Ghana during the pre 2003
period.
With regard to post 2003, and as can be seen from model 3 of Table 9-10
above, the instrumented GCGI is found to be statistically significant and
positively related to ROA after addressing the problems of endogeneity,
evidence not consistent with the previous results reported in model 4 of
Table 8-13 of chapter eight where there is a negative and statistically
insignificant association between the two. As expected, the magnitude of the
GCGI coefficient has increased from -0.065 as in model 4 of Table 8-13 in
chapter eight to 0.355 in model 3 of Table 9-10, its power is lower at 10%
significant level. That notwithstanding, and after addressing the problems of
endogeneity, the evidence suggests that corporate governance does matter
to firm performance measured by ROA during post 2003 period. Overall, the
differences in significant levels during pre 2003 (5%) and post 2003 (10%)
under ROA has contributed to the statistically insignificant level during the
whole period even though the t-value of the instrumented GCGI stood at
1.51 in model 1 of Table 9-10. This suggests that, and as indicated earlier,
grouping the sample into pre 2003 and post 2003 introduction of the
Ghanaian Code has provided better understanding of the governance-
performance link among Ghanaian listed firms.
Table 9-11 presents the instrumental variables fixed-effects regression
results based on ROE and all the control variables during the whole, pre 2003
and post 2003 periods. Unlike ROA, and as can be seen in model 1 of Table
9-11 below, the instrumented GCGI is found to be statistically significant and
positively related to ROE during the whole period. In comparison with the
initial fixed-effects regression during the whole period in model 1 of Table 8-
6 of chapter eight, and as expected, the magnitude of the instrumented
GCGI coefficient increased from 0.310 to 2.315 as in model 1 of Table 9-11.
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However, its statistical power is lower at 10% level. That notwithstanding,
addressing the problems of endogeneity have provided a larger coefficient,
statistically significant and positive relationship between the two. This
suggests that, and relative to model 1 of Table 8-6 of chapter eight,
corporate governance does matter to firm performance measured by ROE
during the whole period. However, the earlier conclusion reported in chapter
eight of the insignificant relationship between the GCGI and ROE during the
whole period is not supported.
Table 9-11: Instrumental variables fixed-effects regression results based
on return on equity (ROE)
The whole period Pre 2003 Post 2003
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant -98.337 -175.638 -105.354
(1.31) (2.59)*** (2.00)**
GCGI 2.315 2.654 1.721
(1.74)* (2.98)*** (2.53)**
GEAR -0.784 -0.903 -0.339
(4.32)*** (3.46)*** (2.99)***
SIZE -0.382 8.454 1.378
(0.13) (1.53) (0.71)
GROWTH 10.443 -17.303 5.247
(1.94)* (0.72) (1.57)
AGE -0.645 0.782 -0.167
(1.65)* (1.44) (0.54)
Observations 283 65 193
Groupa 39 23 39
R2 (Overall) 0.038 0.288 0.012
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE). GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate governance
index instrumented by BODSIZE1 (board size) and DIRHOLD (directors holdings), GEAR is the gearing,
SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-
statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
*Significant at 10% level
As in the case of ROA, the sample is grouped into pre 2003 and post 2003
sub-periods to establish if the previously reported results in model 1 of Table
8-15 of chapter eight are supported by the instrumented GCGI. As can be
seen from model 2 of Table 9-11 above, the pre 2003 instrumented GCGI is
found to remain statistically significant and positively related to ROE after
addressing the problems of endogeneity, evidence consistent with the highly
significant relationship reported in chapter eight during the pre 2003 period
between the two. As expected, the magnitude of the coefficient has increased
from 1.351 in model 1 of Table 8-15 in chapter eight to 2.654 in model 2 of
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Table 9-11. However, and unlike ROA, the statistically significant level of the
instrumented GCGI is still at 1% level as in the case of un-instrumented
GCGI which gives more confidence in the results reported earlier in chapter
eight. This also suggests that the earlier conclusion reported in chapter eight
that corporate governance does matter to firm performance measured by
ROE during pre 2003 is supported given the robustness of the GCGI-ROE
relationship findings.
With respect to post 2003, and as can be seen from model 3 of Table 9-11
above, the instrumented GCGI is found to be statistically significant and
positively related to ROE after addressing the problems of endogeneity. The
findings are not in line with the earlier results reported in model 4 of Table 8-
15 of chapter eight where there is a positive but statistically insignificant
relationship between the two. As expected, the magnitude of the GCGI
coefficient has increased from 0.086 in model 4 of Table 8-15 of chapter
eight to 1.721 in model 3 of Table 9-11. However, and unlike ROA where the
statistically significant level stood at 10%, the statistically significant level of
the instrumented GCGI-ROE relationship is at 5%, suggesting that the GCGI
is indeed endogenously related to ROE during the post 2003 period.
Arguably, and as in the case of Renders et al (2010) who found a negative
association between their overall index and ROE for their initial analysis but
after controlling for the sample selection bias and endogeneity changed to
positive and statistically significant, it is not surprising that the post 2003
GCGI-ROE relationship has changed from insignificant to statistically
significant and positive association between the two after addressing the
problems of endogeneity. This further confirms that causality runs from the
GCGI to firm performance but not vice-versa.
It is important to note that one clear outcome that emerges from the first
stage instrumental variables analysis under the accounting-based firm
performance measures of ROA and ROE is that corporate governance does
matter to firm performance in most cases during the whole, pre 2003 and
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post 2003 periods after addressing the problems of endogeneity. However,
the results do not make clear whether the introduction of the Ghanaian Code
which has contributed to the improvement of compliance level causes firm
financial performance. As indicated in sub-subsection 5.5.3.3 of chapter five,
and following Henry (2008), a dummy variable representing the Ghanaian
Code Change (GCC) is used to instrument the GCGI in the second stage to
investigate whether the introduction of the Ghanaian Code has had any
significant impact on the Ghanaian listed firms’ financial performance. In this
respect and as previously indicated, the dummy variable is coded 1 if sample
firms financial year ends are on or after 31 December 2004 (post adoption of
the Ghanaian Code) and 0 otherwise (pre adoption of the Ghanaian Code).
This approach is used to further help to address the presence of endogeneity
determined in Table 9-1 of this chapter.
As a result, and following Henry (2008), Table 9-12 reports a two-stage
instrumental variable fixed effects regression model for the impact of the
GCGI on the accounting-based firm performance measures of ROA and ROE.
As can be seen from Panel A of Table 9-12, and similar to the reduced form
fixed effects regression model results reported by Henry (2008), the
coefficient on the GCC dummy variable is highly statistically significant and
positively related to the GCGI, indicating that the GCGI is significantly higher
after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. This implies that the GCC
dummy is a valid instrument for the GCGI under both ROA and ROE even
though, and as can be seen from model 1 and 2 of Panel A, there are no
major differences between the two regressions. Also, the evidence of highly
statistically significant and positive GCC-GCGI association provides additional
support to the earlier conclusion reported in section 6.6 of chapter six that
the sampled firms were more compliant after the publication of the Ghanaian
Code than when the code was not in place.
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9-12: Instrumental variables fixed-effects regression results for the impact
of the GCGI on accounting-based firm performance measures
Panel A: Reduced form (first stage) fixed-effects regression model
Model 1 Model 2
GCGI GCGI
Intercept 54.318 54.462
(12.27)*** (12.33)***
GCC 14.058 14.074
(12.29)*** (12.26)***
GEAR 0.052 0.052
(2.15)** (2.14)**
SIZE 0.748 0.734
(1.39) (1.36)
GROWTH 0.362 0.372
(0.36) (0.37)
AGE -0.067 -0.069
(0.84) (0.87)
Observations 283 283
Groupa 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.227 0.227
Panel B: Full (second stage) instrumental variables fixed-effects model
Model 1 Model 2
ROA ROE
Intercept 22.230 63.441
(2.56)** (3.01)***
GCGI 0.680 0.336
(2.05)** (3.39)***
GEAR -0.486 -0.066
(2.18)** (4.72)***
SIZE -3.262 0.801
(1.47) (1.21)
GROWTH 5.056 1.437
(1.24) (1.18)
AGE 0.261 -0.072
(0.82) (0.75)
Observations 283 283
Groupa 39 39
R2 (Overall) 0.081 0.131
Notes: The dependent variables are the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). GCGI is the
Ghanaian corporate governance index instrumented by the Ghanaian Code Change (GCC), GEAR is the
gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and AGE is the firm age. The model
provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
*Significant at 10% level
As can be seen from Panel B of Table 9-12 above, the full fixed effects
regression results show that the GCGI is statistically significant and positively
related to both ROA and ROE after addressing the problems of endogeneity.
This result not only strengthens the importance of the Ghanaian Code under
ROA and ROE but also suggests that better governed Ghanaian listed firms
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tend to have higher firm performance measured by ROA and ROE relative to
poorly governed firms. Arguably, and contrary to the earlier conclusion
reported in chapter eight that not all the Ghanaian Code provisions included
in the development of the GCGI are important to improving firm
performance, the statistically significant and positive association between the
instrumented GCGI and the accounting-based firm performance suggests
that causality indeed runs from the GCGI to ROA and ROE but not vice versa.
9.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
After subjected the initial results of chapter eight to a series of robustness
checks, the lagged specific governance mechanisms-firm performance
relationship provides mixed findings during the whole period after addressing
the problems of endogeneity that may arise because of time-lag. In
particular, the directions and the significant levels of a majority of the
specific governance mechanisms considered under ROA and ROE remain un-
changed. These results provide further support to the earlier conclusion
reported in chapter eight that there is a statistically significant but in most
cases weak association between each of the five specific governance
mechanisms and the accounting-based firm performance measures of ROA
and ROE during the whole period. However, the pre 2003 and post 2003
lagged specific governance mechanism-firm performance relationship has
shown some sensitivity relative to the conclusion reported in chapter eight.
For example, evidence of governance-performance association exists
between board size and ROE during pre 2003 and between PNEDs and both
ROA and ROE during post 2003.
Re-estimating the GCGI to address the problems of endogeneity that may
arise because of time-lag during the whole period, the results based on the
relationship between lagged GCGI and ROA remain unchanged, that there is
statistically insignificant and positive association between the two. However,
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the ROE shows some sensitivity to the lagged GCGI where evidence of
statistically significant and positive association between the two is reported,
suggesting that better governed Ghanaian listed firms tend to have higher
ROE relative to poorly governed firms. This also suggests that the findings
based on the lagged GCGI-ROE relationship does not lend support to the
earlier conclusion reported in chapter eight that there is statistically
insignificant and positive association between the two. Similarly, the results
based on the lagged sub-indices during the whole period suggest some level
of sensitivity to the time-lag under ROA and ROE except for the audit
committee index which is robust whether un-lagged or lagged estimated but
statistically insignificant.
One clear result that emerges from pre 2003 and post 2003 lagged GCGI is
that the highly statistically significant and positive associations between the
un-lagged GCGI and the accounting-based firm performance measures of
ROA and ROE reported in chapter eight have now changed to insignificant
association between them. This evidence contrasts sharply with previous
conclusion reported in chapter eight during the pre 2003 period which may
have been caused by the reduction of the sample size during pre 2003 from
65 to 42 observations after lagging the GCGI as one of the possible reasons.
That notwithstanding, post 2003, although not statistically significant,
experienced some sensitivity with lagged GCGI changing from a negative to
positive sign under ROA. The lagged sub-indices under both ROA and ROE
during the pre 2003 and post 2003 periods experienced slight changes,
suggesting that the earlier conclusion reported in chapter eight is supported.
To further address the presence of endogeneity problems under the
accounting-based firm performance measures of ROA and ROE, two
instrumental variables strategies were implemented to re-estimate the
relationship between the GCGI and firm performance. The findings based on
the first stage instrumental variables fixed effects regressions suggest that
corporate governance does matter to firm performance in most cases during
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the whole, pre 2003 and post 2003 periods. However, and except for pre
2003 under ROE where the relationship and significant level is consistent
with previous results reported in chapter eight, the rest of the results differ in
terms of sign reversal and significant levels relative to the earlier conclusion
reported in chapter eight. These results are further confirmed in the second
stage instrumental variables estimation where the robustness tests suggest
that sample firms performed better after the introduction of the Ghanaian
Code. Fundamentally, this thesis provides strong empirical support for the
main argument that corporate governance does matter to firm performance
holistically other than its specific governance mechanisms after controlling
for endogeneity. Arguably, and as in the case of Henry (2008), the results
are encouraging for the development of a code of best practice on corporate
governance to regulate the operational environment of firms rather than the
selective adoption of the specific governance mechanisms.
9.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has conducted endogeneity tests and a series of robustness
checks to establish whether there is indeed stability in the findings presented
in chapter eight. The main objective has been to examine the robustness of
the reported findings to different explanations and estimations. In particular,
the GCGI was found to be endogenously related to the accounting-based firm
performance measures and therefore subjected it to a series of robustness
checks. In this regard, lagged governance-performance relationships and
panel instrumental variables regressions were used to address the problems
of endogeneity. As in the case of chapter eight, and given that the sample
size was reduced, the lagged governance-performance relationships during
the whole, pre 2003 and post 2003 periods have provided mixed results of
which in most cases show some sensitivity to the time-lag. That
notwithstanding, the panel instrumental variable regressions during the
whole, pre 2003 and post 2003 periods lend empirical support to the main
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argument that corporate governance does matter to firm performance
holistically rather than its specific governance mechanisms. In the next
chapter, the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance are reported.
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CHAPTER TEN
DIRECTORS’ OPINIONS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
10.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the findings based on the directors’ opinions on
corporate governance and firm performance. The key objective is to evaluate
the perceptions of directors of the Ghanaian listed firms on the adoption of
the Ghanaian Code and its benefit to firm performance. In particular, the
chapter analyses the questionnaire data regarding corporate governance
implementation issues and whether the adoption of the Ghanaian Code
provisions is beneficial to firm performance or not. The remainder of the
chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.2 briefly describes the sample
and the questionnaire data. Section 10.3 presents the preliminary results and
the differences in mean responses. Section 10.4 provides major results of the
directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm performance. Section
10.5 presents a summary of the results and discussion, while section 10.6
summarises the chapter.
10.2 SAMPLE AND THE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA
Data considerations and the development of a questionnaire for the directors’
opinions on corporate governance are discussed in section 5.6 of chapter
five. This section briefly describes the sample and the questionnaire data
used in the empirical analysis presented in this chapter. As indicated in
section 5.6 of chapter five, this thesis employs a questionnaire (see Appendix
2 for details) as the data collection method to examine the directors’ opinions
on corporate governance and firm performance. The respondents were
mainly executive and non-executive directors of the Ghanaian listed firms.
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Therefore, 70 directors were selected from 35 firms listed on the Ghana
Stock Exchange (GSE) as at the end of 31 December 2009. As explained in
section 5.6 of chapter five, the main reasons for selecting respondents from
firms listed on GSE are that they are required to comply with the Ghanaian
Code or provide an explanation for non-compliance to their shareholders. In
this case, the CEOs and the Chairmen of the 35 listed firms were selected to
represent the executive and non-executive directors. As indicated in
subsection 5.6.2 of chapter five, and following the work of CBI/Touche Ross
(1995), Jenkins-Ferrett (2001), Moxey et al (2004) and Reed et al (2006),
this thesis directly developed a questionnaire based on the Ghanaian Code
provisions imposed on listed firms and piloted on the directors of three
randomly selected listed firms. The questionnaire was posted and followed-
up during the months of May 2011 to October 2011. As a result, and as
indicated in subsection 5.6.3 of chapter five, 43 out of the 70 executive and
non-executive directors responded to the survey, a response rate of 61.43%.
However, researchers have observed that postal questionnaires have the
possibility of biased response rates (Fox and Boardley, 1998). In particular,
non-response bias exists when non-responses influence the study results
such that they become invalid. In order to minimize this problem, and as
indicated earlier, a reminder letter was sent approximately six weeks after
the initial postal questionnaire. The overall response rate of 61% suggests
that the non-response rate is equal to 39%. If the opinions of the non-
response directors differ significantly from those response directors, research
analysis and findings might not be reliably valid. Following Wallace and Mellor
(1988)44, the non-response bias is investigated by comparing the early (28)
and the late (15)45 respondents to the questionnaire survey with the
underlying belief that the late respondents are proxies to non-respondents.
In this respect, this thesis checked the validity of the early respondents and
44 Wallace and Mellor (1988) developed a statistical method to investigate non-response bias by comparing
responses provided by early respondents to those late respondents in an effort to establish whether there is
significant difference between the two responses.
45 The late respondents to the questionnaire survey in this thesis are the directors who completed the
questionnaire after the reminder letter was sent to them by the researcher.
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late respondents by using the t-test method to compare the mean-values of
each variable in relation to the number of years in a particular role, the
familiarity of the Ghanaian Code and its provisions, corporate governance
implementation issues and corporate governance and firm performance in
Ghana.
Table 10-1: Non-response bias tests
Variable
Mean
Early Response
Mean
Late Response
Statistically
Significant
Number of years in role 1.57 1.20 0.181
Familiarity with the Ghanaian Code 1.71 1.87 0.327
Familiarity with the Ghanaian Code provisions 1.75 1.93 0.299
The Ghanaian Code is a benchmark for good
corporate governance 4.18 4.33 0.435
The standard of corporate governance has
improved since the Intro. of the Ghanaian code 3.57 3.40 0.617
Directors are prepared to complied with further
corporate governance provisions 4.07 3.73 0.338
Regulatory and institutional bodies are supportive
for the implementation of the Ghanaian Code 3.21 3.53 0.296
There is a need to review the Ghanaian Code by
independent committee 4.29 4.13 0.564
Separating the roles of the CEO and the Chairman
is beneficial to firm performance 4.61 4.47 0.613
To have a total number of board members ranging
from 8 to 16 is beneficial to firm performance 2.57 2.33 0.375
A balance of executive and non-executive directors
on the board is beneficial to firm performance 4.54 4.27 0.346
An establishment of audit committee is beneficial to
firm performance 4.68 4.67 0.959
An establishment of a remuneration committee is
beneficial to firm performance 4.61 4.47 0.572
The full adoption of the Ghanaian Code is beneficial
to firm performance than the specific provisions 4.00 3.73 0.327
Respondents 28 15
Notes: Data drawn from Questions 1 to 6
The results as indicated in column 4 of Table 10-1 above show that of all
questions answered, the early respondents did not significantly differ from
the same group in the late respondents because all values are not
statistically significant46. Therefore, the non-response bias could be
considered immaterial which suggests that the responses in this thesis can
be considered as a representative of the whole selected sample.
46The insignificant difference is also confirmed by Mann-Whitney U Test where the null hypothesis of no
difference between early and late respondents is supported.
307
10.3 PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND THE DIFFERENCES IN MEAN
RESPONSES
This section reports the preliminary results and the differences in mean
responses from the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms. The responses to
the questionnaire are presented in tables of which the respondents were
asked to indicate their level of agreement with several statements on a scale
of 1 to 5, where [1] represented strongly disagree, [2] disagree, [3] neutral,
[4] agree and [5] strongly agree. Specifically, subsection 10.3.1 presents the
preliminary results, while subsection 10.3.2 reports the differences in mean
of the CEOs and Chairmen responses.
10.3.1 Preliminary results
Table 10-2 presents the respondents’ role in Ghanaian listed firms. As shown
in Table 10-2 below, the CEOs response rate (56%) is higher than the
Chairman of the board (44%) by 12%. This is not surprising because
executive directors and in this case the CEOs are permanently based in the
listed firms head office to supervise the operational activities relative to the
Chairman who by convention visit the office based on the frequency of board
meetings and hence the differences in the response rate.
Note: Data drawn from Question 1
However, and as can be seen from Table 10-3 below, most of the
respondents (65%) have been in their roles for less than 5 years with 26%
and 9% being in their roles from 5 to 10 years and 11 years or more
respectively. This suggests that only 9% of the directors who responded to
Table 10-2: Respondents role in the Ghanaian listed firms
Response Total Percentage Response
Chairman 19 44.2%
CEO 24 55.8%
Total Respondents 43 100.0%
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the survey questionnaire have been in their respective roles since the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003 and therefore investigating the
differences in responses based on the role of each director will provide better
understanding of how the executive and non-executive directors perceived
the implementation of the Ghanaian Code and its benefit to firm
performance.
Note: Data drawn from Question 2
Table 10-4 contains the respondents’ familiarity with the existence of the
Ghanaian Code and as indicated below, a majority of the respondents are
aware of the existence of the Ghanaian Code. In particular, a little over 25%
noted that they are very familiar with 72% of the respondents familiar with
the existence of the Ghanaian Code. Interestingly, only one respondent
representing 2% indicated not familiar with the existence of the Ghanaian
Code. This evidence is particularly important since the respondents’
familiarity with the existence of the Ghanaian Code may influence the level of
their opinions on the implementation of the Ghanaian Code provisions and its
benefit to firm performance.
Table 10-3: Respondents experience in their roles
Response Total Percentage Response
Less than 5 years
5 - 10 years
11 years or more
28
11
4
65.1%
25.6%
9.3%
Total Respondents 43 100.0%
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Note: Data drawn from Question 3
As a follow-up question to test the respondents’ familiarity with the specific
Ghanaian Code provisions, and similar to the response rate to the earlier
question, a little over 25% of the respondents in Table 10-5 confirmed that
they are very familiar with the Ghanaian Code specific provisions. However,
those familiar with the specific Ghanaian Code provisions dropped to a little
over 67% relative to 72% who noted their familiarity with the existence of
the Ghanaian Code. Interestingly, those not familiar with the specific
Ghanaian provisions rather increased to 7% relative to the 2% reported
earlier regarding the existence of the Ghanaian Code. This suggests that,
although 5% of the respondents indicated their familiarity with the existence
of the Ghanaian Code, they are not familiar with the specific provisions
contained in the Ghanaian Code.
Note: Data drawn from Question 4
Table 10-6 reports the directors’ opinions on corporate governance
implementation issues in Ghana. In this respect, a majority of the
Table 10-4: Respondents familiarity with the existence of the Ghanaian
Code
Response Total Percentage Response
Very Familiar
Familiar
Not Familiar
11
31
1
25.6%
72.1%
2.3%
Total 43 100%
Table 10-5: Respondents familiarity with Ghanaian Code specific
provisions
Response Total Percentage Response
Very Familiar
Familiar
Not Familiar
11
29
3
25.6%
67.4%
7.0%
Total 43 100.0%
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respondents noted that the Ghanaian Code is a benchmark for good
corporate governance practices for Ghanaian listed firms. Specifically, and as
can be seen from row 2 of Table 10-6, over 90% agreed or strongly agreed
that the Ghanaian Code is a benchmark with only 9.3% who did not have an
opinion. This is not surprising because the Ghanaian Code is meant to be
adopted by all listed firms regulated by the GSE. However, and as shown in
row 3 of Table 10-6, the respondents are divided on whether the standard of
corporate governance has improved in their companies since the introduction
of the Ghanaian Code. Whereas, a little over 51% agreed or strongly agreed
that the standard of corporate governance has improved in their firms, 21%
of the respondents’ disagreed and 28% having no opinion. Although 90% of
the respondents noted that the Ghanaian Code is a benchmark, it may be
stated that some of the firms had good corporate governance structures in
place before the introduction of the Ghanaian Code and therefore it did not
make any difference.
Table 10-6: Directors opinions on corporate governance implementation
issues
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Agree
Total
Responses
The Ghanaian Code is a
benchmark for good corporate
governance
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
4
9.3%
25
58.1%
14
32.6%
43
100%
The standard of corporate
governance has improved since
the intro. of the Ghanaian Code
0
0.0%
9
20.9%
12
27.9%
13
30.2%
9
20.9%
43
100%
Directors are prepared to
complied with further corporate
governance provisions
1
2.3%
5
11.6%
5
11.6%
16
37.2%
16
37.2%
43
100%
The regulatory and institutional
bodies are supportive for the
implementation of the
Ghanaian Code
0
0.0%
9
20.9%
16
37.2%
13
30.2%
5
11.6%
43
100%
There is a need to review the
Ghanaian Code by independent
committee
0
0.0%
1
2.3%
7
16.3%
16
37.2%
19
44.2%
43
100%
Note: Data drawn from Question 5a-e
As can be seen from row 4 of Table 10-6, many of the respondents are
prepared to comply with further corporate governance requirements such as
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the establishment of a formal nomination committee if they have not done
so. In this respect, over 74% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed
while 14% disagreed or strongly disagreed with that statement.
Interestingly, 12% of the respondents did not have an opinion regarding
their preparedness to comply with further corporate governance provisions.
Clearly, the failure of the Ghanaian Code to provide for the establishment of
a nomination committee comparable to international best practices is
confirmed by the respondents in their preparedness to comply with such
provision.
That notwithstanding, and as indicated in row 5 of Table 10-6, the
respondents are divided on whether the regulatory and institutional bodies
are supportive for the implementation of the Ghanaian Code provisions. In
particular, and for the first time, less than half of the respondents (42%)
agreed or strongly agreed that the current regulatory and institutional bodies
are supportive of the implementation of the Ghanaian Code relative to 58%
of the respondents who did not have an opinion or disagreed with that
statement. This suggests that the Ghanaian listed firms appear not to be
receiving adequate support from those responsible for the introduction,
enforcement and implementation of good corporate governance. As
expected, over 81% strongly agreed or agreed that there is a need to review
the Ghanaian Code by an independent committee, the findings supported by
what is practised in the UK and South Africa. However, and as can be seen
from row 6 of Table 10-6, a little over 16% did not have an opinion while 2%
of the respondents disagreed with that statement. Arguably, the introduction
of the Ghanaian Code has provided a consistent framework to which the
Ghanaian firms are governed but the code needs to be reviewed in order to
fully meet international best practices.
Table 10-7 presents the directors opinion on corporate governance and firm
performance based on the specific governance mechanisms and the overall
adoption of the Ghanaian Code. As row 2 of Table 10-7 shows, over 90% of
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the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the separation of the roles of
CEO and the Chairman is beneficial to their firm’s performance. As expected,
a little over 2% and 7% respectively, did not have an opinion and disagreed
with that statement. Fundamentally, and as indicated in chapter three, the
Ghanaian corporate governance framework regards duality as detrimental
because it could create power concentration in one person over board
decisions. The insignificant responses of duality benefiting firm performance
reported earlier suggest that combining the two roles is harmful to firm
performance.
Interestingly, to have a total number of board members ranging from a
minimum of eight to a maximum of sixteen members as provided by the
Ghanaian Code is not supported by the respondents as beneficial to their firm
performance. In particular, and as row 3 of Table 10-7 shows, approximately
70% of the respondents disagreed that the recommended board size is
beneficial to firm performance with only 16% agreeing or strongly agreeing
to that statement. Interestingly, 14% of the respondents did not have an
opinion on that statement. Arguably, a minimum of eight and a maximum of
sixteen board size recommended by the Ghanaian Code may be criticized
because the two are all even numbers. If the listed firms complied with the
board size of either eight or sixteen, and in the course of the board decision
making the votes tied, it would be very difficult for the board to arrive at a
decision. Fundamentally, and as reported earlier, there is a need to revise
the Ghanaian code by an independent committee to include a provision on
the establishment of a nomination committee which may help to recruit
quality board members to strengthen the board decision making rather than
focusing on numbers that may affect voting during board meetings.
As in row 4 of Table 10-7, the respondents also noted that to have a balance
of executive and non-executive directors on the board with at least one-third
to be independent non-executive directors as recommended by the Ghanaian
Code is beneficial to their firm’s performance. In particular, a little over 83%
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of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that having a balanced board is
beneficial to their firm’s performance. However, approximately 12% and 5%
of the respondents did not have any opinion and disagreed with the
statement. This indicates the importance of checks and balances as well as
different expertise that non-executive directors provide in board decisions
among the Ghanaian listed firms. In terms of board committees, and as
indicated in Table 10-7 below, the respondents noted that the establishment
of audit and remuneration committees as recommended by the Ghanaian
Code is beneficial to firm performance. Specifically, and as one can see from
row 5 of Table 10-7, over 90% respondents either strongly agreed or agreed
that the establishment of an audit committee as recommended by the
Ghanaian Code is beneficial to their firm performance relative to 7% and 2%
who did not have an opinion and disagreed with that statement.
Table 10-7: Directors opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Agree
Total
Responses
The separation of the roles of
the CEO and the Chairman is
beneficial to firm performance
0
0.0%
3
7.0%
1
2.3%
8
18.6%
31
72.1%
43
100%
To have a total number of
board members ranging from
8 to 16 is beneficial to firm
performance
0
0.0%
30
69.8%
6
14.0%
6
14.0%
1
2.3%
43
100%
To have a balance of
executive and non-executive
directors on the board is
beneficial to firm performance
0
0.0%
2
4.7%
5
11.6%
8
18.6%
28
65.1%
43
100%
The establishment of an audit
committee is beneficial to firm
performance
0
0.0%
1
2.3%
3
7.0%
5
11.6%
34
79.1%
43
100%
The establishment of a
remuneration committee is
beneficial to firm performance
0
0.0%
1
2.3%
4
9.3%
8
18.6%
30
69.8%
43
100%
The full adoption of the
Ghanaian Code is beneficial to
firm performance than the
specific provisions
0
0.0%
1
2.3%
14
32.6%
16
37.2%
12
27.9%
43
100%
Note: Data drawn from Question 6a-f
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Similarly, and as noted in row 6 of Table 10-7, over 88% responded that
they strongly agreed or agreed that the establishment of a remuneration
committee as recommended by the Ghanaian Code is beneficial to their firm’s
performance compared to a little over 9% and 2% who did not have an
opinion and disagreed with that statement. This evidence suggests that the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code has increased the awareness of the
important role played by board committees. Arguably, and as indicated
earlier, an independent committee should be constituted by the regulatory
authorities to strengthen the Ghanaian Code in order to bring it in line with
the international best practices. For example, the recommendation for the
establishment of a nomination committee is important to include in the
Ghanaian Code provisions for firms to adopt which could enable them to
recruit quality directors to serve on the boards of the Ghanaian listed firms.
The statement that the Ghanaian Code is only beneficial to firm performance
if only fully adopted instead of its specific provisions is supported but not at
the same rate as the specific governance provisions. Whereas 65% of the
respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the full adoption of the Ghanaian
Code is beneficial to their firm performance as shown in row 7 of Table 10-7,
the specific governance provisions benefit to firm performance, except board
size (16%), and as explained earlier, are rated much higher as in the case of
CEO/Chairman role separation (90%), balance of executive and non-
executives directors (83%), the presence of audit (90%) and remuneration
(83%) committees. Surprisingly, approximately 37% did not have an opinion
on the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions benefit to firm
performance and a little over 2% disagreed with that statement. These
responses are interpreted as clear indication that not all corporate
governance provisions contained in the Ghanaian code are equally important
to company directors as beneficial to their firm’s performance. As in Jenkins-
Ferrett (2001), many directors supported the full adoption of the Ghanaian
Code provisions as beneficial to their firm performance. This evidence also
provides further support for the views shared by Metrick and Ishii (2002) and
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Klapper and Love (2004) that corporate governance matters more in
countries with weak legal systems relative to countries with strong legal
systems. This is particularly important because the evidence in this thesis
does not lend empirical support to prior directors’ opinions studies in the UK
(CBI/Touch Ross, 1995; Moxey et al, 2004). For example, CBI/Touch Ross
reported that the Cadbury recommendations have had no positive impact on
their firm’s performance, evidence not consistent with the African developing
countries where legal systems are weak.
Although, the respondents in most cases either strongly disagreed,
disagreed, neutral, agreed or strongly agreed with the statements regarding
corporate governance implementation issues and its influence on firm
performance, the preliminary results do not show the directors opinions at an
aggregate level using the full 5-point scale of the responses indicated earlier
to help make a definite conclusion of the directors opinions. However, and
given the different roles of the respondents of being executive and non-
executive directors, the next subsection reports the differences in mean of
responses to establish whether the CEOs responses differ significantly from
the Chairmen to determine whether it warrants separate analysis for the two
respondents in section 10.4 or not.
10.3.2 Differences in mean of the CEOs and Chairmen responses
Table 10-8 presents the differences in mean of responses from the CEOs and
Chairmen of the Ghanaian listed firms on corporate governance
implementation issues. As indicated earlier, and on a scale of 1 to 5, the null
hypothesis of no differences in mean of the CEOs and Chairmen responses is
supported47. This suggests that the responses from both respondents can be
combined for further analysis in supporting or otherwise of the hypotheses
tested in chapter six. However, it can be observed from columns 2 and 3 of
47 The Mann-Whitney U Test was also used to confirm the significant levels of the differences in mean of
the CEOs and the Chairmen responses.
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Table 10-8 that the mean CEOs responses to all the five statements are
consistently lower relative to the Chairmen responses except the support
they receive from the current regulatory and institutional bodies for the
implementation of the Ghanaian Code in row 5 where the CEOs recorded a
mean of 3.46 higher than the 3.16 of the Chairmen responses. That
notwithstanding, and given that there are no statistically significant
differences in mean responses regarding corporate governance
implementation issues, the responses from the CEOs and Chairmen of the
Ghanaian listed firms will be aggregated into means and standard deviations
in section 10.4 to support or otherwise of the hypotheses tested in chapter
six.
Table 10-8: Differences in mean of corporate governance implementation
issues
Mean
CEOs Responses
Mean
Chairmen Responses
Statistically
Significant
The Ghanaian Code is a benchmark
for good corporate governance
4.21 4.26 0.774
The standard of corporate
governance has improved since the
intro. of the Ghanaian Code
3.42 3.63 0.514
Directors are prepared to complied
with further corporate governance
provisions
3.88 4.05 0.602
The regulatory and institutional
bodies are supportive for the
implementation of the Ghanaian
Code
3.46 3.16 0.306
There is a need to review the
Ghanaian Code by independent
committee
4.17 4.32 0.556
Notes: The test statistics is based on the independent sample t-test with no statistically significant level at
5%. The Mann-Whitney U test was also used to confirm the significant level.
Table 10-9 reports the differences in mean of responses from the CEOs and
Chairmen of the Ghanaian listed firms on corporate governance and firm
performance. As indicated earlier, and based on the full scale of 1 to 5, the
null hypothesis of no differences in mean of the CEOs and Chairmen of the
Ghanaian listed firms’ responses is supported for five statements except the
board size influence on firm performance in row 3 of Table 10-9 where there
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are statistically significant differences in mean at 5% level48. This suggests
that, and based on the CEOs and Chairmen of the Ghanaian listed firms’
responses, to have a total number of board members ranging from eight to
sixteen has resulted in different opinions from the respondents. However,
and given that the means of both respondents based on the full scale of 1 to
5 (i.e. CEOs mean = 2.71 and Chairmen mean = 2.21) suggest board size
having no benefit to firm performance, this thesis in the next section will
aggregate the responses from both respondents on corporate governance
and firm performance for further analysis in section 10.4.
Table 10-9: Differences in mean of corporate governance and firm performance
Mean
CEOs Responses
Mean
Chairmen Responses
Statistically
Significant**
The separation of the roles of the
CEO and the Chairman is beneficial
to firm performance
4.50 4.63 0.622
To have a total number of board
members ranging from 8 to 16 is
beneficial to firm performance
2.71 2.21 0.049**
To have a balance of executive and
non-executive directors on the
board is beneficial to firm
performance
4.46 4.42 0.892
The establishment of an audit
committee is beneficial to firm
performance
4.50 4.89 0.171
The establishment of a
remuneration committee is
beneficial to firm performance
4.46 4.68 0.343
The full adoption of the Ghanaian
Code is beneficial to firm
performance than the specific
provisions
4.13 3.63 0.156
Notes: ** denotes 5% significant level base on independent sample t-test. The Mann-Whitney U test was
also used to confirm the significant level.
As can be seen from columns 2 and 3 of Table 10-9 above, and unlike the
differences in mean responses of corporate governance implementation
issues discussed earlier where a majority of the CEOs responses means were
lower than the Chairmen responses, the differences in mean of corporate
48 As in the case of corporate governance implementation issues, the differences in mean of the CEOs and
Chairmen responses regarding corporate governance and firm performance are confirmed by the Mann-
Whitney U Test with similar results.
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governance and firm performance for all the six statements is divided into
two. Whereas CEOs responses means are lower in three statements such as
the separation of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, establishment of
audit committee and a remuneration committee, the Chairmen responses
means are lower in the balance of executive and non-executive directors, to
have a total number of board members ranging from eight to sixteen and the
full adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions benefit to firm performance.
That notwithstanding, and as in the case of corporate governance
implementation issues discussed earlier, the responses from both CEOs and
the Chairmen of the Ghanaian listed firms will be combined for further
analysis in section 10.4. Given that there is no statistically significant
difference between the CEOs and Chairmen responses on a majority of the
statements regarding corporate governance implementation issues and its
benefit to firm performance, the next section provides major results to
support or otherwise the conclusions reported in chapters six and eight.
10.4 MAJOR RESULTS OF THE DIRECTORS’ OPINIONS ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Following the preliminary results and the differences in mean responses, this
section provides major results to support or otherwise the hypotheses tested
in chapters six and eight. A five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 =
strongly agree) was used in evaluating the responses for all the eleven
statements in questions 5 and 6. The means and standard deviations
reported in each table are calculated on the full 5-point scale of the
responses. In addition, a one-sample test49 with a test value of 3
representing no opinion on the 5-point scale was used to distinguish between
the mean scores below and above 3 to help make a definite conclusion for
each statement. If a mean scores below or above 3 is found to be statistically
significant, then one can conclude that the majority of the respondents do
49 It is important to note here that non-parametric one-sample test was also performed where the results is
similar to the statistically significant levels that are reported in Tables 10-10 and 10-11.
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not support or do support a particular statement. In this respect, subsection
10.4.1 presents the directors’ opinions on corporate governance
implementation issues, while subsection 10.4.2 provides the directors’
opinions on corporate governance and firm performance. In all cases, and
unlike the preliminary results, the mean scores for all the statements based
on the full scale of 1 to 5 will be used as a representative opinion for all the
respondents to support or otherwise the hypotheses tested in chapters six
and eight. For the purpose of clarity, the six hypotheses tested in chapters
six and eight are reproduced here as follows:
Ho1: There is significant improvement in the degree of compliance with
corporate governance practices by listed firms during pre 2003 and
post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code.
HO2 The separation of the roles of CEO and the Chairman should lead to
higher firm performance.
HO3 The smaller the board size should lead to higher firm performance.
HO4 The higher the proportion of non-executive directors, the lower the
firm performance.
HO5 The presence of an audit committee and a remuneration committee
should lead to better firm performance.
HO6 There is a significant positive association between the Ghanaian
corporate governance index (GCGI) and firm performance.
The analysis and discussion of the major results in respect of the above
hypotheses are presented in the subsequent subsections 10.4.1 and 10.4.2
respectively.
10.4.1 Directors opinions on corporate governance
implementation issues
Table 10-10 presents the mean scores and the standard deviations of the
directors’ opinions on corporate governance implementation issues in Ghana.
As indicated earlier, a five point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 =
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strongly agree) was used in evaluating the responses for all the five
statements in question 5. Respondents strongly believe that the Ghanaian
Code is a benchmark for good corporate governance practices for Ghanaian
listed firms (mean scores = 4.23, minimum = 3, maximum = 5); and that
the standard of corporate governance has improved in their firms since the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code (mean scores = 3.51, minimum = 2,
maximum = 5). This suggests that hypothesis one is supported and further
provides consistent support to the earlier conclusion reported in chapter six
that the sample firms were more compliant after the introduction of the
Ghanaian Code. Empirically, this evidence also reinforces previous findings
reported by Ocran (2001) that the concept of corporate governance has
gained grounds in Ghana. However, and unlike the analysis of the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code based on the annual report data in
chapter six where the issue of additional compliance could not be addressed,
the respondents strongly believe that their firms are prepared to comply with
further corporate governance requirements such as the establishment of a
nomination committee if not complied with presently (mean scores = 3.95,
minimum = 1, maximum = 5). This is particularly important, and as
indicated earlier, including a requirement for the establishment of a
nomination committee could help to bring the Ghanaian Code in line with
international best practices such as what is practised in the UK and South
Africa.
While the respondents believe that the current regulatory and institutional
bodies are supportive enough to help implement the Ghanaian Code
provisions (mean scores = 3.33, minimum= 2, maximum = 5), the mean
score is at a lower level relative to other statements regarding corporate
governance implementation issues. It would appear that the respondents see
the regulatory and institutional bodies as policing the Ghanaian Code rather
than educating them regarding the importance of corporate governance to
their operations. As indicated in chapter six, and consistent with the
respondents’ weak support for the regulatory and institutional bodies, the
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Ghanaian Code specific provisions that are not backed by the Companies
Code, SECG regulation and the GSE Listing Rules experienced low compliance
level, suggesting that the Ghanaian listed firms follow the box ticking
exercise only to please their regulatory and institutional bodies. Given the
respondents strong preparedness to comply with further corporate
governance requirements noted earlier, and as expected, they strongly
believe that there is a need to review the Ghanaian Code by an independent
committee (mean scores = 4.23, minimum = 2, maximum = 5). Essentially,
and as indicated in chapter three, the Ghanaian Code has not been reviewed
since its introduction and reviewing it may help to bring it in line with what is
practised around the world.
As can be seen from column 6 of Table 10-10 below, there is normal
variation in the directors’ opinions on corporate governance implementation
issues. In particular, the standard deviations are relatively small with few of
them around one-fifth the range, suggesting that the mean scores which are
used for the analysis can indeed stand for the opinions of a majority of the
respondents to the five statements. That notwithstanding, the responses to
the statements in rows 3 and 4 of Table 10-10 are the ones to indicate
greater variations among all the five statements but were not particularly
large, either. In other words, most of the directors who responded provided
clear support to all the five statements regarding corporate governance
implementation issues in Ghana.
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Table 10-10: Descriptive statistics of corporate governance implementation
issues
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev
The Ghanaian Code is a benchmark for
good corporate governance 43 3 5 4.23*** .611
The standard of corporate governance
has improved since the intro. of the
Ghanaian Code
43 2 5 3.51*** 1.055
Directors are prepared to complied with
further corporate governance provisions 43 1 5 3.95*** 1.090
The regulatory and institutional bodies
are supportive for the implementation of
the Ghanaian Code 43 2 5 3.33** .944
There is a need to review the Ghanaian
Code by independent committee 43 2 5 4.23*** .812
Note: A five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). Data drawn from Question 5. ***
and ** indicate statistically significant level at 1% and 5% based on one-sample test value of 3. The non-
parametric one-sample test was also used to confirm the significant levels.
10.4.2 Directors opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance
Table 10-11 reports the mean scores of the directors’ opinions on corporate
governance and firm performance in Ghana. As indicated earlier, a five point
scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree) was used in measuring
the responses for all the five statements in question 6. Respondents believe
strongly that the separation of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman is
beneficial to their firm performance (mean scores = 4.56, minimum = 2,
maximum = 5), suggesting that hypothesis two is supported. Empirically,
this finding also provides clear support to the Ghanaian Code
recommendation of the roles separation between the CEO and the Chairman.
However, the result is not consistent with the conclusion reported in chapter
eight regarding the roles separation and firm performance. In particular and
based on the regression results from the annual report data, there is no
evidence to suggest that roles separation is beneficial to any of the firm
performance measures used (ROA, ROE and Q-ratio).
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Fundamentally, the differences in findings between the directors’ opinions on
roles separation and the regression analysis from the annual report data in
chapter eight may suggest that the directors see the implementation of roles
separation as beneficial to their firm performance, but in practice, it appears
that separating the two roles among Ghanaian listed firms does not have any
positive impact on their profitability or market value. Arguably, separating
the two roles alone may not necessarily guarantee firm performance unless
other specific governance provisions are adopted simultaneously. For
example, a firm may have its two roles separated but if they do not have the
right board size who are not politically chosen in place for decision making
may not have any positive impact on firm performance. This is because, and
as one may argue, the strength of the board may depend on the strength of
the individual members but not the size that matters for important decision
making. That notwithstanding, there is clear indication that the directors who
are responsible for the implementation of good corporate governance in their
various firms appear to value roles separation in Ghana. In particular, and as
can be seen from row 2 of Table 10-9, both executive (CEOs) and non-
executive (Chairmen) directors equally have strong support for the
separation of the two roles among Ghanaian listed firms.
As indicated in row 3 of Table 10-11, the respondents offered no support to
have a total number of board members ranging from eight to sixteen as
beneficial to their firm performance (mean scores = 2.49, minimum = 2,
maximum = 5), suggesting that hypothesis three is not supported. This
evidence is also consistent with the regression results from the annual report
data when ROA is used as a firm performance measure. However, this
evidence contradicts a majority of the regression results from the annual
report data reported in chapter eight. Specifically, the average board size of
8.52 reported in section 6.5 of chapter six was found to have a statistically
significant and positive impact on firm performance measures of ROE and Q-
ratio. Arguably, the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms who are
responsible for the implementation of the Ghanaian Code provisions do not
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share the same view as the Ghanaian Code recommendation of having a
board size of between eight and sixteen. In this respect, there may be
something fundamentally wrong with the content of the Ghanaian Code, and
as indicated earlier, it should be subjected to a review by an independent
committee to take a remedial action.
As shown in row 4 of Table 10-11, the respondents believe strongly that to
have a balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board with at
least one-third to be independent non-executive directors is beneficial to
their firm’s performance (mean scores = 4.4, minimum = 2, maximum = 5).
This evidence is not consistent with hypothesis four but lends empirical
support to the Ghanaian Code recommendations of having a balance of
executive and non-executive directors on the board. However, this evidence
contrasts sharply with the conclusion reported in chapter eight regarding the
PNEDs-performance relationship based on the regression results from the
annual report data. Whereas the regression results from the annual report
data reported in chapter eight (see Tables 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3) show a negative
and statistically significant impact on all the firm performance measures
(ROA, ROE and Q-ratio), the directors strongly perceived the balance of
executive and non-executive directors as beneficial to their firm’s
performance. As indicated in section 6.7 of chapter six, and based on critical
observation during the reading of the Ghanaian listed firms annual reports, a
majority of the firms have only the CEO as an executive director to sit on the
board, suggesting that the Ghanaian Code recommendation of having a
balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board is defeated.
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Table 10-11: Descriptive statistics of corporate governance and firm
performance
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev
The separation of the roles of the CEO and
the Chairman is beneficial to firm
performance
43 2 5 4.56*** .854
To have a total number of board members
ranging from 8 to 16 is beneficial to firm
performance
43 2 5 2.49*** .827
To have a balance of executive and non-
executive directors on the board is
beneficial to firm performance 43 2 5 4.44*** .881
The establishment of an audit committee is
beneficial to firm performance 43 2 5 4.67*** .715
The establishment of a remuneration
committee is beneficial to firm
performance 43 2 5 4.56*** .765
The full adoption of the Ghanaian Code is
beneficial to firm performance than the
specific provisions 43 2 5 3.91*** .840
Note: A five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). Data drawn from Question 6. ***
indicates statistically significant level at 1% based on one-sample test value of 3. The non-parametric
one-sample test was also used to confirm the significant levels.
As reported in section 6.5 of chapter six, and given that the Ghanaian listed
firms’ non-executive directors (76%) outweigh the executive directors
(24%), it is not surprising that the regression results from the annual report
data do not support the expectation of the Ghanaian Code of having a
balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board. In this
respect, one possible explanation for the differences in findings between the
directors’ opinions and the regression results may be that the directors view
a balanced board as beneficial to firm performance, while in practice, the
annual report data does show high PNEDs. Arguably, and given the
recommendation of the Ghanaian Code, the directors’ strong support for a
balanced board may suggest that they do not practise what they perceive as
being beneficial to their firm’s performance; hence their boards are
dominated by the non-executive directors.
As indicated in row 5 and 6 of Table 10-11 above, there is strong support for
the establishment of an audit committee (mean scores= 4.67, minimum = 2,
maximum = 5), as well as a remuneration committee (mean scores = 4.56,
326
minimum = 2, maximum = 5) as beneficial to firm performance, indicating
that hypothesis five is supported. However, this evidence contradicts the
earlier conclusion reported in chapter eight based on the regression results
from the annual report data that audit and remuneration committees have no
positive impact on firm performance measures of ROA, ROE and Q-ratio. In
this case, the directors support the establishment of audit and remuneration
committees as beneficial to their firm’s performance, whereas in practice,
these committees do not matter to firm’s performance based on the
regression results from the annual report data during the whole period. That
notwithstanding, and as reported in chapter eight, those firms that had a
remuneration committee in place before (pre 2003) the introduction of the
Ghanaian Code experienced positive impact on their firm performance
measured by ROA and ROE. Overall, and more importantly, the regression
results from the annual report data remain unchanged after addressing the
endogeneity problems in chapter nine.
In general, the degree of compliance based on the annual report data does
not appear to benefit firm performance other than the period when the
Ghanaian Code was not in place relative to the directors opinions where there
is strong support for the establishment of these committees. This suggests
that and as reported in chapter eight, having these committees in place alone
in practice may not guarantee firm performance until the composition
requirements of such committees are met. This is particularly important
because the existence of these board committees without the right
composition to perform the delegated functions of the board may not have
any impact on firm performance. However, and given the directors strong
support for the establishment of both audit and remuneration committees as
beneficial to firm performance, the level of compliance based on the annual
report data reported in chapter six may be seen more as a box ticking
exercise to satisfy regulators and institutional bodies. For example, the
Ghanaian Code audit committee provision supported by other regulators such
as the SECG regulation and the GSE Listing Rules is highly complied with by
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70% of the sampled firms, whereas a remuneration committee provision that
is not backed by any of these regulators is least complied with at the rate of
28% of the same firms. This may have caused the differences in findings
between the directors’ opinions and the regression results from the annual
report data reported in chapter eight because they appear not to put into
practice what they think is important for their firm’s performance as
confirmed by the establishment of a remuneration committee low compliance
level reported in chapter six.
According to row 7 of Table 10-11 above, the respondents have a strong
belief that the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code is beneficial to their firm’s
performance rather than its specific provisions, suggesting that hypothesis
six is supported (mean scores = 3.91, minimum = 2, maximum = 5). Given
that the statement of the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code is equivalent to
the Ghanaian corporate governance index (GCGI) developed in chapter six,
this evidence contradicts the initial regression results from the annual report
data reported in Tables 8-4, 8-6 and 8-8 of chapter eight using all the firm
performance measures (ROA, ROE and Q-ratio) during the whole period.
However, and after grouping the annual report data into sub-periods50, the
directors’ opinions are consistent with the regressions results of the
accounting-based firm performance measures (ROA and ROE) during the
period (pre 2003) where there was no formal introduction of the Ghanaian
Code. That notwithstanding, and after addressing the endogeneity problems
in chapter nine, the directors view on the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code
as beneficial to firm performance appears to be more consistent with the
regression results of the accounting-based firm performance measured by
ROA and ROE.
Fundamentally, there is some agreement between the directors’ opinions on
the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code and the regression results from the
50 As has been noted in previous chapters, the sub-periods are the pre 2003 and post 2003 publication of the
Ghanaian Code provisions.
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annual report data based on the GCGI that corporate governance does
matter as a whole to the Ghanaian listed firms’ profitability but not its
specific governance provisions. This suggests that the earlier conclusion
reported in chapter nine that corporate governance does matter to firm
performance holistically instead of its specific governance provisions is
supported by the directors opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance. Although, a majority of the directors’ opinions on the specific
governance provisions benefit to firm performance are supported, they are
not in line with the regression results from the annual report data reported in
chapter eight, and the subsequent endogeneity and robustness checks in
chapter nine. Generally, and as indicated in column 6 of Table 10-11 above,
there is normal variation in the directors’ opinions on corporate governance
and firm performance because the standard deviations are relatively small for
all the six statements. This suggests that the mean scores which are used for
the analysis can indeed represent the opinions of a majority of the directors
regarding the adoption of corporate governance provisions and firm
performance in Ghana.
10.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results drawn from the analysis of the questionnaire data, and presented
in this chapter, highlight the opinions of executive and non-executive
directors of the Ghanaian listed firms on corporate governance and firm
performance. Several key findings were examined in this chapter. First, the
participation of the executive (56%) and non-executive directors (44%) is
expected to have been a positive factor in the adoption of corporate
governance provisions by the Ghanaian listed firms. Also, the level of
experience of the respondents suggests that a majority (65%) of them have
been in their positions for less than 5 years but they are familiar with the
existence of the Ghanaian Code (97%) and its specific provisions (92%).
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Second, and regarding the corporate governance implementation issues, the
respondents believe strongly that the Ghanaian Code is a benchmark for
good corporate governance; and that the standard of corporate governance
has improved in their firms since the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. The
view held by the respondents to the effect of their preparedness to comply
with further corporate governance requirements such as a nomination
committee is likely to have been a positive influence on corporate
governance regulators in Ghana to consider reviewing the Ghanaian Code to
meet the standard of international best practices. The respondents felt that
the regulatory and institutional bodies are supportive to help implement the
Ghanaian Code provisions, but they strongly argued for the revision of the
Ghanaian Code by an independent committee, since this has not been done
after its introduction.
Finally, the respondents indicated that the separation of the roles of the CEO
and Chairman is beneficial to firm performance. However, they offered no
support to have a total number of board members ranging from eight to
sixteen as beneficial to their firm’s performance. That notwithstanding, the
respondents clearly held the view that to have a balance of executive and
non-executive directors on the board is beneficial to firm performance, as
well as the establishment of audit and remuneration committees. There is
also strong support, although at a lower level than the specific governance
provisions, for the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions as beneficial
to firm performance. It would appear that a majority of the specific
governance provisions are seen more as highly supported than the full
adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions by the respondents.
In comparison with the regression results from the annual report data, the
results from the directors’ opinions that the standard of corporate
governance has improved in their firms since the introduction of the
Ghanaian Code is consistent with the degree of compliance by the sampled
firms from the annual report data reported in chapter six. However, the
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directors’ opinions on a majority of the specific governance provisions as
beneficial to firm performance are not consistent with the regression results
from the annual report data reported in chapter eight, and the subsequent
endogeneity and robustness checks in chapter nine. Interestingly, the
directors’ opinions on the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions (i.e.
equivalent to the GCGI) as beneficial to firm performance initially failed to
support the regression results from the annual report data reported in
chapter eight, but after addressing the endogeneity problems in chapter
nine, the two results became consistent. As indicated earlier, and given that
the directors opinions on the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code is consistent
with the regression results from the annual report data, it is encouraging for
the development of a code of best practice on corporate governance to
regulate the Ghanaian firms instead of the selective adoption of the specific
governance provisions where there is disagreement between the directors
opinions and the regression results from the annual report data.
10.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the findings from the directors’ opinions on
corporate governance and firm performance. The key objective has been to
investigate the perceptions of the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms
regarding the adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions and its benefit to
firm performance. In this respect, the respondents have noted that the
Ghanaian Code is a benchmark for good corporate governance, and that the
standard of corporate governance has improved since its introduction. The
evidence of improvement of the standard of good corporate governance
supported previous annual report data on the degree of compliance with
corporate governance reported among the sampled firms in chapter six.
While there is no consensus between the directors’ opinions on the specific
governance provisions benefit to firm performance and the regression results
from the annual report data, there is consensus when it comes to the full
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adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions between the two. It is therefore
important to note in this thesis that corporate governance regulators in
Ghana should be encouraged in the development of a code of best practice
instead of allowing the Ghanaian firms to implement selective adoption of
specific governance provisions. The final chapter discusses the conclusions of
the thesis.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
11.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis has investigated the relationship between the degree of
compliance with corporate governance and firm performance in Ghana. This
chapter discusses the conclusions of the thesis. First, it presents an overview
of the objectives of the thesis. Second, it summarises the key results with
particular focus on the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code and
whether its adoption is beneficial to firm performance. Third, the chapter
highlights the contributions of the thesis. Fourth, it discusses the limitations
of the thesis. Finally, the chapter provides suggestions for future research.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 11.2 provides
an overview of the objectives of this thesis. Section 11.3 presents the
summary of the key results of the thesis. Section 11.4 highlights the
contributions of the thesis. Section 11.5 discusses the limitations of the
thesis. Section 11.6 provides suggestions for future research, while section
11.7 summarises the chapter.
11.2 OVERVIEW OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
This thesis has four main objectives. The first objective has been to measure
the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions among
Ghanaian listed firms. Prior researchers in Ghana usually seek to investigate
the impact of the specific corporate governance mechanisms on firm
performance without measuring these variables against the existing code of
best practice. This thesis, however, assessed the degree of compliance with
the Ghanaian Code provisions and the subsequent development of the
Ghanaian corporate governance index (GCGI) and its sub-indices before and
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after its introduction. This suggests a need to assess the extent to which the
degree of compliance is in line with the recommendations of the Ghanaian
Code during pre 2003 (2000-2002) and post 2003 (2004-2009) adoption
periods. The second objective of the thesis is to empirically investigate the
relationship between the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code
provisions and firm performance. For example, prior researchers repeatedly
suggest that corporate governance does matter to firm performance
holistically instead of the selective adoption of its specific provisions.
Fundamentally, it is evident that the corporate governance index based on a
particular country’s code of best practice has provided more consistent
results in European, other developed and developing countries relative to the
North American countries where there are mixed results. An interesting
question therefore, is whether the adoption of the Ghanaian Code specific
governance provisions is more important to firm performance or the
developed GCGI.
The third objective of the thesis is to empirically evaluate the perceptions of
the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms on the adoption of the Ghanaian
Code provisions and its benefit to their firm’s performance. Arguably, it is
perceived that the directors who are responsible for the implementation of
good corporate governance are likely to support the implementation of the
Ghanaian Code provisions as beneficial to their firm’s performance. In
particular, this thesis observes the directors’ opinions to confirm and
complement the relationship between the specific governance provisions or
the GCGI and firm performance, as well as to identify additional issues not
addressed by the annual report data. The final objective of the thesis is to
critically examine whether the use of multiple governance data has the
potential to affect the results of the relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance. An interesting issue here therefore, is
whether the regression results from the annual report data and the
questionnaire data based on the directors’ opinions are consistent or there
are differences in the results.
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The opportunity to achieve the stated objectives is provided by the Ghanaian
listed firms where annual report data and questionnaire data were collected.
From the annual report data perspective, the specific governance
mechanisms, the GCGI, firm performance and control variables were
collected for the period 2000 to 2009, while the executive and non-executive
directors’ responses to questionnaires represent the questionnaire data. Of
particular importance therefore, is whether the regression results from the
annual report data and the questionnaire responses demonstrate differences
in findings and if so, what is the implication of this to governance-
performance relationship studies? In the next section, a summary of the key
results of the thesis are presented.
11.3 SUMMARY OF THE KEY RESULTS
The main focus of this thesis has been the investigation of the relationship
between the adoption of corporate governance related provisions of the
Ghanaian Code and firm performance. As has been noted in chapter three,
and until the introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003, there were some
inconsistencies and weaknesses in the regulation of firms in Ghana (Adda
and Consulting, 2006). However, the introduction of the Ghanaian Code has
provided a consistent approach by which the Ghanaian firms are governed.
In particular, it has documented a range of corporate governance provisions
which the Ghanaian listed firms are expected to adopt. But, does the
adoption of these corporate governance provisions really matter to firm
financial performance? Given that there is no direct evidence regarding the
adoption of the Ghanaian Code and its impact on firm performance, the
findings of this thesis discussed in chapters six, seven, eight, nine and ten
are summarised in this section. In particular, subsection 11.3.1 summarises
the key results based on the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code
provisions that have been discussed in chapter six. Subsections 11.3.2 and
11.3.3 provide a summary of the key results based on the specific
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governance mechanisms and the GCGI reported in chapter eight, and the
subsequent robustness checks in chapter nine. Subsection 11.3.4
summarises the key results of the directors’ opinions on corporate
governance and firm performance reported in chapter ten, while subsection
11.3.5 compares the key regression results and the questionnaire responses.
11.3.1 Results based on the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions
This subsection summarises the key results based on the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions. Using 283 total firm-year
observations from 2000 to 2009, the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian
Code containing 36 corporate governance provisions is measured by the
GCGI during pre 2003 and post 2003 of its introduction. In general, and
consistent with prior studies, the findings that have been presented in
chapter six suggest some variations in the degree of compliance among the
sample firms during the whole, pre 2003 and post 2003 periods. In
particular, and as reported in chapter six, the pattern in the distribution of
the GCGI over the ten years has the lowest GCGI (53%) in the year 2000,
and has progressively improved over the next nine years to 73% in 2009,
suggesting that firms were becoming more compliant over this period. A
positive relationship between the degree of compliance and time findings in
Ghana is further supported by prior studies in the UK, Australia and South
Africa (Shabbir and Padgett, 2008; Henry, 2008, Cui et al, 2008; Ntim,
2009) where a considerable improvement in the degree of compliance was
recorded over time among listed firms. This positive increase is driven by the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code provisions which show substantial
improvement from 2003 to 2004, suggesting that firms might have adopted
the provisions in response to the pressure they felt from being listed on the
Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE).
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Arguably, and as reported in chapter six, the full sampled firms aggregate
GCGI of 69% during the whole ten-year period is consistent with the
comparable prior index studies (Abdo and Fisher, 2007; Aggarwal et al,
2007). Whereas Abdo and Fisher (2007) found a G-Score of 61% in South
Africa, Aggarwal et al (2007) in their cross-country study reported GOV44 of
69%, 61%, 57% and 56% for Canada, US, Finland and the UK respectively.
These findings suggest that the Ghanaian listed firms’ degree of compliance
with corporate governance provisions is above average relative to the
compliance levels in the other parts of the world. However, the pre 2003 and
post 2003 GCGI show some notable differences between the subsamples. As
reported in chapter six, the pre 2003 recorded an aggregate compliance level
of 57%, whereas post 2003 recorded 73%. This shows a 28 percentage
change (i.e. from 57 pre 2003 to 73% post 2003); the change not consistent
with prior comparable index studies (Cui et al, 2008). In particular, Cui et al
(2008) reported a general change from 66% in 2001 to 71% in 2004
representing an 8 percentage change of their CGS. Given the differences in
the study periods, the extent of change among Ghanaian listed firms is
significantly higher than the change experienced by the Australian listed
firms. As explained in chapter six, Cui et al (2008) assessed compliance level
of the Australian listed firms’ for only one year before and one year after the
introduction of their country code, whereas this thesis covered three years
before and six years after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code.
The main hypothesis tested (i.e. hypothesis one) for the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions is that there is a significant
improvement in the degree of compliance with corporate governance
practices by listed firms from pre 2003 to post 2003 introduction of the
Ghanaian Code. After grouping the GCGI into sub-periods, and as reported in
chapter six, the findings based on pre 2003 and post 2003 introduction of the
Ghanaian Code suggest that there is a statistically significant improvement of
the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions measured by
the GCGI, and therefore hypothesis one cannot be rejected. This suggests
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that the sample firms were more compliant after the introduction of the
Ghanaian Code than when it was not in place. This improvement, one can
suggest, would have added to providing a consistent approach in which the
Ghanaian listed firms are governed with a clearer definition of the board of
directors’ responsibilities, board committees’ function, shareholder rights,
financial affairs and auditing and disclosure practices to enhance the effective
implementation of good corporate governance in Ghana. If the improvement
of the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions is then
reflected in the Ghanaian listed firms’ financial performance, then one can
conclude that the overall objective of implementing good corporate
governance in anticipation of enhancing firm performance is achieved.
Overall, the evidence presented in this subsection suggests that the degree
of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions from the Ghanaian listed
firms’ annual reports has significantly improved from pre 2003 to post 2003.
In particular, the Ghanaian listed firms were more compliant with corporate
governance after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003 than before
2003 when the code was not in place. This is consistent with expectations
because the Ghanaian listed firms were expected to comply with the
Ghanaian Code provisions or provide explanation for non-compliance as a
result of being listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). Furthermore, the
greater compliance with the Ghanaian Code indicates the Ghanaian listed
firms’ desire to improve their internal governance mechanisms in areas
where the potential conflict of interest between managers and shareholders
are high. This is particularly important because the evidence of greater
presence of non-executive directors in Ghanaian listed firms, for example, is
more likely to provide greater board independence as a measure to help
reduce the agency problems resulted from the separation of ownership and
control.
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11.3.2 Results based on the specific governance mechanisms
and firm performance
As has been indicated in chapters four and eight, four key hypotheses were
tested in this thesis for the specific governance mechanisms and firm
performance. The associated hypotheses include CEO duality, board size, the
PNEDs and the presence of board committees (i.e. audit and remuneration
committees). The second hypothesis tested in this thesis is that the
separation of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman should lead to higher
firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and Q-ratio. The CEO duality is
found to be positive but statistically insignificant under ROA, the finding not
consistent with the recommendations of the Ghanaian Code that encourages
role separation. This finding also does not provide empirical support to some
of the Ghanaian (Keyereboah-Coleman and Osei, 2008) and international
(Bozec, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) studies which reported negative
relationship between CEO duality and ROA.
Contrary to ROA, CEO duality is found to be negative but statistically
insignificant under ROE. This finding is consistent with prior international
studies (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Kajola, 2008; Sanda et al, 2010) who
reported the roles separation to have a positive impact on ROE. However, it
does not lend empirical support to hypothesis two that the separation of the
roles of the CEO and Chairman should lead to higher firm performance. The
insignificant coefficient also does not lend support to the recommendations of
the Ghanaian Code regarding roles separation. As in the case of ROA, the
CEO duality is found to be statistically insignificant but positively related to
Q-ratio, suggesting that hypothesis two is not supported. This evidence also
does not only lend support to the recommendations of the Ghanaian Code, it
contradicts past Ghanaian (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a) and
international (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Sanda et al,
2010) studies which reported a negative and statistically significant
association between CEO duality and Q-ratio. As reported in chapter eight,
the differences in findings between this thesis and Kyereboah-Coleman and
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Biekpe (2006a) may be explained by different governance data and the
estimation methods used by each study.
As reported in chapter eight, and grouping the annual report data into pre
2003 and post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code, the findings based
on the sub-periods are not significantly different from the whole period
regarding the relationship between the CEO duality and all the firm
performance measures (i.e. ROA, ROE and Q-ratio). However, the pre 2003
experienced insignificant negative relationship between CEO duality and the
firm performance measures of ROA and Q-ratio but with sign reversal during
post 2003 to a positive association between the two. By contrast, the CEO
duality is found to be statistically insignificant but negatively related to ROE
during pre 2003 and post 2003 periods, evidence consistent with the whole
period results. Empirically, the evidence of sign reversals under ROA is not
consistent with Bhagat and Bolton (2009) who found CEO duality to be
statistically significant and positively related to ROA before (pre 2002) and
after (post 2002) the SOX Act 2002. As explained earlier in chapter eight, the
differences in findings between these two studies might have been
contributed to by the differences in the estimation methods used, thus, fixed
effects regression used in this thesis versus OLS and 2SLS estimation
methods used by Bhagat and Bolton (2009). That notwithstanding, and after
subjected the results to a robustness check in chapter nine, the findings
based on the whole, pre 2003 and post 2003 periods remained unchanged,
suggesting that CEO duality has no impact on firm performance in Ghana.
The third hypothesis investigated in this thesis is that the smaller the board
size should lead to higher firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and Q-
ratio. As reported in chapter eight, the board size is found to be positive but
statistically insignificant under ROA, suggesting that hypothesis three is not
supported. By contrast, the board size is found to be statistically significant
and positively related to both ROE and Q-ratio. This suggests that hypothesis
three is supported and also lends empirical support to the recommendations
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of the Ghanaian Code on board size ranging from 8 to 16. The statistically
significant and positive association between board size and ROE lends
empirical support to the findings of Kajola (2008). Also, the statistically
significant and positive relationship between board size and Q-ratio provides
empirical support to the Ghanaian (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a)
and other international (Adam and Mehran, 2005; Coles et al, 2008; Henry,
2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Sanda et al, 2010) studies. However, this
finding is not in line with past studies (Yermack, 1996; Cheng, 2008; Guest,
2009) who reported negative and statistically significant association between
board size and Q-ratio. Arguably, the average board size of 8.52 which falls
between the range of eight and sixteen of the Ghanaian Code
recommendations indicates that the smaller board size appears to be more
effective for the operations of the Ghanaian listed firms than the larger board
size as reflected in the accounting-based firm performance measure of ROE.
In the same way, and as reported in chapter eight, smaller board size in
Ghana is also perceived by the market as more effective than larger board
size as reflected in the findings of this thesis and that of Kyereboah-Coleman
and Biekpe (2006a).
Grouping the annual report data into sub-periods, and as reported in chapter
eight, the board size is found to be statistically insignificant but positively
related to ROA and Q-ratio during pre 2003 and post 2003 sub-periods.
However, and whereas pre 2003 and post 2003 findings under ROA is
consistent with the whole period results, the positive and statistically
insignificant under Q-ratio during pre 2003 and post 2003 sub-periods is not
consistent with the whole period results where the relationship is statistically
significant between the two. Although, the pre 2003 positive and statistically
insignificant association between board size and ROE is similar to the results
of ROA and Q-ratio, the post 2003 period experienced a positive and
statistically significant relationship between the two. As reported in chapter
eight, the slight reduction of the average board size of the Ghanaian listed
firms from 9.03 during pre 2003 to 8.17 during post 2003 might have
341
affected ROE more significantly than ROA and Q-ratio during the post 2003
period.
That notwithstanding, and as reported in chapter nine, the pre 2003 and post
2003 findings are more sensitive after the robustness checks under ROA and
ROE than those for the whole period. Whereas the board size experienced
sign reversal to have insignificant negative impact on ROA during post 2003,
the board size during the pre 2003 period became statistically significant and
positively related to ROE. Given that the results are robust during the whole
period, it can be argued that the reduction of the number in observations
after lagging the board size might have caused the differences in findings
during the pre 2003 and post 2003 periods. Essentially, board size does
matter more in Ghana under ROE and Q-ratio during the whole period than
ROA, whereas the pre 2003 and post 2003 periods provide mixed results
under ROA and ROE after addressing the problems of endogeneity caused by
a time-lag. This suggests that the board size results during the whole period
can be considered as robust, while the results during pre 2003 and post 2003
sub-periods are sensitive to the problems of endogeneity caused by a time-
lag, and therefore the differences in findings between the two estimations.
The fourth hypothesis observed in this thesis is that the higher the proportion
of non-executive directors should lead to lower firm performance measured
by ROA, ROE and Q-ratio. As reported in chapter eight, the proportion of
non-executive directors (PNEDs) on the board (76%) is consistently found to
be statistically significant and negatively related to ROA, ROE and Q-ratio,
suggesting that hypothesis four is supported. However, this evidence does
not lend empirical support to the recommendations of the Ghanaian Code to
have a balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board
because the Ghanaian boards are not balanced (i.e. executive 24% and non-
executive directors 76%). That notwithstanding, the statistically significant
and negative association between the PNEDs and ROA is consistent with prior
studies in Ghana (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; 2006b) and other
international studies (Bozec, 2005; Guest, 2009). This is not the case for the
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statistically significant relationship between PNEDs and ROE where it does
not lend empirical support to past studies (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Daily
and Dalton, 1993) who reported a statistically significant and positive
association between the two. The statistically significant and negative
association between PNEDs and Q-ratio offers empirical support to past
Ghanaian (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a) and international
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Kiel and Nicolson, 2003) studies. Notably, the
poor performance based on the PNEDs can be explained by the unbalanced
nature of the Ghanaian boards relative to the recommendations of the
Ghanaian Code to have a balance of executive and non-executive directors.
As indicted in chapter eight, and grouping the annual report data into sub-
periods, the PNEDs is only found to be statistically significant and negatively
related to ROA during the pre 2003 period, whereas pre 2003 and post 2003
under ROE and Q-ratio remained negative but not statistically significant. The
pre 2003 evidence under ROA lends empirical support to the work of Bhagat
and Bolton (2009) who found a negative and statistically significant
association between board independence and ROA during the pre 2002 SOX
period. However, the statistically insignificant and negative association
between the two post 2003 is not consistent with Bhagat and Bolton (2009)
who experienced sign reversal to a positive and statistically significant
relationship between board independence and ROA. As explained in chapter
eight, and given the differences in findings during post periods under ROA of
the two studies, the US boards became more independent post 2002
adoption of SOX than the Ghanaian counterparts where the PNEDs did not
change significantly (i.e. from 75.20% during pre 2003 to 75.99% post
2003). In addition, the differences in the estimation methods used (i.e. fixed
effects regression versus OLS and 2SLS) might have caused the differences
in findings during post periods.
That notwithstanding, and after subjected the initial results into a robustness
check in chapter nine, the statistically significant and negative relationship
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between the PNEDs and the accounting-based firm performance measures
(i.e. ROA and ROE) remains unchanged during the whole period, suggesting
that the unbalanced nature of the Ghanaian boards is affecting firm
performance poorly in the country. However, the results experienced some
sensitivity during pre 2003 and post 2003 periods where a negative and
statistically significant impact is recorded under ROA and ROE during post
2003 after addressing the problems of endogeneity caused by a time-lag.
This suggests that the Ghanaian listed firms with high proportion of non-
executive directors on their board performed poorly after the introduction of
the Ghanaian Code because they did not comply with the code
recommendations of having a balance of executive and non-executive
directors on the board for effective decision making.
The fifth hypothesis examined in this thesis is that the presence of an audit
committee and a remuneration committee should lead to better firm
performance. As reported in chapter eight, the presence of audit and
remuneration committees are found to be statistically insignificant but
positively related to the accounting-based firm performance measures of ROA
and ROE, whereas the relationship between these committees and Q-ratio is
negative and positive but statistically insignificant for audit and remuneration
committees, respectively. This suggests that hypothesis five is not
supported. Empirically, this evidence does not lend support to the
recommendations of the Ghanaian Code which encourages the establishment
of these committees. However, the positive and statistically insignificant
relationship between audit and remuneration committees and ROA is
consistent with prior Ghanaian (Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu, 2008) and
international (Weir and Laing, 1999) studies. This is not the case of the
relationship between audit committee and ROE where it does not lend
empirical support to Kajola (2008) who reported a negative association
between the two. The negative and statistically insignificant association
between audit committee and Q-ratio offers empirical support to the
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evidence reported in the UK by Weir et al (2002) who reported a negative
relationship between the two.
As reported in chapter eight, and grouping the annual report data into sub-
periods, a remuneration committee is only found to be statistically significant
and positively related to ROA and ROE during the pre 2003 period, whereas
the audit committee during pre 2003 and post 2003 periods under ROA, ROE
and Q-ratio did not experience any significantly different results from the
whole period. This suggests that the Ghanaian listed firms which established
a remuneration committee before the introduction of the Ghanaian Code
perform better than firms which did not have a remuneration committee in
place during the same period. After the introduction of the Ghanaian Code,
both committees did not have any significant impact on firm performance
despite the significant improvement of the adoption of audit committee from
34% during pre 2003 to 85% post 2003. As explained in chapter eight, the
establishment of these committees may matter but their impact on firms
could not be seen in isolation unless the composition requirements of such
committees are met. As in the case of other specific governance
mechanisms, the robustness checks in chapter nine based on the board
committees did not experience any significant changes during the whole, pre
2003 and post 2003 periods. In this case, it can be concluded that the
establishment of both audit and remuneration committees has no significant
impact on firm performance after the publication of the Ghanaian Code,
evidence consistent with Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Weir et al (2002)
in their UK studies.
The evidence presented in this subsection regarding CEO duality, board size,
proportion of non-executive directors, audit and remuneration committees
either suggest statistically significant or in most cases no relationship
between each of the five specific governance mechanisms and different firm
performance measures (ROA, ROE and Q-ratio). Specifically, the results show
that board size has a significant positive impact on firm performance
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measured by ROE. In the earlier theoretical discussion, it was observed that
smaller boards are more effective in monitoring managers than larger boards
since larger boards are seen by investors as ineffective and are likely to
consume more managerial perquisites. In addition, the larger boards may
also affect firm performance negatively because the additional costs
associated with slow decision-making is higher than the marginal benefits if
the number of directors exceeds ten. In this respect, the board size-
performance relationship evidence presented indicates that this may indeed
be the case because the Ghanaian boards are less than ten. The proportion
of non-executive directors shows a significant negative impact on firm
performance measured by ROA, ROE and Q-ratio. This result here support
the idea that boards with a higher proportion of non-executive directors hold
back managerial initiative through excess monitoring and therefore the
benefit of board independence, objectivity and experience expected from the
representation of outside directors appears to be ineffective, hence, poor firm
performance. Consistent with previous studies, CEO duality, audit and
remuneration committees have no impact on firm performance.
11.3.3 Results based on the GCGI and firm performance
Given that the specific governance mechanisms-performance relationships
above have provided mixed results, the main hypothesis (i.e. hypothesis six)
tested in this thesis to establish whether the full adoption of the 36 Ghanaian
Code provisions is more beneficial to firm performance than its specific
provisions is that there is a significant positive association between the
Ghanaian corporate governance index (GCGI) and firm performance
measures of ROA, ROE and Q-ratio. As reported in chapter eight, the GCGI
under all firm performance measures is found to have a positive but
statistically insignificant association between them, suggesting that
hypothesis six is not supported. That notwithstanding, the statistically
insignificant and positive association between the GCGI and ROA is
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consistent with past governance index-performance relationship studies in
developed (Clacher et al, 2008; Bassen et al, 2008; Gupta et al, 2009) and
other developing (Larcker et al, 2007; Price et al, 2011) countries.
However, this result differs from prior studies in other developed and
developing countries which reported a statistically significant and positive
relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance
(Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Ponnu and Ramthandin,
2008; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Ntim, 2009; Gupta et al, 2009; Renders et
al, 2010; Bauer et al, 2010). Specifically, and in the context of Africa where
this thesis is based, Ntim (2009) found a statistically significant and positive
relationship between the South African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI)
and ROA. Given the differences in the results, and as reported in chapter
eight, two possible explanations can be put forward. First, this thesis
included periods (i.e. from 2000 to 2009) of both pre and post publication of
the Ghanaian Code provisions, whereas Ntim (2009) only focused on the post
King II Report to develop the SACGI (i.e. from 2002 to 2006) which might
have affected the findings when using the whole data. Second, and as
reported by Black et al (2006a) regarding large differences of the coefficients
of OLS and fixed effects regressions and significant levels, including signs
reversals in their studies in which they cast doubts on the OLS results, the
differences in findings between this thesis and that of Ntim (2009) may be
attributed to the fixed effects versus OLS regressions used as estimation
methods.
Similarly, the statistically insignificant and positive association between the
GCGI and ROE lends empirical support to prior studies which reported
statistically insignificant but positive association between the Germany
Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) index and ROE (Bassen et al, 2008).
This result however does not lend empirical support to other prior studies
which reported statistically significant and positive association between their
respective index and ROE (Cheung et al, 2007; Bauer et al, 2010; Renders et
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al, 2010). As reported in chapter eight, Renders et al (2010) found a
negative association between their overall index and ROE for the initial
analysis but after controlling for the sample selection bias and endogeneity,
the negative sign changed to positive and became statistically significant. In
addition, the GCGI-Q-ratio positive but statistically insignificant relationship
lends empirical support to prior studies in the developed (Bauer et al, 2003;
Gupta et al, 2009; Aggarwal et al, 2007; Bruno and Claessens, 2010) and
developing ( Kouwenberg, 2006; Garay and Gonzalez; 2008; Cheung et al,
2010) countries. However, the result in this thesis does not lend empirical
support to other prior studies in developed (Gompers et al, 2003; Drobetz et
al, 2004; Beiner et al, 2006; Brown and Caylor et al, 2006; Clacher et al,
2008; Ammann et al, 2011; Bauer et al, 2010) and developing (Klapper and
Love, 2004; Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; Black et al, 2006a; Javed
and Igbal, 2007; Black et al, 2010; Balasubramanian et al, 2010) countries
which reported statistically significant and positive association between their
governance indices and firm performance measured by Q-ratio.
Fundamentally, the results based on the relationship between the GCGI and
both the accounting-based (ROA and ROE) and the market-based (Q-ratio)
firm performance measures indicate that corporate governance does not
matter to firm performance in Ghana during the whole period. However, the
results do not fully reveal the effect of each of the six sub-indices51 of the
GCGI on firm performance. In all, and as reported in chapter eight, financial
affairs and auditing index is found to drive the GCGI-ROA relationship as
being statistically significant and negatively related to ROA. Similarly, the
board composition index is found to drive the GCGI-ROE relationship as being
statistically significant and positively related to ROE, evidence not consistent
with Cheung et al (2007) who reported statistically insignificant but positive
association between the two.
51 The six sub-indices include board composition index, audit committee index, remuneration committee
index, shareholder rights index, financial affairs and auditing index and disclosure index.
348
As reported in chapter eight, and grouping the annual report data into sub-
periods, the GCGI is found to be statistically significant and positively related
to the accounting-based firm performance measures (i.e. ROA and ROE)
during the pre 2003 period, suggesting that hypothesis six is supported. The
post 2003 period, however, suggests that the GCGI has no impact on all the
firm performance measures. These results suggest that the Ghanaian listed
firms which voluntarily adopted some of the 36 provisions before the formal
introduction of the Ghanaian Code perform better than those firms which did
not adopt such provisions. As in the case of the whole period, the pre 2003
period relationship is driven by audit and remuneration committees indices
with a statistical significantly and positively related to both ROA and ROE,
whereas the post 2003 period GCGI-Q-ratio negative relationship is driven by
shareholder rights index or financial affairs and auditing index which are
statistically significant and positively or negatively related to Q-ratio.
As reported in chapter nine, and after subjecting the above results to
endogeneity tests and a series of robustness checks, the relationship
between the lagged GCGI and performance during the whole period under
ROA remains unchanged, whereas the GCGI-ROE relationship experienced a
positive and statistically significant under ROE. This suggests that there is an
improvement in the relationship under ROE after addressing the problems of
endogeneity caused by a time-lag. However, the GCGI-accounting-based firm
performance results do not show the impact of each of the lagged sub-
indices on firm performance. In this regard, the positive and statistically
significant level of the lagged board composition and shareholder rights
indices as well as lagged negative and statistically significant of the financial
affairs and auditing and disclosure indices are seen to drive the positive but
insignificant lagged GCGI-ROA relationship. Similarly, the positive and
statistically significant level of remuneration committee and shareholder
rights indices affected the statistically significant and positive association
between a lagged GCGI and ROE. Given that the financial affairs and auditing
index is robust under ROA, the board composition, remuneration committee,
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shareholder rights and disclosure indices experienced some sensitivity under
both ROA and ROE after addressing the problems of endogeneity caused by a
time-lag.
After grouping the annual report data into pre 2003 and post 2003, and as
reported in chapter nine, the statistically significant and positive relationship
between GCGI and the accounting-based firm performance measures (i.e.
ROA and ROE) reported during the pre 2003 period changed to positive and
statistically insignificant after lagging the GCGI. Similarly, a lagged GCGI
during the post 2003 period has no impact on the accounting-based firm
performance measures. These results suggest that a lagged GCGI during pre
2003 and post 2003 periods is more sensitive under ROA and ROE, evidence
not supported by the earlier conclusion that corporate governance is
important to profitability prior to the introduction of the Ghanaian Code
provisions. As noted in chapter nine, the differences in findings based on the
pre 2003 and post 2003 periods un-lagged and lagged GCGI may be
explained by the differences in the number of observations between the two
estimations as these were reduced from 65 (pre 2003) and 193 (post 2003)
to 42 and 154 during the same periods, respectively. With regard to the six
sub-indices during pre 2003 and post 2003 periods, only a lagged
shareholder rights index under both ROA and ROE experienced some
sensitivity during the post 2003 period with a positive and statistically
significant impact on the accounting-based firm performance measures, but
it could not drive a lagged GCGI-performance relationship to a statistically
significant level.
To further address the problems of endogeneity, and using panel
instrumental variable regressions, the evidence of the relationship between
the GCGI and firm performance during the whole, pre 2003 and post 2003
period suggests that the adoption of corporate governance provisions as a
whole does matter to the Ghanaian listed firms’ profitability. As reported in
chapter nine, and given that Renders et al (2010) governance index
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improved from a negative to a positive and statistically significant impact on
firm performance after controlling for endogeneity, it is therefore not
surprising to have improved results based on the instrumented GCGI relative
to the un-instrumented GCGI results reported earlier. Essentially, the results
in this thesis provide strong empirical support for the main argument that
corporate governance does matter to firm performance holistically rather
than its specific governance mechanisms after addressing the problems of
endogeneity. In particular, the results are encouraging for the development
of a code of best practice on corporate governance to regulate the
operational environment of firms rather than the selective adoption of its
specific governance mechanisms.
In summary, the evidence presented in this subsection suggests that the
GCGI has a significant positive impact on firm performance measured by ROA
and ROE. This finding is consistent with expectations because the Ghanaian
listed firms are expected to adopt the Ghanaian Code provisions holistically
but not on an individual basis. In the earlier theoretical discussion, it was
argued that firm performance is affected holistically by a set of the specific
governance mechanisms but not on an individual basis since integrating
these mechanisms into a single governance index provides more explanatory
power in explaining firm performance than each of the specific governance
mechanisms. In addition, the purpose of the specific governance mechanisms
in reducing the agency problems may not be achieved if corporate
governance provisions are adopted selectively. The evidence presented here
suggests that this may be the case since not all the specific governance
mechanisms are more effective in affecting firm performance as
demonstrated by the specific governance mechanisms-performance
relationship presented earlier. Viewed from this point, the Ghanaian firms are
encouraged to fully implement the Ghanaian Code provisions rather than the
selective adoption of its specific provisions in an attempt to improve their
performance.
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11.3.4 Results based on the directors’ opinions on corporate
governance and firm performance
As one of the objectives of this thesis, and given that the directors of the
Ghanaian listed firms are responsible for the implementation of good
corporate governance, their views were sought regarding the adoption of the
Ghanaian Code provisions and its benefit to firm performance to validate and
complement the regression results from the annual report data. In this
respect, all the six hypotheses tested in chapters six and eight were
examined based on the questionnaire responses, as well as additional issues
not addressed by the annual report data. In relation to corporate governance
implementation issues, the respondents believe strongly that the Ghanaian
Code is a benchmark for good corporate governance in Ghana, and that the
standard of corporate governance in their firms has improved since the
introduction of the Ghanaian Code, suggesting that hypothesis one is
supported. Empirically, this evidence also reinforces past results reported by
Ocran (2001) that the concept of corporate governance has gained grounds
in Ghana.
However, and given that the annual report data could not help to investigate
additional issues such as the directors’ preparedness to comply with further
corporate governance and the need to review the Ghanaian Code by an
independent committee, the questionnaire responses have provided some
interesting results. In particular, and as reported in chapter ten, the
respondents strongly believe that their firms are prepared to comply with
further corporate governance requirements such as the establishment of a
nomination committee, if not complied with presently. While respondents
provided weak support that the current regulatory and institutional bodies
are supportive enough to help implement the Ghanaian Code provisions, they
strongly believed that there is a need to review the Ghanaian Code by an
independent committee. This is particularly important, and as indicated in
chapters three and ten, the Ghanaian Code has not been reviewed since its
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introduction and reviewing it may help to bring it in line with what is
practised around the world.
As reported in chapter ten, and given the directors opinions on the adoption
of the specific governance provisions and firm performance, the respondents
strongly believed that the separation of the roles of the CEO and the
Chairman is beneficial to their firm’s performance, suggesting that hypothesis
two is supported. Empirically, this result also provides clear support for the
Ghanaian Code recommendations of role separation between the CEO and
the Chairman. However, the respondents offered no support to have total
board members ranging from eight to sixteen as beneficial to their firm
performance, suggesting that hypothesis three is not supported. This
evidence also does not lend empirical support to the recommendations of the
Ghanaian Code for having a board size of between eight and sixteen. As
reported in chapter ten, the minimum of eight and the maximum of sixteen
board members recommended by the Ghanaian Code may be criticized
because the two are all even numbers. If the listed firms complied with the
board size of either eight or sixteen, and in the course of the board decision
making a vote tied, it would be very difficult for the board to arrive at a
decision. This problem further supports the views of the directors to review
the Ghanaian Code in order to take remedial action.
In relation to board independence, and as reported in chapter ten, the
respondents strongly believe that to have a balance of executive and non-
executive directors on the board is beneficial to their firm’s performance,
suggesting that hypothesis four is not supported. However, this evidence
lends empirical support to the recommendations of the Ghanaian Code to
have a balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board.
Similarly, there is strong support for the establishment of board committees.
In particular, the respondents strongly believe that the presence of audit and
remuneration committees is beneficial to their firm’s performance,
suggesting that hypothesis five is supported. Empirically, this result offers
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further support to the recommendations of the Ghanaian Code for the
establishment of these committees. Arguably, and except for the board
members specific governance provision where the respondents do not
support its range from eight to sixteen as beneficial to their firm’s
performance, the respondents strongly felt that separating the roles of the
CEO and Chairman, having a balance of executive and non-executive
directors, the presence of audit and remuneration committees are all
beneficial to their firm’s performance in Ghana. This suggests that the
directors who are responsible for the implementation of the Ghanaian Code
support a majority of its specific provisions selected for investigation in this
thesis.
That notwithstanding, and as reported in chapter ten, the respondents also
have a strong belief that the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code is beneficial
to their firm’s performance rather than its specific provisions, suggesting that
hypothesis six is supported. Empirically, this evidence is in line with previous
directors’ opinions study (Jenkins-Ferrett, 2001) in South Africa where the
respondents rated corporate governance as utmost important to important in
contributing to their firm’s performance. As noted in chapter ten, this
evidence also provides further support to the views shared by Metrick and
Ishii (2002) and Klapper and Love (2004) that the adoption of corporate
governance matters more in countries with weak legal systems relative to
countries with strong legal systems. This is particularly important because
the result from the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance in this thesis does not lend empirical support to the past
directors’ opinions studies in the UK (CBI/Touch Ross, 1995; Moxey et al,
2004). Specifically, CBI/Touch Ross (1995) in their directors’ opinions study
reported that the Cadbury recommendations have had no positive impact on
their firm’s performance, suggesting that the adoption of corporate
governance provisions does matter more in countries with weak legal
systems.
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The evidence presented in this subsection provides more insights on the
degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code and its impact on firm
performance from the directors’ standpoint. First, the evidence suggests that
the Ghanaian Code is a benchmark for good corporate governance, and that
the standard of corporate governance has improved since its introduction in
2003. In addition, the directors are prepared to comply with further
corporate governance provisions such as the establishment of a nomination
committee and support the need to review the Ghanaian Code. They however
provided a weak support for the current regulatory and institutional bodies
regarding the support they receive from them in their effort to implement
good corporate governance. In terms of the adoption of the Ghanaian Code
provisions and its impact on firm performance, the directors provide strong
support for the specific governance mechanisms regarding the separation of
the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, to have a balance of executive and
non-executive directors on the board, the establishment of audit and
remuneration committees to be beneficial to their firm’s performance. They
however considered the recommended board members ranging from eight to
sixteen by the Ghanaian Code as not beneficial to their firm performance.
That notwithstanding, the directors provide support for the full adoption of
the Ghanaian Code as beneficial to their firm’s performance instead of the
selective adoption of its specific provisions.
11.3.5 Comparison of the key regression results and the
questionnaire responses
As has been discussed in subsection 1.3 of chapter one, the final objective of
this thesis is to investigate whether the use of multiple governance data has
the potential to affect the findings of the relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance study. Methodologically, the key
regression results from the annual report data and the questionnaire
responses from the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms are compared to
establish the validity or otherwise of the regression results from the annual
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report data. In this respect, the evidence based on the annual report data
regarding the significant improvement in the degree of compliance with
corporate governance after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code is
validated by the questionnaire responses. For the degree of compliance, the
directors’ responses that the standard of corporate governance has improved
in their firms since the introduction of the Ghanaian Code validate the
interpretation of the statistically significant improvement from the pre 2003
period to the post 2003 period. This suggests that the degree of compliance
with the Ghanaian Code provisions has improved both in practice and from
the directors’ opinions which may be a good sign for regulators of corporate
governance in Ghana.
With regard to the adoption of the Ghanaian Code specific governance
provisions and its impact on firm performance, a number of interesting
results emerge when comparing the regression results and the questionnaire
responses. For role separation, while insignificant results are shown in the
regression results, the respondents in this case suggest that the separation
of the roles of the CEO and Chairman is beneficial to their firm’s
performance. As reported in chapter ten, the differences in findings between
the regression results and the directors’ opinions on the role separation may
be explained in that the directors might see the implementation of the role
separation as beneficial to their firm’s performance, but in practice, that may
not be the case as evidenced in the regression results from the annual report
data. This suggests that separating the two roles may not necessarily
guarantee firm performance unless other specific governance mechanisms
are effectively adopted. For example, a firm may have its two roles separated
but if they do not have the right board size with members who are not
politically chosen in place for decision making, this may not have any positive
impact on firm performance. This is because, and as one may argue, the
strength of the board may depend on the strength of the individual
members, but it is not the size that matters for important decision making.
That notwithstanding, there is clear indication that the directors who are
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responsible for the implementation of good corporate governance in their
various firms appear to value role separation in Ghana.
By contrast, the regression results of board size having a positive and
statistically significant impact on firm performance measured by ROE and Q-
ratio is in disagreement with the responses from the directors who offered no
support to the board members ranging from eight to sixteen as beneficial to
their firm’s performance. However, the regression results of statistical
insignificance based on ROA is in agreement with the respondents’ view of
board size not being beneficial to their firm’s performance. The differences in
findings may be explained in that the directors in Ghana focus more on
smaller board sizes (i.e. average board size is 8.52) rather than the range
recommended by the Ghanaian Code of between eight and sixteen. For the
balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board, the
regression results show that, and regardless of the firm performance
measure used, the PNEDs has a negative and statistically significant impact
on firm performance. This result is in disagreement with the responses from
the directors that to have a balance of executive and non-executive directors
is beneficial to their firm’s performance. The differences in findings is not
surprising because, and based on critical observation during the reading of
the Ghanaian listed firms annual reports, a majority of the firms have only
the CEO as an executive director to sit on the board. Similar to the above
differences, the board committees also appear to have no positive impact on
firm performance based on the regression results, whereas the responses
from the directors suggest that the presence of audit and remuneration
committees are beneficial to their firm’s performance. However, and using
the GCGI as the equivalent of the full adoption of the 36 Ghanaian Code
provisions, the regression results of positive and statistically significant
impact on the Ghanaian listed firms profitability is validated by the responses
of the directors who noted that the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code is
beneficial to their firm’s performance.
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Overall, the comparison of the regression results and the questionnaire
responses based on a majority of the specific governance provisions’ benefit
to firm performance is extremely mixed, whereas there is consensus between
the two based on the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions. These
results have important methodological suggestions for future corporate
governance research. Specifically, the type of governance data can
potentially affect governance-performance relationship research findings.
Arguably, and given the consensus between the regression results and the
questionnaire responses based on the GCGI or the full adoption of the
Ghanaian Code provisions, the full adoption of a particular code may be more
important to firm performance than its specific provisions. A possible
explanation is that the development of a corporate governance index cut
across several specific governance provisions to cover actual firms’ different
governance qualities to constitute the overall index. This is reinforced by the
directors who support the idea of the full adoption of a code of best practices
instead of the selective adoption of its specific provisions. Fundamentally, the
full adoption of a particular code of best practice or the development of a
corporate governance index is expected to have a positive impact on firm
performance rather than the selective adoption of its provisions.
11.4 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
Given that there is no evidence regarding the adoption of the Ghanaian Code
provisions and its impact on firm performance in Ghana, this thesis makes
extensions to the existing corporate governance literature and numerous new
contributions to knowledge. First, the Ghanaian Code on corporate
governance suggests that the practices embodied in it are not backed by the
force of law but no study to date has investigated the degree of compliance
among Ghanaian listed firms. This thesis fills this gap in the extant literature
by providing for the first time the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian
Code provisions during the pre 2003 and post 2003 periods. The evidence
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shows that there is significant improvement in the degree of compliance from
pre 2003 to post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code. Although, the
degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions has improved, there
are significant differences in governance standards among Ghanaian listed
firms which can mainly be explained by the formal adoption of the Ghanaian
Code provisions among Ghanaian listed firms.
Second, using corporate governance data directly gathered from annual
reports of the Ghanaian listed firms, this thesis investigates the relationship
between corporate governance practices and firm performance in the context
of pre 2003 and post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code. The findings
suggest that the GCGI developed from the Ghanaian Code provisions has a
positive and statistically significant impact on firm performance. Third, the
thesis provides the first direct evidence of the directors’ opinions on the
adoption of corporate governance and their firm’s performance. The findings
from the responses of the directors suggest that the adoption of the
Ghanaian Code provisions is beneficial to their firm’s performance. These
responses lead to the enhancement of the theoretical interpretations of the
regression results particularly for the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code
provisions impact on firm performance. Given the regression results and the
directors’ responses, the applicability of corporate governance provisions
replicated from the worldwide corporate governance reforms underpinned by
the agency theory is supported in explaining firm performance in Ghana.
Fourth, the thesis provides a methodological extension to prior governance-
performance relationship studies because it incorporates not only the
extensively used specific governance mechanisms in the study of
governance-performance relationships, but also the GCGI and the directors’
opinions on corporate governance and firm performance in the same study
and context. The comparison of the regression results from the annual report
data and the directors’ responses helps investigate the consistency or
otherwise of the governance-performance relationship testing. In particular,
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the directors’ opinions on corporate governance and firm performance
support the interpretation and understanding of the findings from the GCGI
and the specific governance mechanisms’ impact on firm performance.
Furthermore, the analysis of the directors’ responses has helped to discover
additional issues that are not captured by the regression results from the
annual report data. For example, the directors’ preparedness to comply with
further corporate governance provisions such as the establishment of a
nomination committee and their strong support for a review of the Ghanaian
Code is clear evidence that might help regulators to take remedial action.
Finally, a number of implications can be drawn from the investigation of the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Ghana.
In particular, the analyses of the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian
Code provisions and the responses from the directors from the Ghanaian
listed firms suggest that corporate governance standards have improved
since the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. This suggests that attempts by
corporate governance regulators and institutional bodies such as the Security
and Exchange Commission Ghana (SECG), Institute of Directors Ghana (IoD-
Ghana), Ghana Stock exchange (GSE) and the Institute of Chartered
Accountants Ghana (ICAG) are gradually beginning to have a positive impact
on compliance over time. However, and as discussed in section 6.2 of
chapter six, the analyses show the lack of compliance for certain specific
governance provisions52 which suggest that some of them may not be
suitable in the Ghanaian context or there is lack of compliance or
enforcement on the part of regulators. One other implication of this result is
that the Ghanaian Code lacks some recommendations that are comparable to
international standards such as the establishment of a nomination committee
and the chairmanship of a remuneration committee. Similarly, the
52 These include the frequency of board meetings, existence of finance director, members of audit
committee with adequate financial knowledge, existence of remuneration committee, composition of
remuneration committee, disclosure of remuneration committee membership, NED as the chairman of
remuneration committee, board of directors’ remuneration in stock and the opportunity for shareholders to
vote by mail.
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recommendations regarding board size ranging from eight to sixteen and the
unclear definition of what constitutes a balance of executive and non-
executive directors may require further considerations. It can therefore be
argued in this thesis, and as in line with the directors’ support for an
independent committee to review the Ghanaian Code, that there is a need for
regulators to take remedial action. However, any changes should be
considered by comparing the cost and benefit that can be derived from the
review.
Although the regression results and the responses from the directors on the
selective adoption of the specific governance provisions are mixed, the GCGI
positive and statistically significant impact on firm performance validated by
the responses from the directors implies that better governed firms perform
better than poorly governed firms in Ghana. These results have some
important implications. For the Ghanaian firms, the improvement in their
degree of compliance with the Ghanaian code provisions can provide a means
of achieving profitability in their respective firms. For regulators, it is
encouraging for the development of a code of best practice on corporate
governance to regulate the operational environment of firms in Ghana rather
than the selective adoption of the specific governance provisions.
11.5 LIMITATIONS
The key findings of this thesis are important but may suffer from data
limitations which need to be recognised. First, the sample size used is limited
to an average of 28 listed firms over the ten year period. However, the
sample size is larger than prior average samples of Ghanaian studies
(Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; 2006b). For example, Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) used a sample size of 16 non-financial
Ghanaian listed firms to examine the relationship between board size, board
composition, CEO duality and firm performance over the period of 1990 to
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2001. Also, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006b) in conducting a
comparative analysis of listed and non-listed banks in Ghana collected data
on 18 firms over the period 1990 to 2001. However, the ten year period
covered in this thesis to generate a total of 283 firm-year observations is
more or less a representation of the population of firms listed on the GSE.
Second, the compromise between the limitations of manual collection and the
need to have adequate data for the panel data analysis makes the data
collection an extremely labour-intensive exercise for corporate governance
and firm performance variables. In this respect, practical limitations such as
finance and time taken to read relevant pages of the 283 annual reports to
decide whether a particular provision is complied with or not, and binary
coding the number of provisions that are complied by the listed firms for
eventual development of the GCGI were expensive and time consuming.
However, and given that the development of the GCGI is based on an un-
weighted approach, the binary coding may not reflect the relative importance
of the different corporate governance provisions. In this respect, future
research may assign weights to each of the corporate governance provisions
but this may have the disadvantage of making subjective judgements
relative to the importance of each corporate governance provision.
Third, one of the underpinnings of agency model is the separation of
ownership and control. This indicates that ownership structure affects the
extent of agency problems faced by a firm. This thesis did not include
ownership data and it is recognised that this is an important limitation of the
thesis. However, the methodology employed in the analysis is consistent with
a number of recently published papers that have analysed the specific
governance mechanisms-performance relationship (Abdullah, 2004; Haniffa
and Hudaib, 2006; Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; 2006b; Ujunwa,
2012) and governance index-performance relationship (Black et al 2006a;
Cui et al, 2008; Ntim, 2009; Bozec, 2010; Price et al, 2011) but did not
include ownership data. For example, Price et al (2011), in an approach
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similar to that employed in this thesis, used compliance data from the
Mexican code of best practices to investigate the impact of governance
reform on performance and transparency. They did not include ownership as
control variable in their empirical analysis. In this respect, future research
may include ownership as a control variable in the empirical analysis in order
to capture the importance of different ownership structures in an agency
theory analysis.
Fourth, the thesis focuses on firms listed on the GSE. It did not cover
unlisted firms in Ghana. Similarly, the executive and non-executive directors
selected as respondents to the questionnaire are the directors of the firms
listed on the GSE. The thesis did not seek the opinions of directors of unlisted
firms in Ghana. In this respect, corporate governance data are mainly from
firm annual reports and therefore the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions in this thesis should be considered as absolute
compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions based on firm annual reports.
However, there are other media where a listed firm may disclose its
corporate governance practices such as the firm’s website and regulatory
report to SECG. Essentially, the thesis did not consider corporate governance
practices disclosed in other media. Fifth, and given the likely prejudices and
personal circumstances, the directors’ responses to the questionnaire may
have been subjected to their personal biases and possible influences. Also,
and given the respondents time constraint, they failed to answer questions in
section D of the questionnaire which would have provided other qualitative
information which would have been useful for the findings of the thesis.
11.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis identifies a number of areas for future research. First, and as has
already been indicated, it only examines firms that are listed on the GSE;
future research could expand this to unlisted Ghanaian firms. This could
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create a platform for a comparative analysis between listed and unlisted
firms and also provide the opportunity for a larger sample. In relation to the
directors’ opinions, future research may use interview techniques to examine
whether the adoption of corporate governance provisions is beneficial to firm
performance in Ghana. This could also be extended by seeking the opinions
of the institutional investors and financial analysts to enhance the findings in
Ghana. Second, future research might want to refine the development of the
GCGI by assigning weightings relative to the importance of each of the
corporate governance provisions. Third, future research can investigate the
determinants of the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions,
as well as the relationship between the adoption of the Ghanaian Code
provisions and agency costs among Ghanaian listed firms. Fourth, the
definitions of some of the variables used in this thesis could be improved. For
example, the proportion of non-executive directors could be separated into
independent and non-independent directors. Finally, this thesis uses
accounting-based (ROA and ROE) and market-based (Q-ratio) firm
performance measures because they are proxies frequently used in corporate
governance research. A future research into other measures such as return
on capital employed (ROCE) and share price may be necessary to investigate
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in
Ghana.
11.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has provided conclusions to the thesis. First, it has presented an
overview of the objectives of the thesis. In this regard, four main objectives
were highlighted to include the following: (1) to measure the degree of
compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions among Ghanaian listed firms,
(2) to empirically investigate the relationship between the degree of
compliance of the Ghanaian Code provisions and firm performance, (3) to
empirically evaluate the perceptions of the directors of the Ghanaian listed
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firms on the adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions and its benefit to their
firm’s performance, and (4) to critically examine whether the use of multiple
governance data has the potential to affect the results of the relationship
between corporate governance and firm performance. These objectives are
achieved given the opportunity provided by the data collected from the firm’s
annual reports and the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms over the study
period.
Second, the chapter attempted to summarise the key results of the thesis. In
this respect, the results based on the degree of compliance with the
Ghanaian Code provisions suggest significant improvement over the period
under investigation, evidence supported by the responses from directors.
However, the regression results from the annual report data relative to the
responses from directors on the selective adoption of the five specific
governance provisions benefit to firm performance are generally mixed, and
in most cases the regression results indicating a statistically weak impact on
firm performance in Ghana. By contrast, the GCGI is found to have a
statistically significant and positive impact on firm performance, suggesting
that better governed firms, on average, tend to perform better than the
poorly governed firms in Ghana. Essentially, this evidence is validated by the
responses from directors that the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code
provisions is beneficial to their firm’s performance instead of the selective
adoption of its specific governance provisions.
Third, the chapter has highlighted the contributions of the thesis. In this
regard, the thesis makes extensions to the existing corporate governance
research and a numerous new contributions to knowledge as follows: (1) it
fills the gap in the extant literature by providing for the first time the degree
of compliance with the Ghanaian Code provisions during pre 2003 and post
2003 periods, (2) it provides the first direct evidence of the relationship
between corporate governance practices and firm performance in the context
of pre 2003 and post 2003 introduction of the Ghanaian Code, as well as
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systematically addressing potential problems of endogeneity, (3) it offers the
first direct evidence of the directors opinions on the adoption of corporate
governance provisions and their firm’s performance, (4) it makes for the first
time a comparison of results based on the regression estimates and the
responses from the directors on the benefit of the adoption of the Ghanaian
Code provisions, (5) it provides for the first time an integration of the
extensively used specific governance mechanisms in the study of
governance-performance relationship, governance index-performance
relationship and the directors opinions on corporate governance and firm
performance in the same study and context, and (6) it has shown a number
of policy implications from the findings which include the significant
improvement in the degree of compliance which is a positive sign for
regulators’ effort, the need to review the Ghanaian Code by an independent
committee and the consensus by the regression results and the responses
from directors that better-governed firms, on average, perform better than
poorly-governed firms in Ghana.
Fourth, the chapter has discussed the limitations of the thesis. It has
highlighted data limitations as the main focus in this thesis. In particular, the
sample size used is limited to firms listed on the GSE and the compromise
between the limitations of manual collection and the need to have adequate
data for the panel data analysis makes it extremely labour-intensive. Also,
the development of the GCGI based on an un-weighted approach may not
reflect the relative importance of each of the different corporate governance
provisions. Arguably, and given the likely prejudices and personal
circumstances, the responses from the directors may have been subject to
their personal biases and influences.
Finally, the chapter has provided suggestions for future research. In this
regard, future research may expand the investigation of firms listed on the
GSE to include unlisted firms which could create a platform for a comparative
analysis between listed and unlisted firms. Future research might also want
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to refine the development of the GCGI by assigning weights relative to the
importance of the corporate governance provisions. In relation to the
directors’ opinions, future research may use interview techniques which could
also be extended to institutional investors and financial analysts to examine
whether the adoption of corporate governance provisions is beneficial to firm
performance. Essentially, the determinants of the degree of compliance with
the Ghanaian Code provisions, as well as the relationship between the
adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions and agency costs among Ghanaian
listed firms may require future investigation. Given the firm performance
variables used in this thesis, future research may use alternative accounting-
based and market-based firm performance variables to investigate the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Ghana.
367
REFERENCES
ABBOTT, L.J., PARKER, S. and PETERS, G.F., 2004. Audit committee
characteristics and restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory,
23(1), pp. 69-87
ABDO, A. and FISHER, G., 2007. The impact of reported corporate
governance disclosure on the financial performance of companies listed on
the JSE. Investment Analysts Journal, 66, pp. 43-56
ABDULLAH, S.N., 2004. Board composition, CEO duality and performance
among Malaysian listed companies. Corporate Governance, 4(4), pp. 47-61
ABOAGYE, A.Q. and OTIEKU, J., 2010. Are Ghanaian MFIs' performance
associated with corporate governance? Corporate Governance, 10(3), pp.
307-320
ABOR, J. and BIEKPE, N., 2007. Corporate governance, ownership structure
and performance of SMEs in Ghana: implications for financing opportunities.
Corporate Governance, 7(3), pp. 288-300
ADAMS, R.B. and MEHRAN, H., 2012. Bank board structure and performance:
Evidence for large bank holding companies. Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 21, pp. 243-267
ADDA, E. and CONSULTING, L., 2006. EXPLORING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR BUSINESS AND ETHICAL PRACTICES IN GHANA. Journal of Legal, Ethical
and Regulatory Issues, 9(2), pp. 69-80
AGGARWAL, R., EREL, I., STULZ, R.M. and WILLIAMSON, R., 2007. Do US
firms have the best corporate governance? A cross-country examination of
the relation between corporate governance and shareholder wealth. NBER
Working Paper.
AGRAWAL, A. and KNOEBER, C.R., 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms
to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(03), pp. 377-397
AGUILERA, R.V. and CUERVO- CAZURRA, A., 2009. Codes of good
governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), pp.
376-387
AMMANN, M., OESCH, D. and SCHMID, M.M., 2011. Corporate governance
and firm value: International evidence. Journal of Empirical Finance, 18(1),
pp. 36-55
368
ARCOT, S.R. and BRUNO, V., 2007. One size does not fit all, after all:
Evidence from corporate governance. [Online] Available from:
http://old.nhh.no/for/seminars/finance/2007-spring/170107.pdf [Accessed
4th March 2009]
ARMSTRONG, P., SEGAL, N. and DAVIS, B., 2006. Corporate Governance in
South Africa’, in Mallin, C. A. (Ed.), Handbook on International Corporate
Governance.
ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, 2003. Principles of good corporate
governance and best practice recommendations. Australian Stock Exchange
Limited.
BALASUBRAMANIAN, N., BLACK, B.S. and KHANNA, V., 2010. The Relation
between Firm-Level Corporate Governance and Market Value: a Study of
India. Emerging Markets Review, 11, pp. 319-340
BALIGA, B.R., MOYER, R.C. and RAO, R.S., 1996. CEO duality and firm
performance: what's the fuss? Strategic Management Journal, 17(1), pp. 41-
53
BASSEN, A., PRIGGE, S. and ZÖLLNER, C., 2008. Behind broad corporate
governance aggregates: A first look at single provisions of the German
corporate governance code. [Online] Available from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965355 [Accessed 12th
December 2009]
BAUER, G., GUNSTER, N. and OTTEN, R., 2004. Empirical Evidence on
Corporate Governance in Europe: The Effect on Stock Returns, Firm Value
and Performance'. Journal of Asset Management, 5(2), pp. 91-104
BAUER, R., EICHHOLTZ, P. and KOK, N., 2010. Corporate governance and
performance: The REIT effect. Real Estate Economics, 38(1), pp. 1-29
BEASLEY, M.S., 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the
board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting
Review, pp. 443-465
BEASLEY, M.S., CARCELLO, J.V., HERMANSON, D.R. and LAPIDES, P.D.,
2000. Fraudulent financial reporting: Consideration of industry traits and
corporate governance mechanisms. Accounting Horizons, 14(4), pp. 441-454
BEBCHUK, L., COHEN, A. and FERRELL, A., 2009. What matters in corporate
governance? Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), pp. 783
369
BEINER, S., DROBETZ, W., SCHMID, M.M. and ZIMMERMANN, H., 2006. An
integrated framework of corporate governance and firm valuation. European
Financial Management, 12(2), pp. 249-283
BENNEDSEN, M., KONGSTED, H.C. and NIELSEN, K.M., 2008. The causal
effect of board size in the performance of small and medium-sized firms.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(6), pp. 1098-1109
BENNETT, R. and ROBSON, P., 2004. The role of boards of directors in small
and medium-sized firms. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise
Development, 11(1), pp. 95-113
BENSTON, G.J., 1985. The self-serving management hypothesis: Some
evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1), pp. 67-84
BERLE, A.A. and MEANS, G.C., 1932. The modern corporation and private
property. Transaction Pub.
BHAGAT, S. and BOLTON, B., 2008. Corporate governance and firm
performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(3), pp. 257-273
BHAGAT, S. and BOLTON, B.J., 2009. Sarbanes-Oxley, governance and
performance. [Online] Available from:
http://leeds.colorado.edu/asset/burridge/sarbanesoxleygovernanceperforma
nce.pdf; [Accessed 3rd October 2010]
BLACK, B.S., JANG, H. and KIM, W., 2006b. Does corporate governance
predict firms' market values? Evidence from Korea. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, 22(2), pp.366-413
BLACK, B. and KIM, W., 2012. The effect of board structure on firm value: A
multiple identification strategies approach using Korean data. Journal of
Financial Economics, 104(1), pp. 203-226
BLACK, B.S., KIM, W., JANG, H. and PARK K.S., 2010. How corporate
governance affects firm value: evidence on channels from Korea. [Online]
Available from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1365945 [Accessed 3rd
May 2011]
BLACK, B.S., LOVE, I. and RACHINSKY, A., 2006a. Corporate governance
indices and firms' market values: Time series evidence from Russia.
Emerging Markets Review, 7(4), pp. 361-379
BLACK, B., 2001. The corporate governance behavior and market value of
Russian firms. Emerging Markets Review, 2(2), pp. 89-108
370
BLAIR, M.M., 1995. Ownership and control: Rethinking corporate governance
for the twenty-first century. Brookings Institution Press.
BOATRIGHT, J.R., 1999. Ethics in finance. Blackwell Pub.
BOKPIN, G.A. and ISSHAQ, Z., 2009. Corporate governance, disclosure and
foreign share ownership on the Ghana Stock Exchange. Managerial Auditing
Journal, 24(7), pp. 688-703
BÖRSCH- SUPAN, A. and KÖKE, J., 2002. An applied econometricians' view
of empirical corporate governance studies. German Economic Review, 3(3),
pp. 295-326
BOYD, B.K., 1995. CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model.
Strategic Management Journal, 16(4), pp. 301-312
BOYD, B.K., HOWARD, M. and CARROLL, W.O., 1997. CEO duality and firm
performance: an international comparison. Strategy, Structure and Style.
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 23–39
BOZEC, R., 2005. Boards of directors, market discipline and firm
performance. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9-10), pp. 1921-
1960
BOZEC, R., DIA, M. and BOZEC, Y., 2010. Governance–Performance
Relationship: A Re- examination Using Technical Efficiency Measures. British
Journal of Management, 21(3), pp. 684-700
BREUSCH, T.S. and PAGAN, A.R., 1980. The Lagrange multiplier test and its
applications to model specification in econometrics. The Review of Economic
Studies, 47(1), pp. 239-253
BRICKLEY, J.A., COLES, J.L. and JARRELL, G., 1997. Leadership structure:
Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board1. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 3(3), pp. 189-220
BROWN, L.D. and CAYLOR, M.L., 2006. Corporate governance and firm
valuation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25(4), pp. 409-434
BRUNO, V. and CLAESSENS, S., 2010. Corporate Governance and
Regulation: can there be too much of a good thing? Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 19, pp. 461-482
BUCKLAND, R., 2001. UK IPO Board Structures and Post-issue Performance.
Working Paper, University of Aberdeen.
371
CADBURY COMMITTEE, 1992. Report of the Committee on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance, London, Gee Publishing.
CARCELLO, J.V., HERMANSON, D.R. and NEAL, T.L., 2002. Disclosures in
Audit Committee Charters and Reports. Accounting Horizons, 16(4), pp. 291-
305
CARCELLO, J.V., HERMANSON, D.R. and NEAL, T.L., RILEY Jr, R.D., 2002.
Board characteristics and audit fees. Contemporary Accounting Research,
19(3), pp. 365-384
CARCELLO, J.V. and NEAL, T.L., 2000. Audit committee composition and
auditor reporting. The Accounting Review, 75(4), pp. 453-467
CBI/TOUCHE ROSS, 1995. Survey on corporate governance. London: Touche
Ross.
CHEN, A., KAO, L., TSAO, M. and WU, C., 2007. Building a corporate
governance index from the perspectives of ownership and leadership for
firms in Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2), pp.
251-261
CHEN, C.W., LIN, J.B. and YI, B., 2008. CEO duality and firm performance–
an endogenous issue. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(1), pp. 58-65
CHEN, K.C.W., CHEN, Z. and WEI, K., 2009. Legal protection of investors,
corporate governance, and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 15(3), pp. 273-289
CHENG, S., 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance.
Journal of Financial Economics, 87(1), pp. 157-176
CHENG, S., EVANS, J.H. and NAGARAJAN, N.J., 2008. Board size and firm
performance: the moderating effects of the market for corporate control.
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 31(2), pp. 121-145
CHENHALL, R.H. and MOERS, F., 2007. Endogeneity: A reply to two different
perspectives. European accounting review, 16(1), pp. 217-221
CHEUNG, Y.L, JIANG, P., LIMPAPHAYOM, P. and LU, T., 2010. Corporate
governance in China: a step forward. European Financial Management,
16(1), pp. 94-123
CHEUNG, Y.L, THOMAS, C.J., LIMPAPHAYOM, P. and ZHOU, L., 2007. Do
investors really value corporate governance? Evidence from the Hong Kong
market. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 18(2),
pp. 86-122
372
CHIDAMBARAN, N.K., PALIA, D. and ZHENG, Y., 2006. Does better corporate
governance'cause'better firm performance? Unpublished working paper.
[Online] Available from:
http://www.isb.edu/ISBWEB/ISBCMS/File/DoesBetterCorporateGovernance.p
df [Accessed on 10th January 2011]
CHO, D.S. and KIM, J., 2007. Outside directors, ownership structure and firm
profitability in Korea. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2),
pp. 239-250
CHOI, S.H., FRYE, M.B. and YANG, M., 2008. Shareholder rights and the
market reaction to Sarbanes-Oxley. The Quarterly Review of Economics and
Finance, 48(4), pp. 756-771
CLACHER, I., DORIYE, E.J. and HILLIER, D., 2008. Does corporate
governance matter? New evidence from the United Kingdom. [Online]
Available from: http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Turin/Papers/cdh011208.pdf
[Accessed 3rd June 2010]
COCHRAN, P.L. and WOOD, R.A., 1984. Corporate social responsibility and
financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 27, pp. 42-56
COLES, J.L., DANIEL, N.D. and NAVEEN, L., 2008. Boards: Does one size fit
all. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), pp. 329-356
COLES, J.W., MCWILLIAMS, V.B. and SEN, N., 2001. An examination of the
relationship of governance mechanisms to performance. Journal of
Management, 27(1), pp. 23-28
COMBINED CODE, 1998. Corporate Governance, The London Stock Exchange
Limited, London: Gee & Co.ltd.
COMBINED CODE, 2003. The combined code on corporate governance.
London: Financial Reporting Council.
COMBINED CODE, 2006. The combined code on corporate governance.
Financial Reporting Council.
COMBINED CODE, 2008. The combined code on corporate governance.
Financial Reporting Council.
COMMONWEALTH ASSOCIATION FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. 1999.
Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth: Towards global
competitiveness and economic accountability. Marlborough, New Zealand:
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance.
373
CONYON, M.J., 1994. Corporate governance changes in UK companies
between 1988 and 1993. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
2(2), pp. 87-100
CONYON, M.J. and NICOLITSAS, D., 1998. Does the market for top
executives work? CEO pay and turnover in small UK companies. Small
Business Economics, 11(2), pp. 145-154
CONYON, M.J. and PECK, S.I., 1998a. Board size and corporate performance:
evidence from European countries. The European Journal of Finance, 4(3),
pp. 291-304
CONYON, M.J. and PECK, S.I., 1998b. BOARD CONTROL, REMUNERATION
COMMITTEES, AND TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION. Academy of
Management Journal, 41(2), pp. 146-157
CORE, J.E., 2001. A review of the empirical disclosure literature: discussion.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1), pp. 441-456
CORE, J.E., GUAY, W.R. and RUSTICUS, T.O., 2006. Does weak governance
cause weak stock returns? An examination of firm operating performance and
investors' expectations. The Journal of Finance, 61(2), pp. 655-687
COSH, A., GUEST, P. and HUGHES, A., 2008. 10. UK corporate governance
and takeover performance. The Economics of Corporate Governance and
Mergers, pp. 226-265
COSH, A. and HUGHES, A., 1997a. The Changing Anatomy of Corporate
Control and the Market for Executives in the United Kingdom. Journal of Law
and Society, pp. 104-123
COSH, A. and HUGHES, A., 1997b. Executive remuneration, executive
dismissal and institutional shareholdings. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 15(4), pp. 469-492
COUGHLAN, A.T. and SCHMIDT, R.M., 1985. Executive compensation,
management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1), pp. 43-66
CREMERS, K.J. and NAIR, V.B., 2005. Governance mechanisms and equity
prices. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), pp. 2859-2894
374
CUI, T.Q., EVANS, E., WRIGHT, S. and CROWE, S., 2008. Have the
objectives of the ASX recommendations on good corporate governance been
achieved? [Online] Working Paper, Macquarie University. Available from:
http://www.newcastle.edu.au/Resources/Faculties/Faculty%20of%20Busines
s%20and%20Law/Seminars/Business%20Seminar%20Series%202007/BusS
eminarPaper18092007.pdf [Accessed 15th February 2010]
DAHYA, J., LONIE, A.A. and POWER, D.M., 1996. The case for separating the
roles of chairman and CEO: an analysis of stock market and accounting data.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 4(2), pp. 71-77
DAHYA, J., MCCONNELL, J. and TRAVLOS, N.G., 2002. The Cadbury
Committee, Corporate Performance and Management Turnover, Journal of
Finance, 57(1), pp. 461-483
DAHYA, J. and MCCONNELL, J.J., 2009. Board composition, corporate
performance, and the Cadbury Committee recommendation. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42(03), pp. 535-564
DAILY, C.M. and DALTON, D.R., 1992. The relationship between governance
structure and corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of
Business Venturing, 7(5), pp. 375-386
DAILY, C.M. and DALTON, D.R., 1993. Board of Directors Leadership and
Structure: Control and Performance Implications. Entrepreneurship: Theory
and Practice, 17(3), pp. 65-81
DAINES, R.M., GOW, I.D. and LARCKER, D.F., 2010. Rating the ratings: How
good are commercial governance ratings? Journal of Financial Economics, 98,
pp. 439-461
DALTON, D.R., DAILY, C.M., ELLSTRAND, A.E. and JOHNSON, J.L., 1998.
Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and
financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19(3), pp. 269-290
DEDMAN, E., 2002. The Cadbury Committee recommendations on corporate
governance–a review of compliance and performance impacts. International
Journal of Management Reviews, 4(4), pp. 335-352
DEMIRAG, I., SUDARSANAM, S. and WRIGHT, M., 2000. Corporate
Governance: An Overview and Research Agenda, British Accounting Review...
32, pp. 341-354
DEMIRAG, I. and TYLECOTE, A., 1992. The effects of organizational culture,
structure and market expectations on technological innovation: a hypothesis.
British Journal of Management, 3(1), pp. 7-20
375
DEY, A., ENGEL, E. and LIU, X., 2011. CEO and board chair roles: To split or
not to split? Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(5), pp. 1595-1618
DIACON, S.R. and O'SULLIVAN, N., 1995. Does corporate governance
influence performance? Some evidence from UK insurance companies.
International Review of Law and Economics, 15(4), pp. 405-424
DONALDSON, L. and DAVIS, J.H., 1991. Stewardship theory or agency
theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of
Management, 16(1), pp. 49-64
DROBETZ, W., SCHILLHOFER, A. and ZIMMERMANN, H., 2004. Corporate
governance and expected stock returns: Evidence from Germany. European
Financial Management, 10(2), pp. 267-293
DULEWICZ, V. and HERBERT, P., 2004. Does the composition and practice of
boards of directors bear any relationship to the performance of their
companies? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), pp. 263-
280
DURNEV, A. and KIM, E., 2005. To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal
environment, and valuation. The Journal of Finance, 60(3), pp. 1461-1493
EISENBERG, T., SUNDGREN, S. and WELLS, M.T., 1998. Larger board size
and decreasing firm value in small firms1. Journal of Financial Economics,
48(1), pp. 35-54
EISENHARDT, K.M., 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review.
Academy of management review, pp. 57-74
EL MEHDI, K., 2007. Empirical evidence on corporate governance and
corporate performance in Tunisia. Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 15(6), pp. 1429-1441
ELSAYED, K., 2007. Does CEO duality really affect corporate performance?
Corporate Governance: an international review, 15(6), pp. 1203-1214
EPPS, R.W. and CEREOLA, S.J., 2008. Do institutional shareholder services
(ISS) corporate governance ratings reflect a company's operating
performance? Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 19(8), pp. 1135-1148
ERTUGRUL, M. and HEGDE, S., 2009. Corporate governance ratings and firm
performance. Financial Management, 38(1), pp. 139-160
EZZAMEL, M. and WATSON, R., 2002. Pay comparability across and within
UK boards: An empirical analysis of the cash pay awards to CEOs and other
board members. Journal of Management Studies, 39(2), pp. 207-232
376
FACCIO, M. and LASFER, M.A., 1999. Managerial ownership, board structure
and firm value: The UK evidence. City University working paper. [Online]
Available from: https://webkuliah.unimedia.ac.id/ebook/files/owner-
board.pdf [Accessed on 15 October 2009]
FALEYE, O., 2007. Classified boards, firm value, and managerial
entrenchment. Journal of Financial Economics, 83(2), pp. 501-529
FAMA, E.F., 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of
Political Economy. (88), pp. 288-307
FAMA, E.F. and JENSEN, M.C., 1983a. Separation of ownership and control.
Journal of Law and Economics. 26, pp. 301-325
FAMA, E. AND JENSEN, M., 1983b. Agency Problems and Residual Claims,
Journal of Law and Economics. 26, pp. 327-349
FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, 2005. FRC Review Endorses Turnbull
Guidance.
FODOR, A. and DIAVATOPOULOS, D., 2010. Does corporate governance
matter for equity returns? [Online] Available from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546645 [Accessed
20th August 2011]
FORKER, J.J., 1992. Corporate governance and disclosure quality. Accounting
and Business Research, 22(86), pp. 111-124
FOX, C.M. and BOARDLEY, K., 1998. Cost-effectiveness of follow-up
strategies in improving the response rate of mail surveys. Industrial
Marketing Management, 27(2), pp. 127-133
GARAY, U. and GONZÁLEZ, M., 2008. Corporate governance and firm value:
The case of Venezuela. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
16(3), pp. 194-209
GHANA STOCK EXCHANGE, 1993. Ghana Stock Exchange handbook.
Marketing Dept. The Stock Exchange Library.
GHANA STOCK EXCHANGE, 2005. Fact Book: Profiles and Financials of Listed
Companies. The Stock Exchange Library.
GHANA STOCK EXCHANGE, 2010. Fact Book: Profiles and Financials of Listed
Companies. The Stock Exchange Library.
377
GHANA STOCK EXCHANGE, 1990. Guidelines and steps for listing regulation
1990 (LI 1509).
GHANA STOCK EXCHANAGE, 2006. Revised listing Rules 2006.
GHANA STOCK EXCHANAGE, 2011. A list of the Ghanaian listed firms.
[Online] Available from: www.gse.co.uk [Accessed 6th January 2011]
GHOSH, S., 2006. Do board characteristics affect corporate performance?
Firm-level evidence for India. Applied Economics Letters, 13(7), pp. 435-443
GILLAN, S.L., 2006. Recent developments in corporate governance: an
overview. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), pp. 381-402
GOODSTEIN, J., GAUTAM, K. and BOEKER, W., 2006. The effects of board
size and diversity on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3),
pp. 241-250
GOMPERS, P., ISHII, J. and METRICK, A., 2003. Corporate governance and
equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), pp. 107-155
GREENBURY COMMITTEE, 1995. Directors’ Remuneration: Report of A Study
Group. London: Gee & Co. Ltd
GREENE, W.H., 2012. Econometric analysis. 7th ed. International Edition:
Prentice hall.
GRUSZCZYNSKI, M., 2007. Corporate governance ratings and the
performance of listed companies in Poland. [Online] IDEAS. Available from:
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wse/wpaper/4.html [Accessed 15th August 2009]
GUEST, P.M., 2009. The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence
from the UK. The European Journal of Finance, 15(4), pp. 385-404
GUJARATI, D., 1995. Basic Econometrics. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
GUILLET, B.D., SEO, K., KUCUKUSTA, D. and LEE, S., 2012. CEO duality and
firm performance in the US restaurant industry: Moderating role of
restaurant type. International Journal of Hospitality Management, in press
GUO, Z. and KGA, U.K., 2012. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
of Listed Firms in Sri Lanka. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 40, pp.
664-667
GUPTA, M. and FIELDS, L.P., 2009. Board independence and corporate
governance: evidence from director resignations. Journal of Business Finance
& Accounting, 36(1 & 2), pp. 161-184
378
GUPTA, P.P., KENNEDY, D.B. and WEAVER, S.C., 2009. Corporate
Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Canadian Capital Markets.
Corporate Ownership and Control, 6(3), pp. 293-307
HAMPEL COMMITTEE, 1998. The Final Report, Committee on Corporate
Governance and Gee Professional Publishing, London.
HANIFFA, R. and HUDAIB, M., 2006. Corporate governance structure and
performance of Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting, 33(7- 8), pp. 1034-1062
HAUSMAN, J.A., 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, pp. 1251-1271
HEALY, P.M. and PALEPU, K.G., 2001. Information Asymmetry, Corporate
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure
Literature, Journal of Accounting and Economics. 31(1-3), pp. 405-440
HENRY, D., 2008. Corporate Governance Structure and the Valuation of
Australian Firms: Is There Value in Ticking the Boxes? Journal of Business
Finance & Accounting, 35(7- 8), pp. 912-942
HERMALIN, B.E. and WEISBACH, M., 2003. Board of Directors as an
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of Economic Literature.
Economic Policy Review 9, pp. 7-26.
HIGGS COMMITTEE, 2003. Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-
Executive Directors, Department of Trade and Industry, London.
HIMMELBERG, C., 2002. Measuring the real effects of corporate governance:
A note for the GCGF research meeting, April 5, 2002, Washington.
Unpublished Working Paper, Columbia University.
HO, C.A. and WILLIAMS, S.M., 2003. International comparative analysis of
the association between board structure and the efficiency of value added by
a firm from its physical capital and intellectual capital resources. The
International Journal of Accounting, 38(4), pp. 465-491
HSIAO, C., 2003. Analysis of panel data. Cambridge University Press.
HUSSEY, J. and HUSSEY, R., 1997. Business Research Methods. London:
MacMillan.
ISKANDER, M.R. and CHAMLOU, N., 2000. Corporate Governance: A
Framework for Implementation. World Bank Group, Washington DC, USA.
379
ISSHAQ, Z., BOKPIN, G.A. and ONUMAH, J.M., 2009. Corporate governance,
ownership structure, cash holdings, and firm value on the Ghana Stock
Exchange. Journal of Risk Finance, 10(5), pp. 488-499
ITTNER, C.D. and LARCKER, D.F., 2003. Coming up short on nonfinancial
performance measurement. Harvard business review, 81(11), pp. 88-95
JACKLING, B. and JOHL, S., 2009. Board structure and firm performance:
Evidence from India's top companies. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 17(4), pp. 492-509
JAVED, A.Y. and IQBAL, R., 2007. Relationship between corporate
governance indicators and firm value: A case study of Karachi Stock
Exchange. [Online] Munich Personal RePEc Archive. Available from:
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2225/1/MPRA_paper_2225.pdf [Accessed
10th August 2009]
JENKINS-FERRETT, K., 2001. Corporate governance in South Africa:
Perceptions, Practices and Priorities. KPMG.
JENSEN, M., 1993. “The Modern Industrial Revolution: Exit and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems,”. Journal of Finance, 48(3), pp. 831-880
JENSEN, M.C., 1986. Agency Costs of free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and
Takeovers, American Economic Review. 76, pp. 323-329
JENSEN, M.C. and MECKLING, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial
behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial
Economics, 3(4), pp. 305-360
JENSEN, M. and MURPHY, K., 1990. Performance pay and top management
incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225-264
JENSEN, M.C. and RUBACK, R.S., 1983. The market for corporate control:
The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1), pp. 5-50
JIRAPORN, P., SINGH, M. and LEE, C.I., 2009. Ineffective corporate
governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships. Journal
of Banking & Finance, 33(5), pp. 819-828
JOHN, K. and SENBET, L.W., 1998. Corporate governance and board
effectiveness. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(4), pp. 371-403
JOHNSTON, J., 2005. Reward design and CEO succession in the UK. Applied
Economics, 37(13), pp. 1535-1541
380
KAJOLA, S.O., 2008. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: The Case
of Nigerian Listed Firms. European Journal of Economics, Finance and
Administrative Sciences, 14, pp. 16-28
KARAMANOU, I. and VAFEAS, N., 2005. The association between corporate
boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical
analysis. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(3), pp. 453-486
KIEL, G.C. and NICHOLSON, G.J., 2003. Board composition and corporate
performance: How the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of
corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
11(3), pp. 189-205
KING REPORT, 1994. Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa,
Parklands: Institute of Directors.
KING REPORT, 2002. Revised Report on Corporate Governance for South
Africa, Parklands: Institute of Directors.
KING COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 2009. King Report on
Corporate Governance for South Africa: Executive Summary. Institute of
Directors in Southern Africa.
KLAPPER, L.F. and LOVE, I., 2004. Corporate governance, investor
protection, and performance in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 10(5), pp. 703-728
KLEIN, A., 1998. Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal
of Law and Economics, 41(1), pp. 275-303
KLEIN, A., 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and
earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), pp. 375-
400
KLEIN, P., SHAPIRO, D. and YOUNG, J., 2005. Corporate governance, family
ownership and firm value: the Canadian evidence. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 13(6), pp. 769-784
KLEVMARKEN, N.A., 1989. Introduction. European Economic Review, 33(2-
3), pp. 523-529
KOUWENBERG, R., 2006. Does voluntary corporate governance code
adoption increase firm value in emerging markets? Evidence from Thailand.
[Online] Mahidol University Working Paper Series. Available from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958580 [Accessed 10th
January 2009]
381
KRAVCHENKO, N. and YUSUPOVA, A., 2005. Corporate governance and firms
valuations: Case of Russia. [Online] Social Science Research Network.
Available from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=673182
[Accessed 30th January 2009]
KYEREBOAH-COLEMAN, A. and AMIDU, M., 2008. The Link Between Small
Business Governance and Performance: The Case of the Ghanaian SME
Sector. Journal of African Business, 9(1), pp. 121-143
KYEREBOAH-COLEMAN, A. and BIEKPE, N., 2006a. The relationship between
board size, board composition, CEO duality and firm performance: experience
from Ghana. Corporate Ownership and Control, 4(2), pp. 114-122
KYEREBOAH-COLEMAN, A. and BIEKPE, N., 2006b. DO BOARDS AND CEOs
MATTER FOR BANK PERFORMANCE? A comparative analysis of banks in
Ghana. Journal of Corporate Ownership and Control, 4(1), pp. 119–126
KYEREBOAH-COLEMAN, A. and OSEI, K.A., 2008. Outreach and profitability
of microfinance institutions: the role of governance. Journal of Economic
Studies, 35(3), pp. 236-248
LABELLE, R., 2002. The statement of corporate governance practices (SCGP),
a voluntary disclosure and corporate governance perspective. [Online]
Available from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=317519
[Accessed 12th July 2010]
LAING, D. and WEIR, C.M., 1999. Governance structures, size and corporate
performance in UK firms. Management Decision, 37(5), pp. 457-464
LAM, T.Y. and LEE, S.K., 2012. Family ownership, board committees and firm
performance: evidence from Hong Kong. Corporate Governance, 12(3), pp.
299-316
LARCKER, D.F., 2003. Discussion of “are executive stock options associated
with future earnings?”. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1-3), pp.
91-103
LARCKER, D.F., RICHARDSON, S.A. and TUNA, A.I., 2007. Corporate
governance, accounting outcomes, and organizational performance.
Accounting Review, 82(4), pp. 963-1008
LARCKER, D.F. and RUSTICUS, T.O., 2007. Endogeneity and empirical
accounting research. European Accounting Review, 16(1), pp. 207-215
LARCKER, D.F. and RUSTICUS, T.O., 2010. On the use of instrumental
variables in accounting research. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
49(3), pp. 186-205
382
LASFER, M.A., 2004. On the monitoring role of the board of directors: The
case of the adoption of Cadbury recommendations in the UK. Advances in
Financial Economics, 9, pp. 287-326
LEAL, R. and CARVALHAL DA SILVA, A., 2005. Corporate governance and
value in Brazil (and in Chile). [Online] Social Science Research Network.
Available from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=726261
[Accessed 2nd February 2009]
LEV, B. and SUNDER, S., 1979. Methodological issues in the use of financial
ratios. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1(3), pp. 187-210
LINCK, J.S., NETTER, J.M. and YANG, T., 2009. The effects and unintended
consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the supply and demand for
directors. Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), pp. 3287-3328
LIPTON, M. and LORSCH, J.W., 1992. A modest proposal for improved
corporate governance. Business Lawyer, 48, pp. 59-77
MAIN, B.G. and JOHNSTON, J., 1993. Remuneration committees and
corporate governance. Accounting and Business Research, 23(91A), pp. 351-
362
MAK, Y.T. and KUSNADI, Y., 2005. Size really matters: Further evidence on
the negative relationship between board size and firm value. Pacific-Basin
Finance Journal, 13(3), pp. 301-318
MALHERBE, S. and SEGAL, N., 2003. South Africa: After Apartheid in Oman,
C. P. (Ed.), corporate governance in development: the experiences of Brazil,
Chile, India, and South Africa. OECD.
MALLIN, C.A., 2004. Corporate Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MALLIN, C.A., 2007. Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press.
MANGENA, M., TAURINGANA, V. and CHAMISA, E., 2012. Corporate Boards,
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in an Environment of Severe
Political and Economic Crisis. British Journal of Management, 23, pp. 23-41
MARRIS, R.L., 1964. The economic theory of managerial capitalism.
Macmillan London.
MASHAYEKHI, B. and BAZAZ, M.S., 2008. Corporate governance and firm
performance in Iran. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 4(2),
pp. 156-172
383
MCKNIGHT, P.J. and WEIR, C., 2009. Agency costs, corporate governance
mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies:
A panel data analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,
49(2), pp. 139-158
METRICK, A. AND ISHII, J., 2002. Firm Level Corporate governance, Paper
presented at Global Corporate Governance Forum Research Network Meeting,
Washington, D.C.
MILLS, T., 1999. The econometric modeling of financial time series. 2nd ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MIYAJIMA, H., 2005. The performance effects and determinants of corporate
governance reform in Japan. Corporate governance in Japan: institutional
change and organizational diversity, Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, Hideaki
Miyajima, eds., June 2006.
MONSEN JR, R.J. and DOWNS, A., 1965. A theory of large managerial firms.
The Journal of Political Economy, pp. 221-236
MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R.W., 1988. Management ownership
and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics,
20, pp. 293-315
MOREY, M., GOTTESMAN, A., BAKER, E. and GODRIDGE, B., 2009. Does
better corporate governance result in higher valuations in emerging markets?
Another examination using a new data set. Journal of Banking & Finance,
33(2), pp. 254-262
MOULTON, B.R., 1986. Random group effects and the precision of regression
estimates. Journal of Econometrics, 32(3), pp. 385-397
MOULTON, B.R., 1987. Diagnostics for group effects in regression analysis.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 5, pp. 275-282
MOXEY, P., TRUST, C.A.E. and ASSOCIATION OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED
ACCOUNTANTS, 2004. Corporate governance and wealth creation. Certified
Accountants Educational Trust.
MURPHY, K.J., 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration:
An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1), pp. 11-42
NOR, F.M., SAID, R.M. and REDZUAN, H., 1999. Structure of ownership and
corporate financial performance: A Malaysian case. Malaysian Management
Review, (December), pp. 44-48
384
NTIM, C.G., 2009. Internal corporate governance structures and firm
financial performance: evidence from South African listed firms. [Online]
Doctor of Philosophy thesis, University of Glasgow. Available from:
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1282/01/2009ntimphd.pdf; [Accessed 24th 01/2011]
O’CONNELL, V. and CRAMER, N., 2010. The relationship between firm
performance and board characteristics in Ireland. European Management
Journal, 28(5), pp. 387-399
OCRAN, F., 2001. Current State of Corporate Governance in Ghana. West
Africa Regional Conference on Corporate Governance. 28-30 January 2001.
Accra, Ghana: Institute on Directors-Ghana.
OECD, 1999. The organisation for economic co-operation principles of
corporate governance. [Online] Available from:
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/principles_en.pdf [Accessed 10th
June 2008]
OECD., 2004. The OECD principles of corporate governance. [Online]
Available from: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf
[Accessed 20th October 2008]
OPPENHEIM, A., Questionnaire design, interviewing and attitude
measurement. 1992. Pinter, London.
O'SULLIVAN, N. and DIACON, S.R., 2003. Board composition and
performance in life insurance companies. British Journal of Management,
14(2), pp. 115-129
O'SULLIVAN, N. and WONG, P., 1999. Board composition, ownership
structure and hostile takeovers: Some UK evidence. Accounting and Business
Research, 29(2), pp. 139-155
PADGETT, C. and SHABBIR, A., 2008. The UK Code of Corporate
Governance: Link Between Compliance and Firm Performance. Fourth
European conference on management, leadership and governance. Academic
Conferences Limited.
PEARCE II, J.A. and ZAHRA, S.A., 1992. Board composition from a strategic
contingency perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 29(4), pp. 411-438
PENG, M.W., ZHANG, S. and LI, X., 2007. CEO duality and firm performance
during china's institutional transitions. Management and Organization
Review, 3(2), pp. 205-225
PI, L. and TIMME, S.G., 1993. Corporate control and bank efficiency. Journal
of Banking & Finance, 17(2-3), pp. 515-530
385
PONNU, C.H. and RAMTHANDIN, S., 2008. Governance and Performance:
Publicly Listed Companies in Malaysia. Journal of Business Systems,
Governance and Ethics, 3(1), pp. 35-53
BUSINESS and FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan 21-27 2002 cited in PREMPEH, H.K.,
2002. Reforming Corporate Governance in Ghana-Part 1: The Private Sector.
CDD Briefing Paper.
PRICE, R., ROMÁN, F.J. and ROUNTREE, B., 2011. The impact of governance
reform on performance and transparency. Journal of Financial Economics,
99(1), pp. 76-96
RAJAN, R.G. and ZINGALES, L., 1995. What do we know about capital
structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance, 5, pp.
1421-1460
RAPPAPORT, A., 1990. The staying power of the public corporation. Harvard
business review, 68(1), pp. 96-104
RAYTON, B.A. and CHENG, S., 2004. Corporate Governance in the United
Kingdom: Changes to the Regulatory Template and Company Practice from
1998-2002. Code of Good Governance Around the World, pp. 383-411
RECHNER, P.L. and DALTON, D.R., 1991. CEO duality and organizational
performance: A longitudinal analysis, Strategic Management Journal. (2), pp.
155-160
REED, R.O., BUCHMAN, T. and WOBBEKIND, R., 2006. 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
Act: Privately-Held Companies Implementation Issues. JOURNAL OF APPLIED
BUSINESS RESEARCH, 22(3), pp. 25-32
RENDERS, A., GAEREMYNCK, A. and SERCU, P., 2010.
Corporate- Governance Ratings and Company Performance: A
Cross- European Study. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
18(2), pp. 87-106
REPUBLIC OF GHANA COMPANIES CODE, 1963. Ghana, Companies Code (Act
179).
ROBERTS, M. and WHITED, T., 2011. Endogeneity in empirical corporate
finance. [Online] Social Science Research Network. Available from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1748604 [Accessed
30th December 2011]
ROSS, S.A., 1973. The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem.
The American Economic Review, 63(2), pp. 134-139
386
SANDA, A.U., MIKAILU, A.S. and GARBA, T., 2010. Corporate governance
mechanisms and firms' financial performance in Nigeria. Afro-Asian Journal of
Finance and Accounting, 2(1), pp. 22-39
Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002 Title III - Corporate Responsibility Self -
Assessment 2002.
SAUNDERS, M., LEWIS, P. and THORNHILL, A., 2009. Research methods for
business students. Prentice Hall.
SAXENA, A., 2009. Role of corporate governance in corporate performance: A
simple correlation analysis. [Online] Initiative. Available from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478870 [Accessed
20th June 2011]
Securities and Exchange Regulations 2003, LI 1728.
Securities Industry (Amendment) Act 2000 (Act 590). .
SECURITY AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION GHANA., 2003. Corporate
Governance: Code of Best Practices, Ghana, Accra.
SEKARAN, U., 2006. Research methods for business: A skill building
approach. Wiley-India.
SHABBIR, A., 2008. To comply or not to comply: Evidence on changes and
factors associated with the changes in compliance with the UK code of
corporate governance. [Online] Cranfield University School of Management.
Available from: https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/2482
[Accessed 5th January 2010]
SHLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R.W., 1986. Large shareholders and corporate
control. The Journal of Political Economy, pp. 461-488
SHI, C., 2005. International Corporate Governance Developments: The Path
for China. Australian Journal of Asian Law, 71(1), pp. 60-94
SHORT, H. and KEASEY, K., 1999. Managerial ownership and the
performance of firms: evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance,
5(1), pp. 79-101
SHORT, H., Keasey, K., Hull, A. and Wright, M., 1998. Corporate
Governance, Accountability and Enterprise. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 6(3), pp. 151-165
SMITH COMMITTEE, 2003. Report and Proposed Guidance on Audit
Committees, The Financial Reporting Council, London.
387
SONNENFELD, J.A., 2002. What makes great boards great? Harvard business
review, 80(9), pp. 106-113
SPELLMAN, G.K. and WATSON, R., 2009. Corporate governance ratings and
corporate performance: An analysis of governance metrics international
(GMI) ratings of US firms, 2003 to 2008. [Online] Available from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392313 [Accessed 5th
September 2010]
STERNBERG, E., 1997. The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, Corporate
Governance: An International Review. 5(1), pp. 3-10
SUN, J. and CAHAN, S., 2009. The effect of compensation committee quality
on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting
performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(2), pp.
193-207
TOUDAS, K. and KARATHANASSIS, G., 2007. Corporate governance and firm
performance: Results from Greek firms. [Online] Social Science Research
Network. Available from: http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/6414/1/Corporate_Governance_final_20-12-07.pdf [Accessed
20th September 2009]
TSAMENYI, M., ENNINFUL-ADU, E. and ONUMAH, J., 2007. Disclosure and
corporate governance in developing countries: evidence from Ghana.
Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(3), pp. 319-334
TURNBULL COMMITTEE, 1999. Report on Internal Control Guidance for
Directors on the Combined Code, The institute of Chartered Accountants in
England & Wales, London.
UJUNWA, A., 2012. Board Characteristics and the Financial Performance of
Nigerian Quoted Firms. Corporate Governance, 12(5), pp. 656-674
UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, 2010. The UK corporate governance
code. London, Financial Reporting Council.
VEFEAS, N., 1999a. Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal
of Financial Economics, 53(1), pp. 113-142
VEFEAS, N., 1999b. The nature of board nominating committees and their
role in corporate governance. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,
26(1-2), pp. 199-225
VAFEAS, N. and THEODOROU, E., 1998. The relationship between board
structure and firm performance in the UK. The British Accounting Review,
30(4), pp. 383-407
388
WALLACE, W.A., 1987. The economic role of the audit in free and regulated
markets: A Review. Research in Accounting Regulation, 1, pp. 7-34
WALLACE, R.S.O. and MELLOR, C., 1988. Nonresponse bias in mail
accounting surveys: a pedagogical note. The British Accounting Review,
20(2), pp. 131-139
WATTS, R.L. and ZIMMERMAN, J.L., 1983. Agency problems, auditing, and
the theory of the firm: Some evidence. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(3),
pp. 613-633
WEIR, C. and LAING, D., 2000. The performance-governance relationship:
The effects of Cadbury compliance on UK quoted companies. Journal of
Management and Governance, 4(4), pp. 265-281
WEIR, C., LAING, D. and MCKNIGHT, P.J., 2002. Internal and external
governance mechanisms: their impact on the performance of large UK public
companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 29(5- 6), pp. 579-611
WESTPHAL, J.D. and ZAJAC, E.J., 1995. Who shall govern? CEO/board
power, demographic similarity, and new director selection. Administrative
Science Quarterly, pp. 60-83
WHITTINGTON, G., 1993. Corporate governance and the regulation of
financial reporting. Accounting and Business Research, pp. 311-311
WILD, J.J., 1994. Managerial accountability to shareholders: Audit
committees and the explanatory power of earnings for returns. The British
Accounting Review, 26(4), pp. 353-374
WILLIAMSON, O.E., 1964. The economics of discretionary behavior:
Managerial objectives in a theory of the firm.
WINTOKI, M.B., LINCK, J.S. and NETTER, J.M., 2012. Endogeneity and the
dynamics of internal corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics,
105, pp. 581-606
WOOLDRIDGE, J.M., 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel
data. The MIT press.
WOOLDRIDGE, J.M., 2003. Introductory econometrics: A modern approach.
South-Western Pub.
WOOLDRIDGE, J.M., 2006. Introductory econometrics: A modern approach.
South-Western Pub.
389
WOOLDRIDGE, J.M., 2009. Introductory econometrics: A modern approach.
South-Western Pub.
WORLD BANK, 2005. Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes
(ROSC). Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Republic of Ghana. May
2005.
WORLD BANK, 2009. List of developing countries. [Online] Available from:
http://www.compstat2012.org/developingCountries.pdf [Accessed on 10th
November 2010]
WORRELL, D.L., NEMEC, C. and DAVIDSON III, W.N., 1997. One hat too
many: key executive plurality and shareholder wealth. Strategic Management
Journal, 18(6), pp. 499-507
YAN-LEUNG, C., JIANG, P., LIMPAPHAYOM, P. and LU, T., 2008. Does
corporate governance matter in China? China Economic Review, 19(3), pp.
460-479
YERMACK, D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small
board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), pp. 185-211
ZHEKA, V., 2006. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Ukraine.
Herriot-Watt University Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation
Discussion Paper.
390
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: The six dimensions and the operationalisation of the Ghanaian Corporate Governance Index
(GCGI)
Board composition
No. Index questions applied in Ghana Measurement Verification
1
2
3
4
5
6
Are the Chairman of the board and the CEO
post separated?
Does the company board meet at least six
times a year?
Is the board size between eight and sixteen
members as recommended by the Ghanaian
Code?
Does the proportion of the independent NEDs
represent at least one third but not less than
two of the total members of the board?
Does the company have a Finance Director
charged with the responsibility for the finance
function?
Does the company have a Secretary charged
with the responsibility for the effective
function of the board?
A binary number of 1 if the role of the
Chairman and the CEO of the company is
separated, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company
board meets at least six times a year, 0
otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company has
the size of the board to be between eight
and sixteen, 0 otherwise.
A binary number of 1 if the company has
on its board at least one third but not less
than two as independent NEDs, 0
otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company has a
Finance Director in place, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company has
in place a company secretary, 0 otherwise
Verified if the name of the Chairman and the
CEO were not the same at the end of each
financial year.
Verified the number of board meetings from the
company’s annual report at the end of each
financial year
Verified the number from the company’s annual
report at the end of each financial year
Verified the number of independent NEDs at the
end of each financial year from the annual
report.
Verified the existence of a Finance Director from
the annual report at the end of each financial
year.
Verified the existence of a company Secretary
from the annual report at the end of each
financial year.
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Continuation: Appendix 1
Audit Committee
No. Index questions applied in Ghana Measurement Verification
1
2
3
4
5
6
Does the company have an audit
committee in place?
Is the audit committee of a company
composed of a minimum of three directors
of whom majority are independent NEDs?
Do the company audit committee members
comprise directors with adequate financial
Knowledge?
Is the chairman of the audit committee an
independent NED?
Does the company disclose in its annual
report the membership of its audit
committee for each financial year?
Does the company report on the activities
of its audit committee in the annual report
to shareholders?
A binary number of 1 if a company has
an audit committee in place, 0 otherwise.
A binary number of 1 if the company has
2/3 of its audit committee members to be
independent NEDs, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company has
the majority of its directors on the audit
committee to be financially literate, 0
otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the chairman of
the audit committee is an independent
non-executive director, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the membership
of the audit committee is disclosed in the
annual report, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company
report on the activities of its audit
committee, 0 otherwise
Verified the existence of an audit committee
from the company’s annual report at the end
of each financial year
Verified the ratio of independent NEDs on the
audit committee from the company’s annual
report at the end of each financial year
Verified the company audit committee
members background from its annual report
at the end of each financial year
Verified the name of the chairman from the
company’s annual report to confirm his/her
status at the end of each financial year
Verified the company’s audit committee
membership disclosure in its annual report at
the end of each financial year
Verified the company audit committee
activities reported in its annual report at the
end of each financial year
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Continuation: Appendix 1
Remuneration Committee
No. Index questions applied in Ghana Measurement Verification
1
2
3
4
5
6
Does the company have a remuneration
committee in place?
Is the remuneration committee of a
company composed of a majority of
independent NEDs?
Is there any disclosure of the company’s
remuneration committee membership in
the annual report?
Is the chairman of the remuneration
committee an independent non-executive
director?
Does the company provide information in
its annual report on the aggregate amount
of compensation paid to its directors?
Do directors receive part of their
remuneration in stock or stock option and
disclose in the annual report?
A binary number of 1 if the company
has a remuneration committee in place,
0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company
has a majority of its remuneration
committee members to be independent
NEDs, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the membership
of the remuneration committee is
disclosed in the company’s annual
report, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the chairman of
the remuneration committee is an
independent non-executive director, 0
otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the aggregate
amount of compensation paid to
directors is disclosed in the company’s
annual report, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company’s
directors receive as part of their
remuneration stock or stock option, 0
otherwise
Verified the existence of a remuneration
committee from the company’s annual report
at the end of each financial year
Verified the composition of the company’s
remuneration committee from its annual report
at the end of each financial year
Verified the company’s remuneration
committee membership disclosure in its annual
report at the end of each financial year
Verified the name of the chairman from the
company’s annual report to confirm his/her
status at the end of each financial year
Verified from the company’s annual report the
aggregate amount paid as compensation to
directors at the end of each financial year
Verified from the company’s annual report the
remuneration paid in the form of stock or stock
option at the end of each financial year
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Continuation: Appendix 1
Shareholder Rights
No. Index questions applied in Ghana Measurement Verification
1
2
3
4
5
6
Does the company give adequate notice
and information to its shareholders prior to
its AGM?
Does the company allow shareholders to
approve its directors’ re-election at the
AGM?
Does the company facilitate voting by
proxy to appoint directors at the AGM?
Are there any opportunities given to the
company’s shareholders to vote by mail?
Does the company provide information in
its annual report related party transactions
to its shareholders?
Does the company disclose its directors
share ownership in its annual report to
shareholders?
A binary number of 1 if the company
gives notice to its shareholders not less
than 21 days prior to the AGM, 0
otherwise
A binary number of 1 if directors submit
themselves for re-election at least every
three years, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company
allows voting by proxy, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company
allows voting by mail, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company
discloses a related party transactions, 0
otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company
discloses its directors share ownership, 0
otherwise
Verified the date notice was sent to the
shareholders by a company from its annual
report at the end of each financial year
Verified from the company’s annual report if
directors submitted themselves for re-
election at the end of each financial year
Verified from the company’s annual report a
letter of invitation to shareholders at the end
of each financial year
Verified a statement that allows voting by
mail from the company’s annual report at
the end of each financial year
Verified from the company’s annual report
for all related party transactions at the end
of each financial year
Verified the company directors share
ownership from its annual report at the end
of each financial year
394
Continuation: Appendix 1
Financial Affairs and Auditing
No. Index questions applied in Ghana Measurement Verification
1
2
3
4
5
6
Does the company produce its annual
report by the legally required date?
Does the company use one of the
recognised audit firms by the Institute of
Chartered Accountants Ghana?
Does the company provide information in
its annual report the existence of
appropriate systems to monitor risk and
financial governance measures?
Does the company provide a balanced and
understandable assessment of its financial
and operating results in its annual report?
Does the company use Ghana National
Accounting Standards for the preparation of
its financial statements?
Does the company disclose in its annual
report the fees paid to its external auditors
for audit and non-audit related work?
A binary number of 1 if the company
produces its annual report at 31st
December each year, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company has
a qualified external auditor in place, 0
otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company has
provided information on its systems to
manage risk, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company has
provided a balanced and understandable
assessment of its financial and operating
results, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company
uses Ghana National Accounting
Standards to prepare its financial
statements, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if the company
discloses fees paid to external auditors for
audit and non-audit related work, 0
otherwise
Verified the publication date of the
company’s annual report at the end of each
financial year
Verified the auditors report from the
company’s annual report at the end of each
financial year to confirm their status
Verified from the company’s annual report a
statement of the existence of appropriate
systems to manage at the end of each
financial year
Verified from the company’s annual report
an assessment made at the end of each
financial year
Verified from the auditors report of the
company in its annual report the Accounting
Standards used at the end of each financial
year
Verified the fees paid to the external
auditors from the company’s annual report
at the end of each financial year
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Continuation: Appendix 1
Disclosure
No. Index questions applied in Ghana Measurement Verification
1
2
3
4
5
6
Does the company annual report include
information on its current and future
prospects together with foreseeable
material risk factors?
Does the company disclose in its annual
report a statement of responsibility of the
preparation of its financial statements?
Does the company produce a statement as
to the adequacy of internal control in its
annual report?
Does the company disclose in its annual
report a statement as to the compliance
with the law?
Does the company disclose in its annual
report a statement of compliance with
corporate governance?
Does the company produce information on
the degree of being a going concern in its
annual report for each financial year?
A binary number of 1 if the company
provides information on its current and
future prospects in its annual report, 0
otherwise
A binary number of 1 if a statement of
directors responsibility of the preparation
of the financial statements is disclosed by
the company
A binary number of 1 if a statement of
the adequacy of internal control is
disclosed by the company, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if a statement of
compliance with the law is disclosed by
the company, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if a statement of
compliance with corporate governance is
disclosed by the company, 0 otherwise
A binary number of 1 if a statement of
going concern is disclosed by the
company, 0 otherwise
Verified the company’s operation and
financial review from its annual report at the
end of each financial year
Verified the statement of responsibility by
the directors in the preparation of the
financial statement from the company’s
annual report at the end of each financial
year
Verified the statement of internal control
adequacy from the company’s annual report
at the end of each financial year
Verified the statement of compliance with
the law from the company’s annual report at
the end of each financial year
Verified the statement of compliance with
corporate governance from the company’s
annual report at the end of each financial
year
Verified the statement of being a going
concern from the company’s annual report
at the end of each financial year
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Appendix 2: A cover letter and the questionnaire
27th May 2011
The Chairman of the Board of Directors.
Private Mail Bag
Accra-North
Ghana
Dear Chairman
I am conducting a study into corporate governance practices of listed companies
on the Ghana Stock Exchange towards a Doctor of Philosophy Degree through the
Aberdeen Business School at the Robert Gordon University in the United
Kingdom. The research topic being investigated hopes to investigate the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The
questionnaire is based on the Ghanaian Code of best practices on corporate
governance introduced in 2003.
I sent this questionnaire to you because you are a board member of a listed
company. If you are involved in the implementation of the Ghanaian Code
provisions, you are invited to participate in this research. If you choose to
complete the questionnaire you can be assured of anonymity and confidentiality
since the results will be used only in aggregated form. The completed
questionnaires will be securely kept and only available to the researcher and the
supervisory team.
The results will be included in the thesis that will be made available at the Robert
Gordon University library and also some aspects will be disseminated in
aggregate through possible conference presentations or professional and
academic journal articles.
The questionnaire should take approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. Your
participation would be much appreciated and I look forward to receiving the
completed questionnaire by 30th June 2011. You can send the completed
questionnaire in the self-addressed (no stamp required) envelope provided and
return to my collection postal address at P.O. Box 43, Jachie-Ashanti, Ghana.
Should you have any other questions regarding the research or the questionnaire,
please do not hesitate to contact me on +44 1224 263960 or e-mail:
a.owusu@rgu.ac.uk or my Principal Supervisor, Professor Charlie Weir on
+44 1224 2638 or e-mail: c.weir@rgu.ac.uk.
Thank you very much for your participation
Yours sincerely,
..........................
Andrews Owusu
PhD Student
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QUESTIONNAIRECORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRMPERFORMANCE
Prior literature on corporate governance and firm performance in Ghana
with regard to the implementation of the Ghanaian Code introduced in
2003 is limited. As a result, please provide your opinion regarding the
implementation of the Ghanaian Code in your company and its benefit to
your firm performance.
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SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION
1 What is your role in the company?
Chairman □
MD/CEO □
Other (Please specify) □ __________
2 How long have you been in this role?
0 - 5 years □
5 – 10 years □
11years and over □
3 How familiar are you with the Ghanaian code of best practices on
corporate governance published in 2003?
Very familiar □
Familiar □
Not familiar □
4 How familiar are you with the provisions of the Ghanaian Code of
best practices on corporate governance?
Very familiar □
Familiar □
Not familiar □
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SECTION B: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree (SD) Disagree (D) Neutral (N) Agree (A) Strongly Agree (SA)
5 Your view on the application of the Ghanaian Code of best
practices on corporate governance published in 2003
SD D N A SA
a I believe that the Ghanaian Code is a benchmark for good corporate
governance practices for Ghanaian listed companies.
1 2 3 4 5
b I believe that the standard of corporate governance has improved
in my company since the introduction of the Ghanaian Code.
1 2 3 4 5
c I believe that my company is prepared to comply with further
corporate governance requirements such as the establishment of a
nomination committee if not complied presently.
1 2 3 4 5
d I believe that the current regulatory and institutional bodies are
supportive enough to help implement the Ghanaian Code provisions
1 2 3 4 5
e I believe that there is a need to review the Ghanaian Code by an
independent committee
1 2 3 4 5
SECTION C: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree (SD) Disagree (D) Neutral (N) Agree (A) Strongly Agree (SA)
6 In your view, the voluntary adoption of the following
Ghanaian Code provisions is beneficial to my firm
performance
SD D N A SA
a The separation of the roles of the MD/CEO and the Chairman of the
board of directors as recommended by the Ghanaian Code
1 2 3 4 5
b To have a total number of the board members ranging from eight
to sixteen as recommended by the Ghanaian Code
1 2 3 4 5
c To have a balance of executive and non-executive directors on the
board with at least one-third to be independent non-executive
directors as recommended by the Ghanaian Code
1 2 3 4 5
d The establishment of an audit committee as recommended by the
Ghanaian Code
1 2 3 4 5
e The establishment of a remuneration committee as recommended
by the Ghanaian Code
1 2 3 4 5
f I believe that the Ghanaian Code is only beneficial when it is fully
adopted instead of its specific provisions
1 2 3 4 5
Please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements on a scale
of 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree and, 5 is strongly agree.
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SECTION D: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
7 Would you be willing to be contacted for any follow-up questions?
Yes □
No □
8 If your answer was yes, please fill in the form below:
Company Name...............................................................................
Your Name......................................................................................
Daytime telephone number.............................................................
9 If you have any further comments about the implementation of the
Ghanaian Code of best practices on corporate governance and its
benefit to firm performance in Ghana, please indicate them here:
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THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOU PARTICIPATION
Please send the completed questionnaire in the self-addressed (no stamp
required) envelope provided and return to my Ghana address:
Andrews Owusu
P. O. Box 43
Jachie Ashanti
Ghana
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Appendix 3: The Wooldridge (2006) edogeneity test
Panel-data fixed-effects lag/forward regressions of the GCGI and the
accounting-based firm performance of ROA and ROE
Lag Models Forward Models
ROA ROE ROA ROE
Intercept 39.739 83.645 33.062 86.926
(4.01)*** (2.49)** (3.27)*** (2.37)**
GCGI 0.135 0.164 0.096 0.427
(1.36) (0.49) (0.93) (1.13)
Lag GCGI 0.162 0.660 - -
(1.68)* (2.02)** - -
GEAR -0.065 -0.602 -0.109 -0.720
(2.04)** (5.59)*** (3.31)*** (6.01)***
SIZE 0.058 1.251 0.403 2.873
(0.08) (0.52) (0.50) (0.98)
GROWTH 0.484 4.515 1.248 3.366
(0.43) (1.17) (1.01) (0.75)
AGE -1.035 -2.746 -0.949 -2.945
(3.09)*** (2.42)** (2.68)*** (2.29)**
Forward GCGI - - 0.035 0.008
- - (0.33) (0.02)
Observations 244 244 244 244
Groupa 39 39 39 39
R2 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.20
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate
governance index, GEAR is the gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity and
AGE is the firm age. The model provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top
of parenthesis.
a Unbalanced panel
***Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
*Significant at 10% level
